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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the extent to which regulation theory provides an appropriate 
theoretical framework for analysing the development of capitalist economic relations 
and activities in transitional economies. The investigation uses secondary sources 
and information gained from interviews conducted with tourism business owners 
and managers in three Vietnamese cities: Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. I find 
that through its recognition of firstly, the path dependent nature of regulatory 
processes and secondly, national and local scales as key sites in the regulation of 
global economic processes, regulation theory can be utilised in analysing the 
development of capitalist economic relations and activities in transitional 
economies. 
Nevertheless, the findings in this thesis also challenge and offer new perspectives on 
a number of the key concepts contained within regulation theory. Firstly, my 
findings illustrate how political imperatives play a much more significant role in the 
regulation of economic activity than acknowledged in regulation theory. In Vietnam, 
as a way of maintaining the state as the leading institution in the Vietnamese socio- 
economy, the central Vietnamese state has historically ceded a significant degree of 
regulatory control over economic space to the local state. As a consequence, the 
local state has traditionally constituted the key institution regulating economic 
activity in local space. In the transitional Vietnamese economy, I illustrate that 
political imperatives are continuing to inform the practices of the central state in 
regulating nascent capitalist economic processes. I find that this is chiefly being 
articulated through the informal regulatory practices and capacity of the central state 
as it seeks to mediate capitalist economic relations between supra and sub-national 
actors and institutions. This runs counter to assertions within regulation theory 
where the regulatory power of the central state is chiefly derived from its capacity to 
enact a formal framework of regulatory forms to guide global economic processes 
throughout national space. Secondly, I highlight the importance of the social 
regulation of economic activity and how in Vietnam the cultivation of social ties 
with local state officials has historically constituted an important institutional 
mechanism regulating economic activity in local spaces. In the transitional 
Vietnamese economy, I find that among private tourism business owners 
interviewed in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, the cultivation of social ties with 
local state officials has continued to play an important role in the establishment and 
running of their businesses. 
Out of these findings, I adapt the conceptual framework provided in regulation 
theory and build a more appropriate analytical framework that can be utilised in 
examining how regulatory processes and relations are evolving in regulating 
capitalist economic activity in transitional economies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Attempting to analyse the organisation and operation of nascent capitalist economic 
activities in the transitional Vietnamese economy in a sufficiently rigorous manner 
requires an approach which allows for consideration of the extraordinary 
complexities and uniqueness of Vietnam's social and political history. Regulation 
theory claims to offer just such an approach by integrating the structural dynamics of 
capitalism with the institutional forms of society through its recognition that 
capitalist economic relations and activities are embedded in distinct social, cultural 
and political institutional structures and practices (Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 339; 
Boyer, 2000: 276). 
However, in relation to analysing transitional economies such as the Vietnamese 
economy "regulation theory remains underdeveloped" (Smith & Swain, 1998: 32). 
Nevertheless, authors such as Smith and Swain contend that, as the conceptual 
framework of regulation theory builds upon the premise that regulatory processes 
which help to secure processes of capitalist accumulation evolve out of political and 
economic institutional structures and practices, "regulation theory can provide a 
strong theoretical understanding of the economic dynamics and transformation of 
ECE political economies" (Ibid: 47). 1 They argue that "what is required is the 
specification of the particular social relations structuring a political economy and 
how these relations work out, in terms of the conjunction of accumulation and 
regulation" (Ibid: 32). 
' ECE stands for Eastern and Central Europe 
Consequently, in this thesis I seek to address the above points, firstly, by examining 
the extent to which regulation theory can provide a strong theoretical basis for 
understanding and analysing the development of capitalist economic relations and 
activities in transitional economies. Secondly, addressing the need highlighted by 
Smith and Swain to investigate the role of social relations in processes of regulation, 
I examine the role of social capital in regulating nascent capitalist economic 
relations and activities in transitional economies. 
Moreover, the current research output on the regulation of capitalist economic 
activity in the contemporary Vietnamese economy is only limited. As a result, in 
addition to advancing an important theoretical enquiry, I also aim to provide the 
most substantive account produced in recent years of how the social, economic and 
political geography of Vietnam is evolving in transition. 
1.1 PRINCIPAL RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS IN THE THESIS 
The principal research aim in this thesis is: 
To examine the extent to which regulation theory can provide a 
strong theoretical basis for understanding and analysing the 
development of capitalist economic relations and activities in 
transitional economies. 
This aim is explored by addressing the following five research questions: 
2 
1. To what extent does regulation theor3, provide a useful 
conceptual framework with which to examine how nascent 
capitalist economic processes are being regulated in transitional 
economies? (investigated in Chapter 2, discussed in Chapter 8) 
2. What evidence is there from other transitional economies to 
support the utilisation of the key analytical concepts identified in 
regulation theonr to examine how nascent capitalist economic 
processes are being regulated in transitional economies? 
(examined in Chapter 3) 
3. To what extent does the local scale constitute the key site at 
which nascent capitalist economic activities are being regulated 
in the transitional Vietnamese economy? (analysed in Chapter 5) 
4. To what extent does the central state remain a key institution 
through which global economic processes are being mediated in 
regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy? (analysed in Chapter 6) 
5. To what extent does the notion of social capital constitute an 
important institutional mechanism regulating private capitalist 
economic activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy? 
(analysed in Chapter 7) 
3 
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These questions are approached in two ways: firstly, by conducting reviews of 
regulation theory literature and of literature exploring key analytical concepts and 
themes outlined in regulation theory and written in the context of transitional 
economies; and secondly, by conducting qualitative field research in Vietnam, 
primarily interviews with tourism business owners and managers in three 
Vietnamese cities - Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City - and the subsequent analysis 
of data gathered from the field. 
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1.2 SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The organisation of the thesis is illustrated in Figure 1.2 and outlined thereafter. 
Figure 1.2. Schematic structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
CREATING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter 2: Developing a Conceptual Framework for Examining 
Capitalist Economic Activities in Transitional Economies 
Review of Literature on Globalisation, Neo-Liberalism, Regulation 
Theory, Social Capital 
Chapter 3: Creating an Analytical Framework: Regulation 
Theory and Social Capital in Transitional Economies 
Path Dependency, the Local Scale, the Central State, the Local 
State, Social Capital 
GROUNDING THE RESEARCH 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
Chapter 5: An Historical Account of Regulatory Processes in the 
Vietnamese Economy 
Path Dependency - the Central State and the Local State, Social 
Capital, Distinct Local Regulatory Processes 
ANALYSIS 
Chapter 6: The National Mode of Social Regulation 
The Central State in the Regulation of Tourism in the Transitional 
Vietnamese Economy: Political Imperatives and Path Dependency 
Chapter 7: The Local Mode of Social Regulation 
The Local State in the Regulation of Tourism in the Transitional 
Vietnamese Economy: Social Capital as a Regulatory Mechanism, 
Diversity in Local Regulatory Processes 
Chanter 8: Conclusions and Discussion 
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In Chapter 2,1 lay the theoretical foundations for the thesis. I first briefly discuss the 
notions of economic globalisation and neo-liberalism before moving on to focus on 
the extent to which the analytical tools and conceptual framework in regulation 
theory provide a useful foundation for constructing an analytical framework for 
carrying out a research investigation into the regulation of nascent capitalist 
economic activities in transitional economies. Towards the end of this chapter, I 
introduce the concept of social capital into the theoretical discussion and identify its 
potential utility as a tool with which to examine the role and importance of pre- 
existing relations between social, economic and political actors in regulating nascent 
capitalist economic relations and activities in transitional economies. 
Chapter 3 develops the themes discussed in Chapter 2 through a review of literature 
written in the context of the regulation of nascent capitalist economic processes in 
transitional economies which identify and utilise key analytical concepts introduced 
in Chapter 2. These include path dependency in regulatory processes, the local scale 
as a site of distinct regulatory practices, the changing role of the central state and the 
local state as regulatory institutions as well as the notion of social capital. This 
discussion is used to inform our understanding of regulatory processes in transitional 
economies and thus in developing the analytical framework constructed in Chapter 
2. From this, a more rigorous framework is created, on which the subsequent 
research investigation and analysis are based. 
In Chapter 4,1 outline the different methodologies employed throughout the 
research process, with a particular emphasis on the strengths and shortcomings of 
those employed during the fieldwork stage, in undertaking qualitative research in 
Vietnam. 
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Building on a number of the key analytical tools of regulation theory discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 5 provides a historical and contextual account of 
regulatory processes in Vietnam. The chapter focuses on the path dependent nature 
of regulatory processes and relations evidenced historically in Vietnam with a 
particular emphasis on how relations between the central state and the local state 
have evolved through time. 2 1 then turn to examine how the control of the central 
vis-a-vis the local state has shifted in regulating nascent capitalist economic 
processes in the transitional Vietnamese economy. In the final two parts of this 
chapter, I first examine the role that social ties has historically played in regulating 
socio-economic processes, before moving on to discuss how distinct historical 
legacies in particular local spaces within Vietnam have informed contemporary 
attitudes in the transitional economy with regard to the regulation of nascent 
capitalist economic activities. 
In Chapter 6, focusing on national space, I analyse the extent to which the VNAT, 
the central state tourism body in Vietnam, constitutes a key institution in the 
regulation of tourism in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 3 Drawing on themes 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and thereafter incorporated into the analytical 
framework, I examine the extent to which the regulatory practices of the VNAT 
have reflected, firstly, political imperatives and secondly, path dependency as 
evidenced in what I see as the historical and ideological suspicion and antipathy of 
the central state towards capitalist economies. 
2 Path Dependency refers to the notion that social, economic and political processes evolve out of the 
experience of past practices rather than being constituted by radical breaks and departures from 
established processes. 
VNAT stands for the Vietnam National Administration of Tourism or Tong cuc Du lich. 
I am primarily concerned with analysing the ways in which tourism as a global economic process is 
being negotiated in national and local spaces. Therefore, tourism in this thesis is taken to refer to the 
provision of hotel and tour operator services for foreign visitors not domestic tourists. 
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In Chapter 7, the focus of the analysis shifts to a consideration of local space. Based 
on findings from interviews with private tourism business owners and managers, I 
examine the extent to which the local scale constitutes the key site at which tourism 
activity is being regulated in the transitional Vietnamese economy. Again based on 
findings from the field research, I analyse the extent to which social capital is a 
defining characteristic of the regulatory environment for private tourism business 
owners in the transitional Vietnamese economy. Throughout the chapter, in 
addressing the theme of diversity in local regulatory processes identified in Chapter 
3,1 examine the extent to which similarities and differences in regulatory practices 
and arrangements were revealed from interviews with private tourism business 
owners and managers in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. In particular, addressing 
a recurring theme throughout the thesis, I analyse how the social and historical 
connectedness of actors in the Ho Chi Minh City economy with the international 
arena has in the transitional economy facilitated development of tourism business for 
private tourism business owners to a much greater extent than in Hanoi and Hue. 
In Chapter 8, the key findings from this thesis are discussed: namely that regulation 
theory can provide a strong theoretical basis for understanding and analysing the 
development of capitalist economic relations and activities in transitional 
economies, but that greater consideration should be directed at how political 
imperatives as well as social ties impact on the regulation of economic activity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK FOR 
EXAMINING CAPITALIST ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 
This chapter lays a theoretical foundation for investigating the organisation and 
operation of nascent capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
To start the theoretical journey, illustrated in Figure 2.1,1 first examine how the 
processes inhering in economic globalisation and neo-liberalism help to inform our 
understanding of how capitalist economic relations and activities are being 
articulated in the contemporary global economy. Nevertheless, as theoretical 
constructs, the notions of economic globalisation and neo-liberalism are of limited 
utility for my investigation as they tend to oversimplify and under-differentiate 
processes by which global economic activity is being conducted. In particular, they 
fail to address satisfactorily issues relating to the specificities of place and the role 
that social, cultural, historical and political practices operating across national and 
local contexts play in organising economic activity. 
As a result, through its claims of offering a conceptual framework which recognises 
the embeddedness of capitalist economic activity, I introduce regulation theory into 
the theoretical discussion. I examine how the key analytical tools and conceptual 
framework provided in regulation theory do indeed provide a useful foundation in 
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Figure 2.1. The theoretical journey taken in this chapter 
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building an analytical framework for carrying out the research investigation. 
However, I also identify a number of gaps in the regulation theory framework. In 
addressing one of these deficiencies - the lack of a tool to analyse the struggles and 
contestation between actors through which regulatory processes evolve -I introduce 
in the final part of this chapter the concept of social capital into the theoretical 
discussion. 
2.1 ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION 
The re-integration of the Vietnamese economy into the international capitalist 
economy towards the end of the 1980s, and the development of economic activities 
such as tourism oriented towards the international capitalist economy, coincided 
with heightened discourse regarding the concept of economic globalisation, which 
proponents such as Ohmae (1990) claimed were leading to substantive changes in 
global economic activity. 
The concept of economic globalisation has invoked the notion of increasing time- 
space compression and the expansive and accelerated mobility of economic activity. 
This it is argued is leading to a substantive reconfiguration in the global economy 
with economic activities increasingly being conducted in global markets and in 
accordance with global norms and standards. At the same time, it is claimed that 
processes of economic globalisation are undermining the pre-eminent role of the 
nation state as the key constituent in the global economy and rendering conventional 
notions of national economic space increasingly irrelevant (Martin & Sunley, 1997: 
281). Processes of economic globalisation have been facilitated by rapid 
developments in communications and information technology which have been 
responsible for the creation of a global economic system in which economic 
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activities can be conducted in all four `corners' of the world, as distance and location 
are no longer pre-eminent as determinants of economic operations (Ohmae, 
1990: 172; Hoogvelt, 1997: 121). 
Epitomising changes in global economic activity has been the rapid growth which 
has occurred in the tourism industry, the object of study in this thesis, and which is 
often accorded the status as the world's largest and most globally interconnected 
industry (Wackermann, 1997). Rapid developments in aviation and information 
technology have led to a `stretching' of tourism activity to encompass much of the 
globe. Time-space compression exemplified by increases in distances between 
source and destination markets has resulted in the rapid accessing and drawing in of 
new and peripheral locations into global tourism circuits, particularly countries in 
the Developing World such as Vietnam (Mowforth & Munt, 1998: 43). 
However, during the 1990s, a huge body of literature emerged to analyse claims that 
fundamental restructuring was occurring in the global economy due to processes of 
economic globalisation. While acknowledging that significant changes were at work 
in the functioning of the global economy, most writers challenged the view of 
economic globalisation as a homogenising and hegemonic force and argued instead 
that the actual effects of economic globalisation had been over-exaggerated and 
undifferentiated across individual spaces throughout the global economy. Critics 
such as Kelly and Olds contended that the concept of economic globalisation as an 
inexorable and universalising force was functioning more as an economic and 
political ideology than as an expression of the restructuring and intensification of 
connections in the global economy (Kelly & Olds, 1999: 12; Glick Schiller, 
1999: 203). 
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Instead, it was argued that the economic and technological processes which have 
engendered global shifts in economic activity are interacting with existing 
institutions and structures in highly uneven ways. This is producing significant 
variations and divergent outcomes in particular national and local contexts, 
consequent of a wide range of political, economic, cultural and historical processes 
influencing such spaces. National and local spaces are thus shaping as well as 
responding to global processes and, consequently, the contextualisation of place 
remains fundamental in analysing all forms of socio-economic activities (Dicken, 
1998: xiv; Parnwell & Rigg, 2001: 205). 
When global economic activities, such as tourism, interact with national and local 
spaces, they become grounded and mediated through the distinctive social, cultural, 
institutional and political practices contained within particular spaces. Central in 
these processes of mediation is the role that key national and local actors and 
institutions, with competing priorities, objectives and power, and complex historical 
and social backgrounds, play in appropriating national and local spaces in redefining 
strategies and imperatives in regulating economic activity within and across national 
and local spaces in response to global processes (Dicken, 1998: 82; Mittelman, 
2001: 212; Parnwell & Rigg, 2001: 206; Elmhirst, 2001: 285,286). 
In this thesis, it will therefore be important to analyse how the points raised in the 
discussion above have been reflected in Vietnam in the development of a tourism 
industry oriented towards the international capitalist economy. Firstly, who are the 
key actors and institutions at both the national and local scales involved in mediating 
global tourism processes? Secondly, how effective are these actors and institutions 
13 
in mediating such processes? Thirdly, to what extent are strategies of mediation by 
these actors and institutions premised on historical, social, cultural, institutional and 
political practices distinctive to national and local spaces. 
One additional theme which is used to challenge the notion of economic 
globalisation as a homogenising force is that global economic activities and 
processes such as tourism continue to interact with local spaces, less as a result of 
purely economic considerations and more due to the embeddedness of global actors 
in the social, cultural and historical contexts of distinct local spaces (Jessop, 
1994: 270). Thus, not only between but even within particular national spaces, the 
degree of interconnectedness between global and particular local spaces displays 
wide disparities. Consequently, global economic activities are interacting with 
particular localities within national spaces in highly uneven ways. 
This theme is potentially of particular utility in the case of Vietnam, where the 
northern, central and southern regions have evolved out of distinct social, cultural, 
political and historical contexts, which in turn has been reflected in widely varying 
degrees of interconnectedness between these spaces and global spaces. In particular, 
in contrast to Hanoi and Hue, the Ho Chi Minh City economy, in the south of 
Vietnam, is deeply connected with actors in the international capitalist economy, as 
a result of social ties firstly between the ethnic Chinese communities in Ho Chi 
Minh City and around the world and secondly between local Vietnamese actors and 
the Vietnamese diaspora, who fled Vietnam predominantly after the War in 1975. 
Consequently, one question I seek to address in this thesis, is the extent to which 
distinct social and historical contexts have influenced the contemporary 
14 
development of tourism in particular local spaces within Vietnam. In particular, how 
has the social and historical connectedness of actors in the Ho Chi Minh economy 
with actors in the international capitalist economy facilitated the development of 
tourism in Ho Chi Minh City vis-ä-vis local spaces in the north - in Hanoi, and in the 
centre - in Hue. 
2.2 NEO-LIBERALISM 
While the development in Vietnam of capitalist economic activities such as tourism 
was occurring as substantive changes in the functioning of global economic 
activities were taking place, the collapse of the socialist system at the end of the 
1980s and the re-integration of former socialist economies such as Vietnam into the 
international capitalist economy also acted to boost significantly the credibility and 
hegemonic status of neo-liberalism as the dominant ideology in the economic and 
political governance of the international capitalist economy. Consequently, since 
that time, transitional, fledgling capitalist economies, such as the Vietnamese 
economy, have entered and integrated into an international capitalist economy in 
which economic relations between capitalist nations in economic activities, such as 
tourism, are being increasingly constructed in stricter accordance with neo-liberal 
ideology and global market forces (Peck & Tickell, 1994: 319; O'Neill, 1997: 290). 
Neo-liberalism is being supported and proselytised by de facto US-led institutions, 
such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (Jessop, 
2002: 454). These institutions have sought to universalise the adoption of neo- 
liberalism as the basis of economic transactions among all nations in the 
international capitalist economy (Agnew & Grant, 1997: 227; Tickell, 1998: 3; 
Jessop, 2002: 454). Similarly, in the tourism sphere, global institutions such as the 
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World Tourism Organisation, the World Tourism and Trade Council, the Pacific- 
Asia Travel Association (PATA) as well as United Nations institutions, such as the 
UNDP, have sought to apply neo-liberal principles in their governance of the global 
tourism industry. This has been particularly evident in tourism development plans 
designed by these institutions in building tourism industries in developing countries 
such as Vietnam, which have generally revolved around the deregulation of national 
tourism industries in advocating that tourism business activity be largely conducted 
by private actors in accordance with market principles. 
In the case of Vietnam, the World Tourism Organisation and the UNDP were 
responsible for drawing up the `Tourism Development Master Plan for the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam' published in 1991 (Jansen-Verbeke, 1995: 317; Theuns, 
1997: 306; Smith & Bui, 1998: 74; Thai Binh, 1998: 28). The Plan constituted the 
blueprint for the development of the tourism industry in the transitional economy. 
However, almost all policy prescriptions contained in the Plan reflected the 
generalised and ideological principles of the institutions involved rather than 
consideration of contextual issues specific to the case of Vietnam. In particular, 
recognising that the state was involved as both an administrator as well as an actor in 
the Vietnamese tourism industry, the Plan recommended the "separation between 
public policy functions and commercial activities" (WTO, 1991) with the state 
advised to divest itself of its tourism business interests and instead function 
primarily in an administrative capacity, transferring the bulk of tourism business 
activity into the hands of private actors (EIU, 1991: 18). 
2.2.1 Critique 
It is undeniable that since the mid to late 1980s, in the construction of economic 
relations between capitalist nations, neo-liberalism has become more pervasive as 
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the operating ideology or system regulating these relations. Nevertheless, as with the 
concept of economic globalisation, as an inexorable and universalising force, neo- 
liberalism functions more as an economic and political ideology than as an 
expression of how relations between economic actors are in reality being articulated. 
In reality, neo-liberalism as the modus operandi in capitalist economic relations is 
being mediated, negotiated and contested by actors and institutions, operating at all 
spatial scales, including the national and local scales of nation states, as they seek to 
optimise their gains and minimise their losses from participating in the 
contemporary international capitalist economy (Jessop, 1999: 23; Peck, 2001: 449). 
The diversity and distinctiveness of `local' responses in particular spaces has 
underscored the continued importance of the specificity of social, cultural, political 
and institutional practices in shaping socio-economic activity (Hay, 2000: 511). 
Economic activity in practice does not simply function as neo-liberal ideology 
postulates in accordance with inexorable economic rationale and laws. Instead, all 
economic activity is grounded in socially and culturally embedded systems, 
institutions and forms of regulation, which operate at all spatial scales, including the 
national and local scales (Bienefeld, 1996: 426; Barnes, 1997: 234; Yang, 
2002: 467,468). This misconception in neo-liberal logic has been most brutally 
illustrated by the failed restructuring in the former socialist economies of Eastern 
and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. The dismantling of socially and culturally 
embedded institutional practices and the imposition of neo-liberally-conceived 
market-supporting institutional mechanisms in these economies patently failed to 
take account of the embeddedness of social, economic and political institutions 
(Jessop, 2002: 470). 
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As a result, in order to analyse the development, in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy, of nascent capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, I need instead to 
utilise an approach which recognises that capitalist economic relations and activities 
are embedded in social, cultural and political institutional structures and practices, 
operating at the national and local scales of nation states. This will then allow me 
for example to investigate the extent to which actors and institutions, operating at 
the national and local scales of the Vietnamese state have been able to mediate and 
contest neo-liberal processes of tourism activity emanating from the global 
economy, such as the policy recommendations made by the World Tourism 
Organisation and the UNDP in the Tourism Development Master Plan. 
Regulation theory is put forward as just such an approach. Indeed, one of the 
principal claims of regulation theory lies in its recognition that capitalist economic 
activity is embedded in distinctive political, social and cultural institutional 
structures and practices (Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 339; Boyer, 2000: 276). In the 
next section, I examine the key conceptual tools outlined within regulation theory in 
order to start building an analytical framework to investigate the development of the 
tourism industry in Vietnam. 
2.3 REGULATION THEORY 
Regulation theory aims to integrate the structural dynamics of capitalism with the 
institutional forms of society. It claims to offer a functionalist approach, as opposed 
to simply a collection of abstract concepts, in examining the regulation of processes 
of capitalist accumulation in real space. Indeed, it provides a useful set of analytical 
tools and a conceptual framework to carry out this task (Goodwin, Duncan & 
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Halford, 1993: 68; Jessop, 1995: 317; Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 335,337; Gibbs, 
1996: 5). 1 
Concurring with themes introduced in the discussion on neo-liberalism in the last 
section, regulation theory builds on the premise that while in the contemporary 
international capitalist economy the role of global institutions in the regulation of 
economic activity has been heightened, national and local scales within individual 
nation states remain key sites in the regulation of global economic processes, such as 
tourism (Dunford, 1990: 309). 
Regulation theory analyses how hegemonic global systems of capitalist 
accumulation, currently neo-liberalism, are mediated through the conduits of 
national and local spaces by modes of social regulation (MSR) operating in these 
spaces. 
The MSR consists of the ensemble of socially, politically and culturally embedded 
institutional forms and practices, including: the institutional structures and political 
practices of the state, formal laws and regulations as well as informal constraints, 
such as norms of behaviour (Tickell & Peck, 1992: 193; Peck & Tickell, 1994: 284; 
Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 340; North, 1995: 23). 
Changing institutional forms and practices help to secure relative and temporary 
institutional fixes, which have the effect of guiding and stabilising the capitalist 
The term `regulation' comes from the French language as the concept of regulation theory was first 
discussed in the late 1970s and early 1980s by academics within the Parisian regulation school. 
Consequently, when talking about `regulation' the meaning intended is not the English meaning of 
regulation as in control or restrict. Instead, in the English language, the French word `regulation' 
translates as regularisation or normalisation (Jessop, 1995: 309). This is the meaning I wish to convey 
throughout this thesis. 
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accumulation process (Aglietta, 1979: 382; Tickell & Peck, 1992: 192; Peck & 
Tickell, 1994: 285; Jessop, 1995: 317; Gibbs, 1996: 5). According to regulation 
theorists, it is the MSR which helps to mediate processes of capitalist development 
in creating a temporary resolution to contradictions and instability, which are seen to 
be inherent in the capitalist accumulation process (Barnes, 1997: 238) 
2.3.1 Path Dependent Nature of Regulatory Processes 
In the search for a reconfigured MSR to guide the accumulation process, one 
important concept highlighted in regulation theory is that capitalist social relations 
evolve in a path dependent manner with the residues and legacies of former modes 
of regulation shaping the options in future configurations (Hay, 1995: 399; Smith & 
Swain, 1998: 26; Aglietta, 1998: 44). Consequently, an evolving MSR is more likely 
to constitute a simple re-alignment than a radical departure from the previous mode, 
arising out of contestation and struggles between and shifts in the balance of power 
among social and political actors and institutions (Hay, 1995: 399). 
Citing evidence from a number of points in Vietnamese history, the universalism 
and oversimplification of evolving capitalist social relations can nevertheless be 
challenged by arguing that this is not necessarily the case when a transformation 
rather than a simple shift occurs in the power and influence of actors and institutions 
on regulatory processes. 
First, the colonisation of Vietnam by the French saw the imposition of a capitalist 
accumulation process, oriented towards the international capitalist economy, on, in 
particular, the southern Vietnamese economy, together with the emergence of, first, 
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French companies and thereafter the ethnic Chinese as new, major socio-economic 
actors in the southern economy. 
Second, in the north of Vietnam, after the abolition of the monarchy in 1945 and 
after regaining independence in 1954, the Hanoi regime introduced the socialist 
accumulation system of central planning throughout the northern economy. This 
dismantled traditional social, economic and political institutional networks and 
relations and a socio-economic hierarchy, which had previously been based on ties 
to positions of power in the monarch system. Under the central planning system, the 
socio-economic hierarchy was transformed and now depended on ties to positions of 
power in the state economic management and political administrative system 
(Porter, 1993: 57; Templer, 1998: 57; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 25). 
Nevertheless, throughout the majority of Vietnamese political history, what evidence 
is there to support the notion of path dependency in regulatory processes with 
socio-economic and political relations evolving as the political economy has shifted 
between the four broad `isms' of feudalism, colonialism, socialism and capitalism? 
In particular, in the current transition from a socialist to a capitalist-oriented 
accumulation process, to what extent have global capitalist economic processes such 
as tourism been mediated by the ensemble of socially, politically and culturally 
embedded institutional forms and practices, which have evolved and which evoke 
legacies of former socio-economic systems? At the same time, has the current 
`transformation' in the socio-economic system in Vietnam transformed socio- 
economic and political relations and produced entirely new sets of actors and 
institutions and the displacement of old actorial and institutional forces or, rather, 
shifts and re-alignments in the roles and balance of power of actors and institutions 
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in the regulation of nascent capitalist economic activities such as tourism? 
Furthermore, what evidence is there to support the claim in regulation theory that in 
the regulation of nascent capitalist economic activities such as tourism, regulatory 
processes and arrangements are evolving and being reworked through contestation 
and struggles between existing social and political actors and institutions? 
2.3.2 The National Scale: The National State as a Regulator of Global Economic 
Processes 
According to regulation theory, the national state, as the primary institution capable 
of exerting its authority across the whole of its territory, remains a key conduit 
through which global economic processes are mediated and negotiated in regulating 
capitalist economic activities across national spaces (Hay, 1995: 403; Hirst & 
Thompson, 1995: 431,432; Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 345,347; Bienefeld, 
1996: 427). One of the main ways in which the national state achieves this is through 
the enactment of formal regulatory norms - laws, policies and directives - which 
seek to mediate the prevailing global system of capitalist accumulation in 
articulating social and political specificities and priorities and the interests and views 
of powerful social, political and economic actors and institutions within the national 
constituency (Hirst & Thompson, 1995: 43 1). In this way, the national state remains 
a key regulatory conduit as it acts as a bridge in mediating capitalist economic 
relations and activities between both supra and sub-national actors and institutions 
impacting on national space (Ibid: 431). 
In the context of Vietnam, I therefore need in this thesis to address how this 
assertion has been borne out in the development of a tourism industry oriented 
towards the international capitalist economy. In what ways does the national state 
tourism institution in Vietnam - the VNAT - constitute a key conduit regulating 
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tourism activity? How has it attempted to maintain regulatory control over tourism 
activity in Vietnam? How effective has it been in achieving this? Furthermore, 
linking up with the previous section on path dependency, what evidence is there to 
suggest that in reconfiguring relations and arrangements in orienting the tourism 
industry towards the international capitalist economy, the regulatory practices of the 
VNAT have evolved in a path dependent manner, evoking legacies of former socio- 
economic systems? 
2.3.3 The Local Scale 
At the same time, regulation theory highlights the fact that distinct processes of 
regulation not only operate between national spaces, but also within national spaces. 
2.3.3.1 Relations between Local Actors and Institutions 
In regulation theory, differentiated local spaces of regulation arise due to distinct 
local configurations of economic, social, political and cultural institutional forms 
and practices. Within these spaces, key local actors and institutions possess the 
capacity to interpret and mediate global and national regulatory processes (Amin, 
1994: 8; Nielsen, 1991: 22; Agnew & Grant, 1997: 221; Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 
1993: 69). One local institution in particular in regulation theory afforded a pivotal 
role in mediating global and national regulatory processes in regulating processes of 
capitalist accumulation in local space is the local state (Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 
345,347). 
According to regulation theory, the restructuring of a local MSR to sustain processes 
of capitalist economic activity, such as tourism, takes place through struggles and 
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contestation between those social, economic and political actors and institutions 
participating in local economic activity. The balance of political and economic 
forces and interests at any given time will result in the emergence of one set of 
dominant interests, institutions and regulatory practices. This will in turn lead to the 
establishment of a temporary and relative degree of coherence and the restructuring 
of a distinct local mode of regulation to sustain the prevailing system of 
accumulation (Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 1993: 71,72,73,75,83,84). 
2.3.3.2 Relations between Local and Extra-local Actors and Institutions 
In regulation theory, distinct local processes of regulation also evolve from ties 
between actors and institutions in individual local spaces and extra-local scales 
(Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 1993: 83; Smith, 1995: 761; Goodwin & Painter, 
1996: 636). Building on the discussion in Section 2.1, is the idea that in the 
contemporary global economy, differentiation in local regulatory processes is being 
heightened as social, cultural and historical legacies and ties between actors and 
institutions in particular local spaces and international spaces are being invoked in 
conducting economic activities, such as tourism (Goodwin & Painter, 1996: 646; 
Aglietta, 1998: 65). According to authors such as Jessop, national regulatory 
practices are often mediated in such arrangements (Jessop, 1999: 22). Consequently, 
building on the issues and questions raised in Section 2.1, how has the social and 
historical connectedness between actors in the Ho Chi Minh City economy and 
actors in the international capitalist economy been invoked in developing 
international tourism business? How significant have these ties been in facilitating 
the development of tourism in Ho Chi Minh City? At the same time, what evidence 
is there to support the claim that in tourism business arrangements between actors in 
24 
Ho Chi Minh City and international actors, the regulatory control of the national 
scale is being undermined and mediated by regulatory processes at the local scale? 
2.3.3.3 Relations between National and Local Actors and Institutions: The Mode of 
Societalisation 
While acknowledging the existence of distinct local MSRs, one conceptual tool in 
regulation theory, which helps to explain why such MSRs do not necessarily lead to 
divergence and ultimately fragmentation within national spaces, is the mode of 
societalisation. This refers to the national state's role in instituting and enforcing 
regulatory practices across the whole of its territory (Jessop, 1990: 179; Goodwin, 
Duncan & Halford, 1993: 70). This involves a series of political compromises, 
social alliances and regulatory practices, which operate across scales and assist in 
affirming institutional integration and social cohesion. This complements the 
prevailing system of accumulation and the national mode of social regulation and 
thereby secures the conditions for their acceptance within the wider society (Amin, 
1994: 8; Jessop, 1994: 252). 
Nevertheless, within regulation theory, the mode of societalisation has remained 
conceptually and empirically under-researched. Consequently, in this thesis, I seek 
to build on the body of research conducted about the mode of societalisation by 
analysing the processes by which the national state attempts to maintain regulatory 
control over national economic space in the face of competing and contesting 
processes of regulation in local spaces. 
The investigation is carried out by examining how the Vietnamese national state has 
remained the primary institution capable of exerting its authority across the whole of 
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its territory. This is despite the considerable geographical space of the Vietnamese 
territory with the northern, central and southern regions having evolved out of 
distinct social, cultural, political and historical contexts. What evidence is there to 
support the claims postulated by Jessop (1990) of modes of societalisation evolving 
through political compromises, social alliances and regulatory practices between 
national and local actors and institutions? Similarly, in the current transition from a 
socialist to a capitalist-oriented accumulation process in Vietnam, in what ways has 
the national state attempted to maintain regulatory control over the development of 
global capitalist economic processes such as tourism, operating within national 
Vietnamese space? How effective has it been in achieving this? 
2.3.4 Political Imperatives in Regulatory Practices 
Incorporating the mode of societalisation as a tool into the conceptual framework, 
and thereby introducing political issues into the framework, also requires us now to 
address one further area where regulation theory has remained deficient - namely in 
the consideration of political imperatives in regulatory practices. 
In research invoking regulation theory, the focus of analysis has tended to be on 
economic imperatives in regulatory practices. Indeed, as I discussed in Section 2.2, 
since the end of the 1980s, consideration of economic exigencies in regulatory 
practices has intensified. Nevertheless, the attainment of non-economic objectives 
such as political and ideological imperatives still remain as potentially significant 
factors on processes of regulation (Painter & Goodwin, 1995: 343). However, 
regulation theory is generally of limited utility in considering the extent to which 
regulatory processes are driven by these non-economic factors (Hay, 1995: 401-2). 
Indeed, Robert Boyer has argued that "one of the current main themes of Regulation 
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School research" is that "more consideration should be given to interrelations 
between the political and the economic" (Boyer, 2000: 275). 
As a way of accepting Boyer's challenge, in this thesis I seek to address issues such 
as, firstly, to what extent have political imperatives historically mediated economic 
considerations in the regulation of economic space? In what ways has this affected 
the relative capacities of the national and local states in regulating local economic 
spaces? Similarly, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, how have political 
exigencies been reflected in the regulation of global capitalist economic processes? 
How has this affected the development of capitalist socio-economic relations in 
activities such as tourism? 
2.3.5 Critique: Gaps and Weaknesses in the Regulation Theory Research 
Project 
2.3.5.1 The Local Scale and the Local State 
While the fact that processes of regulation operate in local spaces is conceptualised 
in regulation theory, it remains one area of the regulation theory research project 
which has been neglected and inadequately discussed. The bulk of analysis has 
concentrated on national space as the primary site in the regulation of capitalist 
processes with the forming of a national MSR. As a result, it has largely been 
assumed that changes in regulatory processes in national space are similarly 
translated into changes in local spaces (Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 1993: 68-70, 
83; Hay, 1995: 394; Smith, 1995: 761). Consequently, the ability, capacity and 
efficacy of key actors and institutions within local spaces to mediate global and 
national regulatory processes have tended to be downplayed and under-researched 
(Hay, 1995: 394,402). 
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In particular, as mentioned in Section 2.3.3.1, while regulation theory recognises the 
importance of the local state in mediating global and national regulatory processes 
of capitalist accumulation in local space, besides studies by Painter and Goodwin 
(Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 1993; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Goodwin and 
Painter, 1996) into the changing nature of local governance in Britain, the role of the 
local state has rarely been examined (Goodwin, Duncan & Halford, 1993: 68; Hay, 
1995: 394). Consequently, in this thesis I seek to address this deficiency by 
investigating the role that the local state has played in regulating economic processes 
in local space both historically and in the transitional economy in Vietnam. 
Linking up with the conceptual tools of path dependency and the mode of 
societalisation introduced earlier in Section 2.3,1 first need to provide a historical 
account and examine the extent to which the regulatory role of the local state has 
evolved as the political economy has shifted between feudalism, colonialism, 
socialism and capitalism. In particular, with the national state attempting to 
societalise regulatory practices across the whole of its territory, in what ways has the 
local state acted as a facilitator or a mediator in this process? At the same time, what 
evidence is there to suggest that the support of the local state in affirming national 
regulatory practices has been achieved through political compromises and 
concessions by, and social alliances between, the national and local states? 
Similarly, in the contemporary transitional economy in Vietnam, in what ways have 
the capacities of the national state vis-a-vis the local state to regulate nascent 
processes of capitalist accumulation such as tourism shifted? Again, in what ways 
has the local state acted as a facilitator or a mediator of national regulatory 
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practices? Furthermore, with the reconfiguration of regulatory practices in local 
economic spaces to support nascent processes of capitalist accumulation, to what 
extent do the regulatory arrangements emerging reflect the interests of local actors 
and institutions, including the local state, vis-ä-vis national institutions? 
2.3.5.2 Analysing Regulatory Processes 
One final shortcoming of the conceptual framework of regulation theory concerns its 
analysis of local regulatory processes. In regulation theory, regulatory practices in 
local spaces evolve out of struggles, contestation and negotiation between social, 
economic and political actors and institutions. These include not only state but also 
non-state actors and institutions. However, analysis of the actual processes through 
which the interests and priorities of these actors and institutions have shaped local 
MSRs has remained insufficient (Goodwin, Duncan, Halford, 1993: 69; Hay, 
1995: 394; O'Neill, 1997: 293; Smith & Swain, 1998: 29). To start to overcome this 
deficiency, in the following section I introduce the concept of social capital into the 
theoretical discussion. I discuss how the concept of social capital, which highlights 
the importance of social ties in the regulation of economic activity, provides us with 
a useful tool with which to analyse regulatory processes in local economic spaces. 
2.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
As with regulation theory, the concept of social capital is premised on the 
recognition that capitalist economic relations are embedded in distinctive social, 
political and cultural institutional structures and practices. However, it builds on this 
theme with the notion, as Granovetter contends: 
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most economic action is closely embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations (Granovetter, 1985: 594). 
Although within the literature social capital is defined in numerous ways and 
invoked in order to analyse a diverse range of processes, definitions broadly 
coalesce around an understanding that social capital originates: 
from the web of social ties, connections, networks and 
relationships based on shared values and norms of behaviour, 
which individuals in a community or society are embedded in 
and which are invoked by these individuals as a way of obtaining 
temporal objectives 
Justification for incorporating social capital as a conceptual tool in the analytical 
framework for the present research investigation is provided in the literature in a 
number of ways. First, linking up with themes outlined in Section 2.2 is recognition 
among authors such as North (1995: 25) of the growing penetration of neo-liberal 
institutional forms and practices on national and local socio-economic spaces. The 
concept of social capital is, as a result, being utilised to analyse how local social 
norms and institutional practices, more fixed in concrete space, are mediating such 
institutional forms and practices in the reconfiguration of regulatory processes in 
local economic spaces. 
Similarly, of particular relevance to my research investigation is the recognition 
among authors such as Portes and Landolt (2000: 530) that, with the expansion in 
capitalist economic relations, one way in which individuals and small groups in 
communities are currently attempting to harness new and growing economic 
opportunities, such as tourism, is by invoking social ties and networks as a means 
of entering and operating in new or existing economic activities. This provides 
an implicit acknowledgement that while social ties can augment market-rational 
strategies, not all goods and services are available through market transactions, i. e. 
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on the basis of sufficient economic capital. Access to other goods, services or 
markets instead relies on the possession of sufficient social capital (Bourdieu, 1986: 
252). This in essence is at the heart of discourse on social capital with the assertion 
that "social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain 
ends that in its absence would not be possible" (Coleman, 1988: S98). 
2.4.1 Sites in Creating Social Capital 
While the primary site for the accumulation of social capital is the family, other 
sites, which invoke a sense of shared affiliation - for example, kinship, school, 
workplace or hometown - can also constitute important sites in creating and 
cultivating stocks of social capital (Coleman, 1988: S99; Putnam, 1995: 73). In the 
context of transitional nations, such as Vietnam, one further site which could be 
added here is political affiliation as members of the Communist Party. 
Shared affiliation in social networks constitutes the primary mechanism through 
which trust and norms of reciprocity are engendered among members (Granovetter, 
1985: 490; Grootaert, 1998: 2; Portes & Landolt, 2000: 532). These, in turn, facilitate 
co-operation among actors in social networks for mutual material benefit, as 
agreements are `embedded' within a larger structure of personal relations and social 
networks (Coleman, 1988, S98; Putnam, 1993a: 172,177; Putnam, 1995: 67). 
Within the above discussion, there is an implicit recognition of the exclusionary 
nature of social capital (Coleman, 1988: S98; Putnam, 1993b: l1). Benefits and 
opportunities available to individuals or small groups within certain social networks 
may be unobtainable to individuals and groups outside these networks (Portes, 
2000: 4; Portes & Landolt, 2000: 532-533). Such benefits can include privileged 
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access to resources, lucrative business opportunities or opportunities to circumvent 
laws. This raises a number of questions in the context of this thesis. Firstly, how do 
individuals with limited stocks of social capital overcome their lack of ties and 
connections in accomplishing material objectives such as establishing and running a 
tourism business? Conversely, among individuals deeply embedded in networks of 
social ties, how and to what extent has this facilitated the processes of establishing 
and operating businesses? 
2.4.1.1 Vertical and Horizontal Ties: The Creation and Cultivation of State-Private 
Ties 
Social capital can be accumulated through the cultivation of both horizontal ties, 
between actors of equivalent status and power, and vertical ties, linking actors with 
differential status and power, as long as these social ties produce benefits for both 
parties (Putnam, 1993a: 173; Shivakumar, 1998: 8). Among sites recognised as 
important for invoking vertical ties is that between civil society and the state, where 
differentials in access to power and opportunities exist (Woolcock, 1998: 154,155). 
The issue of vertical ties is of particular significance in the context of Vietnam, 
where, as discussed earlier in this chapter, social, economic and political relations 
and the socio-economic hierarchy have traditionally been configured around ties to 
positions in the state bureaucratic system. As a consequence, one important question 
which needs to be addressed in this thesis is the role that social capital between 
state and non-state actors has historically played in regulating economic space in 
Vietnam. 
Linking up with this theme is the notion within the literature on social capital, as in 
regulation theory, of path dependency. Thus, it is argued that in societies such as 
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Vietnam, social capital is historically and institutionally grounded. Through 
particular institutional contexts, the nature and function of social ties, for example 
between state and non-state actors, have evolved in a path dependent manner 
(Putnam, 1993b: 3; Woolcock, 1998: 157,185). Thus, in the context of Vietnam, 
what evidence is there to demonstrate how the form and function of social capital 
between state and non-state actors have evolved through particular historical and 
institutional contexts? Similarly, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, how have 
social ties between state and non-state actors been reconfigured and invoked in 
regulating nascent capitalist economic processes such as tourism? 
Within the literature on social capital, the discussion on vertical ties has tended to 
focus, as I have so far, on the cultivation of ties by non-state actors with state actors. 
However, of significance in transitional economies, where economic activity has 
traditionally been configured within bureaucratic and hierarchical state 
administrative systems, is to investigate the extent to which vertical ties have been 
cultivated between state actors. Once again in acknowledging the path dependent 
nature of social capital, in this thesis, first, I will need to provide a historical account 
of vertical ties cultivated between state actors. I will then move on to examine how 
social ties between state actors have evolved in regulating tourism activity in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
2.4.2 Scales in Creating Social Capital 
In much of the literature on social capital, the local scale is accorded the primary 
scale at which social capital is both accumulated through the bulk of social relations 
formed and cultivated at that scale, and invoked in the pursuit of material objectives. 
Nevertheless, there is also the recognition that social capital can be cultivated in 
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social ties and networks which operate across a range of scales from the local to the 
global (Woolcock, 1998: 164,186; Grootaert, 1998: 4; Narayan, 2000: 103,118). 
This ties in with issues raised in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, where I discussed how there is 
growing recognition of the embeddedness of global actors in the social, cultural and 
historical contexts of distinct local spaces. In contemporary global economic 
processes, such as tourism, social, cultural and historical legacies and ties are being 
invoked between actors and institutions in particular local spaces and international 
spaces. I will seek to address this issue by investigating the extent to which social 
connectedness between tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City and overseas 
have facilitated tourism business activity. At the same time, in addressing the theme 
of scale, I will also need to examine the importance for tourism business owners of 
social ties with actors at the local versus the international scale in the development 
of their businesses. 
2.4.3 Cultivating Social Capital 
One final theme within the social capital literature is that stocks of social capital are 
not constant but need to be invested in and built up. Social ties, connections and 
networks are maintained and cultivated through investment constituted by regular 
social interaction and exchange between actors in which recognition is reaffirmed. 
Such social interaction implies the expenditure of time and money, in the form of 
gifts, including financial gifts and entertainment (Bourdieu, 1986: 250). This is 
aimed at cultivating lasting, useful social relationships that can be used in the short 
and long term to secure a regular flow of temporal benefits (Ibid, 1986: 249). Actors 
continue to invest in social ties and relations as long as these ties produce material 
benefits (Coleman, 1988: S 105). 
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Therefore, with regard to my own research investigation, it will be useful to 
incorporate the mechanism of cultivating social capital into the research framework, 
and informative to examine in what ways the social investment strategies of actors in 
the tourism industry in Vietnam conform to those identified in the social capital 
literature. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
While capitalist economic activities such as tourism have become even more 
globally-interconnected and have `stretched' to encompass much of the globe, they 
are interacting with and being mediated in particular spaces in highly uneven ways 
due to the distinctive social, cultural, and political institutional structures and 
practices contained within these spaces. 
Regulation theory provides a useful set of analytical tools and a conceptual 
framework to analyse such processes. It builds on the recognition that national and 
local scales remain key sites responding to as well as regulating global economic 
processes, such as tourism, and that the national state and the local state remain 
key conduits mediating and negotiating these processes. At the same time, regulation 
theory contends that regulatory processes and socio-economic and political relations, 
through which these processes are reworked, evolve in a path dependent manner 
out of the residues and legacies of former modes of regulation. 
As an analytical framework, there are nevertheless a number of gaps in the 
regulation theory approach, which I need to address in this thesis. First, inadequate 
analysis and discussion has been conducted about the local scale as a key site and 
the role of the local state in the regulation of capitalist economic processes. Second, 
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there has been inadequate consideration of the extent to which regulatory processes 
evolve out of political imperatives as well as economic priorities and exigencies. 
Finally, regulation theory does not provide a conceptual tool with which to allow us 
to analyse the struggles and contestation between social, political and economic 
actors through which regulatory processes evolve. As a result, I have incorporated 
the concept of social capital into the conceptual framework of the regulation theory 
approach. This will allow me to investigate the extent to which social capital 
between state and non-state actors, at local, national and international scales, has 
constituted an important institutional mechanism in the regulation of economic 
activity, both historically and currently in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
In the following chapter, I start to examine and operationalise some of the key 
analytical concepts identified in this chapter in a review of the literature on 
transitional economies which, like Vietnam, are currently moving from a socialist to 
a capitalist-oriented socio-economic system. This will allow the development of an 
analytical framework informed by the experiences from these economies with which 
to examine how nascent capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, are being 
regulated in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CREA TING AN ANAL YTICAL FRAME WORK: REG ULA TION 
THEORYAND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN TRANSITIONAL 
ECONOMIES 
In the last chapter, I started to construct an analytical framework out of the 
framework provided by regulation theory. In this chapter, I develop this framework 
further through operationalising a number of the key analytical concepts and themes 
introduced in Chapter 2 in a review of literature written about transitional 
economies. This will help, firstly, to inform discussion on these themes, secondly, to 
address a number of the gaps and weaknesses identified in the last chapter in the 
regulation theory framework and, thirdly, to identify areas which require further 
investigation. From this I aim to produce a more informed analytical framework 
with which to carry out my research investigation. 
The chapter initially explores a number of the key analytical concepts and themes 
highlighted within regulation theory and discussed in Chapter 2. First, I examine the 
extent to which evidence from transitional economies supports the notion of path 
dependency in regulatory processes and socio-economic and political relations. I 
then move on to explore the changing regulatory role of actors and institutions at the 
local scale in transitional economies. Issues discussed include the shifting regulatory 
power of the central vis-ä-vis the local state in local space and the heightened 
differentiation in local regulatory processes, which is perceived to be occurring in 
local spaces as a result of distinct historical experiences and socio-cultural ties 
with international spaces. Particular emphasis is placed on the power and control 
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of the local state in regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in the 
transitional economy. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the extent to which the literature supports 
the notion of social capital as an important institutional mechanism regulating 
relations between social, economic and political actors and institutions historically, 
but in particular, in regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in the 
transitional economy. I focus on the extensive body of literature which has been 
written in recent years on guanxi and the role that social ties between social, 
economic and political actors are playing in regulating nascent capitalist economic 
activities in the transitional Chinese economy. I examine the role that vertical ties 
with local state officials as well as horizontal ties with family, friends and 
colleagues are playing for entrepreneurs in facilitating the establishment and running 
of private businesses. I also discuss the key sites involved in creating guanxi, the 
role of social ties at the international scale and the ways in which guanxi is being 
cultivated. 
3.1 PATH DEPENDENCY 
Legacies are a central component of the possibilities and limits to 
transition (Smith & Pickles, 1998: 15). 
The transition in the post-socialist economies is not one 
characterised by epochal breaks but by a transformation of social 
relations, forms and practices that carries important traces of the 
legacy of the previous forty years (Pickles, 1998: 174-5). 
As discussed in Section 2.2 in Chapter 2, literature on the transitional economies of 
Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) broadly supports the view that the imposition of 
neo-liberal processes of capitalist accumulation on ECE nations has neglected to 
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consider the "particularity and complexity" of political and economic institutional 
structures and practices (Smith & Pickles, 1998: 10; Smart, 1998: 429). As a result, 
processes of capitalist accumulation are currently being mediated by regulatory 
processes, which are evolving in complex and highly differentiated ways, at both 
national and local scales in ECE nations (Smith & Swain, 1998: 47; Smith & 
Pickles, 1998: 20). 
These regulatory processes are evolving, much as described in regulation theory, in 
a path dependent manner, out of the legacies of politically, economically and 
socially-embedded institutional structures and practices from the former socialist 
system (Smith & Pickles, 1998: 1-2). Consequently, the introduction of capitalist 
economic institutional structures, rather than resulting in the elimination of those 
institutional structures and practices that existed in the former state socialist system, 
is instead leading to a complex reworking of both sets of institutional structures and 
practices (Smith & Pickles, 1998: 11-12). Regulatory processes are emerging which 
reflect a reconfiguring of the old in the context of the new (Smith & Pickles, 
1998: 13; Smith & Swain, 1998: 39; Smart, 1998: 434). 
Consequently, how this is reflected in the current transition from a socialist to a 
capitalist-oriented accumulation process in Vietnam remains an area for 
investigation in this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 2,1 need to examine the extent 
to which in the regulation of global capitalist economic processes such as tourism, 
regulatory processes are evolving out of the ensemble of socially, politically and 
culturally-embedded institutional forms and practices from the former socialist 
system. 
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3.2 ACTORS 
According to authors writing about transitional economies, regulatory processes 
are evolving in a path dependent manner due largely to the fact that key actors and 
institutions span both former and current socio-economic systems. Thus, addressing 
questions raised in Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 is evidence from the literature on 
transitional economies illustrating how socio-economic and political relations from 
the former socialist era are being reconfigured rather than dismantled in the 
regulation of nascent capitalist economic activities. Authors such as Smith and 
Pickles also highlight the fact that in the regulation of nascent capitalist economic 
activities the roles and balance of power of key social, economic and political actors 
and institutions from the former socialist system are being struggled over (Smith & 
Pickles, 1998: 10,11,13,16). This again provides support for assertions made in 
regulation theory discussed in Section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, according to 
most authors, key actors and institutions from the socialist era continue to play 
pivotal roles in regulating economic activities in the transitional economy. 
How has this been reflected in Vietnam? In a similar way to questions asked in 
Chapter 2, to what extent have key actors and institutions from the former socialist 
system maintained regulatory control over economic activities in the transitional 
economy? In addition, what evidence is there of contestation and struggles taking 
place between key social and political actors and institutions from the former 
socialist era in reconfiguring regulatory power and control in the transitional 
economy? 
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3.2.1 Private Business: Entrepreneurs 
With regard to establishing private businesses, Grabher and Stark (1998), Dunford 
(1998), Smith (1995), Pickles (1998) and Smart (1998) all describe similar processes 
occurring in transitional economies in which entrepreneurship "has been driven by 
key actors in the old formal and informal networks" (Grabher & Stark, 1998: 65). 
Grabher and Stark (1998: 61) illustrate this with studies from Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Eastern Germany which support the view that "the new economic elite 
as entrepreneurs is likely to come from the ranks of the socialist cadre" with "the 
continuing prominence of elite groupings, which have straddled the party and now 
entrepreneurial classes" (Ibid: 61). Smith and Pickles contend that the Czech 
economy continues to be dominated by institutions with close ties to the state (Smith 
& Pickles, 1998: 1). Similarly, in China, Smart illustrates the rise of "cadre 
entrepreneurship" in the transitional economy (Smart, 1998: 435). In all cases, actors 
have taken advantage of their positions in or ties with the state to gain access to 
resources and property in developing "recombinant" business interests in the nascent 
capitalist economy (Grabher & Stark, 1998: 65). These business activities, while 
nominally private, rely on ties with the state in order to gain political protection and 
support, through access to information and economic privileges (Grabher & Stark, 
1998: 66; Dunford, 1998: 96). 
The above findings provide invaluable insight to utilise in the research investigation 
in analysing the extent to which similar processes are occurring in Vietnam. To what 
extent are private tourism business owners emerging out of positions in or ties with 
state institutions? How have ties with state institutions facilitated the development of 
a private tourism business? In particular, how significant a role has social capital 
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between state actors and private tourism business owners played in regulating 
tourism business activity? 
3.3 THE LOCAL SCALE 
3.3.1 Ceding of Regulatory Control from the Centre down to the Local Scale 
One area where the literature on transitional economies and regulation theory do 
diverge is in the regulatory power and control accorded to the central state in the 
contemporary international capitalist economy. Whereas in regulation theory the 
central state remains a key conduit regulating capitalist economic activities within 
national spaces, authors writing about transitional economies argue instead that 
transition in these economies has been accompanied by significant restructuring and 
diminution in the role of the central state as a regulatory institution (Smith, 
1995: 768; Smith & Swain, 1998: 46; Smart, 1998: 435). For these authors perhaps the 
most important manifestation of transition lies in the reterritorialisation of regulatory 
processes downwards to the local scale. They contend that the central state has 
ceded significant functional power and autonomy to local institutions in regulating 
local economic spaces as it is no longer able to perform the task as the primary 
supplier of financial and material resources (Lin, 1995: 304). Consequently, for these 
authors, the local scale has come to constitute the key site at which nascent 
processes of capitalist accumulation are being regulated in transitional economies 
(Lin, 1995: 304; Smart, 1998: 432,438). 
How is this reflected in the transitional Vietnamese economy? In what ways have 
shifts in the power and control of national and local spaces in the regulation of a 
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tourism industry oriented towards the international capitalist economy reflected the 
arguments of authors writing on other transitional economies and regulation theory? 
One reason for the disparity in treatment of the central state may lie in the absence 
of the mode of societalisation in the analytical framework of authors writing about 
transitional economies. Consequently, examining the mode of societalisation as an 
appropriate conceptual tool with which to analyse processes of regulation by the 
central state continues to constitute one area I address in this research investigation. 
In particular, what evidence is there of the VNAT attempting to maintain regulatory 
control over tourism activity operating within national Vietnamese space through 
political compromises and regulatory practices between national and local actors and 
institutions? How effective has it been in achieving this? 
3.3.2 Historical Experiences: Distinct Local Regulatory Processes 
Linking up with the theme of path dependency are findings from authors such as 
Smith and Pickles which support the notion in regulation theory of distinct local 
regulatory processes, which are evolving in transitional economies out of the 
legacies and diversity of historical experiences (Smith & Pickles, 1998: 10). 
Adrian Smith examines how processes of capitalist accumulation in the industrial 
sector of the transitional economy in Slovakia are being mediated regionally, due to 
the embeddedness of economic activities at that scale with current regulatory 
processes evolving out of "the form of regional regulation and integration 
established prior to 1989" (Smith, 1995: 761). These legacies "affect the ability of 
industries and regions to transform themselves into emergent forms of local 
capitalism" together with the specific strategies being formed in the transitional 
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economy (Ibid: 761,762,770). As a result, Smith contends that this is resulting in 
the emergence of distinct and divergent regulatory processes articulated regionally 
among industrial enterprises (Ibid: 767). 
In particular, Smith cites the example of a set of "diversified regional industrial 
economies" (Ibid: 765) established during the socialist era, which were locally- 
integrated and owed their diversified structures to the role they played in the 
capitalist industrialisation of Slovakia before 1939. With the imposition of processes 
of capitalist accumulation, "these regional economies have been best able to react 
flexibly" (Ibid: 765) in realigning regional economic activity and integrating into the 
international capitalist economy in accessing international markets and capital. 
The articulation of regional regulatory processes is also supported by Smart 
(1998: 429), who contends that the socialist system in China has left different regions 
with a great diversity of economic and social resources and institutional forms and 
practices, through which distinct regulatory processes are evolving in the transitional 
economy. 
Similar diversity in historical experiences to that depicted in Slovakia and China 
also exists with regard to socio-economic differentiation between local spaces in 
Vietnam. In particular, from the colonisation of Saigon in 1859 until the 
reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the economy in the south of Vietnam effectively 
functioned as a distinct regional economy, integrated into the international capitalist 
system of accumulation (Nguyen, 1993: 381; Forbes, 1995: 801). On the other hand, 
during this period the development of capitalist economic relations in the northern 
economy remained extremely limited. Consequently, one question I seek to address 
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in this thesis is how differential historical experiences of capitalist economic 
processes in the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City economies have been reflected in the 
development of tourism in these localities in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
Has, as in Smith's case study of Slovakia, the Ho Chi Minh City economy, as the 
local economy historically most imbued with capitalist practices and relations, been 
best equipped in the transitional economy to develop tourism, establish international 
relations in the tourism sphere and integrate tourism activity into the international 
capitalist economy? 
3.3.3 Relations between Local and International Actors and Institutions 
The literature on transitional economies also provides evidence supporting the 
assertion made in regulation theory that distinct local regulatory processes are also 
evolving due to the extent of social and cultural ties between actors and institutions 
in particular local spaces and international spaces, what Smith and Pickles term 
"modes of insertion" in the international capitalist economy (Smith & Pickles, 
1998: 11). As a result, processes of international capitalist economic activity are 
interacting with local spaces within individual transitional economies to highly 
varying degrees. 
Nan Lin (1995: 308-9) illustrates this, in the context of the transitional economy in 
China, where socio-cultural ties have been reignited between actors in Junjiang in 
Fujian province and overseas Chinese communities with the latter providing foreign 
investment and access to overseas markets in stimulating traditional handicraft 
production in Junjiang. Similarly, in the Pearl River Delta region in Guangdong and 
the coastal region of Fujian, socio-cultural ties with overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South-East Asian countries have been utilised as a way of accessing 
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foreign investment in order to develop export-oriented economic activity (lbid: 309). 
By contrast, local spaces in regions in the Chinese interior with few socio-cultural 
ties overseas have been constrained in moving into new capitalist economic areas of 
the transitional economy (Ibid: 309). 
The above discussion helps to inform and develop the issues and questions raised in 
the last chapter, regarding how social and cultural ties between actors in Ho Chi 
Minh City and the overseas Vietnamese and overseas Chinese communities have 
facilitated the development of tourism activity in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy. In light of Nan Lin's analysis, firstly, how significant has capital provided 
by overseas Vietnamese and Chinese actors been in enabling actors in Ho Chi Minh 
City to establish private tourism businesses? Secondly, to what extent has the greater 
social connectedness of actors in Ho Chi Minh City with actors overseas facilitated 
access to international tourism markets and thus developed the international tourism 
business conducted by these businesses vis-ä-vis businesses in Hanoi and Hue? 1 
3.3.4 The Local State 
Despite the acknowledgement of diversity in local regulatory processes, one point of 
consensus expressed throughout the literature on transitional economies is the 
emergence of the local state as the key regulatory institution, mediating global and 
national regulatory processes in local space. 
Smart (1998: 432,435-6) in his analysis of transition in the Chinese economy, 
illustrates that the central state acted as the key conduit through which processes of 
International tourism is specifically tourism business organised in source countries, bringing foreign 
visitors to Vietnam. 
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capitalist accumulation were initially mediated. However, since then, the central 
state has ceded considerable regulatory power to the local state to initiate and 
experiment with nascent capitalist processes. Consequently, in the transitional 
Chinese economy, the local state has been conferred as the key institution regulating 
processes of capitalist economic activity. Moreover, while the central state continues 
to issue broad policy directives and enact resolutions regulating national economic 
space, it has conferred on the local state a significant degree of power and autonomy 
in mediating and adapting its directives and resolutions in line with local interests 
and priorities (Ibid: 443). This therefore serves to weaken the assertion made in 
regulation theory, discussed in Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2, concerning the primacy of 
the central state as a regulatory institution through its role in enacting laws, policies 
and directives which regulate capitalist economic processes across national space. 
As a result, diversity in local regulatory processes, arising out of historical 
experiences and social and cultural ties at the international scale is being accentuated 
by the distinct regulatory practices of the local state. This is leading to "the growth 
of multiple and diverse forms of local capitalism" (Smith and Pickles, 1998: 15). 
The power of the local state in regulating local economic space in the transitional 
Chinese economy has been achieved in two main ways. First, local state institutions 
control the bulk of productive activities, enterprises and resources in local space. 
Second, local state officials and institutions retain a significant degree of control 
over bureaucratic and administrative levers, such as in the issuing of licences, 
thereby regulating the entry of actors into capitalist economic activities arising out 
of the transition (Lin, 1995: 304,307; Smart, 1998: 434,441). As a result, Lin 
maintains that in the transitional Chinese economy, local state institutions and 
officials have been able not only to maintain their traditional dominance in local 
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economic space, but also to extend their control over lucrative new activities in the 
nascent capitalist economy (Lin, 1995: 304). 
The preceding discussion helps to operationalise and situate the local state more 
firmly within the conceptual framework of the regulation theory approach, by 
augmenting our understanding of the role of the local state in regulating processes of 
capitalist accumulation and in mediating global and national regulatory processes. 
This is a theme which in the last chapter I had identified as under-researched. 
Nevertheless, building on the themes introduced in this section, in my research 
investigation I firstly need to examine to what extent the findings of Smart and Lin 
writing in the context of the transitional Chinese economy are relevant also to 
Vietnam. Furthermore, by incorporating the mode of societalisation into my 
analytical framework, I also seek to investigate the extent to which regulatory 
control over tourism space in the transitional Vietnamese economy has been 
negotiated over, rather than simply ceded, by the central state to the local state. 
Within this investigation I need to consider issues such as the role of political 
imperatives in the reconfiguration of regulatory processes between the central and 
the local state. 
Connected to the above point, in the context of the regulation of international 
tourism, is the need to investigate the extent to which the central state tourism 
institution - the VNAT - continues to play an important role in regulating 
international tourism space by acting as a conduit between international and local 
tourism actors and institutions, including local state tourism institutions. 
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Nevertheless, within local spaces in the transitional Vietnamese economy, has the 
local state, as Lin depicts in China, emerged as the key institution regulating nascent 
capitalist economic activities, such as tourism? At the same time, with the 
sanctioning of private economic activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy, 
what capacity have local state institutions and officials had in regulating the entry of 
private tourism actors and the development of private tourism businesses in local 
spaces? Moreover, what evidence is there that in the regulation of private tourism 
activity in local spaces in the transitional Vietnamese economy, social capital 
between local state institutions and officials and private tourism business owners has 
constituted an important mechanism? I return to consider this theme in more detail 
in the next section when I review the literature on social capital in the context of 
transitional economies. 
One final question to consider is what evidence is there to support the claim of 
Smith and Pickles (1998: 15) that in transitional economies not only are diverse local 
regulatory processes emerging out of historical, social and cultural specificities, but 
also out of the distinct regulatory practices of individual local states? I will seek to 
address this question by examining the practices of local state institutions and 
officials in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City in regulating tourism activity in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
3.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 
Within the literature on transitional economies there is a considerable body of 
evidence demonstrating the role social capital has played in regulating relations 
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between social, economic and political actors and institutions for the purposes of 
obtaining material objectives and in the carrying out of economic activity. 
Demonstrating the path dependent nature of social capital is recognition that during 
the socialist era, social capital constituted an important mechanism through which 
scarce basic consumer goods were procured in transitional economies (Wu, 2001: 33; 
Yang, 2002: 463,464; Fan, 2002: 377). The existence of social capital in the former 
Soviet Union can be illustrated by the fact that in the Russian language there is a 
term - blat - which describes many of the characteristics inherent in social capital 
(Xin & Pearce, 1996: 1642; Wu, 2001: 28 from Walder, 1986: 179). Similarly in 
China, during the Cultural Revolution, social capital represented an important 
mechanism in overcoming institutional impediments and achieving material 
objectives (Smart, 1998: 433). In fact, guanxi, the term used in China to describe the 
invoking of social relations for the purposes of obtaining material objectives, has 
according to authors such as Wu Jieh-Min (2001: 29) functioned for hundreds of 
years as a set of values that emphasise instrumental personal ties in the ordering of 
socio-economic and political life. 
Of particular significance to my own research investigation is the fact that guanxi is 
culturally and historically rooted in the Confucian ethics of interpersonal kinship 
relations, where the rule of Man has traditionally been privileged over the rule of 
law and where the cultivation of social ties has been instrumental in structuring 
relations between the state and civil society (Guthrie, 1998: 257; Pye, 1999: 776; Fan, 
2002: 376). Consequently in Vietnam, with socio-economic and political institutional 
structures similarly originating in the doctrine of Confucianism, to what extent has 
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this also resulted in social ties playing an important institutional role regulating 
social and political relations in Vietnamese society? 
3.4.1 Social Capital in Transitional Economies 
Among authors writing about transitional economies in ECE and China, most 
highlight the role that social ties and relations are currently playing in regulating 
economic activity and in particular nascent capitalist economic activities arising out 
of the introduction of the capitalist economy. In the context of socio-economic 
transformation, the introduction of capitalist market institutions, the restructuring of 
governance mechanisms and re-integration into the international capitalist economy, 
it is argued that social capital is adapting and shaping new configurations of socio- 
economic institutional practices and finding new fertile ground in which to thrive 
(Smart, 1998: 433; Yang, 2002: 459,460). 
While the literature on transitional economies recognises the role that horizontal 
ties between entrepreneurs and vertical ties between entrepreneurs and state 
managers are playing in regulating nascent capitalist economic activities, it is at the 
entrepreneur - local state official nexus on which the bulk of analysis 
is 
concentrated (Lin, 1995: 3 10; Fan, 2002: 374). This is due to a number of contextual 
issues. 
First, as I mentioned in Section 3.3.1, a number of writers contend that in the 
transitional economy local state institutions and officials have been afforded key 
roles in regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in local spaces. For 
example, through their control over bureaucratic and administrative 
levers, such as 
the issuing of licences, local state officials constitute key regulatory conduits 
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through which entrepreneurs must interface and negotiate in order to participate in 
new capitalist economic activities such as tourism (Sum, 1999: 142; Peng & Luo, 
2000: 488; Wu, 2001: 34; Yang, 2002: 464,465). 
Second, while capitalist market institutional structures such as transparent and 
coherent business laws are being introduced in transitional economies, they remain 
weak and opaque (Smart, 1993: 404; Wank, 1996: 822; Peng & Luo, 2000: 486,487; 
Wu, 2001: 36). Consequently, entrepreneurs are cultivating social ties with local state 
officials, as a substitute for dealing with these undeveloped formal institutional 
structures. In the transitional Hungarian economy, Stark (1996: 1016) describes how 
similar processes are occurring as a way of overcoming "the blurring and ambiguity 
in legitimating principles and property rights" as entrepreneurs seek to take 
advantage of burgeoning business opportunities in the nascent capitalist economy 
(Stark in Smart, 1998: 433; Rose-Ackerman, 2001,563). 
Third, while capitalist market institutional structures are being reworked by the 
central state into a framework of formal rules and laws for regulating capitalist 
economic activity, local state institutions have themselves been vested with 
considerable discretionary powers in interpreting and enforcing these rules and laws 
in local space (Davies et al., 1995: 211; Sum, 1999: 139; Wu, 2001: 28 from Walder, 
1986: 26-27). In particular, where the central state has attempted to streamline 
regulatory processes and hollow out cumbersome and complicated bureaucratic 
arrangements from the former socialist system, these have been fiercely contested 
and mediated by local state institutions and officials as they seek to retain control 
over bureaucratic levers and the privileges which this control affords them (Davies 
et al., 1995: 211). Consequently, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, vaned 
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and arbitrary regulatory processes are emerging out of the fusion of old and new 
institutional structures and practices which have again motivated entrepreneurs to 
cultivate social ties with local state officials. 
Fourth, formal legal institution structures and practices are also being contested and 
mediated by state and non-state actors, as they represent an attempt to displace more 
culturally and socially-embedded informal norms, which have traditionally 
functioned to order social, political and economic relations (Pye, 1995: 37). The 
notion of guanxi could be cited as an example here. 
All of the above factors have therefore produced an institutional environment 
characterised by uncertainty, significant distrust, unpredictability in the enforcement 
of rules and arbitrary bureaucratic intervention. As a result, social ties have been 
cultivated by entrepreneurs with local state officials as an alternative to formal 
bureaucratic processes and procedures in regulating economic activity in transitional 
economies (Smart, 1993: 398,404; Xin & Pearce, 1996: 1645; Guthrie, 1998: 257; 
Peng & Luo, 2000: 486,487) 
The above discussion has provided invaluable insight into the role of institutional 
and contextual factors in the unfolding of regulatory processes and the role that 
social ties between entrepreneurs and local state officials are playing in regulating 
economic activity in the transitional economies of ECE and China. To what extent 
are similar processes occurring in Vietnam? In particular, in establishing and 
running a private tourism business, to what extent has the cultivation of social ties 
by entrepreneurs with local state officials constituted an important institutional 
mechanism regulating business activity? 
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3.4.2 Social Capital in Practice 
Informing and augmenting the discussion in Chapter 2 on social capital is the 
significant body of academic literature written in the last few years in particular 
about guanxi, in which the role that social ties have played in regulating capitalist 
economic activities in the transitional Chinese economy is analysed. Reviewing the 
literature on guanxi introduces a number of useful themes for my research 
investigation. 
3.4.3 Sites in Creating Social Capital 
The key sites in which guanxi is created mirror those identified in the social capital 
literature by authors such as Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995), namely sites 
which evoke a sense of shared affiliation through: family, kinship, school, 
university, workplace, home village, town or province (Smart, 1993: 399 from 
Yang, 1988: 411; Bell, 2000: 135). 
Building on this, a number of authors, such as David Wank (1996), have illustrated 
how in the transitional Chinese economy, guanxi has been invoked by entrepreneurs 
as a way of participating in nascent capitalist economic activities. Authors such as 
Wank reinforce the idea that entrepreneurs cultivating vertical ties with local state 
officials constitutes a key mechanism regulating nascent capitalist economic 
activities. Wank (1996) in particular identifies a number of important sites through 
which entrepreneurs are invoking social ties. Friendships formed during childhood 
and adolescence, particularly through shared affiliation as school mates or 
university friends, are being invoked by entrepreneurs in cultivating social ties with 
former classmates now working as state officials (Wank, 1996: 829,830). 
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Entrepreneurs are also utilising previous experience working in state institutions in 
cultivating social ties with former colleagues (Ibid: 831). 
In invoking guanxi, Wank found that the stronger the guanxi tie, the stronger the 
obligation between actors. Thus, in terms of support, the bigger the favour available 
to an entrepreneur with smaller if indeed any pecuniary reward required by the state 
official (Ibid: 828). The higher a state official's rank, the greater the discretionary 
power able to be wielded by the official with regard to the extent of the favour 
afforded to an entrepreneur (Ibid: 826). Moreover, a tie with a high-ranking official 
also provides an entrepreneur with access to the official's network, thus significantly 
reducing the time and money an entrepreneur needs to spend cultivating a network 
(Ibid: 826). 
3.4.4 Benefits 
3.4.4.1 Vertical Ties 
Authors writing about guanxi identify how vertical ties with local state officials are 
being cultivated by entrepreneurs as a way of achieving two key objectives: firstly, 
in facilitating the process of establishing a private business, and secondly, in 
facilitating the running of a private business (Peng & Luo, 2000: 486,487,490). 
With regard to establishing a private business, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, in the 
transitional economy local state officials retain significant control over bureaucratic 
levers, such as the issuing of licences. Consequently, they possess considerable 
discretionary power in approving or rejecting applications to establish a private 
business. Moreover, they constitute key regulatory conduits through which 
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entrepreneurs must interface in navigating the potentially cumbersome 
bureaucratic process of applying for a multitude of licences which still exist and 
are required in establishing a new business (Davies et al., 1995: 212; Xin & Pearce, 
1996: 1643; Wank, 1996: 829; Sum, 1999: 139; Peng & Luo, 2000: 489; Fan, 
2002: 378). 
In facilitating the running of a private business, authors writing on guanxi identify 
how ties with local state officials can assist an entrepreneur with the smooth 
completion of administrative tasks, carried out periodically by local state officials 
(Davies et al., 1995: 212; Wank, 1996: 820,823,829; Sum, 1999: 139; Fan, 2002: 
378). It is also claimed that in the absence of any guanxi tie, local state officials may 
use their control over administrative levers to cause significant disruption to 
particular businesses or to profit by levying arbitrary fines, whether there has been 
any wrongdoing or not (Wank, 1996: 825; Xin & Pearce, 1996: 1641,1643,1654). 
Furthermore, as local state officials also retain considerable discretionary powers in 
interpreting and enforcing rules and laws, for an entrepreneur close ties with 
relevant officials can also be cultivated with the objective of circumventing rules 
and laws as a way of enhancing business performance and profitability (Davies et 
al., 1995: 211; Wank, 1996: 820,824; Wu, 2001: 36; Fan, 2002: 374,376). 
Social ties cultivated with state officials can also facilitate access to information for 
entrepreneurs, useful in the development and planning of an entrepreneur's business. 
Sources of information could relate to market trends, business opportunities as well 
as forthcoming changes in central and local state rules and laws and in the case of 
central state rules and laws, the local state's interpretation of them (Smart, 1993: 400; 
Davies et al., 1995: 211; Wank, 1996: 825; Wu, 2001: 36; Fan, 2002: 378). The issue 
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of access to information is particularly relevant in transitional economies, in the 
context where one of the legacies of the former central planning system is how 
information has traditionally been concentrated within the state apparatus and 
disseminated down vertical channels from the centre to local state institutions with 
limited access for non-state actors and institutions (Wank, 1996: 825). 
3.4.4.2 Horizontal Ties 
Within the guanxi literature the cultivation of horizontal ties by entrepreneurs is 
also recognised as currently playing an important role in establishing and running a 
private business in the transitional Chinese economy. Reviewing this literature both 
informs the discussion on social capital in Chapter 2 and provides a number of 
useful themes to investigate in the context of Vietnam. First, in establishing a private 
business, invoking family and friendship ties has been identified as essential for an 
entrepreneur as a way of raising sufficient capital to set up a private business. This 
occurs in the context of a Chinese financial system, dominated by state banks, where 
lending continues to be skewed towards the state rather than the private sector (Xin 
& Pearce, 1996: 1643 from Nee, 1992). Connected to this point and linking up with 
ideas discussed in Section 3.3.3 as well as in Section 2.4.2 in Chapter 2 is how 
authors such as Yang (2002: 463) identify how growing interconnectedness between 
local and international spaces is expanding the scale in which guanxi is being 
cultivated in the transitional Chinese economy. In particular, entrepreneurs are 
cultivating ties with blood relatives living overseas as a way of obtaining capital to 
set up a business. 
According to writers such as Mike Peng and Yadong Luo (2000: 489,497) 
cultivating horizontal ties is also proving vital in running a private business, 
57 
allowing entrepreneurs to compete effectively, to counteract intense competition 
and to sustain business operations. Wank too identifies how horizontal ties with 
former school mates, university friends and colleagues are being cultivated in 
providing market support for an entrepreneur's new business (Wank, 1996: 829; 
831). 
Similar findings have also been revealed in a study by Kuczi and Mako of a local 
community in Hungary and discussed by Grabher and Stark (1998: 68). Kuczi and 
Mako found how in the transitional Hungarian economy, social ties are being 
cultivated between actors with shared affiliation as colleagues in local state 
enterprises during the socialist era. Ties are "reducing the liability of newness" (Ibid: 
1998: 68) i. e. reducing the uncertainties and risks in the setting up of new businesses 
by, for example, introducing and providing customers. 
In my research investigation, I will therefore need to examine how the above points 
are reflected among private tourism business owners in Vietnam. Moreover, as well 
as ties at the local scale, as I discussed in Section 3.3.3, horizontal ties are also 
being cultivated at the international scale by entrepreneurs with blood relatives 
overseas in developing private business operations. Consequently, I will also seek to 
investigate the importance of horizontal ties at the local scale vis-ä-vis at the 
international scale in running a private tourism business. 
3.4.5 Cultivating Guanxi 
The mechanics of cultivating guanxi closely mirror those described in the section on 
social capital in the last chapter. As with social capital, the cultivation and 
strengthening of guanxi ties is articulated through regular social interaction and the 
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exchange of gifts, favours and invitations for meals and drinks (Guthrie, 
1998: 256 from Yang, 1994: 6; Fan, 2002: 372). The cultivation of guanxi requires a 
regular investment of time and money through social interaction and/or financial 
remuneration. In this way, relationships are maintained and strengthened resulting in 
a stream of mutual benefits over the long term (Smart, 1993: 400,402,403; Wank, 
1996: 831; Xin & Pearce, 1996: 1645; Lovett, Simmons & Kali, 1999: 232; Wu, 
2001: 30). Regular social interaction also helps in regularising the behaviour and 
expectations of each party, for example, with regard to the extent of the gift 
required by officials (Wank, 1996: 822). The cultivation of social ties continues as 
long as both parties continue to benefit from the relationship. 2 
The mechanics of cultivating guanxi in producing benefits for socio-economic and 
political actors in the transitional Chinese economy provide a number of useful 
themes for my investigation. I will therefore seek to examine the extent to which 
social ties are similarly being cultivated in the Vietnamese tourism industry, in 
particular, ties cultivated by private tourism business owners with local state 
officials in facilitating the processes of establishing and running tourism businesses. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Within the literature written on the processes of transition occurring in the 
economies of ECE and China, there is a substantial body of evidence which supports 
the utilisation of the key analytical concepts and themes introduced in Chapter 2 in 
my research investigation. 
2 Thus, guanxi can be distinguished from a bribe in that in the former the cultivation of a personal 
relationship over the long term, albeit for business purposes, is implicitly privileged above purely 
commercial considerations (Davies et al., 1995: 2 10). A bribe, on the other hand, is not embedded in 
any social relationship, but is intended only as a one off payment for a service immediately rendered 
(Smart, 1993: 399,403). 
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As in regulation theory, authors writing about transitional economies recognise the 
role of path dependency in the reconfiguration of relations among socio-economic 
and political actors involved in regulating nascent capitalist economic processes in 
these economies. They also support the notions that, firstly, the local scale has 
emerged as a key scale, secondly, that distinct local regulatory processes are 
evolving and, thirdly, that the local state constitutes a key regulatory institution and 
local state institutions and officials pivotal actors in regulating nascent capitalist 
economic processes. 
Nevertheless, discourse on regulatory processes in transitional economies fails to 
address the extent to which regulatory control over nascent capitalist economic 
activities is being negotiated over rather than simply ceded by the central state to the 
local state. Again as I have already discussed, this is in part due to an inadequate 
consideration of the role of political imperatives in the reconfiguration of 
regulatory power and relations between the central and the local state. As a 
result, there is a significant need for further investigation of these two themes. 
Reviewing the literature on transitional economies also provides substantial support 
for utilising the notion of social capital in my research investigation. In particular, 
examining the role of guanxi in the regulation of private economic activity in the 
transitional Chinese economy with the cultivation by entrepreneurs of vertical ties 
with local state officials and horizontal ties with local and international actors 
provides a number of useful themes to incorporate into the analytical framework. 
These are utilised in Chapter 7 to examine the extent to which the notion of social 
60 
capital constitutes an important institutional mechanism regulating private tourism 
activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
The concepts and themes introduced and discussed in Chapter 2 and developed 
further in this chapter now allow me to construct an informed analytical framework, 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. This framework is utilised in Chapter 5 where I provide an 
historical account of regulatory processes in the Vietnamese economy, and 
throughout my investigation into the regulation of tourism in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy in Chapters 6 and 7. Before starting to analyse the findings 
from my research investigation, first in Chapter 4,1 outline how this research was 
undertaken and discuss the different methodologies employed in order to carry out 
qualitative research on Vietnam. 
61 
Figure 3.1. An analytical framework informed by literature on transitional 
economies to examine the regulation of tourism in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy 
Globalisation Neu-Liberalism 
CRITIQUE 
Place/context: 
National, local space 
Social, political, historical practices 
REGULATION THEORY 
(informed by literature on transitional economies) 
Path dependency (analysed Ch. 5,6) 
The Local scale: distinct regulatory processes due to social, historical 
specificity (analysed Ch. 5,7) 
The Local state: local state institutions/officials (analysed Ch. 5,6,7) 
The Central State (analysed Ch. 5,6) 
Mode of Societalisation (analysed Ch. 5,6) 
Incorporation of Political imperatives (analysed Ch. 5,6) 
Analysing Regulatory Processes: 
Relations between social, political, 
economic actors 
Regulatory processes at the local 
scale, the local state 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Guanxi 
Vertical Ties: entrepreneurs & local 
state officials 
Horizontal Ties: local, international 
(analysed Ch. 5,7) 
62 
CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter I outline the different methodologies I employed in undertaking this 
research as well as examining the strengths and shortcomings of these, in particular 
in the context of carrying out qualitative research in Vietnam. 
Having identified from the literature the main concepts and themes relevant to my 
research investigation, I then carried out another review of the literature in order to 
operationalise these concepts in the context of transitional economies. For this, as 
well as utilising the library at the University of Hull to access relevant material, I 
also made use of inter-library loans as well as the British Library. From this, having 
constructed an analytical framework, I then attempted to start to build on and fine 
tune this framework in the context of Vietnam. However, due in large part to a 
dearth of literary sources, particularly in relation to contemporary issues in Vietnam 
including my object of study, tourism, I was unable to accomplish this satisfactorily. 
At the same time, having decided that my research investigation would be best 
carried out on an individual firm basis and that an interview schedule would 
represent the optimal way of gaining information, the lack of relevant material also 
hindered construction of an interview schedule, informed by contextual issues 
(Robson, 1993: 229). 
Consequently, having already made the decision to go to Vietnam in order to 
conduct interviews with tourism business owners and managers, I realised that the 
initial phase in Vietnam would be taken up accessing literary resources and 
gathering material in order to develop my knowledge of social, economic and 
63 
political issues relevant to my research topic as well as to be able to construct an 
interview schedule, sufficiently informed by these issues (Scott, 1990; Punch, 1998: 
190-1). 
4.1 PREPARATION FOR CARRYING OUT FIELD WORK IN VIETNAM 
I lived in Vietnam for 30 months. For most of this time I lived and worked in Hanoi. 
During the interview stage, I stayed in Hue and Ho Chi Minh City for two and a half 
months in each location. Spending such a considerable amount of time in Vietnam 
had been my deliberate intention before leaving the UK for two main reasons: first, 
as explained above in order to gather information. However, perhaps of greater 
importance was that spending such an amount of time `in the field' would allow me 
the opportunity to develop my understanding of socio-economic issues affecting the 
process of transition in Vietnam to a sufficiently deep and nuanced level. This, I 
knew, could only be achieved by working on and raising the standard of my 
Vietnamese language skills to a very high standard. In particular, as the main 
emphasis of my research was on the collection of qualitative, opinion-based data, I 
knew that my knowledge of the native language needed to be good enough so as to 
pick up nuances made in responses, which is a significant feature of the Vietnamese 
language. 
At the same time, while it may equally be true in other countries, from previous 
experience in Vietnam I had already observed how one's ability in the native 
language creates a number of significant advantages for a foreigner, which would be 
extremely useful in carrying out field research for this thesis. First, the ability to 
read Vietnamese would allow me to make use of a much wider variety of 
literary 
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sources, written in the Vietnamese language, rather than relying on material 
translated into the English language and often sanitised in the process. Second, with 
a high standard of spoken and listening competence, I would be able to maximise 
the amount of control I had over the research process, by conducting the whole 
process in the Vietnamese language, rather than losing a significant degree of 
control by relying on translators and interpreters. Thirdly and perhaps most 
importantly of all for the research process would be the respect and/or greater 
acceptance I would gain in the eyes of the majority of Vietnamese people, in being 
seen as a foreigner who had made an effort to master the mother tongue. 
In comparison with what I have observed even in neighbouring countries in South 
East Asia, in Vietnam, few foreigners speak the native language to a reasonable 
standard. Moreover, in contrast to anecdotal evidence from China, Vietnamese 
people do not expect foreigners to know their language. Consequently, conducting 
the research process in the Vietnamese language proved invaluable not only in 
terms of making contact with actors, but more importantly I consider it significantly 
enhanced the depth and integrity of the responses given by respondents and 
informants alike (Burgess, 1984). On a number of occasions, after carrying out an 
interview, a day or so later I would receive a call from a respondent inviting me out 
for a meal. While the essence of the invitation was social, as I discuss throughout 
this thesis, the building of social relations through a meal acted as a precursor to 
more frank conversations on a range of issues, including issues connected to the 
research. Among the majority of respondents interviewed, there seemed to be the 
perception of a symbiosis between language and understanding and that as I spoke 
the Vietnamese language well, then I must equally understand well about the 
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complexities and nuances of social, cultural, economic and political life in Vietnam, 
which in a number of cases I did not. 
Therefore, for the first nine months in Vietnam, I concentrated on raising the 
standard of my Vietnamese language, not by attending formal, structured classes, 
but by self-study, targeting areas of specific utility in the context of my own 
particular research topic and by maximising "real experiences" and interaction with 
Vietnamese people, in particular on the street. At the same time, I carried out a 
comprehensive review of literature published in Vietnam relating to my research 
topic, written both in Vietnamese as well as in English, which in itself served to 
activate and enhance my Vietnamese vocabulary. This included books and articles 
from the National Vietnamese library, the UNDP library, state bookshops, back 
copies of the Vietnam Tourism Review -a journal published by the VNAT, 
newspapers and academic journals published in Vietnam as well as internet web- 
sites relating to general economic and tourism issues in Vietnam. 
4.2 USING DATA 
It is a fact of life in Vietnam that the truth is often without hard 
evidence, but the hard evidence is also often without truth (Phong & 
Beresford, 1998: 8). 
Throughout the research process, for example in building the analytical framework, 
in carrying out the literature review after arriving in Vietnam, in constructing an 
interview schedule and in presenting the findings from my research in chapters 5,6 
and 7,1 have focussed on the collection and presentation of qualitative data. By 
contrast, I have attempted to use official numerical and written data sparingly, 
cross-referencing data sources wherever practicable. While my chosen research 
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topic naturally lent itself to an emphasis on the collection and presentation of 
qualitative, opinion-based data, this in part also reflected my own reservations, 
supported among other writers on Vietnam about the use of official, published data 
as illustrated in the following quotes and comments. 
... we 
have had to rely largely on the methods of oral history. 
Researchers on Vietnam understand only too clearly that reliance on 
documentary sources to support one's arguments and anah'ses, 
especially on official decrees and documents, is likely to produce 
contrary results. One will not be able to understand the hidden truths 
within the process since, in most cases the official documents simply do 
not reflect the real relations involved. In this study, therefore, we have 
relied heavily on our own observations, on unofficial documents and 
on interviews (Phong & Beresford, 1998: 7-8). 
The Party has traditionally manipulated information to serve its own 
ends (Porter, 1993: 139). 
It is widely known that the Party releases inaccurate data in order to 
claim success in the implementation of specific economic policy 
initiatives (Kolko, 1997: 104). 
The unreliability of official statistics in Vietnam has been compounded by firstly, a 
lack of experience in the collection of transparent and accurate data. Official 
statistics have only been widely disseminated since 1987, when the statistical 
annual, Nien Giäm Thong Ke was first published (Forbes, 1995: 794). Secondly, 
institutionalised circumspection and ambivalence towards the disclosure of data by 
private individuals to state institutions as well as information sharing by and 
between state institutions also inhibit the process. 
Both the above shortfalls have affected the reliability of data collected on the 
tourism industry. Consequently, I have been reluctant to use official tourism data to 
any significant degree throughout this thesis in presenting and supporting 
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arguments. As the two quotes below illustrate, regarding the unreliability of official 
tourism statistics: 
The basic problem facing the researcher seeking to reconstruct 
patterns of tourism in Vietnam is the consistence' and reliabiliti' of the 
available statistics. This is confirmed by Anonymous (1997) where the 
statistics on international arrivals do not tally. This is a historical 
problem related to the secrecy which surrounded tourist arrivals 
during the socialist regime. It also reflects internal disagreement 
between the immigration and the tourism departments over what and 
who should be recorded in tourist arrivals (Cooper, 2000: 170). 
As international tourism is a new phenomenon in Vietnam, it is only in 
the last few years that statistical data have been collected on a regular 
basis. One problem affecting the gathering of data is that government 
authorities are not keen on information sharing. Information collection 
on a national scale is as yet poorly developed in Vietnam (Aderhold, 
Twining-Ward, July 1995: 28). 
I encountered a similar problem to the one cited by Cooper above when accessing 
the official Vietnam Tourism website www. vietnamtourism. com to look at 
statistical data on visitor arrivals to Vietnam in 2000.1 thought the breakdown of the 
visitor numbers into nationalities seemed a little low compared to the previous year, 
despite having an `others' category. When I added up the individual nationality 
figures plus the `others', the total was 367,000 short of the 2,140,100 total. ' 
Similar reservations have been expressed in the media exemplified by the following 
comments: 
Official figures from 815,000 to 1.3 million have been called into 
doubt and even in the government-controlled press... 
At a recent conference of hard-pressed hotel managers and tour 
organizers, there were complaints that those numbers had been 
falsified ... and included more than 
200,000 Viet Kieu staying with 
1 Accessed on 25 January 2002 
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relatives (New Frontiers, V2 No. 9, September 1996: 7 from Bangkok 
Post, 29.8.96). 
Vietnam's tourist figures are inflated because they include large 
numbers of Chinese traders who cross the border in the north even, 
day (Backpacker's Alley, Source: Los Angeles Times 
http: //www. saigonnet. vn/dulich/data/backpacker. htm) (accessed on 20 
January 2002). 
Tour operators point out that figures for foreign visitors include huge 
numbers of Viet Kieu, business visitors, Chinese traders and diplomats, 
"making it very difficult to work out how many actual tourists have 
arrived" (VIR, 21-27 May 2001: 4). 
Similarly, when cross-referencing data, particularly quantitative data, to verify 
reliability, I often came across alternative sources which deviated significantly from 
the original source, thus making me circumspect in using any of the data. Examples 
were as follows: 
According to the Saigonnet website, in 2001, around 700,000 foreign visitors came 
to Hanoi, an increase of 40% on 2000, whereas in year 2000 statistical annual for 
Hanoi, the figure for foreign visitors is only 320,000 
(http: //www. saigonnet. vn/dulich, 2 January 2002 viewed 1 February 2002; Cuc 
Thong ke, Ha Noi, Ni en Giam Thong Ke Hanoi 2000: 135). 
In the March 1996 edition of the Vietnam Tourism Review, it is quoted that in 1995, 
Saigontourist received 245,701 foreign customers, more than double the 1994 
figure. However, two months later in the same journal, the same figure is only 
32,476 (Tap chi Du lich, March 1996: 37; Tap chi Du lich, May 1996: 32). 
With regard to the poor disclosure of accurate data in particular by private 
businesses, concurring with the comments made by Gates below, it was repeatedly 
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mentioned to me about the difficulties state officials and institutions have in 
collecting reliable statistical data from private businesses, as almost all private 
business owners understate revenue earned in order to reduce their tax liabilities. 
Quantitative analysis is not fruitful particularly with regard to 
statistics of private businesses due to the sensitivity of financial data: 
revenue, profits, taxes etc. (Gates, 1996: 215). 
Furthermore, as I illustrate in Chapter 7, official data disseminated about private 
businesses also has to be treated with circumspection as complicity between local 
state officials and business owners also results in the underreporting of data in 
particular, relating to revenue earned by individual businesses as owners attempt to 
reduce their tax liabilities. 
On the other hand, complicating the situation even more were comments made to 
me by a foreign tourism consultant with a number of years experience in Vietnam, 
who told me to be particularly cautious of quantitative data provided to me during 
interviews as tourism business owners and managers would tend to exaggerate 
performance figures, for example, customers served or revenue earned, in order to 
suggest that their businesses were performing better than was actually the case (K12, 
18.06.01). 
4.3 THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
With the collection and assimilation of literary as well as anecdotal material in the 
initial period in the field, I was then ready to start designing an interview schedule 
greatly informed by this material. 
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4.3.1 Designing the Interview Schedule 
As can be seen in Appendix 1, the first part of the interview schedule contained a 
`Supplementary Questionnaire', which was used to garner general background and 
statistical information relating to businesses and business owners. In line with the 
objectives of the field research discussed earlier in this chapter, the main part of the 
interview schedule contained predominantly open-ended questions as my priority 
was to gather qualitative, subjective and opinion-based information and data 
(Fowler, 1993; Oppenheim, 1996: 112-3). With this in mind, the interview schedule 
was designed in a way that lent itself to the carrying out of semi-structured 
interviews. While interviewers were to follow a prepared schedule of subject areas 
and questions, the design of the interview schedule allowed them a degree of 
flexibility in probing more deeply by asking follow-up questions on interesting 
issues and opinions arising in the course of conducting an interview with a tourism 
business owner or manager (Gilbert, 1993: 136; Mason, 1996). 
The `main interview schedule' was divided into 8 sections, broadly reflecting the 
stages in developing a business and similar to the structure of Chapter 7. In line with 
one of the objectives of the research investigation, for private businesses, the main 
focus in the sections on `establishing a tourism business', `running a business' 
and `business development' was on the existence, origin and nature of social ties 
cultivated by business owners and the extent to which these ties; both vertical and 
horizontal, had facilitated the establishment process and were currently facilitating 
the running and development of the tourism business. In doing so, I would then be 
able to determine the importance of social capital as a regulatory norm and the 
71 
impact of ties at particular spatial scales for the regulation of tourism business 
activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
In the section on running a business, questions were also asked to elicit 
information and opinions from respondents concerning how the official and 
unofficial regulatory environments for tourism businesses had evolved since the 
establishment of their businesses. In particular, in relation to my research 
framework, tourism business owners and managers were asked questions 
concerning changes in the influence of institutions and actors situated in local and 
national space on regulatory processes in the transitional economy. This was done in 
order to examine how the regulatory control of national and local actors and 
institutions has shifted during the process of transition. 
Connected to this, the section on international tourism promotion sought to 
identify how institutions at the national scale, in particular the VNAT, and at the 
local scale were cultivating ties and promoting the Vietnamese tourism industry in 
the international capitalist economy. This would allow me to examine to what 
extent, in promoting Vietnam as an international tourism destination, the practices 
of these institutions were evolving in a path dependent manner and out of historical 
legacies from previous socio-economic systems. 
While private tourism businesses constituted the main focus of the investigation, 
state tourism business managers were also interviewed in part as a way of 
examining how, in the transitional economy, the regulatory practices of both 
national and local state institutions have impacted on the development of these 
businesses vis-ä-vis private tourism businesses. In designing separate interview 
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schedules for both state and private tourism businesses, I tried to minimise any 
differences between the two schedules, in order that reliable comparison could be 
made between the different types of businesses. Only the section on establishing a 
business exhibited significant variance between the schedules, reflecting the 
obvious differences in the processes of setting up a state and a private business. 
The interview schedule drafted in English was then, to make more efficient use of 
time translated into Vietnamese by a Vietnamese colleague, an academic. I then 
reviewed the completed translation, annotating any parts where I considered that the 
translation failed to convey the exact meaning and nuance I wanted. I then discussed 
these points with my colleague and made any changes that were necessary. I then 
asked a friend, a failing entrepreneur, to review the Vietnamese translation and to 
make any suggestions regarding alterations. It was quite surprising how many 
changes my entrepreneur friend recommended to the interview schedule translated 
by a fellow Vietnamese, as a way of clarifying the meaning of questions and making 
the interview schedule linguistically more "business savvy" to respondents, the 
majority of whom like him were going to be business people and not academics. It 
served to illustrate how the same questions and statements could be interpreted by 
different people in different ways (Hoinville and Jowell, 1978: 42; Fowler, 1993). 
This is a theme I discuss in Chapter 5 in relation to the interpretation of official 
regulations by state officials. For the purposes of the interview process, this was 
something therefore to be mindful of in conducting interviews to ensure that 
consistency in the interpretation of questions by respondents was maintained. 
Before conducting face to face interviews, the interview schedule was piloted on 10 
tourism businesses owned or managed by friends and business relations of my 
73 
entrepreneur friend, after which time a few of the questions were modified 
(Oppenheim, 1996). 
4.3.2 Finding a Research Assistant 
It had been my intention that during the interview stage, I would hire an assistant to 
help in sharing this work. At the time I envisaged someone who, with good English 
language skills, could both carry out interviews and then translate their findings into 
English for me to analyse. However, my search for a research assistant initiated a 
pattern which was to continue throughout the interview stage in both Hanoi and Hue 
of candidates emerging, who at the outset seemed both qualified and comfortable in 
doing the tasks involved. However, as they started to comprehend the full extent of 
the interview, in particular the depth of enquiry required, and consequently the 
demands placed on them, candidates became less enthusiastic and one by one made 
excuses or simply disappeared from the picture. 
An acquaintance, a Vietnamese academic who has conducted extensive 
collaborative research with a UK university, contended that the academic traditions 
in the UK and Vietnam are very different. According to him, in the UK enquiry is 
comparatively deep and rigorous, with researchers requiring a thorough knowledge 
of their object of study and always probing in order to understand why. Whereas in 
Vietnam, he asserted that in large part due to social, cultural and political traditions, 
academic research is relatively superficial and much less questioning with enquiry 
concentrating on what with little interest in how or why. Therefore, he considered 
that it would be difficult for most Vietnamese people to comprehend the amount of 
detail and depth I required in my own particular research investigation. 
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In Hanoi, candidates who fell by the wayside included: my colleague, who had 
translated the original questionnaire, who held a Bachelor's degree and a Master's 
degree and at the time was also studying for a PhD; and a man, recommended by a 
foreign friend at the UNDP in Hanoi, who had extensive experience working on 
projects for institutions such as the UN. I finally had to advertise for a research 
assistant in the Vietnam News. Unfortunately once again, the successful applicant, 
having seemed capable in preliminary discussions, was, as more detailed instruction 
of the research task was given, able to grasp only a fraction of what was required, 
despite being given repeated instruction in both English and Vietnamese. 
4.3.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
4.3.3.1 Snowball Sampling 
The only individual who seemed able to assimilate the issues and objectives relating 
to the interview thoroughly and deeply was my entrepreneur friend, Thang. 
2 While I 
was looking for a research assistant, he had agreed to initiate the interview stage by 
approaching connections of his working in tourism businesses in Hanoi. Thus, 
employing snowball sampling, Thang was able to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with tourism business owners or staff, with whom he had pre-existing 
relations, some of whom, in turn, introduced him to relations of theirs working in 
other tourism businesses. I was nevertheless mindful of a possible bias in the 
snowball sample, with business owners and managers interviewed then introducing 
respondents from within their social networks with similar backgrounds and 
opinions (Gilbert, 1993: 74; Oppenheim, 1996: 43; Lee, 1999: 66-7). Thang and I 
therefore monitored and assessed the profiles of respondents to ensure the inclusion 
21 have used a pseudonym to protect the anonymity of my research assistant. 
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of a diverse and representative sample of respondents, of different ages, 
backgrounds and from as full and representative a range of tourism businesses as 
possible, i. e. hotels and tour operators under state, private and joint-venture 
ownership (Gilbert, 1993: 74; Lee, 1999: 68). 
The disadvantage of snowball sampling was that it was slow in generating a large 
quantity of respondents and data. However, the major advantage of this technique 
came about out of the pre-existing personal ties and social networks in which Thang 
and respondents were embedded. In a similar way to that discussed in the section on 
social capital in Chapter 2, this facilitated co-operation between Thang and 
respondents. At the same time, Thang was "able to vouch for the researcher's bona 
fides" (Lee, 1999: 67). As a result, interviews were in the main conducted in an 
atmosphere of informality, friendliness, conviviality and most importantly trust, in 
which opinions could be freely expressed. This I consider allowed a wealth of 
authentic and subjective qualitative data to be collected. This was thankfully in 
contrast to the experience of many other foreign writers and researchers, who have 
found that in Vietnam "acquiring information is sometimes like extracting teeth. 
There still seems to be deep-rooted suspicions if someone asks questions " 
(Coomber, 2000: 29). 
I was fortunate that the period in which I was unsuccessfully looking for a suitable 
research assistant coincided with the dissolution of Thang's two failed businesses. 
As a result, we managed to negotiate terms by which he became formally involved 
in assisting me. The only downside in his appointment was that he did not speak 
English. As a result, the whole interview process was conducted in Vietnamese. A 
lot of my time was therefore then assigned to translating data, from Vietnamese into 
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English, from interviews Thang had carried out, work which I had anticipated being 
done by a research assistant. 
At one stage, we did attempt to hire a translator to translate information from 
completed interviews into English. However, despite only being given the remit to 
translate word for word, she insisted on omitting to translate large chunks of the 
Vietnamese text. When questioned about this, she responded that she did not 
consider it useful. In fact, a lot of the omitted material contained salient and 
extremely useful data. After this experiment had failed, I decided to do the 
translation myself. Although translating the interview schedules completed by 
Thang from Vietnamese into English was extremely time consuming and reduced 
the amount of time I was able to devote to conducting interviews myself, as I was 
personally responsible for reviewing all completed interview schedules, this allowed 
me to retain a high degree of control over the quality of information generated 
during the interview process. At the same time, translating interview schedules 
during the interview phase, as well as reducing the amount of time I would need to 
spend completing this task at the end of the interview process, was also of particular 
importance as it allowed me to identify trends and pick up on themes emerging from 
interviews completed. These could then be raised in subsequent interviews. 
One further issue was that the interview schedule drafted was 38 (font size 8) typed 
pages long. Thus, Thang and I were concerned about the length of time it would 
take to complete one interview, and, in particular, the length of time a respondent 
would be required to answer questions. We first attempted to reduce the actual 
interviewing time by obtaining the background, personal and statistical data 
required in the supplementary questionnaire outside of the core 
interview; either 
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over the telephone, in a brief meeting at the respondent's office or by leaving a 
supplementary questionnaire for the respondent to complete in their own time. 
However, during piloting, completion of the main interview schedule still took an 
excessive amount of time, well over two hours. Thang and I agreed that the 
optimum time we should aim for was around one hour and certainly no more than 
one and a half hours. In order to achieve this, we first attempted to use a Dictaphone 
when carrying out interviews. However, although most respondents raised no 
objections when we asked and explained why we wanted to record the interview, we 
still felt that in using the Dictaphone there was a sense that we were taking control 
over the information produced from the interview, and making respondents a little 
wary and overall creating a more formal atmosphere to the possible detriment to the 
quality of responses. As a result, in subsequent interviews, we dispensed with the 
Dictaphone and instead while following the interview schedule we took down notes 
ensuring that this did not affect to any significant degree the flow or informality of 
the interview. From these notes, we then completed the schedule in greater detail as 
soon as possible after the interview. 
In other cases, having pre-existing ties or developing relations with respondents 
provided us with greater flexibility in carrying out interviews. In a lot of cases an 
interviewer only has one chance to meet a respondent. However, where we already 
had social relations with respondents, more than one meeting could be arranged, 
giving us the opportunity to follow up on issues raised in previous meetings. 
Alternatively, where respondents were constrained by time in completing a whole 
interview at one time, more than one meeting could be arranged at which parts of 
the interview were conducted. Again, as I mentioned earlier, pre-existing social ties 
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between Thang and respondents acted to enhance the level of co-operation between 
ourselves and respondents and in the majority of cases, instilled a high level of trust 
between both parties; for respondents, our pledge to keep all identities anonymous, 
for which I consider respondents generally provided detailed, open and truthful 
responses. 
Again articulating the discussion on social capital, after an interview had been 
completed, to show our gratitude and as a way of cultivating social relations with 
respondents or as described in Chapter 2 as a "social investment strategy", we 
generally invited respondents out for a meal and a few beers or occasionally (rice) 
wine. In most cases, invitations were accepted, for lunch, if an interview had taken 
place in the morning; or for a few drinks and snacks at the end of an afternoon 
interview. On occasion, entertaining could take up an entire afternoon or evening, if 
the respondent indicated that he wanted this. As well as a way of cultivating social 
relations, entertaining a respondent also gave us an opportunity to finish asking 
questions, if we had not quite managed to finish an interview or to probe for more 
details on particularly interesting points or issues arising from the interview, in a 
more informal setting. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, developing relations 
also enhanced opportunities to meet respondents more than once. 
After Thang had conducted an interview and completed an interview schedule, I 
reviewed it, annotating any areas for which I needed clarification. In line with the 
comments I made earlier in this chapter, regarding the superficiality in Vietnamese 
analysis, I had emphasised to Thang the amount of depth I required when giving 
instruction on the interview schedule. Nevertheless, this was usually the area in 
which I sought greater clarification. Again reviewing information from an interview 
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conducted by Thang was at times extremely arduous as I tried to extract as much 
useful data as I could from every interview. The process of reviewing one schedule 
did at times take several hours to complete, sometimes causing severe exasperation 
on my part or on the part of Thang, exhausted by my incessant demands for 
disclosure of every sinew of potentially useful data. But probing further did at times 
produce extremely useful additional information which had been omitted from the 
completed schedule. 
4.3.3.2 Simple Random Sampling 
As well as utilising snowball sampling and approaching tourism business owners 
and managers with whom we had pre-existing relations, using a list of tourism 
businesses I had compiled from a range of sources, including local business 
directories, newspaper advertisements and guide books, we also employed a simple 
random sample to select owners of small, private hotels with whom we had no pre- 
existing relations. These were located predominantly in the Old Quarter of Hanoi 
(36 ph6 phuö'ng), the area where the bulk of small, private hotels serving foreign 
backpackers has been set up in the last few years. I anticipated that the simple 
random sample would complement the snowball sample by generating a greater 
quantity of data at a faster rate than we were achieving with the snowball sampling, 
if not as rich a supply of qualitative data. I envisaged that approaching and 
interviewing owners of small, private hotels would be relatively straightforward and 
uncomplicated by cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, such as obtaining letters of 
introduction and getting official permission, often required in approaching state 
institutions. 
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However, after trialing the random sampling method for about one month, this was 
largely abandoned as results were in the main disappointing, not only in terms of the 
quality of data obtained, but also in the slow rate at which interviews were being 
completed. While initial contact with the majority of private hotel owners was on 
the whole encouraging and seemed to offer the promise of co-operation, arranging 
to conduct interviews proved more difficult. Owners seemed to use a wide variety 
of excuses to avoid being interviewed. Again it sought to underline the importance 
of social capital and how while pre-existing ties with respondents, in the snowball 
sample, seemed to create an obligation to co-operate; with the private hotel owners 
approached in the random sample, as there were no pre-existing ties, there was 
therefore no obligation to assist and be interviewed. As a consequence, during the 
remaining time spent interviewing in Hanoi, we concentrated on utilising the 
snowball sample. As mentioned previously, while this limited the number of 
interviews we were able to carry out, I consider that this was more than 
compensated for by the quality of data obtained. 
The interview process in Hanoi was undertaken between the middle of May and the 
end of August 2001. Before moving to Hue at the beginning of September 2001, we 
decided to mailshoot tourism businesses in Hue and sent letters to fifty-two 
businesses, introducing my study to them, informing them about our intention to 
come to Hue and asking for their co-operation in allowing us to conduct interviews, 
providing an email address for them to reply to. We hoped that by doing this, we 
would save time in having to introduce ourselves and the study after arriving in 
Hue. However, our initiative was not at all successful. In total, before we arrived in 
Hue, we had received only two replies from tourism businesses. Similarly, once we 
had arrived in Hue and started making contact with tourism businesses, the response 
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was again relatively poor, with only around 40% of tourism business owners and 
managers agreeing to be interviewed. It seemed that our lack of connections was 
inhibiting the process. 
As a result, instead, we started to focus more on utilising Thang's relations, living in 
and around Hue and as in Hanoi employing snowball sampling. Thang's parents' 
homeland (que huong) was a district just outside Hue. Consequently, Thang had a 
lot of blood relatives still living and working in and around Hue. These included an 
uncle who was the manager of a general state company in Hue, with businesses 
including a hotel, and a cousin, who was the manager of a tourist boating company 
belonging to a local state tourism company. Through the connections of Thang's 
relatives, we were introduced directly to tourism business owners and managers, 
which greatly improved our opportunities to conduct interviews with them. At the 
same time, the husband of one of Thang's cousins, who worked in the Hue 
statistical office, and his colleague, both of whom had an extensive network of 
connections in the locality, agreed to carry out interviews with tourism businesses 
with which they had connections. Both these men quickly assimilated the depth of 
enquiry demanded in conducting interviews and, combined with having pre-existing 
relations with respondents, their interviews produced a wealth of invaluable 
qualitative data. Again as we did in Hanoi, to counter any possible bias in the 
representativeness of the snowball sample, after interview schedules had been 
completed, Thang and I analysed details regarding respondents and their businesses 
to ensure that a diverse range of respondents, of different ages, backgrounds etc. 
was being interviewed. Using tourism statistics from the provincial state statistical 
office also ensured that a representative sample of both state and private hotels and 
tour operators was being included. 
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The interview process in Hue was completed in two and a half months from the 
beginning of September to the middle of November 2001. Thereafter, we moved to 
Ho Chi Minh City. From the outset, using the experience gained in Hanoi and Hue, 
we utilised snowball sampling and made use of friends of Thang, who like Thang 
were originally from the north of Vietnam, who had primarily met each other while 
studying together at university in Hanoi and who were now working in Ho Chi 
Minh City. Thang's friends introduced us to tourism businesses in which they had 
connections. In turn, the owners, managers or staff at these tourism businesses 
introduced us to relations of theirs who owned or worked in other tourism 
businesses. Again based on our experience in Hanoi and Hue, Thang and I 
monitored respondents and businesses interviewed to ensure representativeness in 
our sample. The interview process in Ho Chi Minh City was conducted from the 
middle of November 2001 until just before Tet (Vietnamese New Year), at the 
beginning of February 2002. 
In total, interviews were conducted with owners and staff at 117 private, state and 
foreign-invested joint-venture tour operators and hotels: 40 in Hanoi, 31 in Hue, 2 in 
Hol An and 44 in Ho Chi Minh City. A profile of these businesses can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
After the end of the interview phase and after I had finished translating the 
interview schedules arising out of these final interviews into English, I set about 
devising a method to analyse the data collected. As I had deliberately set out to 
83 
collect predominantly qualitative data with an interview schedule largely comprised 
of open ended questions, I did not then simply want to convert, represent or confine 
the data collected into boxes and numbers. However, it was difficult to know how to 
deal systematically with the qualitative data collected when "there are no 
prescriptive formulae for this task" (Robson, 1993: 370). 1 eventually decided to 
design three two-dimensional matrices in order to analyse the responses made by 
business owners and managers to questions regarding, firstly, background 
information and the establishment process, secondly, the running of the business 
and, thirdly, business development (Robson, 1993). Separate matrices were used to 
analyse data and compare private versus state tourism businesses and between 
businesses interviewed in the three locations at which interviews were conducted: 
Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. 
Down the vertical axis, I listed a series of subject headings which corresponded to 
points 1 had identified when constructing the analytical framework in chapters 2 and 
3. As a brief example, Appendix 3 illustrates part of the matrix designed to analyse 
the establishment process, for private tourism business owners in Hanoi. As a way 
of determining the existence, origin and nature of social ties cultivated by business 
owners, points in this matrix included: the birthplace of business owners, the years 
at the current business location, education, experience, ties and relations with 
particular institutions and the origin of these ties etc. This is illustrated in the matrix 
by initials and abbreviations representing a guide to the responses obtained from 
each business owner or manager interviewed. Completing the matrices was a 
relatively painstaking process, taking approximately two months. After this time, I 
was then in a position to analyse and interpret the data obtained in addressing the 
key themes in the analytical framework constructed for the research investigation. 
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At the same time, by collecting data comprising long, opinion-based responses to 
open-ended questions, as well as presenting my findings in the form of an overview 
based on the responses of tourism business owners and managers, I also have a 
wealth of quotations which I have extensively utilised to support my findings 
particularly in chapters 6 and 7 which I consider really inform the discussion and 
personalise the points raised. 
4.5 RELATIONS WITH THE VNAT 
During the first year of the PhD, while I was still in the UK, a colleague from the 
Centre for South-East Asian Studies in Hull, who was conducting research in 
Vietnam, approached the VNAT on my behalf to introduce my research. Thereafter, 
I was officially invited by the Institute for Tourism Development Research (ITDR) 
(Vien Nghien cüu Phät trien Du lich), the research institution of the VNAT, to come 
and conduct research in Vietnam. The ITDR acted as my sponsor in applying for a 
visa. 
During my time in Vietnam, relations between myself and contacts at the ITDR 
closely reflected what I was discovering about relations between private tourism 
business owners and local state officials. While tourism research was officially 
encouraged by the VNAT, particular officials at the ITDR who were responsible for 
"supporting" me and facilitating my research investigation possessed considerable 
discretionary and arbitrary powers in interpreting this policy. 
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Initially, I attempted to cultivate close relations with my contact, the ironically titled 
Head of the International Co-operation Section at the ITDR, by emphasising how I 
wanted my study to be more a collaborative research project, providing an 
opportunity for both parties to co-operate and benefit. I also stressed that through 
the invaluable opportunity I had to approach tourism businesses throughout 
Vietnam, if while carrying out my own study, I could assist the ITDR in any way, 
then I would be most happy to do this (Gilbert, 1993: 159; Lee, 1999). 
Most points were however largely met with blank expressions and in the case of 
requests, including access to the ITDR library to review tourism literature related to 
my research topic, generally rejection. I did attempt on a number of occasions to 
invite my contact out for drinks and meals as a way of cultivating social relations, 
but these were always turned down with excuses. At Tet, I gave my contact a carton 
of cigarettes hoping that this might herald improved relations the following year, but 
this never happened. 
I did however gain access to back copies of the Vietnam Tourism Review (Tap chi 
Du lich) a journal published by the VNAT, going back to 1993. This was useful as a 
source of background material on the development of tourism, in particular with 
regard to the changing nature of actors and institutions involved in the tourism 
industry as well as changing trends and attitudes in the industry. As a sign of my 
gratitude as well as in an attempt to cultivate closer relations with the ITDR and 
with the sub-editor of the journal, I accepted a request from her to contribute an 
article to the journal (see Appendix 4). 
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As the initial information gathering phase was coming to an end and as I started to 
draft the interview schedule, I began to think about and anticipate any problems 
which I would encounter at the interview stage. I had been told by a number of 
friends and informants that adhering to traditional protocol, most tourism owners 
and managers I approached would require proof that I was being sponsored by the 
VNAT, in the form of an official letter of introduction from the VNAT. This they 
said would greatly facilitate the interview process. Therefore, in June 2000,1 met 
my contact at the ITDR to discuss this matter. He advised me that I needed to go 
through the Head of the International Co-operation Department at the VNAT. 
Consequently, at the beginning of July 2000,1 met the Head of the International Co- 
operation Department and had an extremely positive meeting. He agreed to help me 
and simply asked me to compile a list of all tourism businesses I wanted to conduct 
interviews with. He said he would then send a letter to them asking for their 
assistance in this. 
After completing the list, I briefly met the Head again. This time on seeing the large 
number of businesses I wanted to interview, he told me that he would draft a letter 
for me to copy and send, instead. When after a few weeks I still had not received the 
letter, I started to try and get in touch with him. When I eventually did manage to 
speak to him, he told me that he had delegated the task of drafting the letter to my 
original contact at the ITDR and was surprised to hear that I still had not received it. 
When I got in touch with my contact, he informed me that he had been seconded to 
the VNAT from the ITDR and as a consequence I should no longer liaise with him 
but with the deputy head of the ITDR. 
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This initiated the reforming of relations from scratch, both face to face and by 
submitting a whole range of documentary evidence and testimony, which was 
extremely time-consuming to produce, to support what I had been doing in Vietnam 
up until then and what my future plans were. Included amongst this documentation 
was a polite request for the letter of introduction. Once again, this led to protracted 
attempts at securing the letter, including numerous visits to the ITDR to ask politely 
how my letter was progressing and after a request from the deputy head for me to 
submit a new list of tourism businesses that I wanted to conduct interviews with. All 
these delays and bureaucratic requests simply served to demonstrate how little 
assistance the ITDR were prepared to provide me and how many obstacles they 
were prepared to put in my way to hinder my progress. 
Eventually in the middle of April 2001,1 was asked to come to the ITDR to receive 
the letter by an assistant of the deputy head. On receiving it, I queried the fact that 
the letter was not sealed as authenticated, official letters always were. I was told 
incorrectly that this was not required with the type of letter such as mine. In fact, 
what I had waited ten months for (see Appendix 5) was a letter which officially was 
barely worth more than the paper it was printed on! Thankfully although questioned 
a number of times by tourism business owners about the lack of a seal, in the 
majority of cases this did not seem to act as a stumbling block in approaching 
potential respondents. 
The lack of support by officials at the ITDR of the kind described in previous 
paragraphs, made me reluctant to ask for assistance in other matters relating to the 
research. For example, informants at times suggested I meet with officials working 
in particular local and central state institutions, relevant to my study, the Hanoi 
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Bureau of Tourism, for instance. However, officially in Vietnam, a meeting with 
officials from a state institution must be supported by a letter of introduction from 
the institution, generally a state institution, sponsoring an individual. Therefore, the 
tardiness of my contacts at the ITDR in procuring a letter of introduction to conduct 
interviews tended to deter me from asking for further letters of introduction to 
enable me to meet up with individual state officials. 
My final dealings with officials at the ITDR occurred when my visa was about to 
expire. This occurred at a time when my research assistant and I were in the process 
of completing interviews in Hanoi and were preparing to go to Hue, a move which 
although outlined in plans submitted to the ITDR on numerous previous occasions 
seemed to unnerve officials as it would mean that I would be out of their immediate 
geographical sphere of control. This time, I found that my latest contact, the deputy 
head, was about to be suspended for involvement in a scandal (vu be böi). 
Therefore, in asking for my visa to be renewed, this time, I had to approach the 
Head of the ITDR. In supporting my visa extension, once again I had to submit a 
considerable amount of documentary evidence, which again wasted a considerable 
amount of time. 
My research assistant advised me to circumvent the official process and suggested 
that if I paid my original contact a visit at his home with an envelope containing say 
VND500,000 then he thought the visa application would be successful. We had 
nevertheless already found that in the event of the application being unsuccessful, a 
friend of ours, who was a partner in a private tour operator, would be able to issue a 
new visa, although this would be a more expensive alternative to the envelope 
method. My Protestant sensibilities 
however would not allow me to pursue the 
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envelope option. I could not go to the house of a man, who instead of assisting my 
research investigation as he had officially been charged to do, had instead at every 
opportunity attempted to obstruct its progress. I could not face him and pretend to 
be on friendly terms with him, when in fact all I wanted to do was offer him some 
money in exchange for the renewal of my visa. Furthermore, having compromised 
myself in this manner, I had also been told there was still no guarantee that this 
method would be successful. Consequently, when the ITDR refused to support my 
visa application, I turned to the alternative, albeit more expensive way and obtained 
a new visa through the friend working at the private tour operator in order to stay in 
Vietnam and continue the research. 
4.6 MY POSITIONALITY IN THE FIELD 
As a `western' researcher in Vietnam, the degree to which I was perceived as an 
`outsider' or `the other' varied with each individual interaction (D'Amico-Samuels, 
1991). As such, it is impossible to generalise about my position in each and every 
situation. Instead, each interaction was uniquely defined by the collective social and 
cultural backgrounds of both respondent and researcher resulting in the extent or 
lack of fusion between both parties. 
One possible advantage I had over other researchers in `a foreign field' was my 
chosen object of study - tourism. Thus, I was investigating a topic in which I also 
played a role as an actor rather than researching about a topic that I was interested 
in, but in which I could have no possible connection with. Consequently, this 
created a natural bridge and point of convergence between respondent and 
researcher and so in the majority of cases my investigation was perceived as a 
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plausible and comprehensible enquiry rather than an irrational and illogical 
inquisition. 
Another factor in nullifying the effects of `otherness' may have resulted from a trait 
of Vietnamese people in social interactions to seek out points of commonality as a 
way of defining and distinguishing differences and otherness. As I discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3 with regard to sites in the creation of social capital, in the 
establishing of otherness, place constitutes a primary site. Differentiation with 
regard to place exists across a full spectrum of geographical scales from local to 
global and so as such the fact that I was an `occidental' researcher interviewing an 
`oriental' respondent was not any more alien than differences created out of 
national, provincial, municipal or even district otherness, for example Vietnamese v 
Thai, Hung Yen v Hoa Binh provinces, Hanoi v Hue or Hai Bä Trung v Hoän Kiem 
districts. 3 
At the same time, as the majority of my time in Vietnam was spent in Hanoi, I 
naturally assimilated a number of social, cultural as well as linguistic mores of the 
locality. Consequently, I perceived that this mitigated the effects of occidental v 
oriental otherness and helped to create a sense of commonality and familiarity in the 
majority of interactions. Correspondingly, when I moved to Hue and then Ho Chi 
Minh City, I felt that my lack of social, cultural and linguistic experience in these 
locations accentuated my otherness in a lot of interactions with respondents, 
particularly in Hue. As a result, I felt more reliant on Thang, 
his friends and his 
relations. 
3 Hung Yen and Hoa Binh are two provinces adjacent to 
Hanoi. Hai Bä Tnrng and Hoän Kiem are 
two districts in Hanoi. 
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As I have discussed throughout this chapter, in employing snowball sampling by 
selecting respondents with whom my research assistant, Thang, had pre-existing 
social relations, I was aware that I myself was reactive in this initial selection 
process by the fact that I relied on the social ties of Thang. However, once again 
articulating themes discussed in the section on social capital in Chapter 2, due to my 
friendship with Thang, I was therefore embedded within his network of social ties 
and personal relations within which respondents were also directly connected or 
indirectly connected through other friends and/or blood relatives of his. 
Consequently, I perceived that in the majority of interactions with respondents, this 
shared affiliation once again mitigated my sense of `otherness'. 
4.7 OTHER METHODOLOGIES 
4.7.1 Informants 
In the time I lived in Vietnam, I had the opportunity to meet a wide variety of 
people from different backgrounds and with different perspectives and opinions on 
contemporary issues affecting Vietnamese life. A small percentage of these 
individuals acted as informants in the research and are listed in Appendix 6. In the 
initial stages, they enabled me to gain thorough background knowledge of a number 
of key issues connected to my research, for example, the structure of the tourism 
industry, the national and local actors and institutions involved in regulating tourism 
activity and the realities of the business environment for entrepreneurs. Throughout 
my time in Vietnam, they provided a wealth of anecdotal and qualitative data to 
enrich the thesis. During the phase of carrying out interviews, informants were 
extremely useful, firstly in discussing and cross-referencing issues arising out of 
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particular interviews and secondly, as a way of confirming, validating or refuting 
points arising from interviews. 
4.7.2 Personal communication 
As well as informants with whom I maintained relationships throughout my time in 
Vietnam and in many cases continue to do so up to the present, I also came into 
contact with a plethora of individuals with whom relations extended in most cases 
for a brief period only: during a meal, a drink, on a bus, on the beach, for example. 
Once again, the fact that I spoke Vietnamese facilitated the vast majority of these 
encounters. This initiated a number of unstructured interviews and free flowing 
conversations in which, while respondents naturally raised points of particular 
interest to themselves, I was also able to bring up issues and ask questions directly 
connected to my own research investigation. In these exchanges, respondents 
seemed to derive great satisfaction in having met a foreigner who had made a 
considerable effort to learn their native language and with whom they were able to 
converse freely. In addition, they met someone who genuinely wanted to learn about 
their culture and their society. For me, these interactions produced invaluable 
additional sources of reference and information to supplement the semi-structured 
interviews being carried out during the same period. At the same time, through these 
unstructured interviews, I was also able to gain a rich supply of anecdotal material 
from which a number of the case studies presented in this thesis originated 
(Johnson, 1978). 
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
A wide range of methodologies was utilised throughout the research process both in 
the UK and Vietnam: during the literature review, the drafting of the interview 
schedule, the interview and the analysis stages. 
During the period of the research in Vietnam, the methodologies utilised were 
greatly informed by the social and cultural contexts in which every aspect of 
Vietnamese life is played out and consequently in which the research was also 
situated. Both relative successes and failures were registered in this regard. With 
regard to the former, the personal ties and social networks in which both respondent 
and researcher were embedded allowed a full and candid disclosure of qualitative 
data to analyse the impact of social ties in regulating tourism business activity in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. Conversely, an inability to cultivate social ties 
and close personal relations with the particular state officials responsible for 
facilitating my investigation inhibited the smooth completion of my field research. 
Before discussing the results of the analysis of the data collected on tourism 
businesses in Vietnam, I first turn in the next chapter to provide an historical and 
contextual account of regulatory processes in Vietnam, utilising information 
collected from secondary sources in the UK and Vietnam as well as from primary 
sources: interviews and informants in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF REGULATORY PROCESSES 
IN THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY 
Before starting to investigate the regulatory environment in which nascent capitalist 
economic activities such as tourism are currently situated, it is first imperative to 
provide an historical and contextual account of regulatory processes in Vietnam, as a 
way of informing our understanding of contemporary economic, political and socio- 
cultural processes. 
In this chapter, 1 analyse a number of the key analytical tools identified within 
regulation theory and outlined in Chapter 2, which were then developed in the 
context of transitional economies in Chapter 3. 
The main part of this chapter focuses on the path dependency of regulatory 
processes and examines the extent to which socio-economic and political relations 
have evolved as the Vietnamese political economy has shifted between the four 
`isms' of feudalism, colonialism, socialism and presently capitalism. In particular, 
invoking the concept of the mode of societalisation, I analyse how relations 
between the central state and the local state have evolved historically. 
I then turn to examine how this is currently being translated in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy in terms of the regulatory power and control of the local state 
vis-ä-vis the central state over local economic space, in particular in regulating 
nascent private business activities. Finally, in this part, I examine the regulatory 
role of local state officials historically up to the present in local spaces. 
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In the second part of the chapter, I examine the role that social ties havc 
traditionally played in regulating socio-economic processes in Vietnam and how the 
form and function of social ties have adapted and evolved through particular 
historical and institutional contexts. 
In the final part of this chapter, I augment the discussion on path dependency by 
considering the role of local context in examining how distinct social, cultural and 
historical legacies in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, have informed contemporary 
attitudes in the transitional economy with regard to the regulation of internationally- 
oriented capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, in these distinct local spaces. 
5.1 PATH DEPENDENCY 
5.1.1 Overview 
Analysing the political history of Vietnam provides two key and enduring 
institutional norms around which socio-economic and political relations have been 
reconfigured in a path dependent manner throughout much of Vietnamese history. ' 
With the reconfiguring of socio-economic and political relations in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy, these norms continue to influence regulatory arrangements 
governing the introduction and development of capitalist economic activities, such 
as tourism. 
I As recognised in the section on regulation theory in Chapter 2, there are however exceptions to this, 
where socio-economic and political relations have been transformed rather than evolved. These 
include the colonisation of the southern economy by the French and the introduction of the central 
planning system after 1954 in the north of Vietnam. 
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The first norm concerns the authoritarian tradition in Vietnamese political 
history. Throughout history, the central state (chinh quyen trung ucng) has 
attempted to regulate national economic space by centralising power and decision- 
making within the central state apparatus and then disseminating edicts down 
hierarchical political institutional structures to the local state (Porter, 1993: xiv). 
Nevertheless, by contrast, the second norm relates to how throughout history, the 
central state, in order to achieve political imperatives in maintaining the hegemony 
of the state throughout the whole of Vietnam, has been forced to cede a significant 
degree of regulatory control down to its agent in local space, the local state 
(chinh quyen dia phuang) (Kolko, 1997: 4,152). Consequently, historically, with 
the societalisation of central state regulatory practices, the local state has been 
afforded significant power and autonomy and, as a result, has emerged as the key 
institution regulating local economic space. This therefore challenges the position 
taken within both neo-liberal discourse and the literature on transitional economies, 
where shifts in the regulatory control of the central state vis-ä-vis the local state are 
only discussed with reference to contemporary processes of capitalist accumulation 
occurring in the global economy including the adoption of neo-liberal processes in 
transitional economies. 
In particular, a focal point in this research is how officials (quan chirc nhä nü(yc) in 
local state institutions (co quan nhä nuOc ö dia phuoong), although charged with 
implementing central state edicts in local spaces, have also been conferred 
significant discretionary powers in carrying out this task. As a result of their control 
over economic and administrative levers, local state officials have emerged as 
pivotal actors in the regulation of local economic space. 
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In Section 5.2,1 describe how the regulatory role of local state officials has been 
reconfigured in the transitional Vietnamese economy. In particular, with the 
sanctioning of private economic activities, local state officials have emerged as key 
conduits through which entrepreneurs (thuomg gia) must negotiate in order to enter 
lucrative new sectors of the capitalist economy, such as tourism. 
In summary, throughout much of Vietnamese history resistance on the part of state 
actors and institutions to the relinquishing of control over political and 
administrative levers constitutes one important explanation why regulatory 
processes have evolved in a path dependent manner. At any one historical juncture, 
conflict and struggle has resulted in a reworking of social, political and economic 
relations rather than the dismantling of these relations. How this translates in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy is analysed first in Chapter 6 with regard to the 
central state VNAT, and thereafter in Chapter 7 with regard to actors and institutions 
within the local state. 
5.1.2 The Authoritarian Tradition in Vietnamese Political History 
Even before Vietnam was colonised by the Chinese at the beginning of the first 
millennium, traditional Vietnamese village life was already organised according to 
strict authoritarian and hierarchical socio-political structures (Porter, 1993: 2). The 
subsequent imposition of the doctrine of Confucianism by the Chinese in the 
regulation of all social and political relations in Vietnamese society, including in the 
administration of the state, therefore perpetuated existing rather than introduced new 
hierarchical socio-political institutional structures (Nguyen, 1993: 21,22,52,123). 
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The strict and authoritarian socio-political hierarchy in Confucianism centred around 
the absolute authority of and loyalty to the monarch (Nguyen, 1993: 21,22,52, 
123). It was therefore not surprising that the Confucian doctrine was readily adopted 
by the first Vietnamese monarch - Ly Thai To - after Vietnam had regained its 
independence at the beginning of the 11th century, and was reaffirmed thereafter by 
successive Vietnamese dynasties until the abolition of the monarchy in 1945 
(Nguyen, 1993: 239). Confucianism served the monarchy as a useful ideological tool 
in centralising and consolidating its power and authority in society through the tight 
control and ordering of social relations (Leifer & Phipps, 1991: 18; Nguyen, 
1993: 52). 
Similarly, after 1954, with the introduction of the central planning system (che dö 
bao cäp) in the north of Vietnam, the institutional forms and structures through 
which the system was regulated closely evoked legacies of the former monarchical 
system (Porter, 1993: 17; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 33). All decisions relating to the 
issuing of orders and plans and the allocation of resources were concentrated at the 
centre and transmitted down an administrative hierarchy to the local state. 
5.1.3 The Societalisation of Central State Regulatory Practices: Ceding of 
Regulatory Control to the Local State 
The authoritarian pretensions of the central state have however historically come up 
against the Vietnamese tradition of isolated, self-sufficient and autonomous 
communities with socio-economic and political norms and structures more locally- 
integrated (Porter, 1993: 2). In regulating political and economic space, local 
customs and communal law (luät tuc, tuc le) have been privileged over rules and 
edicts emanating from the central state, which have traditionally been contested and 
mediated (Nguyen, 1993: 21). This evokes the often quoted Vietnamese adage that: 
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The rule of the king yields to the law of the village 
(phep vua thua le lang) 
While contestation between the central state and local spaces was prevalent in the 
original heartland of the Vietnamese state - present day northern Vietnam - these 
tensions were exacerbated as the territory of the Vietnamese state was extended into 
present day central Vietnam at the end of the 15th century and into the present day 
south of Vietnam more than 1700 kilometres from the central state at the end of the 
17th century (Nguyen, 1993: 88,119; Porter, 1993: 1; Le, 1997: 43,44; Templer, 
1998: 35). As a consequence, throughout history the considerable physical space of 
the Vietnamese territory, combined with the diverse socio-cultural, economic and 
political traditions of the central and southern regions, have limited the capacity of 
the central state to enforce its authority across the whole of its territory (Porter, 
1993: 1; Kolko, 1997: 152). 
As a way of achieving its paramount goal of maintaining the hegemony of the state 
over national space, the central state has been forced to compromise on its 
authoritarian pretensions and has ceded a significant degree of control to the local 
state in the regulation of local economic space as a way of retaining the local 
state's political support for the central state. 
2 The significant power and autonomy 
afforded the local state has established it as the key regulatory institution in local 
economic space and with considerable discretionary powers in interpreting, 
mediating and implementing central state directives in accordance with local 
2 By local state, I am referring in particular to provincial and municipal people's committees. I do 
however acknowledge the regulatory power and autonomy possessed by the local state at lower 
administrative levels. Figure 5.1 illustrates the state administrative structure 
in Vietnam. 
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specificities and priorities. The way in which the central state has throughout 
Vietnamese history attempted to maintain regulatory control over national economic 
space as depicted in this discussion clearly establishes the important role played by 
the mode of societalisation in these processes. 
5.1.3.1 The Central Planning System (Che dö bao cap) 
The ceding of regulatory power to the local state was perpetuated after Vietnam had 
regained its independence in 1945. Once again reflecting political imperatives, on 
this occasion in seeking to facilitate political cohesion across national space 
following the coming to power of the Ho Chi Minh Government, the central state 
enacted administrative reform by promulgating Decree 63, which set up `People's 
Committees' (üy ban nhän dän) at all administrative levels from the province (tinh) 
and municipality (thänh pho) to the commune (xä) (Nguyen, 1993: 245). This 
administrative structure, which has continued up to the present, is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. In this structure, the local state at each administrative level was afforded 
a significant degree of autonomy in regulating local economic space (Phong & 
Beresford, 1998: 2 1,23). 
The introduction of the central planning system from 1954 in the north of Vietnam 
similarly demonstrated the path dependent nature of regulatory processes with the 
mechanics of the system perpetuating the two institutional norms cited at the 
beginning of this chapter, namely the co-existence of both authoritarian yet 
decentralised regulatory processes. While, in the central planning system, decision- 
making with regard to the issuing of orders and plans and the allocation of resources 
was concentrated at the centre, implementation of central state directives was largely 
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Figure 5.1. Administrative structure of the Vietnamese State 
THE CENTRAL STATE 
(Chinh qu''' n trung zrong) 
MINISTRIES 
(Cäc Bö) 
State Corporations 
(Cäc Tang Cöng ty) 
State companies under the 
control of state corporations 
(C is Töng Csc) 
GOVERNMENT 
(Chinh phi) 
GENERAL DEPARTMENTS PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES 
e. g. 1. Viettravel (Ministry of 
Communication & Transport) 
2. Vietnam Oil and Gas Services 
and Tourism Company 
(OSC Travel) 
(Tong Cöng ty dau khi Viet Nam) 
e. g. 1. Vietnam Airlines 
(Tong Cuc Häng Khöng Viet Nam) 
2. The General Statistical Office 
(Tong Cuc Thong Ke) 
3. Vietnam National Administration 
of Tourism (VNAT) 
(Töng Cuc Du lich) 
THE LOCAL STATE 
(Chinh guten dia phuang) 
On, ban nhän dän) 
/ \\4 
Municipal Provincial 
People's People's 
Committees Committees 
(uy ban (üyv ban 
nhän dän nhän dän 
thänh phö) linh) 
Tourism companies under the State companies under the 
control of VNAT control of Municipal / 
Provincial People's 
Committees 
e. g. Vietnamtourism (Vinatour) e. g. 1. Hanoitourist (Hanoi 
in Hanoi, HCMC, Da Nang Municipal People's 
Committee) 
2. Saigontourist (HCMC 
Municipal People's 
Committee) 
3. Huong Giang Tourism 
Company, Hue (Thua Thien 
Hue Provincial People's 
Committee) 
District People's Committees 
Urban areas Rural areas 
(üy ban nhän (üy ban nhän 
dän quoin) dän hut-en) 
State companies under the control of District 
People's Committees, e. g. Ben Thanh Tourist 
Company, HCMC (VNAT & District I People's 
Committee, HCMC) 
11 Precinct Commune 
People's People's 
Committees Committees 
(in municipal areas) (in rural areas) 
(üy ban nhän (iiyv ban nhdn 
dän phuring) dän xd) 
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in the hands of the local state, as state enterprises were in the main under the control 
of provincial and municipal people's committees (ay ban nhän dän thänh ph6 / tinh) 
(Porter, 1993: 17; Kolko, 1997: 47; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 16; Vasavakul. 1999: 169). 
The central planning system, in particular, led to an enhanced regulatory role for 
provincial and municipal people's committees. In part, this came about as an 
important by-product of the central planning system had been to create provincial 
industrial economic structures, self-sufficient in the production of basic products and 
consumer goods by using raw materials indigenous to each region (Nguyen, 1993: 
313). As a result, provincial and municipal people's committees were assigned 
significant functional powers in regulating local economic spaces as they acted as 
important conduits between the centre and lower levels in disseminating orders, 
plans and resources (Kolko, 1997: 47; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 16; Vasavaku], 
1999: 169). The regulatory and mediatory role of provincial and municipal people's 
committees in local space was further consolidated through the regulatory powers 
afforded to them in being conferred authority, not only in interpreting central state 
directives, but also in enacting their own decrees (Phong & Beresford, 1998: 19,53, 
59). 3 
The regulatory power and autonomy of provincial and municipal people's 
committees were consolidated further with the onset of war with the United States. 
Once again in order to achieve its political imperatives, this time in mobilising local 
support for the war effort combined with the physical and infrastructural limitations 
for communicating orders from the centre, the central state assigned provincial and 
municipal people's committees enhanced decision-making powers in the regulation 
3 The 1960 constitution afforded provincial and municipal people's committees equal status with 
central ministries (Riedel & Turley, 1999: 13). 
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of economic production as well as with regard to military matters in local spaces 
(Beresford & McFarlane, 1995: 54-55; Kolko, 1997: 5,47; Le, 1997: 283; Phong & 
Beresford, 1998: 19). 
5.1.3.2 After 1975 
As a way of achieving political imperatives, the central state continued to cede 
regulatory powers over local economic space to the local state after the end of the 
war in 1975 until the end of the 1970s. 
Initially, for a brief period after 1975, the central state attempted to claw back some 
of the regulatory powers it had ceded to the local state during the war by revitalising 
the central planning system. However, a series of pernicious domestic and 
international factors conspired in leading to irreversible crisis in the central planning 
system as the central state was no longer able to provide sufficient resources into the 
system. These included repeated typhoons which led to large declines in rice 
production, the adverse effects of domestic policies, falling aid levels, conflict with 
China and Cambodia as well as the political and economic isolation of Vietnam 
from much of the world (White, Murray & White, 1983: 243; Nguyen, 1993: 395; 
Fforde & de Vylder, 1996: 12). 
With the central state largely comprising political ideologues rather than rational 
economic decision-makers, it was unable to devise policy initiatives out of the 
economic impasse (Fforde & de Vylder, 1996: 12; Vasavakul, 1999: 168). Instead, 
crisis in the central planning system led to a growth in spontaneous, anti-regulatory 
`fence breaking' (phä rao) activities within local spaces. Local economic actors 
attempted to solve resource deficiencies, by in particular, engaging in market 
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activities by diverting state supplied goods and resources from the plan onto the free 
market, allowing farm produce to be purchased at prices above official prices, 
increasing production outside the plan and by establishing illegal check-points 
taxing inter-provincial trade (Fforde & de Vylder, 1996: 12; Phong & Beresford, 
1998: 60). 
As a way of re-imposing a degree of regulatory control in economic space, but in 
particular in order to stem the erosion of political legitimacy, which had ensued 
from the economic crisis, the central state was forced to cede further power and 
autonomy to the local state in the regulation of local economic spaces. In the context 
of a relative vacuum of lucid policy initiatives emanating from the central state, the 
local state was increasingly relied upon as the key site in devising solutions out of 
the economic impasse, which in turn would help to safeguard the hegemony of the 
Party-State. In this context, the central state tolerated experimentation by the local 
state with market initiatives as a way of temporarily solving local resource 
deficiencies (Fforde & de Vylder, 1996: 12; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 70,79; 
Vasavakul, 1999: 168). 
At the same time, the local state, as well as being conferred greater regulatory 
control over local economic space through its capacity to issue local economic 
policy directives, was also afforded considerable space in negotiating the vague 
directives emanating from the central state. Throughout this period, the local state 
further undermined the regulatory authority of the central state by foot-dragging, 
liberally interpreting or simply ignoring implementation of central state directives 
(Fforde & de Vylder, 1996: 12; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 60,70,79). The 
heightened regulatory power and autonomy afforded to the local state during this 
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period combined with the diminution of control by the central state in local space 
culminated in what Beresford and McFarlane describe as "the creation of self- 
sufficient fiefdoms and the establishment of 400 little SRVs" (Beresford & 
McFarlane, 1995: 52,69). 4 
The ceding of regulatory power to the local state in the regulation of local economic 
spaces from the end of the 1970s was seen by the central state as a necessary but 
temporary solution to the economic crisis. At the beginning of the 1980s, the central 
state, still dominated by socialist ideologues, firmly believed that at a suitable time 
in the future it would be able to re-assert its regulatory control over economic space 
by eradicating market activity and resurrecting the central planning system (Porter, 
1993: 140,141). However, instead, during the first half of the 1980s, continued 
policy paralysis within the central state further undermined the central state's 
regulatory control of economic space, while consolidating that of the local state 
(Phong & Beresford, 1998: 86). The period also witnessed a significant expansion in 
capitalist economic activity. 
However, by 1985 the piecemeal regulatory concessions made by the central state to 
the local state were failing to stem a rapidly deteriorating economic situation. 
Pressure for more fundamental reform from the local state intensified (Porter, 
1993: 142). In the absence of any feasible alternatives, the central state was therefore 
forced to accede to these demands and initiate a programme of major structural 
economic reform (Kolko, 1997: 26). As with previous concessions, the central state's 
principal priorities were political with the fact that its failure to stimulate the 
4 SRV stands for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
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economy was seriously eroding its political legitimacy and hegemony and if not 
remedied could ultimately lead to the collapse of the Party. 
5.1.3.3 Since 1986 
Since the Doi M66 (Renovation) programme was initiated in 1986, the regulatory 
role of the central state vis-ä-vis the local state over local economic space has 
continued to diminish. In order to achieve its overriding political objective of 
maintaining the hegemony of the state, the central state has ceded further regulatory 
power and control to, in particular, provincial and municipal people's committees 
(Nguyen, 1993: 383; Jerneck, 1993: 5; Jerneck & Nguyen Thanh Ha, 1995: 160; 
Gates, 1996: 215; Kolko, 1997: 26,48,152; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 85,104). 
Consequently, very much concurring with the views of authors writing on 
transitional economies discussed in Chapter 3, the local state in Vietnam has 
similarly emerged as the key institution regulating nascent processes of capitalist 
economic activity in local space in the transitional Vietnamese economy. Again in a 
similar way to that outlined by Nan Lin in the context of the transitional Chinese 
economy and discussed in Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3, for local states in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, their control over political, economic and 
administrative levers has been irresistible in strengthening the local state's 
regulatory role in local economic space. Municipal and Provincial People's 
Committees, acting as both economic actors and economic regulators in local space, 
have consequently used their regulatory powers in creating a favourable playing 
field for the development of businesses under their control vis-a-vis other businesses 
in the local economy: both other state businesses belonging to state institutions other 
than the municipal or provincial people's committee as well as new private 
businesses (Dollar, 1996: 181; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 34; Gainsborough, 2002: 354). 
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In particular, with Vietnam's reintegration into the international capitalist economy, 
the local state has sought to take advantage of its pivotal position as both actor and 
regulator to extend its business interests into lucrative, new internationally-oriented 
economic activities, such as tourism (Riedel & Turley, 1999: 33). 
5.1.3.3.1 The Local State as an Actor 
In developing its business interests in the transitional economy, the local state, has 
enjoyed preferential access to local resources, including land and infrastructure, loan 
capital through the local state banking sector and foreign investment capital through 
its privileged position in forming joint-ventures with foreign companies (Kolko, 
1997: 58; Levine, 1998: 1; Templer, 1998: 144; Scholtes, 1998: 194; Riedel & Turley, 
1999: 32). These factors have contributed to the rapid growth in local state 
enterprises in the transitional economy. By 1995, more than 70% of all state 
enterprises were under the control of local state institutions (Riedel & Turley, 
1999: 33). Similarly in the development of tourism in the transitional economy, 
municipal and provincial people's committees have come to dominate local tourism 
spaces, in terms of the number and scale of hotels and tour operators under their 
control (Vietnam Business Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, August 1995: 12). 
After 1986 in the construction and upgrading of tourism infrastructure, the biggest 
obstacle faced by potential investors was capital. For local state institutions, as 
mentioned above, this was readily accessible through local branches of state banks. 
By contrast, for private businesses this was in the main not available (Tap chi Du 
lich, October 1995: 10). 
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This bias in lending to state institutions has continued to the present with a recent 
report by the Ministry of Planning and Investment asserting that Vietnam's financial 
sector continues to be characterised by the intertwining of state-owned commercial 
banks with state-owned enterprises, with the former providing the latter with cheap 
loans at preferential rates with analysis regarding the risk or viability of the loan 
largely absent. The bias towards the state sector has at the same time crowded out 
lending to private businesses, which has remained minimal (EIU Country Report, 
July 2000: 23). This mirrors the situation in the financial system in the transitional 
Chinese economy, where as discussed in Section 3.4.4.2 in Chapter 3, entrepreneurs 
are in response invoking family and friendship ties as an essential means of 
obtaining capital to start a business. To what extent similar processes are occurring 
in the establishment of private tourism businesses in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy is discussed in Chapter 7. 
At the same time, for non-state businesses, access to loan capital through the state 
banking system continues to be difficult, in part due to the regulatory hurdles 
constructed by the state with "strict requirements on collateral (ky quy) which are 
almost impossible for non-state firms to meet" (Duong Phong, 2001: 1). 
The comments made above regarding privileges accruing to the local state in the 
setting up of tourism businesses in the transitional Vietnamese economy were 
similarly affirmed by an informant and managers of a number of state tourism 
businesses interviewed at each of the three locations at which interviews were 
carried out: Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. Their comments are summarised 
below. 5 
5 In the case of the tourism businesses quoted, pseudonyms are used 
in order to protect the 
anonymity of these companies. 
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State firms have easy access to loans sponsored by the state 
institutions managing them. Often no collateral is needed to secure 
loans as these are guaranteed by the relevant state institution. On the 
other hand, private firms often have to put forward collateral of 
between one and a half to two times the loan amount required. This 
makes it extremely difficult for them to borrow (KI1,18.03.02). 
With regard to borrowing money, state businesses need only draw up 
a business development plan outlining the reasons they ivunt to 
borrow money. The bank will examine the plan and if thely find it 
feasible, they will approve the loan application. For private 
businesses, the process is much more onerous. Private businesses are 
required to offer collateral with a value more than the value of the 
loan they are applying for (Thanh Tuu Hotel, HCMC, a state hotel, 
under the control of the HCMC Municipal People's Committee). 
In 1994, we were lent 3.6 billion ding (USD$325,000) to extend and 
renovate the guest house; including the building of 37 new bedrooms 
and an international standard restaurant. There are small privileges 
given to state businesses under the control of the provincial state 
... preferential 
loans, land etc.... our hotel in particular has been 
supported by the provincial state in Hue in borrowing money to 
develop the business (Hong Ngoc Hotel, Hue, a state hotel, belonging 
to the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People's Committee). 
Hanoi municipal state institutions have created very good conditions 
to develop the hotel 's business operations. In particular, in recent 
years, the authorities have supported us in borrowing money on 
favourable terms to upgrade the hotel ... to meet the ever-increasing demands for a higher standard of tourism in Vietnam from foreign 
tourists (Hoang Tu Hotel, Hanoi, a state hotel, under the control of 
the VNAT). 
State businesses receive the additional assistance of the state 
authority institutions. For example, the Hue Provincial People's 
Committee (PPC) and the Bureau of Planning and Investment will 
examine the applications of state businesses wanting to enter the 
tourism sector quickly and help the business enter the sector and 
start operations as quickly as possible... 
... moreover, the 
Hue PPC and the Bureau of Planning and 
Investment assist state businesses in providing incentives for state 
businesses to borrow investment capital to improve the operations of 
the business. The Hue PPC also creates favourable business 
conditions for state companies in helping to develop relations and 
networks with companies in other fields in and outside the province. 
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... the Bureau of Tourism supports state tourism businesses in finding 
a suitable location for the business and in introducing contacts to 
provide sources of guests for state businesses in the initial stages of 
operations (A Dong Tourism Company, a state tour operator, under 
the control of the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People's Committee). 
In Hue, the dominance of the local state, the Thua Thien Hue Provincial People's 
Committee, in the local tourism market can be illustrated by the fact that in 2000, 
66% of the total revenue earned from tourism in the local market accrued to tourism 
businesses under the control of the local state, compared to only 2% earned by 
central state businesses and 15% by private businesses. 6 The proportion of revenue 
earned by the local state in the local tourism market has in fact been increasing 
steadily in recent years, from 59% in 1996 to 65% in 1999 before reaching 66% in 
2000 (Cuc Thöng Ke Tinh Thüa Thien Hue (Thua Thien Hue Provincial Statistical 
Office), Nien Giäm Thong Ke Tinh Thixa Thien Hue (Statistical Yearbook for Thua 
Thien Hue Province) 2000, Hue: Cuc Thong Ke Tinh Thera Thien Hue: 272). 
Similarly, in Ho Chi Minh City, the dominance of the local state in the local tourism 
market in the transitional economy can be illustrated with reference to Saigontourist, 
a state tour operator under the control of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) Municipal 
People's Committee, which has developed into the largest tourism company in 
Vietnam (Cooper, 2000: 173; http: //www. saigonnet. vn/dulich, 28 December 2001 
viewed 31 January 2002). Founded in 1975, Saigontourist was the first tourism 
company established in the south of Vietnam after reunification (Tap Chi Du lich 
July 1998: 5,15). As the flagship tourism business under the control of the local 
state, Saigontourist rapidly gained control over a significant proportion of prime 
land holdings and tourism property in Ho Chi Minh City (Moore, 1997: 28). 
6 Of the remainder, around 8% of total revenue was earned by foreign-invested businesses and 
9% by mixed businesses. 
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Initially, this was through acquiring the stock of hotels of capitalist owners created 
during the French and US colonial periods, including some of the city's most 
historic hotels, such as the Majestic, opened in 1925, the Caravelle, built in 1959 as 
well as the Continental and Rex hotels (Sheehan, 1992: 100; Moore, 1997: 28,30; 
Tap chi Du lich, April 1999: 9; VIR, 25-31 October 1999: 20; Tap chi Du lich, August 
2000: 27). In addition, from 1977 with the launch by the Hanoi regime of the 
campaign to eliminate all capitalist activity through the appropriation of private 
property and enterprises, many hotels belonging primarily to the ethnic Chinese 
were also placed under the control of Saigontourist (Sheehan, 1992: 78; Storey, 
1995: 23; Kolko, 1997: 24; Templer, 1998: 306). 
From the late 1980s, recognising the potential of tourism in the transitional 
economy, the HCMC Municipal People's Committee afforded Saigontourist 
privileged access to capital to invest in developing its tourism services, including in 
the construction and upgrading of its hotels. As a result, it was able to meet the 
initial demands of the lucrative foreign visitor market, achieve rapid returns on its 
capital and reinvest profits into expanding its tourism interests further (Tap chi Du 
lich, April 1995: 20). 
At the same time, Saigontourist used its unrivalled political as well as economic 
leverage in the Ho Chi Minh City tourism industry when negotiating with potential 
foreign joint-venture partners. For example, the first foreign-invested, joint-venture 
project, the Saigon Floating Hotel, opened in 1990, was a joint-venture between 
Saigontourist and companies from Australia and Japan (Cooper, 2000: 173). It was 
the first international-standard hotel to operate in the nascent tourism industry in 
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Vietnam (EIU Country report, No. 2,1990: 19; Gonsalves, 1995b: 224; Gilbert, 
Nguyen & Vu, 1998: 4). 
Consequently, in the transitional economy, Saigontourist has developed into one of 
the largest and most powerful state businesses in Ho Chi Minh City (Tap chi Du 
lich, April 1995: 20). Its dominance in the local Ho Chi Minh City tourism market 
can be gauged by the fact that before 1997 it controlled over half of all international- 
standard hotel rooms in the city (Moore, 1997: 29). 
5.1.3.3.2 The Local State as a Regulator 
The very political nature of the Politburo makes rational economic 
decision making problematic (Kolko, 1997: 27). 
As I have emphasised throughout this chapter, the local state in Vietnam has 
historically been vested with the authority and capacity to interpret and mediate 
central state directives and policies in regulating local space. Throughout 
Vietnamese history during the monarch system, the socialist system and during 
wartime, this has served political imperatives in maintaining the hegemony of the 
state over national space. Similarly, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, the 
capacity of the local state to interpret and mediate directives and policies emanating 
from the central state, in a similar way to that depicted by Smart in Section 3.3.4 in 
the context of the transitional Chinese economy, has been premised on prevailing 
political realities and the attainment of political objectives as I discuss below. 
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5.1.3.3.3 Vague Wording of Central State Resolutions 
During the Doi Mm era, an increasing number of overlapping (chong cheo) and 
shifting political alliances and factions, linking central and provincial constituencies 
within the Party-state, have emerged (Kolko, 1997: 66,68). These have arisen 
largely out of competition over business interests in the nascent capitalist economy 
and the maintenance and consolidation of control over resources and gate-keeping 
positions in lucrative areas of the transitional economy (Templer, 1998: 90,91; 
Riedel & Turley, 1999: 35; Gainsborough, 2002: 360; Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 608). 
Within the central state, this has contributed to a crisis in national policy and 
decision-making as it has been extremely difficult for the central state to broker 
policy consensus among the competing and polarised interest groups, alliances and 
factions and their constituencies within the Party-state (Leifer & Phipps, 1991: 10; 
Williams, 1992: 24; Kolko, 1997: 27,43; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 58; Templer, 
1998: 97; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 6; Dixon, 2000: 293; Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 611). 
As a result, in attempting to maintain a relative degree of political cohesion among 
these disparate groups, the central state has been compromised in its construction of 
a coherent regulatory framework to guide nascent capitalist economic processes in 
the transitional economy. Instead, the policies and directives issued by the central 
state have been watered down and become intentionally vague, opaque and 
ambiguous, generally expressing only broad intentions and occasionally containing 
contradictory statements. Once again this demonstrates the important role being 
played by the mode of societalisation in regulatory processes evolving through 
struggles between social, political and economic actors in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy. 
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Consequently, interpreting central state directives has been largely left to individual 
state institutions and officials, which has heightened levels of inconsistency in 
interpretation and arbitrary and haphazard implementation (Kolko, 1997: 125; VIR, 
17-23 July 2000: 10; Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 610). At the level of the local state, 
through their control over bureaucratic levers, these processes have as a result acted 
to consolidate and expand the regulatory control of local state institutions and 
officials over nascent capitalist economic processes in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy.? 
The lack of clarity by the central state in building a formal legislative framework to 
regulate private economic activities such as tourism is reflected in an article in the 
Vietnam Investment Review, entitled `Anyone Know Which Law To Follow? ' in 
which the writer Diep Anh outlines how: 
There is widespread confusion in the business community about the 
meaning of rules and regulations and what exactly is required under 
the law. At the same time, the legal system is neither transparent, 
consistent nor stable. Conflicting requirements are laid out under 
different decrees and regulations undergoing alteration. Even if a 
private business takes considerable care to follow the law and 
attempts to fulfil all requirements, it is not certain that it actually has 
(VIR, 19-25 June 2000: 6). 
7 This continues regulatory norms and practices in which the local state has traditionally been 
afforded considerable space to interpret central state policies and resolutions. While policy-making 
has traditionally been centralised, decision-making, however, has been extremely decentralised. 
Central State resolutions have traditionally been disseminated down bureaucratic and hierarchical 
lines with the highest levels receiving comprehensive details of the new resolutions, lower levels only 
a general outline and non-Party-state members receiving little or no information. Resolutions are 
disseminated in a range of meetings comprising central and lower level institutions: ministries, 
provincial leaders or branches or local levels etc. Therefore within each administrative level there is 
considerable scope for interpretation in accordance with local conditions and the priorities of 
particular administrative levels or institutions. After the discussions, a circular is issued by each 
institution, which guides implementation of a new directive by an institution's officials. The circular 
also reflects an institution's particular interpretation of the new central directive. This may be 
significantly different from the interpretation intended by the central state (Phong & Beresford, 
1998: 73-78; VIR, 17-23 July 2000: 10). 
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The processes described in this section closely mirror those discussed in Section 
3.4.1 on social capital in transitional economies. Consequently, to what extent they 
have similarly resulted in a heightened role for the invoking of social ties by 
entrepreneurs wanting to participate in nascent capitalist economic areas of the 
transitional Vietnamese economy with local state officials is a theme I will start to 
discuss in the context of Vietnam later in this chapter in Section 5.3. In Chapter 7,1 
address this issue by analysing the findings from interviews with private tourism 
business owners in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. 
5.1.3.3.4 Vague Wording of Tourism Directives 
With regard to the regulation of tourism business activity in the transitional 
economy, the lack of clarity in the regulatory environment for tourism businesses 
has been further complicated and compounded by the fact that there is a wide 
variety of components in the tourism industry. Different aspects of the industry fall 
within the remit of different central state institutions, which as discussed in the 
previous section have been competing to maintain their control over regulatory 
processes. For example, the VNAT is responsible for the drafting of laws and 
directives relating directly to tourism activity, for example, criteria required for 
businesses to obtain an international tour operator licence permitting them to 
conduct tourism business in the international market. However, policy-making 
relating to general business aspects of a non-state tourism business is carried out by 
other central state institutions, such as the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, as non-state tourism businesses are subject to general 
business laws, such as the Company Law, the Law on Private Enterprise and the 
Foreign Investment Law (Tong Cuc Du lich, 1997: 70). 
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In the transitional Vietnamese economy the role played by the mode of 
societalisation, as the VNAT has attempted to societalise regulatory practices in 
developing a tourism industry oriented towards the international capitalist economy, 
closely mirrors that described in the previous section with reference to the regulation 
of general economic processes. As the following two examples illustrate, the VNAT 
has been compromised and constrained in enacting a clear and coherent regulatory 
framework to guide tourism activity. Instead, as a way of societalising the broad 
social, economic and political aims and imperatives inherent in its policies among 
state institutions and officials across national space, the wording in laws and 
directives emanating from the VNAT has remained intentionally vague and opaque. 
As in the general economy, this has consequently afforded state institutions and 
officials considerable discretionary power in interpreting and mediating VNAT 
directives and, as a result, key roles in the regulation of tourism activity in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
Decree (Nghj dinh) 02/CP enacted in January 1995 formalises the legal 
requirements which an entrepreneur has to satisfy in order to establish a private 
hotel or tour operator business. However, the list of requirements detailed under the 
Decree is vague and imprecise, simply comprising minimum standards relating to 
infrastructure, equipment, the quality of services, environmental health and safety 
conditions, a suitable location, as well as minimum standards of professional 
expertise and training for any potential business owner (Tap chi Du lich, October 
1995: 2; Tong Cuc Du lich, 1997: 76). As I discuss in Section 5.2 and in Chapter 7, as 
a consequence of the vague wording of decrees such as Decree 02, entrepreneurs are 
reliant not only on the often arbitrary interpretation of opaque central state directives 
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by individual local state officials but also their "support" in negotiating the 
regulatory environment and establishing a tourism business. 
Similarly, while the `Tourism Law' (Phäp lenh Du lich), enacted at the beginning of 
1999 was hailed as "creating a clear legal framework for tourism activities " ("tao 
hänh lang phäp ly cho chüng to tien hänh läp lai tritt tu trong hoat döng du lich") 
(Tran Van Dan, 1999: 7), most of the articles in the 27 page document are vague, 
outlining general pronouncements and objectives with imprecise instructions 
regarding implementation or information on how objectives contained in the Law 
are to be realised. 8 For example, under Article 31 of the Law, for the VNAT to issue 
an international tour operator licence, a tourism business is required to satisfy the 
following minimum criteria: personnel with good professional knowledge and health 
conditions appropriate with the tourist business line(s) and scope, a feasible tourist 
business plan, adequate material foundations and facilities suited to the tourist 
business line(s) and scope, a business location compatible to the tourist business 
line, tourist programs for foreign tourists, tourist guides compatible to the tourist 
programs provided for foreign tourists and collateral according to government 
stipulations. Once again these vague conditions provide relevant state institutions 
and officials with considerable space in interpreting, mediating and implementing 
particular aspects of the Article. 
At the beginning of the next chapter I continue the discussion by examining how the 
roles of the central state - VNAT vis-a-vis the local state - municipal and provincial 
people's committees in regulating tourism activity have been formally reconfigured 
in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
8 The Ordinance on Tourism - the Tourism Law (11/1999/PL-UBTVQH 10) was approved and 
promulgated under (02L/CTN) on 20 February 1999. 
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5.1.3.3.5 Struggle and Contestation between the Central and Local States in the 
Regulation of Private Business Activities 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, within regulation theory there is the notion that in the 
restructuring of regulatory practices to sustain processes of capitalist economic 
activity, struggle and contestation takes place between social, economic and political 
actors and institutions involved in these processes. In Chapter 3,1 discussed how 
authors such as Smith and Pickles recognise how in the regulation of nascent 
capitalist economic activities in the transitional economies of ECE, such struggles 
are taking place between key social and political actors and institutions from the 
former socialist era. Similarly, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, struggles 
and contestation are being evidenced in particular between the central and local 
states in reconfiguring regulatory power and control over nascent capitalist 
economic activities. 
Since 1986, in order to facilitate the development of capitalist economic processes 
and integration into the international capitalist economy, the central state has been 
attempting to create a framework of formal regulatory norms and legislative forms 
(dieu 1e) to guide and stabilise private capitalist economic activities, including 
tourism, in the transitional Vietnamese economy. The rights and status of private 
business were initially recognised with formal decrees enacted by the central state in 
1988 (Porter, 1993: 43,45,149; Gates, 1996: 215). At the beginning of the 1990s, 
with the enactment of the `Law on Private Enterprise' and the `Company Law', the 
central state formally established the legal equality of non-state businesses with all 
other forms of economic ownership (Nguyen Nhu Binh & Brennan, 2000: 7). 
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Throughout the 1990s, as illustrated in the quote below from the owner of a private 
tour operator business in Hanoi, in enacting new legislation and amending existing 
legislation, the central state sought to create a clearer and more transparent formal 
regulatory framework in facilitating the establishment and running of private 
businesses. 9 In particular, the central state has attempted to reduce excessive and 
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures administered, in particular, by local state 
officials, and encountered by entrepreneurs in the course of setting up and running a 
private business. 
Changes in the economy, the opening up of systems of control and 
management by state institutions together with the ever increasing 
demands of the tourism industry for a more favourable environment 
in which to develop a tourism business have all led to many changes 
in the powers of local institutions and overall a diminution in the 
responsibilities of local authorities. This has been chiefly manifested 
in a less bureaucratic regulatory system in local institutions with a 
reduction in the quantity and scale of regulations and licences, and 
in the number of bridges needed to be crossed by businesses 
Nhi 'ng su chuyen bien [thay döi] trong nen kink te, su' trien khai he 
thong kiem soät vä quän ly bäi cäc co, quan nhä nzcöv, cling väi cäc 
d 6i höi [nhu caul khöng ngirng Läng len cüa ngänh du Lich ve mot 
möi trzröng u'u äi han cho ngänh du Lich phät trien dä dän den nhieu 
sir thay döi ve quyen han cüa cäc ca quan nhä nzeäc ä dia phzeong vä 
tren het lä str giäm bat träch nhiem cüa cäc co, quan nhä ntroc ä dia 
phzeong. Van cue nay ca ban dä dieac the hien 6 he thong quän ly 
hänh chinh [lieu khien] it quan lieu hon trong cäc co, quan nhä nithc 
6 dia phirong väi su giäm bat sö luong vä pham vi dieu chinh vä giäy 
phep, vä sir giäm bät sö lteong cäc rao can ma cäc doanh nghiep phäi 
vu'o't qua (Nam Sao Tourism Company, Hanoi, a small private tour 
operator). 
Not surprisingly, where central state legislation has had the effect of emasculating 
the control of the local state over local economic space, such legislation has been 
contested by local state institutions and officials in a similar way to that described in 
9 For example, the Law on the Promotion of Domestic Investment in 1994 aimed to create a more 
favourable and secure investment environment for Vietnamese individuals (Nguyen Nhu Binh & 
Brennan, 2000: 7). 
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Section 3.4.1.1° In particular, central state resolutions have been mediated where 
they threaten to undermine the local state in the two roles ascribed to it throughout 
this section: firstly, as the dominant economic actor in local space by facilitating the 
establishment and running of non-state businesses and thus heightening competition 
for local state businesses and, secondly, where they attempt to undermine the 
regulatory power of local state institutions and officials through their control over 
bureaucratic levers. " 
In line with comments made at the beginning of Section 5.1.3.3, the local state's 
contestation of central state legislation has been all the more intense as it has sought 
to consolidate its control over the enlarged and expanding economic space of the 
transitional capitalist economy, in particular, in lucrative, internationally-oriented 
economic activities, such as tourism. 
Overall, during the transitional period, contestation and struggle between the central 
and local states regarding the respective regulatory role of each institution has been 
reflected not in a linear process of continual diminution in the role of one institution 
relative to the other, but rather incremental changes and `successes' achieved by 
both the central and local states. While the central state has made gains in 
streamlining bureaucratic processes, the local state has been successful in largely 
resisting many of these measures emanating from the central state. Consequently, as 
I demonstrate in Chapter 7, for an entrepreneur, in establishing and running a private 
10 Updating the traditional Vietnamese adage quoted at the beginning of this chapter "Vietnamese 
newspapers have reported cases in which `the emperor's edicts stopped not only at the village gate 
but also at the provincial gate' (phep vua thua khöng chi le läng mä cä le tinh)" (Vasavakul, 
1999: 167). 
" Even the Minister of Planning and Investment Tran Xuan Gia admits that although a formal legal 
framework exists in regulating the private sector, the main problem remaining is in the 
implementation of these laws by state officials. "I have to admit that some public servants are not 
respecting their responsibilities. They are not following the laws" he conceded (67R, 26 June-2 July 
2000: 1). 
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tourism business, fulfilling and complying with official regulatory criteria contained 
within formal legislation enacted by the central state provides little guarantee that 
business objectives will be accomplished. Instead, an entrepreneur has to engage 
with and negotiate the informal regulatory environment constructed by local state 
institutions and officials. 
5.1.3.3.6 The Enterprise Law 
Epitomising the struggles and contestation occurring between the central and local 
state has been the unfolding of the Enterprise Law (Ludt Doanh nghiep). The 
Enterprise Law came into effect at the beginning of 2000 (Nhä Xuät Ban Lao D ng, 
2000: 6). It constitutes the latest revision made by the central state to the formal 
legislative framework regulating the establishment of private businesses. The main 
aims of the Enterprise Law are firstly, to assist in the construction of a more 
coherent formal legislative business framework, and secondly to create a more 
favourable operating environment for entrepreneurs, by streamlining both formal 
and informal bureaucratic procedures in the setting up of private businesses (VIR, 
12-18 June 2000: 10). In particular, the Law aims to streamline formal bureaucratic 
procedures by reducing the number of licences that an entrepreneur is required to 
obtain in setting up a business (Vietnam Economic Times, October 1999: 12). It also 
aims to restrict the space in which the unofficial and arbitrary decision-making 
powers of local state officials in approving or blocking licensing applications can be 
invoked (VIR, 4-10 April 2000: 13). 
Under the Enterprise Law, a steering committee, whose members come from a 
number of relevant ministries, was set up to review the licensing system and to 
recommend the abolition of any licences deemed incompatible with the spirit of the 
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Enterprise Law (Vietnam Economic Times, October 1999: 12). 12 Based on the 
findings and recommendations of the Steering Committee, in February 2000, the 
central state enacted Decision (Quyet dinh) 19, which formally abolished (bäi bö) 84 
licences and sub-licences, including three sub-licences directly pertaining to the 
tourism sector (Thai bäo Kinh to Viet Nam, 16 February 2000: 12; VIR, 4-10 April 
2000: 13; EIU Country Report, July 2000: 14). However, since then, Decision 19 has 
been fiercely resisted by both central state ministries and, in particular, local state 
institutions (VIR, 31 January-13 February 2000: 12; VIR, 4-10 April 2000: 9; VIR, 26 
June-2 July 2000: 4). Implementation of the Decision by the local state has been poor 
with a large number of licences and sub-licences abolished under the Decision 
continuing to be effective (VIR, 12-18 June 2000: 10; VIR, 18-24 June 2001: 1). 
Ministries and local state institutions claim that their foot-dragging with regard to 
the scrapping of licences is due to a lack of clear guidelines issued by the steering 
committee (VIR, 13-19 March 2000: 2; VIR, 4-10 April 2000: 9). However, it is 
obvious that the real reason for blocking the abolition of licences lies in reluctance 
on the part of state institutions and officials to relinquish control over administrative 
levers (VIR, 31 January-13 February 2000: 12; VIR, 4-10 April 2000: 9). One official 
at the Ministry of Trade, ironically complained that with the loss of sub-licences, he 
would "have no businesses to manage" (www. mekongresearch. com, 22-27 May, 
2000 viewed 30/05/00). By this, as I discuss in Section 5.2, the official is implying 
that with the loss of each successive licence, one regulatory hurdle for entrepreneurs 
and one potential source of "gifts" required by an official from an entrepreneur for 
issuing the licence is being removed. 
12 The Enterprise Law steering committee recognised that 305 sub-licences needed to be submitted in 
order to set up a new business of any kind (VIR, 4-10 April 2000: 13). 
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Central and local state institutions and officials have mediated the Enterprise Law in 
a variety of ways, as they seek to maintain control over bureaucratic levers in the 
regulation of private businesses. Ministries have been engaging in foot dragging in 
compiling lists of licences for review by the Enterprise Law steering committee 
(VIR, 6-12 November 2000: 5). Central and local state institutions have been 
continuing to issue licences already abolished. Local state institutions are continuing 
to ask entrepreneurs for documents no longer required and are refusing to approve 
licences unless they receive these obsolete documents (VIR, 16-22 July 2001: 13). 
Central and local state institutions have also been "trying to reintroduce abolished 
licences through the back door" (EN Country Report, July 2000: 14) by replacing 
abolished licences with certificates (VIR, 16-22 July 2001: 13; VIR, 18-24 February 
2002). There are also fears that ministries will start to create new sub-licences to 
replace those abolished (VIR, 21-27 August 2000: 7). 
As discussed in the last section, in the case of the local state, in mediating the 
Enterprise Law in the ways described above, it is firstly aiming to insulate local state 
businesses from competition from private businesses by continuing to exert 
significant regulatory control over the process of establishing a private business and 
secondly, ensuring that state officials continue to profit from their control over 
bureaucratic levers in the regulatory environment. 
In Chapter 7, based on the findings of my research, I analyse how the struggles and 
contestation between the central and local state discussed above have been reflected 
in the evolving regulatory environment in establishing a private tourism business. In 
particular, I examine to what extent local state institutions and officials have been 
successful in mediating the formal regulatory environment constructed by the 
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central state in the establishing of a private tourism business and thus how, in the 
transitional economy, the informal regulatory environment, constructed at the local 
scale by local state officials with entrepreneurs continues to play a pivotal role in the 
process of establishing a private hotel or tour operator business. 
One additional way in which local state officials, such as tax officials and the police, 
have been seeking to compensate for the threat of a loss of regulatory control over 
bureaucratic levers in the setting up of a private business engendered by the 
Enterprise Law has been by increasing bureaucratic interference on businesses 
already operating by carrying out excessively frequent and thorough inspections 
(VIR, 6-12 November 2000: 5; VIR, 8-14 January 2001: 1). A survey, undertaken by 
the Enterprise Law Steering Committee, found that the number of inspections 
undertaken by local state officials on private businesses had increased to an average 
of five a year when only one inspection a year was officially stipulated (VIR, 27 
November-3 December 2000: 5). 
Again in Chapter 7, based on the findings from interviews with private tourism 
business owners, I examine to what extent inspections of private tourism businesses 
by local state officials, such as tax officials and the police, are similarly performing 
an informal regulatory role in the running of a business. At the same time, I illustrate 
how, as a way of minimising interference and disruption in the running of their 
businesses, private tourism business owners are attempting to cultivate social ties 
with those local state officials responsible for carrying out inspections. 
The case of the Enterprise Law provides one contemporary illustration of the 
traditional regulatory capacity of the local state in negotiating and mediating policies 
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and directives emanating from the central state, in line with the interest and 
priorities of local state actors. It is also interesting with regard to the regulation of 
capitalist economic activity, how the attitude of the local state vis-ä-vis the central 
state regarding the opening of economic space has fluctuated over time. As was 
illustrated earlier in this chapter, up to 1986 the local state liberally mediated central 
state directives in regulating for much greater reform in local economic activity than 
the central state was at that time prepared to allow. However, currently, as 
exemplified by attitudes towards the Enterprise Law, this has been reversed. This is 
encapsulated in the comment made by Nguyen Minh Phu, a director of a Hanoi- 
based private business: 
I was given a fishing rod, and sometimes even bait, but the lake where I 
could fish is not fully opened. The (central) government is making efforts 
to improve the business climate, but the pace has slowed right down 
because local people are trying to delay the process (VIR, 18-24 
February 2002: 4). 
5.2 ACTORS: LOCAL STATE OFFICIALS 
The discussion so far in this chapter has established how throughout history, as a 
way of societalising its regulatory practices and thus achieving its overriding 
imperative of maintaining the hegemony of the state, the central state has been 
forced to cede a significant degree of regulatory control down to the local state. 
Consequently, through this process, the local state has emerged as the key institution 
regulating local economic space and local state officials (quan chirc nhä nüoc a dja 
phuorng) key actors involved in regulating local economic space. 
Thus addressing and supporting themes discussed in chapters 2 and 3, is the notion 
that throughout Vietnamese history, even as the politico-economy has shifted from 
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monarchy to socialism and presently from socialism to capitalism, local state 
officials have remained key actors regulating processes emerging out of successive 
systems. Historically, through their control over local resources and bureaucratic 
levers, local state officials have sought to regulate local economic space in large part 
by translating their political and administrative powers into economic power. They 
have firstly sought to exploit the privileges which control over local resources 
affords them in acquiring material assets and economic enrichment (Nguyen, 
1993: 74; Templer, 1998: 143). Secondly, through their control over bureaucratic 
levers, they have constituted key conduits in regulating local economic space for 
non-state actors. Thirdly, although charged with implementing central state edicts in 
local spaces, local state officials have been conferred significant arbitrary and 
discretionary powers in interpreting and implementing central state directives in 
local economic space. At the same time, having gained control over economic and 
administrative levers, local state officials have traditionally fiercely resisted any 
attempts by, in particular the central state, to rein in their powers and undermine the 
economic privileges their positions have afforded them (Nguyen, 1993: 74; Templer, 
1998: 143). 
5.2.1 The Monarch System 
During the monarchical system, the monarch governed through a complex mandarin 
bureaucracy. Mandarins (quan), who acted as the agents of the monarch in local 
spaces, were able to exploit their power and control over local spaces, in particular 
to appropriate land from the peasantry as well as afforded special privileges with 
regard to property and special clothing (Nguyen, 1993: 71,89,97). They also 
derived significant financial privileges through their control over the administering 
and collection of taxes and land rent from the peasantry (Ibid: 69,74). Furthermore, 
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in the regulation of foreign trade, with the state exercising monopoly control, 
mandarins, acting as the state's gatekeepers, were able to accrue significant 
economic privileges in negotiating with both foreign and Vietnamese merchants 
(Ibid: 99). 
The considerable physical space of the Vietnamese territory, which hindered the 
task of disseminating orders from the centre, enhanced the regulatory capacity of the 
mandarins in local spaces, while constraining the capacity of the monarchy to 
enforce its authority across the whole of its territory. Orders issued from the central 
state often did not reach the localities or were liberally interpreted. Taxes collected 
from localities often did not reach the monarch (Nguyen, 1993: 88). Similarly, 
mandarins engaged in the arbitrary collection of tax in amounts far in excess of that 
legislated by the centre (Ibid: 98). 
The inability of the monarchy to enforce its authority over mandarins in local spaces 
was most clearly illustrated in attempts by the monarchy to enact land reform in the 
face of the appropriation of land by local mandarins and other notables. In both 
central and northern Vietnam, the appropriation of land culminated in the severe 
impoverishment of the peasantry. In 1613, the Nguyen Lords, the rulers of central 
and southern Vietnam at the time, attempted to intervene by establishing a register, 
so as to limit the amount of communal land being appropriated and turned into 
private holdings. Landowners and notables, however, with the complicity of 
mandarins ignored the central state's directive. This was followed in 1669 by a total 
ban on the appropriation of communal land. However, central state intervention was 
again largely ignored in local spaces and increasing amounts of communal land 
continued to be appropriated (Nguyen, 1993: 98). 
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Similarly, towards the middle of the eighteenth century (1740), the Trinh, the rulers 
in the north of Vietnam at the time, attempted to devise laws nationalising land to 
rent out to peasants. However, due to the strong resistance of the mandarin 
bureaucracy and landowners, the legislation was never enacted (Nguyen, 1993: 89, 
96). 
5.2.2 The Central Planning System 
The introduction of the central planning system from 1954 in the north of Vietnam 
also provided state officials with a pivotal role in the regulation of local economic 
space. Under the central planning system, control over all administrative levers and 
resources was assigned to state officials in the state administrative bureaucracy 
(Porter, 1993: 137; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 35; Vasavakul, 1999: 170). Although 
under the central planning system, the central state regulated economic activity 
through its control over the issuing of orders and plans and through its allocation of 
resources to state enterprises, the majority of enterprises were in the hands of local 
state institutions (Kolko, 1997: 47; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 16; Vasavakul, 1999: 169). 
As a consequence, through their control over administrative levers and by acting as 
a key conduit between the central state and local state enterprises, local state 
officials were afforded a significant role in regulating productive activity in local 
spaces (Porter, 1993: 15,137; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 35; Vasavakul, 1999: 168, 
170). 
One way this was achieved was through manipulating production statistics and 
results and through compiling inaccurate production reports. Local state officials 
were known to produce three different reports, one for higher levels, one for 
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members of co-operatives and another for cadres in co-operatives. Through 
discrepancies in the figures between the three reports, local officials were able to 
make substantial economic gains by falsifying records to both members of co- 
operatives and the central state (White, Murray & White, 1983: 258). Circumvention 
in the planning system by state officials as a result of their control over planning 
levers and resources contributed to disrupting the flow and allocation of resources 
and consequently undermined the capacity of the central state to regulate the central 
planning system effectively. 
5.2.3 After 1975 
The mediation of central state regulatory power by local state officials was similarly 
evidenced in the Saigon economy from 1975. After reunification, the central state in 
Hanoi sought to integrate the southern economy into the national economy by 
eliminating capitalist socio-economic relations and transforming the southern 
economy into a socialist socio-economy (Nguyen, 1993: 394). 13 This was, however, 
fiercely contested by the local Vietnamese political elite in Saigon (Sheehan, 
1992: 77; Forbes, 1995: 801; Templer, 1998: 115). In large part, this was due to the 
significant economic benefits local Saigon state officials gained from regulatory 
arrangements in the Saigon economy, constituted by politico-economic ties between 
local Vietnamese state officials and local ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, in 1977, the central state initiated a campaign and directed the local 
state in Ho Chi Minh City to eliminate all capitalist activity through the 
This was initiated at the National Assembly (Quoc hei) in April 1976. It was also at this assembly 
that the name of Saigon was changed to Ho Chi Minh City (Nguyen, 1993: 457-8). 
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appropriation of private property and enterprises, predominantly from ethnic 
Chinese capitalists and to transfer it into state hands (Sheehan, 1992: 78; Storey, 
1995: 23; Kolko, 1997: 24; Templer, 1998: 306). While this campaign resulted in the 
closure and appropriation of significant numbers of private enterprises and prompted 
the exodus of between one third and one half of the ethnic Chinese community in 
Ho Chi Minh City; commerce and trade continued to be regulated largely through 
existing, albeit temporarily clandestine, private, capitalist structures and networks 
(Thrift & Forbes, 1985: 300,301; Porter, 1993: 33,47; Nguyen Khac Vien, 1995: 49; 
Templer, 1998: 305). The continuation of prevailing capitalist practices and the 
mediation of central state directives to transfer whole areas of the southern economy 
into state hands were accomplished by the local Ho Chi Minh City political elite. 
They continued to support regulatory arrangements under which the ethnic Chinese 
were allowed to maintain their control over commerce and trade in the local 
economy (Thrift & Forbes, 1985: 300,301). The significance of politico-economic 
ties cultivated between the ethnic Chinese and the local Vietnamese in regulating 
economic activity in the Ho Chi Minh City economy is discussed in more detail later 
in Section 5.3.3. 
Similarly, with the crisis in the central planning system towards the end of the 
1970s, the central state was forced to concede further regulatory control to the local 
state as a way of resolving the economic impasse. The regulatory role of local state 
officials, which under the central planning system had been constituted through their 
control over administrative levers, was now extended to economic levers, including 
resources (Porter, 1993: 61-62; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 66; Riedel & Turley, 
1999: 15; Vasavakul, 1999: 188). Local state officials in economic management, 
production or trading positions, with access to state goods and resources were 
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therefore able to derive substantial economic benefits through appropriating or 
purchasing these goods and resources at subsidised prices and then diverting and 
selling them onto the emerging black market or by distributing to friends and 
relatives (Porter, 1993: 61-62; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 15; Vasavakul, 1999: 188). 
5.2.4 Since 1986 
As discussed in Section 5.1.3.3, since the launch of the Doi Möi reform programme, 
with the central state ceding power and control down to the local state in regulating 
nascent capitalist economic activities, the economic space over which the regulatory 
control of local state officials now extends has expanded significantly. In particular, 
with the emergence of capitalist economic actors, such as entrepreneurs in new 
economic activities, such as tourism, local state officials have sought to maximise 
the potentially lucrative gains their regulatory control over bureaucratic levers 
affords them in a similar way to that depicted by Lin in the context of the 
transitional Chinese economy, discussed in Section 3.3.4. 
In the transitional Vietnamese economy, the key role traditionally played by local 
state officials in regulating economic activity in local space has been consolidated in 
their regulation of nascent capitalist economic activities. As identified within other 
transitional economies and discussed in Section 3.4.1, this is taking place as 
institutional and legislative forms are currently being restructured and reconfigured 
in the process of transition from a socialist to a capitalist oriented economy. 
First, as discussed in the previous section, with the central state constrained in 
creating a coherent framework for regulating private business, the discretionary and 
arbitrary powers of local state officials in interpreting and implementing central state 
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directives has been increased. This has resulted in not only different interpretations 
by officials working in different institutions, but also officials working in the same 
institution (Williams, 1992: 24; Kolko, 1997: 153; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 74; 
Templer, 1998: 151; Vasavakul, 1999: 167; Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 608,610). 
At the same time, while the central state is attempting to create a formal regulatory 
framework with a clear and transparent delineation of responsibilities between state 
institutions, administrative processes continue to be both bureaucratic and 
cumbersome, evoking legacies of the former central planning system. Moreover, 
administrative processes are still complicated by the overlapping jurisdictions of 
various state institutions; both between central institutions - ministries and between 
municipal and provincial authorities, where officials at different institutions act 
contrary to one another (VIR, 8-14 January 2001: 1). As a result, the bureaucratic and 
arbitrary nature of interpreting regulations is manifested in inaccurate and 
incomplete decision-making. A decision made by one official is subject to overrule 
by another official in another institution or even from the same institution, as a result 
of different interpretations. Moreover, as the regulatory environment for private 
business is continually evolving as changes and amendments are made to 
regulations, this has in turn exacerbated uncertainty and unreliability for 
entrepreneurs (Gates, 1996: 213; Levine, 1998: 1; Templer, 1998: 136). 
All these factors have compounded the difficulties for entrepreneurs attempting to 
enter and operate in the nascent private economy. Despite having been officially 
sanctioned by the central state since 1988, entrepreneurs have in reality encountered 
a hostile regulatory environment. In large part this has been due to the fact that local 
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state officials retain significant control over administrative levers, acting as 
conduits, entrepreneurs must negotiate before setting up and running a business. 
In the course of setting up or operating a private business, the regulatory 
environment allows for a large number of gatekeepers: officials from local state 
institutions with significant arbitrary and discretionary powers over the bureaucratic 
process. Each individual official has considerable capacity to facilitate or hinder any 
stage of the setting up or operating process (Scholtes, 1998: 194; Templer, 1998: 135; 
Levine, 1998: 1). Entrepreneurs are consequently reliant on local state officials to 
negotiate smoothly through the establishment and operating process. 
In the mid-1990s, it was found that: 
... setting up a small guesthouse in Ho Chi Minh City required the 
submission of forty different documents that were stamped with 
eighty-three official chops and signed by 107 bureaucrats from 
twenty-six different offices. At almost every step, officials would 
demand a fee'. Officials have almost unlimited discretion to block 
licenses... (Templer, 1998: 137). 
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, it has been found that as a result of the difficulties 
faced by entrepreneurs in dealing with the bureaucratic system, the vast majority of 
private businesses which have emerged in new economic activities, such as tourism, 
since 1988 have grown out of connections with the Party-state (Kolko, 1997: 124; 
Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 603,612). Very much supporting the evidence of authors 
such as Grabher and Stark (1998) discussed in Section 3.2.1 is the fact that in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy most private businesses have been set up by 
relatives of state and party officials or by entrepreneurs cultivating ties with state 
and party officials (Kolko, 1997: 122; Riedel & Turley, 1999: 49). 14 
14 Until March 2002, it was officially illegal for Party members to engage in private business activity 
(Abrami, 2003: 96). 
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The themes discussed in this section are explored further in chapters 6 and 7 where I 
analyse the extent to which ties cultivated by entrepreneurs with state officials are 
facilitating the establishment of private tourism businesses in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy. In particular, I examine the extent to which social capital, 
with the cultivation of pre-existing social ties by entrepreneurs with local state 
officials, constitutes an important institutional mechanism regulating the 
establishment and running of a private tourism business. In the next section, I 
initiate this discussion by examining the role that social capital has historically 
played in regulating socio-economic processes in Vietnam. 
5.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
As in the transitional economies of ECE and China discussed in Chapter 3, in 
Vietnam there is a considerable body of evidence supporting the notion that social 
ties (quan he xä hei) have historically played an important role in regulating socio- 
economic processes in Vietnamese society and that throughout history the nature 
and function of social ties in regulating socio-economic processes have evolved 
through particular institutional contexts. In particular, throughout history, cultivating 
social ties with the state has constituted a key mechanism in negotiating the 
regulatory environment prevailing at any one time. 
More specifically, due to their control over administrative levers and resources, 
state officials have traditionally played a pivotal role in regulating economic space. 
Through this control, state officials have throughout Vietnamese history sought to 
regulate economic space for the benefit of themselves, their families and their 
relatives (Nguyen, 1993: 74,88; Templer, 1998: 143). For 
individuals and groups 
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without family or kinship ties to the state, social ties with state officials have been 
created and cultivated as a way of negotiating regulatory processes. 
5.3.1 The Monarch System: The Mandarin Bureaucracy 
In Chapter 3,1 discussed how the fact that guanxi is rooted in the Confucian ethics 
of interpersonal kinship relations could help to inform our understanding of the role 
of social ties between the state and civil society in Vietnam where socio-economic 
and political institutional structures similarly originate in the doctrine of 
Confucianism. One illustration of the influence of Confucianism in structuring 
socio-economic and political relations between the state and civil society in Vietnam 
both historically and currently can be revealed from the old Vietnamese adage, 
conceived during the monarch system, but which is equally invoked in the 
contemporary, transitional economy that: 
mot nguäi lam quan, cä ho dzeac nhä 
(Once a man becomes a mandarin, his whole family can rely on him) 
As the above expression implies, social capital created through shared affiliation as 
family members has historically played an important role in structuring socio- 
economic and political relations between the state and civil society. For example, in 
the monarch system, having attained their positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
mandarins, the equivalent of local state officials during the monarch system, were 
able to utilise the significant privileges their positions afforded them: material 
rewards, including land and property, and financial rewards, through their collection 
of land rents and taxes, for the benefit of themselves and their entire families 
(Nguyen, 1993: 74). 
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At the same time, providing an example of the exclusionary nature of social capital, 
discussed in Chapter 2, mandarins fiercely sought to preserve their positions in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, not only in order to safeguard privileges accruing to them at 
that time, but also for the benefit of future generations of their families, by, for 
example, restricting access to mandarin competitions to the sons of mandarins and 
aristocratic families (Nguyen, 1993: 36). 
5.3.2 Vertical State - State Social Ties 
While the focus of the discussion on social ties is on the creation and cultivation of 
vertical ties by private actors with state actors, as mentioned in Chapter 2, vertical 
ties between state actors have also played a regulatory role. The cultivation of state 
to state social ties with ties cultivated between actors with shared political affiliation 
as state officials emerged with the introduction of the central planning system. The 
abolition of the monarchy in 1945 and the introduction of the central planning 
system in the north of Vietnam from 1954 transformed the socio-economic 
hierarchy and consequently regulatory relations in economic space. Control over all 
regulatory levers - administrative levers and resources - was assigned to state 
officials in the state bureaucracy (Porter, 1993: 137; Phong & Beresford, 1998: 35; 
Vasavakul, 1999: 170). 
Under the central planning system, plans, orders and resources flowed down a 
cumbersome bureaucratic hierarchy from the centre to localities. At each stage in the 
planning system, a state official at a higher level in the hierarchy exerted total 
regulatory control over the flow of resources down to the next level in the hierarchy. 
To ensure that resources moved smoothly down the planning hierarchy towards their 
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destination, the state enterprise, lower level state officials cultivated ties with higher 
level officials by offering gifts (Porter, 1993: 129,137-8; Templer, 1998: 144: 
Gainsborough, 2003: 73). The creation of vertical ties by lower level state officials 
with higher level officials in the planning system became known as the "umbrella" 
(ö dü) or connections system. 
15 
The mechanics of the umbrella system were similarly evidenced in the operation of 
the tourism industry in the north of Vietnam at that time. With the development of 
foreign relations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) with 
socialist countries, including China, Korea, East Germany and Poland throughout 
the 1950s, in 1960, the Vietnam Tourism Company (VTC) was established as the 
central state institution responsible for regulating the flow of foreign visitors, almost 
exclusively from these socialist countries, coming to Vietnam (Nguyen, 1993: 
273). 16 
The VTC exerted total regulatory control over the allocation of foreign visitors to 
one or more of the handful of state tourism companies under its authority, operating 
at that time (Pham Trung Luong, 1995: 114; Tran Van Dan, 1999: 7; Cooper, 2000: 
170). Therefore, as a way of receiving preferential consideration with regard to 
foreign visitors, these state tourism companies cultivated ties with officials at the 
VTC, as illustrated in the quote below by a manager at one of these companies: 
For state companies such as ours before 1990 our operations 
including customers and capital were wholly dependent on the 
allocation of tourism work given to our company by the VTC. Under 
the old planning system when our company was still a unit of the 
15 The term `umbrella' system was used due to the `protection' afforded from above by higher level 
officials down to lower level officials. 
16 Officially until 1993, the Vietnam Tourism Company (VTC), although under different names, 
regulated all foreign visitors to Vietnam. 
138 
VTC, there were a number of officials at the VTC who caused 
difficulties in the running of the company and, in particular, 
problems in the allocation of foreign tourists to our company . 
If our 
company had "good relations " with the official at the VTC in charge 
of allotting tourists, he could provide us with information relating to 
forthcoming visitors. With this information we could ask the l "TC to 
distribute this work to us. Thus, overall the VTC would distribute a 
larger amount of tourists to our company, bringing about a higher 
level of revenue for our company (Thuy Tien Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a state tour operator). 
The example above, as well as illustrating the mechanics of vertical state to state 
ties, also demonstrates how the central state VTC was able to retain regulatory 
control over flows of foreign visitors coming to Vietnam and the allocation of this 
business to tourism companies. In Chapter 6,1 examine the extent to which in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, these processes have been perpetuated in the 
VNAT retaining a significant degree of regulatory control over international tourism 
activity. Similarly, I examine to what extent this has correspondingly provoked the 
cultivation of ties by state tour operators with officials at the VNAT as a way of 
receiving preferential access to international tourism space. 
5.3.3 Vertical Private - State Social Ties 
The cultivation of vertical ties by entrepreneurs with local state officials as a 
mechanism regulating capitalist economic activities in local space, discussed in 
Chapter 3, was initially recognised when political and economic relations were 
reconfigured in the Saigon economy after 1954. Before that time, in the south of 
Vietnam, under the French colonial administration, the regulatory powers of the 
mandarin bureaucracy had remained largely intact. In extending its patronage to the 
colonial administration, the mandarin bureaucracy had served the administration by 
maintaining a repressive grip over the rural peasantry. In this way, mandarins had 
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consolidated their traditional privileges through appropriating land and collecting 
crippling levels of taxes from the peasantry (Nguyen, 1993: 182). 
However, after the withdrawal of the French colonial administration, the local 
Vietnamese assumed control over the political apparatus of the local Saigon state. 
The local ethnic Chinese (ngixöri Hoa), who, during the colonial period, had moved 
into and increasingly dominated commercial and trading activities in the Saigon 
economy, yet who had remained politically marginalised, started to cultivate ties 
with the new local Vietnamese political elite in order to maintain their economic 
hegemony in the local economy. 
Social ties were however formed and constructed by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs 
with local Vietnamese state officials rather than created out of shared affiliation and 
cultivated out of pre-existing ties as illustrated in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, since 
1954, the ethnic Chinese entrepreneur - local Vietnamese state official nexus has 
perpetuated as the key institutional mechanism regulating economic space in Ho Chi 
Minh City (Templer, 1998: 305). Moreover, the nature, stream and mutuality of 
benefits obtained by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and local Vietnamese state 
officials during this time and discussed below is closely identifiable with the notion 
of social ties portrayed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Social ties were cultivated through the offering of fees by ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs to local Vietnamese state officials. In return, Chinese entrepreneurs 
benefited through the protection and support provided for their businesses by local 
state officials. This included bureaucratic support, preferential access to licences and 
the evasion of tax. Furthermore, local state officials occasionally acted as the 
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nominal `owners' of businesses owned by the Hoa, particularly in sectors of the 
economy where the central state barred foreigners from operating, thus providing an 
example where local state officials mediated and transgressed central state directives 
(Barton, 1983: 48; Kolko, 1997: 45; Templer, 1998: 303). 
As I discussed in Section 5.2.3, the embedded nature of politico-economic ties 
between ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and local Vietnamese state officials was 
instrumental in mediating attempts by the central state to eliminate capitalist 
economic structures and introduce socialist institutional structures into the southern 
socio-economy after 1975. Local state officials in Ho Chi Minh City underpinned 
regulatory arrangements under which the Hoa were allowed to maintain their control 
over commerce and trade in the local economy. In a number of cases, ties between 
ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and local state officials allowed a proportion of the 
productive activities of the Hoa to be nominally transferred into state hands, while 
ownership remained in Chinese hands (Thrift & Forbes, 1985: 300,301). 
After 1979, with the crisis in the central planning system, traditional regulatory 
processes in the Ho Chi Minh City economy resumed unadulterated by the socialist 
pretensions of the central state (Porter, 1993: 34,61; Kolko, 1997: 25,26). 
Significant numbers of enterprises were handed back to their former Chinese owners 
(Thrift & Forbes, 1985: 301; Kolko, 1997: 52). Local state officials continued to 
provide political protection to Chinese entrepreneurs and support for businesses, for 
example, in allowing businesses to conceal revenue earned in order to evade tax 
(Porter, 1993: 132). At the same time, with the unravelling of the planning system, 
local state officials in Ho Chi Minh City, whose positions in the planning system 
afforded them access to state goods and resources, expanded market activities by 
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appropriating these goods and resources and diverting them to ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs and businesses to dispose of on the burgeoning black market (Porter, 
1993: 61). This appropriation of state goods and resources for selling in the market 
was replicated in other major urban centres throughout Vietnam and the first half of 
the 1980s witnessed the growth in ties between state and private actors to a point 
where they played an increasingly significant regulatory role in economic space 
(Porter, 1993: 61). 
In the transitional Vietnamese economy, politico-economic ties between ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs and local Vietnamese state officials have continued to 
constitute the key nexus regulating economic activity in the Ho Chi Minh City 
economy. However, as I discuss in the following section, the scale of economic 
activity conducted through this nexus has expanded significantly as international 
capitalist economic activity has officially been sanctioned in the national economy. 
Similar politico-economic regulatory arrangements between entrepreneurs and local 
state officials have also emerged in other commercial centres in Vietnam as nascent 
capitalist economic activities have developed. As discussed in the context of 
transitional economies in general in Chapter 3, for entrepreneurs throughout 
Vietnam, cultivating social ties with state officials has in part helped to counter 
uncertainty in a rapidly changing regulatory environment in the transitional 
economy. As depicted in Chapter 3 and in the social ties cultivated by ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs with local Vietnamese state officials in Ho Chi Minh City, 
ties cultivated by entrepreneurs throughout Vietnam with local state officials have 
afforded both parties economic benefits. For an entrepreneur, benefits obtained 
again mirror those identified by David Wank (1996) and discussed in Chapter 3, 
including in the running of a business, bureaucratic support and non-interference in 
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the operations of a business. Again as identified by Wank (1996) and similarly 
illustrated in the ties cultivated by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs with local 
Vietnamese state officials in Ho Chi Minh City, ties cultivated by entrepreneurs 
throughout Vietnam with local state officials have also served to engender 
complicity between entrepreneurs and local state officials for mutual benefit with 
the partial or complete circumvention of central state regulations, for example in tax 
evasion (Kolko, 1997: 56; Templer, 1998: 146). 
In Chapter 7,1 analyse to what extent similar politico-economic arrangements 
between private tourism business owners and local state officials have also emerged 
in regulating tourism business activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy. I 
examine to what extent social ties cultivated by private tourism business owners are 
facilitating the processes of establishing and running a private tourism business in 
the ways described by Kolko and Templer. I also analyse to what extent the 
mechanics of cultivating social ties so far discussed with reference to the Ho Chi 
Minh City economy are similarly being replicated in Hanoi and Hue by 
entrepreneurs with local state officials. In particular, I examine to what extent my 
research findings support the notion that social capital, with the invoking of pre- 
existing ties by private tourism business owners with local state officials, constitutes 
an important institutional mechanism regulating the establishment and running of a 
private tourism business in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
5.4 LOCAL CONTEXT: HANOI AND HO CHI MINH CITY 
The discussion so far in this chapter has highlighted how the local scale has emerged 
as the key scale at which nascent capitalist economic activities are being regulated in 
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the transitional Vietnamese economy. However, individual local spaces have faced 
varying capabilities and constraints in regulating capitalist economic activities and 
relations, in particular, with regard to establishing links in the international capitalist 
economy and developing internationally-oriented activities such as tourism. Out of 
this, distinct regulatory processes are evolving in particular local spaces in 
regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy. In large part, as in other transitional economies discussed in Chapter 3, 
such distinct regulatory processes appear to be resulting from the legacies and 
diversity of historical experiences in particular local spaces. 
Examining the diverse historical experiences of Ho Chi Minh City vis-ä-vis other 
urban centres in Vietnam, in particular Hanoi, provides two key legacies, which 
have informed contemporary attitudes and arrangements in the regulation of 
capitalist economic activities in these spaces. With the integration of the Vietnamese 
economy into the international capitalist economy, these legacies have had a 
significant impact on the regulation of internationally-oriented economic activities, 
such as tourism. 
The first legacy concerns the "insertion " of the Saigon economy into the 
international capitalist economy during the colonial period. 
'7 In particular, the 
emergence of the ethnic Chinese as major socio-economic actors in the Saigon 
economy during this period, initiated the development of social and economic ties 
and networks by the ethnic Chinese in Saigon with kinship groups overseas. As I 
describe later in this section, these ties have been pivotal in stimulating the 
17 A term used by Smith and Pickles and discussed in Chapter 3. 
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development of capitalist economic activities, including tourism, in the transitional 
Ho Chi Minh City economy. 
Conversely, the second legacy relates to the historical antipathy of the Vietnamese 
state towards commerce and international trade. Among, in particular, northern 
elements of the Party-State, the experience of colonialism significantly reinforced 
such traditional prejudices and engendered a deep-seated resentment of capitalism 
and capitalist economies (Nguyen, 1993: 164,166; Storey, 1995: 13). As a result, the 
degree of "insertion" historically of local economic spaces, outside of the southern 
economy, including Hanoi and Hue with the international capitalist economy, has 
been stifled. In the transitional economy, in contrast to the internationally-integrated 
Ho Chi Minh City economy, it is claimed that the lack of connectedness with the 
international capitalist economy combined with continued ambivalence towards 
capitalist economies in these localities has acted as a serious constraint on the 
capacity of these local economic spaces to develop internationally-oriented capitalist 
economic activities, such as tourism. 
Continued suspicion of and antipathy towards, in particular, western capitalist 
economies among conservative, northern factions within the central state in Hanoi 
have resulted in circumspection regarding the degree to which the national economy 
should integrate into the international capitalist economy. This has been evidenced 
in the slow process of re-establishing and developing relations with, in particular, 
western capitalist economies. At the same time, indecision within the central state 
regarding policy initiatives which forge closer international integration has been 
exacerbated as the central state, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, attempts to 
broker a policy consensus which satisfies disparate and competing interests and 
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factions including both pro- and anti-integration lobbies within the Party-State. In 
Chapter 6,1 examine to what extent similar attitudes have pervaded the VNAT as it 
has integrated the Vietnamese tourism industry into the international tourism 
economy. 
5.4.1 Social and Historical Ties between Actors in Ho Chi Minh City and the 
International Capitalist Economy 
Regarding the first legacy, from the colonisation of Saigon in 1859 until the 
reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the southern economy effectively functioned as a 
distinct regional economy outside the orbit of the Vietnamese state (Nguyen, 1993: 
381; Forbes, 1995: 801). Saigon was turned into the colonial centre for commercial 
and international trading activities. Socio-economic relations throughout the local 
economy were regulated largely in accordance with capitalist principles (Williams, 
1992: 8; Pelzer, 1993: 315; Nguyen, 1993: 382; Beresford & McFarlane, 1995: 53; 
Nguyen Khac Vien, 1995: 50; Templer, 1998: 211). 
However, in the colonial economy in Saigon, it was the ethnic Chinese who came to 
the fore as a capitalist class rather than the indigenous Vietnamese who remained 
marginal. For socio-cultural reasons, reinforcing the prejudice in Confucianism 
against commercial activities, the Vietnamese preferred to take up bureaucratic 
positions in the colonial administration or to maintain their control over land in the 
rural economy (Williams, 1992: 8; Nguyen, 1993: 167,169,182,183,187; Porter, 
1993: 5-6; Templer, 1998: 186). 
The precursor to economic dominance by the Chinese in the southern economy 
evolved from the time the Vietnamese moved and settled into the south at the end of 
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the 17th century (Storey, 1995: 13; Nguyen Khac Vien, 1995: 80; Le, 1997: 486). At 
around the same time, a large group of Chinese migrants arrived in Vietnam seeking 
refuge (Nguyen, 1993: 121; Le, 1997: 508). While given permission to stay, the 
Chinese migrants were allowed to settle only in marginal delta areas. During the 
French colonial period, these areas developed into centres for commercial and 
international trading activities, in particular Saigon (Nguyen, 1993: 121; Le, 
1997: 508). At the same time, the Chinese migrants were denied rights over land or 
any political role in the colonial administration. Consequently, trading provided 
their only viable option. 
Trading activities nevertheless suited the Chinese as capital remained relatively 
liquid and generated quick returns, allowing savings to be repatriated back to the 
homeland. This was attractive for the migrant community, expecting their stay in 
Vietnam to be only temporary (Lim, 1983: 2). Over time, such investment priorities 
have been reinforced by uncertainties regarding the tenure of the Chinese 
community, historically subject to varying degrees of acceptance, scrutiny and 
repression by the Vietnamese State. By acting as intermediaries for the French in the 
domestic economy, during the colonial period, the ethnic Chinese were able to move 
into and increasingly control commercial and trading activities throughout the 
southern economy (Lim, 1983: 2,3; Williams, 1992: 8; Porter, 1993: 6; 33; Nguyen, 
1993: 169,388; Nguyen Khac Vien, 1995: 50). 
Of particular relevance to socio-economic relations in the transitional economy was 
that the colonial period also initiated the building of economic and trading ties and 
networks by the ethnic Chinese community in Saigon with kinship groups overseas, 
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initially in South-East Asian countries, similarly involved ýý ith colonial 
administrations and companies (Nguyen, 1993: 187). 
During the American War, the scale of these ties intensified. Investment capital 
from ethnic Chinese communities, predominantly in East and South-East Asia, 
flowed into the Saigon economy as capitalist economic relations in the southern 
economy expanded significantly as huge volumes of goods were imported by the US 
(Barton, 1983: 47; Nguyen, 1993: 388; Kolko, 1997: 52). 18 
For a short time after 1975, as the central state in Hanoi initiated its campaign to 
eliminate capitalist economic activity throughout the southern economy, discussed 
earlier in this chapter, economic and trading ties and networks between the ethnic 
Chinese community in Ho Chi Minh City with kinship groups overseas were 
temporarily suspended. However, again as previously discussed, with the crisis in 
the central planning system towards the end of the 1970s, the local state regained 
control over the regulation of local economic space. In Ho Chi Minh City, one of the 
main initiatives proposed by the local state to reinvigorate the local economy at that 
time was to recreate a conducive business environment encouraging the return of 
those ethnic Chinese who had left after 1975 and stimulating capital inflows from 
ethnic Chinese communities overseas back into the Ho Chi Minh City economy. 19 
As part of these proposals, property seized from ethnic Chinese owners was returned 
18 Before 1975, Taiwan and Hong Kong were among the largest investors in the southern economy 
(Nestor, 1997: 190). 
19 One example of this is the case of Chau Hong, an ethnic Chinese businessman, who prior to the 
clampdown on capitalist economic relations, owned and operated several private enterprises in Ho 
Chi Minh City. On 24 March 1978, policeman and youth volunteers seized Chau Hong's factories 
and he left Ho Chi Minh City. However, he returned in 1981, where he was approached by Nguyen 
Thi Thi, who had permission to set up a capitalist enterprise, to co-operate in the venture (Far 
Eastern Economic Revie'r', 4 August 1988: 21). 
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to them (Kolko, 1997: 52). As a result, in the first half of the 1980s, capital started to 
trickle back into the Ho Chi Minh City economy. 
Since 1986 with the formal commitment from the Vietnamese Central State to 
establish a capitalist-oriented economy and integrate into the international capitalist 
economy, in the more secure and open politico-economic environment, ties between 
ethnic Chinese communities in Ho Chi Minh City and, in particular South-East Asia, 
have been reignited and expanded significantly. 20 This mirrors the situation 
described by Nan Lin (1995) in the transitional Chinese economy discussed in 
Chapter 3. At the same time, the case of Ho Chi Minh City largely supports 
comments made by Adrian Smith (1995) discussed in Section 3.3.2 regarding how 
particular regional economies historically most imbued with capitalist practices have 
been better able to develop capitalist economic activities and integrate into the 
international capitalist economy. However, the case of Ho Chi Minh City illustrates 
a greater role for historical, socio-cultural ties between economic actors in 
embedding capitalist economic processes in particular local spaces than recognised 
by Smith. 
In the transitional Vietnamese economy, the bulk of official foreign investment and 
international trade in Vietnam has flowed from kinship groups in Singapore, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong to ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in the Ho Chi Minh City economy 
(Nestor, 1997: 167,191; Kolko, 1997: 52; Templer, 1998: 302). In addition, at least 
equivalent amounts of capital and trade have been channelled into and out of the Ho 
Chi Minh City economy through unregulated, informal family networks located 
20 While figures vary, it is estimated that in excess of half a million Hoa, live in Cho Lon (District 5 
in Ho Chi Minh City) another half a million in other districts in Ho Chi Minh City and a further one 
million throughout Vietnam, mostly in the Mekong Delta (Le, 1997: 112; Templer, 1998: 302). 
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worldwide (Kolko, 1997: 45; Templer, 1998: 302). 21 A significant proportion of this 
capital has flowed into the hotel sector in Ho Chi Minh City, as investment in the 
sector has perpetuated the traditional preference among ethnic Chinese investors for 
projects and activities where capital remains liquid yet generates high and rapid 
returns (Kolko, 1997: 52). 2'` 
Investment in the hotel sector was initially due to renewed investor interest after 
1986 in the general Ho Chi Minh City economy, predominantly from ethnic Chinese 
communities overseas. This resulted in investment capital flowing into the 
renovation and development of tourism infrastructure including hotels to 
accommodate the increasing number of foreign, predominately ethnic Chinese, 
investors coming to Ho Chi Minh City at the end of the 1980s and investors more 
generally from East and South-East Asia, in the first half of the 1990s. 23 With the 
growth in tourist numbers to Vietnam from the mid-1990s, the investment in tourism 
infrastructure made after 1986 has significantly facilitated the development of the 
Ho Chi Minh City tourism industry. Consequently, ties between the ethnic Chinese 
community in Ho Chi Minh City and kinship groups overseas have played a vital 
role in the development of capitalist economic activities in the Ho Chi Minh City 
economy in the transitional economy. 
21 It is estimated that two thirds of ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City have family connections in 
western or other Asian countries (Kolko, 1997: 45; Templer, 1998: 302). 
22 This is illustrated by the fact that the bulk of official investment from the ethnic Chinese in Hong 
Kong has flowed into trade and services, including hotels (Nestor, 1997: 180). 
23 During the early 1990s, the growth in Taiwanese and Japanese visitors was largely responsible for 
overall increases in visitor numbers. Taiwanese visitors accounted for 45% of total visitor numbers in 
Ho Chi Minh City (Cooper, 2000: 171). 
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5.4.1.1 Viet Kieu 
As well as being "inserted" into the international economy as a result of kinship ties 
with the ethnic Chinese community overseas, the Ho Chi Minh City economy has 
also been uniquely connected through kinship ties with the overseas Vietnamese 
(Viet Kieu) communities, around 40% of whom are in fact ethnic Chinese, who left 
Vietnam predominantly after the end of the war in 1975 (Dorais, 2001: 3,24 )., 4 As 
the vast majority of Viet Kieu were originally from in or around Ho Chi Minh City, 
they have facilitated growth chiefly in the Ho Chi Minh City economy through 
remitting increasing amounts of investment capital back into the local Ho Chi Minh 
City economy (Sheehan, 1992: 67; Nestor, 1997: 167). 25 
Significant amounts of investment capital from the Viet Kieu have been flowing into 
the Ho Chi Minh City economy since private economic activities were officially 
sanctioned by the central state in 1988. These flows have predominantly been 
channelled informally through family networks into the Ho Chi Minh City economy 
(Nestor, 1997: 167; Templer, 1998: 303). As in the discussion in Section 3.4.4.2, this 
has provided entrepreneurs in Ho Chi Minh City with sources of capital to set up 
private businesses. 26 More specifically, a significant proportion of remittances have 
been invested in the construction of hundreds of small, private hotels in Ho Chi 
Minh City as the potential of tourism was recognised (Templer, 1998: 303; Dorais, 
2001: 11-12; Cohen, 16 Jan 2003: 48). 
24 The overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu) population is currently estimated at around 
2.7 million 
including the children of Viet Kieu born outside Vietnam (Dorais, 2001: 3,24; 
Cohen, 16 Jan 2003: 
48). 
25 The majority of remittances are sent from the US, followed 
by Canada, Australia, France, Germany 
and Japan. (Cohen, 16 Jan 2003: 48). 
26 Official figures underestimate foreign investment... it is estimated that 
half of the private 
businesses in Ho Chi Minh City operate with foreign capital (EIU, Vietnam: Country Report, 4th 
quarter, 1997: 20). 
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In Chapter 7, based on the findings from my own field research, I analyse how 
important social, cultural and historical ties between actors in the Ho Chi Minh City 
economy and the international capitalist economy have been in facilitating the 
development of tourism activity among private tourism business owners. I first 
examine the extent to which my findings support those of authors such as Templer 
(1998) in the role that social ties with actors in the international capitalist economy 
have played in providing capital enabling entrepreneurs in Ho Chi Minh City to set 
up tourism businesses. I then move on to examine, how in a similar way to that 
discussed in Section 3.3.3, with the majority of Viet Kieu living in western 
countries, how important ties cultivated with family members overseas have been 
for private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City in facilitating access to 
western markets in developing their tourism business operations by providing 
customers for their businesses. 27 
5.4.2 Antipathy towards Capitalism and Capitalist Economies in the Hanoi 
Party-State 
The second legacy concerning the historical antipathy of the Vietnamese state 
towards commerce and international trade originated from the doctrine of 
Confucianism, adopted during the monarch system, which afforded private business 
a very low status (Templer, 1998: 186). This was compounded by a state 
administrative system which, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, gave local state 
officials, as a result of their control over administrative levers and resources, 
substantial regulatory powers in local economic space. Consequently, the 
developmelit of private economic activity was stifled and private economic actors 
27 Around a half of Viet Kieu live in the US; 400,000 in France, 200,000 in Australia and 200,000 in 
Canada (Templer, 1998: 312; Dorais, 2001: 3). 
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largely emerged out of ties and connections with local state officials (Nguyen, 
1993: 108,109). 
At the same time, one important characteristic of feudal monarchy was the 
monopoly control exercised by the state in regulating international economic space 
as illustrated in the following quote (Nguyen, 1993: 34,71). 
Foreign trade was strictly controlled by the state; transactions could 
be conducted only with government authorization and in specified 
places. Many foreign trading vessels were banned from entering port 
(Nguyen, 1993: 71). 
During the French colonial period, unlike Saigon, Hanoi was only marginally 
integrated into the colonial economy, instead functioning primarily as an 
administrative centre. Consequently, the development of capitalist economic 
relations in the local Hanoi economy during this period remained limited (Thrift & 
Forbes, 1985: 292; Williams, 1992: 8; Womack, 1993: 283; Nguyen, 1993: 296; 
Beresford & McFarlane, 1995: 53). 
At the same time, anti-colonial sentiment and the growth of nationalism were at 
their strongest in the north (Nguyen, 1993: 194). Particularly in the north, 
colonialism was perceived as exploitative associated as it was with the establishing 
of capitalist socio-economic relations in an export-driven economic system in which 
economic space was appropriated by French companies, through their exploitation 
of the Vietnamese resource base and their exploitation of the majority of the 
Vietnamese population, which became increasingly impoverished (Nguyen, 
1993: 164,166,187; Storey, 1995: 13). 
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The culmination of `colonial exploitation' occurred during the Second World War. 
when further demands were exacted by the colonial administration in supporting the 
war effort (Nguyen, 1993: 222,225,227). In the north, rice farmers, whose 
livelihoods had traditionally been precarious, were required to increase supplies of 
rice at the same time as the amount of land under rice cultivation decreased as more 
land was requisitioned for industrial crop production (Nguyen, 1993: 227; Nguyen 
Vinh Phuc, 1995: 58; Templer, 1998: 49). This policy was largely blamed for the 
ensuing famine in 1944 and 1945, in which approximately two million people in the 
north died (Templer, 1998: 48-49; Porter, 1993: 9-10). The legacy of colonialism and 
the famine has engendered deep-seated political and ideological suspicion and 
circumspection which has persisted to the present, among northern elements of the 
Party-State towards, in particular, major European and North American capitalist 
economies. 
Until 1986, the degree of "insertion" of the Hanoi economy in the international 
capitalist economy was extremely limited as from the 1950s international ties had 
been forged almost exclusively with socialist nations (Nguyen, 1993: 273). With the 
collapse of the socialist system, these ties were, therefore, of limited utility in 
facilitating integration of the Hanoi economy into the international capitalist 
economy. However, since 1986, traditional ideological suspicion and 
circumspection have persisted among more conservative, northern elements within 
the central state regarding the opening of the Vietnamese economy and the forming 
and cultivation of closer, substantive economic relations, particularly with major 
western capitalist economies. Compounded by, in comparison with the Ho Chi Minh 
City economy, a lack of international connectedness, it is claimed that this has 
consequently acted as a serious constraint on the capacity of economic actors in the 
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Hanoi economy to develop internationally-oriented capitalist economic activities. At 
the same time, this has impacted not only on the degree of international integration 
of the Hanoi economy, but also the national economy, in the context where the 
central state acts as a conduit regulating economic relations in international space. In 
part, this reflects a fear that integrating into the international capitalist economy will 
result in an excessive loss of national economic sovereignty and the import of a neo- 
colonial form of exploitation (Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 605). It also reflects 
inexperience on the part of members of the Party-State in negotiating with foreign 
actors on capitalist economic issues, which potentially compromise the central 
state's control over national economic space. Moreover, it is also in response to the 
privileging of political exigencies by the central state, in regulating international 
capitalist economic relations in the interests of businesses belonging to the central, 
but, in particular, the local state, as a way of ensuring that the state remains the 
hegemonic institution in the transitional Vietnamese economy, a theme I have 
emphasised throughout this chapter (Dixon & Kilgour, 2002: 605). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Utilising the key analytical concepts and themes identified and discussed in chapters 
2 and 3 provides a useful framework for analysing how regulatory processes and 
relations between social, economic and political actors have evolved, not only in the 
transition from a socialist to a capitalist-oriented economy, but throughout 
Vietnamese history. 
Throughout Vietnamese history, the path dependent nature of regulatory processes 
has been evinced in three important ways: 
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Firstly, as a way of maintaining the hegemony of the state across national space, the 
central state has traditionally ceded a significant degree of regulatory control over 
local economic space to the local state. As such this challenges much of neo-liberal 
discourse where there is the notion that contemporary economic changes in the 
global economy are chiefly responsible for the reconfiguration and heightened 
significance of the local scale as a regulatory scale. Furthermore, it extends the 
discussion within the transitional economy literature, where it is generally argued 
that the process of transition occurring in these economies has similarly been 
responsible for a significant diminution in the regulatory role of the central state and 
the corresponding heightened significance of the local scale as a regulatory scale. 
Nevertheless, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, as in other transitional 
economies, the ceding of regulatory control by the central state over economic space 
down to the local state has allowed the local state to emerge as the key actor and 
regulator of nascent capitalist economic activities in local space. However, in 
Vietnam in doing so, this has only to a small extent resulted from prevailing global 
economic realities, but rather once again reflects the political imperative of the 
central state to maintain the hegemony of the state throughout national space. 
Secondly, through their control over resources and bureaucratic levers, local state 
officials have historically constituted key actors regulating economic activities in 
local spaces. Similarly, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, as institutional and 
legislative structures for regulating nascent capitalist economic activities are being 
reconfigured, through their control over bureaucratic levers, as identified in other 
transitional economies, local state officials are emerging as key conduits economic 
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actors must negotiate with in order to participate in nascent capitalist economic 
activities. 
Correspondingly, the third feature of regulatory processes throughout Vietnamese 
history has been the cultivation of social ties in particular by private economic actors 
with local state officials as a way of negotiating the regulatory environment in local 
space. Historical evidence in Vietnam however points to social ties constituted not 
only through pre-existing ties between actors and based on shared affiliation as I 
have been focussing the discussion on up until now, but also as in the case of ties 
created by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs with local Vietnamese state officials in 
Saigon after 1954 where no shared affiliation exists. However, in both cases, ties 
have been similarly premised on mutual and regular benefits. In the transitional 
Vietnamese economy, as in other transitional economies, for entrepreneurs, 
cultivating social ties with local state officials has in part helped to counter 
uncertainty in a rapidly changing regulatory environment. 
Combined with the identification of distinct local regulatory processes evolving in 
the transitional economy out of particular historical experiences in Ho Chi Minh 
City and Hanoi, the material in this chapter very much supports the claims made by 
authors writing on other transitional economies that in the transitional economy, the 
local scale has come to constitute the key scale at which nascent capitalist economic 
processes are being regulated and the local state, the key regulatory institution. 
Consequently, what role is left for the central state in regulating nascent capitalist 
economic activities such as tourism in the transitional Vietnamese economy? This 
is a theme I turn to examine in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE NA TIONAL MODE OF SOCIAL REGULA TION 
In this chapter I analyse the role of the VNAT - the central state tourism institution 
- in the regulation of tourism activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
I first briefly examine to what extent processes identified in chapters 3 and 5, with 
the ceding by the central state of regulatory control over economic activity in local 
spaces to the local state, have been evinced in the regulation of tourism activity in 
the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
In the second part of the chapter I turn to examine the extent to which my findings 
support the assertion made in regulation theory regarding the key regulatory role 
played by the central state as a conduit mediating global economic processes across 
national spaces. I focus on the capacity of the VNAT to regulate international 
tourism activity through mediating access for Vietnamese tourism businesses to the 
international tourism market and for foreign tourism businesses to the Vietnamese 
tourism market. 
In the final part of the chapter, addressing the theme of path dependency, I 
investigate to what extent the practices of the VNAT have been informed by the 
legacies of historical experiences and former socio-economic systems. 
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6.1 REGULATION OF NATIONAL TOURISM SPACE 
Supporting the discussion in chapters 3 and 5, in developing a tourism industry 
oriented towards the international capitalist economy, the VNAT has, in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, similarly ceded a significant degree of regulatory 
control over tourism activity in local spaces to the local state. In part, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, this has been through the vague wording of directives issued by the 
VNAT. This has consequently afforded local state institutions and officials 
considerable capacity to mediate and interpret VNAT directives in local spaces. 
Furthermore, as I discuss in this section, control has also been formally ceded with 
the enactment of successive laws and resolutions transferring regulatory power from 
the VNAT to the local state. This therefore serves to challenge the claim made in 
regulation theory that the central state remains a key regulatory conduit through its 
capacity to enact laws and directives which guide capitalist economic processes 
throughout national space. 
As discussed in the last chapter, from its inception in 1960 up to 1986, the central 
state Vietnam Tourism Company (VTC), renamed the General Department of 
Tourism after reunification, had possessed total regulatory power over the entry of 
all foreign visitors coming to Vietnam, allotting foreign visitors and groups to the 
state tourism companies under its control. ' However, with the introduction of Doi 
Möii after 1986, tourism was immediately recognised and highlighted as an 
1 In June 1978, the General Department of Tourism came into being as the central state tourism 
institution managing the tourism industry throughout the whole of newly reunified Vietnam 
(Anonymous (DLVN), Tap Chi Du lich July 1998, `Vietnamese tourism on the road to restructuring 
and development (Du lich Viet Nam tren duöng doi mini vä phät trien): 5,15). 
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economic sector offering considerable potential in the transitional economy. '` 
Consequently, as with other potentially lucrative economic activities emerging out 
of the transition to a capitalist economy, powerful municipal and provincial 
constituencies within the Party-state, in particular in Ho Chi Minh City, supported 
by allies within the central state exerted considerable political pressure for much 
greater regulatory control over the development of tourism activity in local spaces 
(K17,20.12.00). 
The central state has acceded to the demands of these political constituencies and 
significant institutional restructuring has taken place in the regulation of tourism. 
The pattern of restructuring closely mirrors that occurring throughout the 
transitional economy with the VNAT relinquishing its previous monopoly control 
over tourism activity and ceding a significant degree of regulatory power down to, 
in particular, the local state - provincial and municipal people's committees. This 
was evinced as early as April 1987 with the enactment of Central State Resolution 
63, with the recommendation to: 
quickly reorganise the system of tourism management from the centre 
to the local and on the basis of moving towards the abolition of 
centralised management, transfer entirely to self-financing socialist 
businesses; clearly differentiating the state management functions of 
the General Department of Tourism with the independence of tourism 
businesses 
(Nhanh chin chinh he thong quän ly du lich tir Trung uong den dia 
phirong vä co sä theo huöng xoä bö tip trung quan lieu bao cap 
chuyen hin sang hach toän kinh doanh xä höi chü nghia; phän biet rö 
chüc näng quän ly Nhä nuöc cüa Tong cuc Du lich voi quyen tu chü 
kinh doanh cüa cäc to chüc kinh doanh du lich)(Anonymous, Nhüng 
2 At the seminal 6th Communist Party Congress in December 1986, which launched the Döi Mari 
reform programme, one announcement made was to "Quickly make good use of the favourable 
conditions of the country to expand tourism by mobilising domestic investment capital and by co- 
operating with foreign countries" (Nhanh chöng khai thäc cäc dieu kien thuän lqi cüa dat nuöac de möa 
r6ng du lich bang vön dau tu trong nuörc vä hop tic vöri nuöc ngoäi) (Anonymous, Nh(mg ngäy thing 
vä sir kien ding ghi nhä (Dates and events worth remembering) Tap chi Du 1ich, 1999: 4). 
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ngäy thäng vä su kien dang ghi nh i (Dates and events worth 
remembering) (Tap chi Du lich, 1999: 6). 
However, it was not until the early 1990s that the proposals contained within 
Resolution 63 were acted on. First, in October 1992, Decree 05/CP established the 
Vietnam National Administration for Tourism (VNAT), as the new central state 
institution charged with regulating the Vietnamese tourism industry in the 
transitional economy (EIU, Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 1996-7; Tong cuc 
Du lich, 1997: 47; Anonymous, Nhixng ngäy thäng vä sir kien dang ghi nhör (Dates 
and events worth remembering) Tap chi Du lich, 1999: 4,6; Nguyen Nhu Binh & 
Brennan, 2000: 17; Cooper, 2000: 175). 3 This was followed by the dissolution of the 
Vietnam Tourism Company which, as previously discussed, up until then had 
constituted both the key regulator of international tourism activity and the key actor 
through the state tourism companies under its control. At the same time, the 
majority of these companies were transferred from the control of the central state to 
municipal and provincial people's committees (Nguyen Nhu Binh & Brennan, 
2000: 8). In June 1993, the limited role to be played by the VNAT as an actor, 
operating tourism businesses, was reaffirmed when Resolution 45/CP further 
diminished the number of tourism businesses under its control. 
Finally, in February 1994, with the enactment of Decree 09/CP, the central state 
ceded further regulatory control to provincial and municipal people's committees 
conferring them as the key institutions regulating tourism activity in local space. 
Under the Decree, the VNAT assigned total regulatory control to provincial and 
municipal people's committees in implementing tourism directives enacted by the 
VNAT in approving the setting up and administering the running of tourism 
3 `CP' as in Decree 05/CP stands for chinh phü which signifies the central state government 
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businesses: hotels and domestic tour operators in local spaces (EN, Vietnam: 
Country Report, 1st quarter, 1995: 29; Tong cuc Du lich, 1997: 71). 
Consequently, with the enactment of decrees such as Decree 09, the formal 
regulatory framework created for the tourism industry in the transitional economy 
has conferred provincial and municipal people's committees as the key institutions 
regulating tourism activity in local space. This has occurred in a context where 
provincial and municipal people's committees act both as the key tourism actors in 
local space, through the hotels and tour operator businesses directly under their 
control and as the key institutions regulating the establishment and running of 
tourism businesses in local space, both businesses under the control of state 
institutions other than provincial and municipal people's committees, but in 
particular, private tourism businesses. 
6.2 REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TOURISM SPACE 
While the VNAT has ceded a significant degree of regulatory control over tourism 
activity to local spaces, in this section I discuss how it has however retained 
considerable regulatory control over international tourism activity. The VNAT acts 
as the key institution regulating access for Vietnamese tourism businesses to the 
international tourism market and for foreign tourism businesses to the Vietnamese 
tourism market (www. batin. com. vn viewed 04.02.00). These powers were formally 
conferred on the VNAT with the enactment of Resolution 45 in June 1993. This 
assigned the VNAT as the sole regulatory institution responsible for issuing and 
revoking licences for Vietnamese and foreign businesses to conduct international 
tourism activity in Vietnam. 
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As such, the findings presented in the rest of this chapter go a long way towards 
reinserting the central state back into the regulatory picture as a key institution 
regulating global economic processes, as claimed in regulation theory. The evidence 
presented in this section also serves to demonstrate how the claims made by authors 
writing about transitional economies regarding the extent to which the central state 
has relinquished regulatory control in the transitional economy have been 
exaggerated. Instead, where capitalist economic activities are internationally- 
oriented as in the case of tourism, the central state remains a key regulatory conduit 
mediating capitalist economic relations and activities between local and 
international tourism actors and institutions, as contended within regulation theory. 
6.2.1 Political Imperatives in the Regulatory Practices of the VNAT 
In regulating access for Vietnamese tourism businesses to international tourism 
markets, political imperatives have clearly shaped the regulatory practices of the 
VNAT. As a way of, firstly, preserving the role of the state as the leading institution 
in the Vietnamese tourism industry, secondly, retaining its role as the key political 
institution in the transitional Vietnamese tourism industry, and, thirdly, as a way of 
societalising the broad social, economic and political aims and imperatives inherent 
in its policies, the VNAT has regulated access to international tourism space for 
state tourism companies, belonging to, in particular, municipal and provincial 
people's committees. This has allowed a handful of tourism companies, primarily 
under the control of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's 
Committees, to develop into dominant economic actors in the international tourism 
industry in the transitional economy. 
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The priorities and objectives of the VNAT have been most clearly illustrated in the 
access it has afforded Vietnamese tourism businesses to: 
0 international tour operator licences (ITOLs) 
9 membership of international tourism associations and 
0 international tourism trade fairs. 
I will discuss each of these in turn. 
6.2.2 International Tour Operator Licences 
Perhaps the most effective way by which the VNAT regulates access to 
international tourism space for Vietnamese tour operators is in its role as the sole 
institution responsible for issuing international tour operator licences (ITOLs) (giäy 
phep kink doanh lü hänh qu6c te). 
These licences are a vital requirement for Vietnamese tour operators in developing 
their international tourism operations. Having an ITOL officially allows a 
Vietnamese tour operator to approach and establish relations directly with foreign 
institutions. With an ITOL, a tour operator is authorised to sign agreements with 
foreign tour operators to receive tour groups; to arrange tour business to Vietnam 
with foreign companies; to participate in international tourism trade fairs; and to 
become a member of international and regional tourism organisations. At the same 
time, foreign tour operators wanting to develop business relations in Vietnam are 
officially required to go through an international tour operator (ITO) -a Vietnamese 
tour operator with an ITOL. 
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Since being conferred with total regulatory authority over the issuing of ITOLs in 
1993, the regulatory practices of the VNAT have clearly demonstrated its overriding 
objective to achieve the political imperatives cited earlier in this section. ITOLs 
have been issued almost exclusively to tour operator businesses belonging to 
municipal and provincial people's committees as well as a number of central state 
institutions. This can be illustrated by the fact that by the end of 1993, the VNAT 
had issued ITOLs to 65 Vietnamese tour companies of which almost all were state 
businesses under the control of municipal and provincial people's committees as 
well as central state institutions (Tap chi Du lich, August 1994: 12,15). ' 
6.2.2.1 Regulation of ITOLs for Private Tourism Businesses 
Conversely as a way of concentrating the building of ties with foreign tourism 
actors and institutions in the hands of local state tourism companies, the VNAT has 
issued very few ITOLs to private tourism businesses. For a number of years, as the 
following quote from the Nam Sao Tourism Company illustrates, the VNAT argued 
that they were only issuing ITOLs to a handful of state tourism companies in order 
that they could effectively maintain the quality of tour programmes as well as 
guarantee security for foreign tourists. This was despite the fact that, as I discuss in 
Chapter 7, state tour operators often sell tour programmes, which they themselves 
do not run but instead buy from private tour operators. 
The VNAT only issues licences for companies to conduct tourism 
business overseas to state companies... the government and the VNAT 
want to keep a reasonable level of control on the tourism industry, as in 
all other economic sectors generally, saying that they want to 
4 Despite the transformation and rapid development of the international tourism industry between 
1993 and 2001, in particular with the huge growth in private tourism businesses, by the beginning of 
2001, the number of Vietnamese tour operators with ITOLs had only increased to a little over 100 
(Tap chi Du lich, March 2001: 18). 
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guarantee the quality of tourism business for the sake of foreign 
tourists, while it can be argued that they realbi i+ ant to preserve a 
leading role for state companies in the tourism industry by preventing 
most private companies from conducting the higher end, more 
lucrative tour business booked from overseas, preserving this business 
in the hands of state companies and a select few, well-connected 
private businesses (Nam Sao Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). 5 
In addition, in regulating access to ITOLs, the VNAT has created a formal 
regulatory environment which discriminates against small scale tourism businesses, 
which includes the overwhelming majority of private businesses. Pronouncements 
contained within Decree 66 in April 1995, later amended with the enactment of the 
Tourism Law in February 1999, combined with unofficial policy guidelines, have 
created a framework of stringent conditions which all tour operator businesses, both 
state and private, officially have to fulfil before being eligible to apply for an ITOL 
(Tap chi Du lich, October 1995: 2; Töng cuc Du Lich, 1997: 598,737-738; Nguyen 
Nhu Binh & Brennan, 2000: 7). For the vast majority of private tour operators, these 
requirements far surpass their capabilities. 
First, tour operator businesses have to satisfy a number of minimum financial 
requirements as a respondent outlined as follows: 
To establish a tourism business authorised to market for international 
business from outside Vietnam is very difficult as the government 
together with the VNAT only want to provide these licences to state 
businesses which can meet certain criteria such as having 3 years of 
tourism experience, annual turnover of VND1 billion (US$67,000) and 
a fixed level of collateral stipulated by the VNAT at VND300 million 
(US$20,000) (Tran Xuan Soan Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a 
private tour operator). 
5 Throughout this chapter, with tourism businesses from which quotes are illustrated, pseudonyms are 
used in order to protect the anonymity of these companies. 
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In particular, the requirement regarding a minimum annual turnover of `'ti DI 
billion is extremely high, far exceeding the average annual revenue of the vast 
majority of private tour operators. Among all tour operator owners I interviewed, 
apart from the large state tour operators, only one respondent, a private tour operator 
in Hanoi with an ITOL, generated turnover of over VND1 billion. 
Second, after obtaining an ITOL, a tour operator must continue to fulfil minimum 
financial criteria and satisfy minimum requirements regarding the amount of 
tourism business generated in the international market. For example, one year after 
obtaining an ITOL, a business must have signed at least one tour agreement 
involving at least 500 foreign tourists a year with a tourism company or individual 
in the international market. In addition, at least 20% of a tour operator's customers 
must have come from foreign tour business (Tap chi Du lich, April 1995: 16-17; 
www. mekongexpress. com `October-December 1996' viewed 02.11.01; Tap chi Du 
lich, September 1997: 23; T6ng cuc Du lich, 1997: 607; www. batin. com. vn viewed 
04/02/00). 
Consequently, as the quotes below illustrate, while in the last ten years, the 
regulatory environment in establishing and running a private tour operator business 
in the domestic market has become more favourable, the VNAT, through its control 
over the issuing of ITOLs, has been extremely effective in regulating access to the 
international tourism market, severely constraining private businesses from 
establishing formal ties with foreign actors and institutions. 
As the tourism industry started to develop, the policies of the 
government and the tourism authorities assisted state companies only 
and restricted the development of private businesses. While in recent 
years, policy changes have eased the restrictions on the establishment 
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of private businesses, restrictions still appli" in the issuing of international tour operator licences to private tourism businesses 
(Thuy Tien Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a state tour operator, 
under the control of the VNAT and the Hanoi Municipal People's 
Committee). 
It's difficult for a private business to obtain an international tour 
operator licence ... as the government only wants state institutions to be responsible for doing tourism business overseas and arranging for 
foreign tourists to come to Vietnam... (Au Lac Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
The only point which constrains the business is the policy of the VNAT 
in issuing ITOLs almost exclusively only to state companies and a feig, 
well-connected private businesses. This has constrained the running 
and development of our business quite considerably. For example, it'e 
have cultivated a number of relations with institutions in China, 
Australia and France, through our relations with the General Steel 
Corporation and the Ministry of Trade. When these institutions 
introduce customers who want to come to Vietnam, we aren 't allowed 
to conduct business with them directly but instead have to go through 
an authorised business, in our case Hanoitourism. By having to do 
this, organising the tour becomes complicated and time-consuming, 
which leads to the loss of these relations as they feel the process is too 
complicated. Instead they start dealing directly with a company like 
Hanoitourism when they want to come to Vietnam. Thus, we lose 
overseas customers, current revenue and potential revenue in the 
future and generally become ineffective in doing business with 
overseas customers (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and Investment 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
Obtaining an international tour operator licence ... is practically impossible for private businesses... a private business must have the 
support of the VNAT and the owner of the business must have ven' 
good relations with officials at the VNAT (Danh Du Tourism and Trade 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Accordingly, access to ITOLs and international tourism markets has largely been 
the preserve of a handful of local state tour operators. As illustrated in Table 6.1, 
formal ties with tourism institutions overseas have been concentrated among a 
handful of, in particular, state tour operators belonging to the Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City Municipal People's Committees. Consequently, in large part due to the 
extensive network of formal ties these state tour operators have been able to create 
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with foreign counterparts, they have come to dominate international tourism activity 
in Vietnam, in terms of the number of foreign visitors served as well as the revenue 
generated from this business. This is again shown in Table 6.1. 
Comments made in the last two quotes above do however illustrate for "a /ii titwell- 
connected private businesses " (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and Investment Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator) with "very good relations with officials at the VNAT 
(Danh Du Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an 
ITOL), the discretionary power possessed by officials at the VNAT with regulatory 
control over the issuing of ITOLs has nevertheless allowed these businesses to 
obtain ITOLs. The example above also highlights how officials from the VNAT 
have retained significant control over international tourism processes in the 
transitional tourism economy, in particular through their capacity to mediate VNAT 
directives. In this context, it is therefore not surprising that private tourism business 
owners are invoking pre-existing social ties with officials at the VNAT as a way of 
negotiating the regulatory environment in, for example, obtaining an ITOL. 
This was confirmed among all private ITO owners interviewed in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City with all respondents citing good relations with officials at the VNAT - in 
the case of private tour operator owners interviewed in Hanoi or, with officials at 
the Ho Chi Minh City Bureau of Tourism (S& Du lich thänh pho Ho Chi Minh), in 
the case of private tour operator owners interviewed in Ho Chi Minh City - as the 
principal means by which their businesses had obtained ITOLs. 6 As previously 
mentioned, only one of these businesses had actually fulfilled the official 
requirement of generating an annual turnover over VND 1 billion. 
6 Bureaux of Tourism act as agents for the VNAT, outside Hanoi, with responsibility for overseeing 
the implementation of VNAT policies in local spaces. 
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The significant control and discretionary power possessed by officials at the VNAT 
in regulating international tourism is similarly being evidenced as private tourism 
businesses, which have obtained ITOLs, have then attempted to develop their 
international tourism activities. While obtaining an ITOL officially allows an ITO to 
approach the international tourism market directly, to cultivate relations with 
foreign tour operators and to arrange tour business with foreign companies, 
approval by officials at the VNAT is still however required before an ITO can carry 
out any of these tasks, as the quotes below illustrate (Tap chi Du lich, September 
1997: 23; Danh Du Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an 
ITOL). 
Before a Vietnamese ITO can receive a group of foreign tourists, it 
must first send a report (bäo cäo thu'c hien tour) to the VNAT giving 
detailed information about the participants and the schedule of the 
tour programme and ask the VNAT for permission to allow this tour 
group to come to Vietnam (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and Investment 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
When an ITO wants to receive foreigners, it must first report to the 
VNAT and the office of immigration to complete the necessary 
procedures (Thuy Tien Tourism and Trade Company, a state ITO 
under the control of the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism). 
Consequently, this again affords officials at the VNAT with considerable control 
over international tourism processes through the discretionary power they possess in 
approving requests made by individual ITOs to carry out any tourism activity in the 
international market. As the quote below illustrates, in the absence of pre-existing 
ties, private tourism business owners are cultivating ties with officials at the VNAT 
so that the procedures involved in, in this instance, organising and conducting tour 
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group business from overseas, can be competed smoothly. As I found in Chapter 5, ties 
cultivated provide regular and mutual benefits. 
We have cultivated good relations with an official at the VNA T as a way of 
easing and speeding up the completion of administrative tasks. When we 
require the quick completion of any procedures or relevant paperwork 
arising from our work of receiving foreign tour groups, a member of staff 
at our company deals with this particular official at the MAT. Our 
member of staff only has to provide some benefit (a sum of money) for the 
official at the VNAT (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a 
private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Nevertheless, while the example above illustrates where a private ITO has successfully 
negotiated the informal regulatory environment, the arbitrary decision-making power 
exercised by officials from the VNAT was equally in evidence among a number of 
other private ITO owners interviewed in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. For example, 
the owner of the Tu Hai Tourism Company in Ho Chi Minh City explained to me how 
although officially permitted to approach and carry out tourism business in the 
international market directly, he had failed to negotiate the informal regulatory 
environment. 
We have faced a lot of difficulties in trying to conduct tour business. There 
are still a lot of cumbersome procedures and obstacles to overcome to be 
able to do this. In the international market, our relations in France, 
Canada and Denmark introduce our business to a number of tour 
operators in the cities where they live. However, we co-operate with the 
Hoa Binh Tourism Company to carry out tour business and receive tour 
groups directly. Although, we have a licence to do this, in reality we use 
Hoa Binh to facilitate bringing foreign tour groups to Vietnam (Tu Hai 
Tourism Company, HCMC, a private tour operator with an ITOL). ' 
7 Hoa Binh Tourism Company is a large state ITO in Ho Chi Minh City. 
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Demonstrating the important regulatory role played by officials at the VNAT was 
illustrated by the fact that turning down requests made by particular private ITOs 
interviewed in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to carry out international tourism activity 
had, as in the case of Tu Hai Tourism, had the effect of circumscribing development of 
international tourism operations among these businesses. 
6.2.3 Membership of International Tourism Associations 
For a Vietnamese tourism business, membership of international tourism associations, 
in particular the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), provides it with an invaluable 
opportunity to tap into the network of tourism actors and institutions in these 
associations and establish business ties and relations with fellow members, throughout 
the international tourism market, particularly in lucrative and competitive markets in 
Europe, the United States, Australia and Japan. 8 
The VNAT possesses total regulatory control over the process of nominating 
Vietnamese tourism businesses and approving applications for membership of 
international tourism associations. As with the issuing of ITOLs, in regulating access to 
membership of international tourism associations, the VNAT has demonstrated its 
overriding objective to maintain the leading role for the state in the tourism industry by 
8 Other international tourism associations important for Vietnamese tourism businesses in building ties 
with foreign tourism actors and institutions include the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) and 
the Japan Association of Travel Agents (JATA) (www. bttvn. com). 
173 
nominating, in almost all cases, tourism businesses under the control of municipal and 
provincial people's committees as well as the VNAT itself. 
Consequently, as with ITOLs, for a handful of state tourism businesses in particular 
under the control of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Committees, 
this has further facilitated the building of relations with tourism actors and institutions 
overseas. As a consequence, the bulk of formal international tourism ties have been 
concentrated among these tourism businesses. This has enabled them to become 
dominant actors in the international tourism industry in Vietnam as illustrated in Table 
6. L 
As an illustration of the regulatory support afforded by the VNAT to these state tourism 
businesses, substantive and formal integration between Vietnamese and foreign tourism 
businesses was initially manifested when, in January 1994, the first branch of PATA in 
Vietnam was established. 9 At that time, 18 state tourism businesses were nominated by 
the VNAT to become members of the Association (thänh vien Chi höi PATA Viet 
Nam) (Tap chi Du lich, January 1994: 36). 10 This enabled these businesses to initiate the 
building of ties and relations in the international tourism market with the estimated 
17,000 members of PATA in 40 countries and to sign tourism agreements with foreign 
tourism companies (Tap chi Du lich, April 1994: 6). 
9 Vietnam became a member of PATA in 1990 (Tap chi Du lich, January 1994: 36). 
10 By 2001,128 Vietnamese tour operators and hotels, almost all state tourism businesses, were members 
of PATA Vietnam ('More to Do', 06/08/01: www. mekongsources. com viewed 07/08/01). 
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Due in large part to the regulatory support afforded to state tourism businesses by the 
VNAT in attaining, in particular PATA membership, by the end of 1994 state tour 
operators had signed agreements with 473 foreign tour operators in 45 countries to 
bring foreign visitors to Vietnam (Tap chi Du lich, December 1994: 5). '' The majority 
of these agreements were signed by tour operators under the control of the Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi Municipal People's Committees as well as the VNAT itself. For 
example, in that initial period of international integration, Saigontourist, under the 
control of the Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Committee, established relations 
with 133 foreign tourism firms, while by July 1994 the Vietnam National Travel 
Agency (VINATOUR), under the control of the VNAT, had cultivated relations with 
more than 100 foreign tour operators in markets such as France, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
China and Russia (Tap chi Du lich, July 1994: 33; Tap chi Du lich, April 1995: 21). 
In particular, membership of international tourism associations allowed local state tour 
operators to initiate and subsequently develop the most formal and extensive ties with 
tourism actors and institutions in important and lucrative source markets for 
Vietnamese tourism, including in Europe, North America and Japan. As an example, in 
1993, Ben Thanh Tourist Company in Ho Chi Minh City, under the control of the 
District 1 People's Committee in Ho Chi Minh City and the VNAT, signed tourism 
agreements with 35 foreign tour operators in 16 countries to co-operate in bringing 
foreign visitors to Vietnam. Of these 35 companies, 19 were from Europe and North 
America, including five from the United States (Tap chi Du lich, December 1994: 19). 
II By 2001, the number of relations officially established between Vietnamese and foreign tourism 
companies had risen to more than 820 in 55 countries (Tap chi Du lich, January 1999: 3; Tap chi Du lich, 
May 2001: 23). 
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The importance of membership of international tourism associations in developing ties 
in the international tourism market can be illustrated in the following comments made 
by managers of a number of local state tour operators interviewed in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City and again in Table 6.1. 
Our foreign customers mainly come from France, Germany, the United 
States, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. This is mainly due to ties 
we have formed with fellow members of PA TA, ASTA and JA TA (Song 
Hong Tourism, Hanoi, a state ITO under the control of the Hanoi 
Municipal People's Committee). 
The most effective marketing has come through our participation in PA TA, 
ASTA and JA TA. This has been very successful in terms of developing the 
company's business and the performance of the business. As a result, we 
have achieved the status as one of the leading tour operators in Vietnam 
(Tu Do Tourism Company, HCMC, a state ITO, under the control of the 
HCMC Municipal People's Committee and the VNAT). 
The most successful marketing has been through our membership of the 
international tourism associations. Through this, we've been able to liaise 
with many other members, advertise our company and our tourism 
products and distribute promotional literature (Viet Huong Tourism, 
Hanoi, a state ITO under the control of the VNAT). 
6.2.4 International Tourism Trade Fairs 
The VNAT has also demonstrated significant regulatory control over the building of 
relations and activities between Vietnamese tourism businesses and foreign tourism 
actors and institutions in selecting and financially supporting a handful of state tourism 
businesses to accompany it at international tourism trade fairs (trien lam höi chq du Lich 
quöc te). These constitute a key forum bringing together tourism actors and institutions 
from international tourism markets, allowing tourism businesses to meet face to face in 
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building and developing business ties and alliances. As the quotes below from large 
state ITOs illustrate, for Vietnamese tour operators they provide invaluable 
opportunities to create business relations with foreign tour operators as a way of 
expanding international tourism business operations. For foreign tour operators they 
provide opportunities to develop ties with Vietnamese tour operators as a way of 
entering the Vietnamese tourism market. 
Through taking part in a number of international tourism trade fairs and 
exhibitions in countries such as Thailand, Belgium and Germany, our 
company has been able to introduce and promote its activities (Song Hong 
Tourism, Hanoi, a large state tour operator under the control of the Hanoi 
Municipal People's Committee). 
The ties we have formed with companies in the French and Japanese 
markets have come about primarily through our participation at tourism 
trade fairs and through our membership of PATA (Tu Do Tourism 
Company, HCMC, a large state ITO, under the control of the District 1 
People's Committee in HCMC and the VNAT). 
The most successful form of marketing has been in being able to prepare 
promotional programmes and literature and sending these to our 
controlling institution, Saigontourist and the VNA T to distribute when they 
participate in international tourism trade fairs such as ITB from Germany, 
VITFA in Hanoi and tourism trade fairs in Japan and Switzerland. This 
has resulted in our business being able to form and co-operate with 
partners from these events in carrying out tourism business (Dong Tay 
Tourism Company, HCMC, a large state ITO under the control of 
Saigontourist). 
As the quotes below illustrate, in regulating access to international tourism trade fairs 
the VNAT has again demonstrated its overriding objective of providing support for 
local state tour operators by, in almost all cases, inviting only a handful of tour 
operators, under the control of, in particular, the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City 
Municipal People's Committees to participate in international tourism trade fairs. 
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Only a handful of state companies receive invitations from the IWAT to go 
to international tourism trade fairs, which can greatly help these 
businesses introduce their companies in the international market (Le Loi 
Tourism and Service Company, Hanoi, a state tour operator under the 
control of a state institution other than the municipal people's committee 
or the VNAT) 
The VNAT, our controlling institution, has given us preferential treatment 
by inviting our company to attend a lot of international tourism trade fairs 
and exhibitions... This has been the most effective form of marketing. 
Through taking part we have been able to introduce our company and sign 
cooperative agreements with a number of foreign tour companies (Thuy 
Tien Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a state tour operator, under the 
control of the Hanoi Municipal People's Committee and the VNAT). 
Our business receives more support than other state businesses, one 
reason being that we are directly managed by the VNAT. When the VNAT 
participates in international tourism events and exhibitions, it will 
introduce the Vietnamese tourism industry and also introduce a number of 
businesses involved in the industry in Vietnam, giving preference to those 
businesses under its control, including our business (Hoang Tu Tourism 
and Hotel Company, Hanoi, a state hotel under the control of the VNAT). 
In almost all tourism fairs held abroad, joint-venture tour operators were 
excluded from the list of participants while priority was given to state- 
owned companies like Saigon Tourist Corp. or Vietnam Tourism (Gilbert 
Degryse, a tourism consultant from Belgium, working at the ASEAN 
Hotel, Hanoi, VIR, 1-7 May 2000: 12). 
As well as requiring an invitation by the VNAT to attend an international tourism trade 
fair, perhaps a more serious constraint for the vast majority of Vietnamese tour 
operators, including most of the large state tour operators under the control of the Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Committees, is lacking the financial 
capability to attend. Consequently, they are reliant on the VNAT, not only to be invited, 
but also to be financially sponsored to attend international tourism trade fairs. 
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The importance of financial considerations is illustrated in the following quotes made 
by managers at two state tour operators. The first quote from a manager at Song Hong 
Tourism, a large state tour operator under the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's 
Committee, illustrates the preferential access afforded this business to international 
tourism trade fairs by the VNAT. This has enabled the business to develop ties in the 
international tourism market through which it has become one of the most important 
actors in the international tourism industry in Hanoi. 
With regard to being invited to take part in international tourism trade 
fairs and exhibitions, the VNAT decides to take part in some of these and 
then invites a small number of companies, almost exclusively a number of 
the original state tourism companies set up in the industr i', including 
ourselves, to attend. Attending these trade fairs is very important and 
lucrative for all tourism businesses as a significant way in which to 
promote our business and form ties with foreign companies and 
organisations. Being sponsored by the VNAT to attend saves a lot of 
expense for a company, without which most companies wouldn't have the 
necessary financial capacity to attend (Song Hong Tourism, Hanoi, a 
large state tour operator under the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's 
Committee). 
Conversely, this second quote from a manager at another state tour operator in Hanoi, 
but not under the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's Committee, equally 
demonstrates how the lack of support from the VNAT in being invited and more 
especially not being financially sponsored by the VNAT to attend international tourism 
trade fairs has acted as a serious constraint on this business's attempts to develop 
relations with tourism institutions in the international market. 
State tourism companies directly under the control of the VNAT are given 
a lot more preferential treatment in developing their ties in the 
international tourism market by being invited to attend tourism trade fairs 
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and exhibitions with the expenses for these trips financed from the budget 
of the VNAT This acts as an effective way in which they can expand their 
relations and contacts in the international tourism market. Other state 
companies not under the management of the VNAT but instead under the 
management of ministries and state corporations would like to attend 
these trade fairs as well but are unable to because of financial limitations. 
Instead they have to rely on the relations that their ministries or 
corporations have in the handful of countries that the government and the 
VNAT have given permission for these tourism companies to sign tourism 
agreements with (Le Loi Tourism and Service Company, Hanoi, a state 
tour operator, under the control of a state institution other than the 
municipal people's committee or the VNAT) 
Nevertheless, while for the majority of Vietnamese tour operators the lack of financial 
capability does constitute a major constraint on these businesses attending international 
tourism trade fairs, as the earlier quote from Gilbert Degryse demonstrates, the VNAT 
is in addition still able to effectively regulate access to international tourism trade fairs 
in the event that individual businesses do possess sufficient financial capability to 
attend. Thus, in the example cited by Gilbert Degryse, foreign joint-venture tour 
operator projects, between foreign and Vietnamese tour operators, which it can be 
assumed possess sufficient financial capability to attend international tourism trade 
fairs, are effectively prevented from attending as the VNAT excludes these businesses 
from a list of businesses it draws up. Instead, as in Gilbert Degryse's example, 
invitations are reserved for state tour operators such as Saigontourist, under the control 
of the Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Committee and Vietnamtourism, under 
the control of the VNAT itself. 
One additional point arising out of the comments of the manager of Song Hong 
Tourism concerns how the VNAT almost exclusively invites a number of the original 
state tourism companies to attend international tourism trade fairs. In the case of state 
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tourism companies in Hanoi, such as Song Hong Tourism, the majority of those 
companies, which as discussed in Chapter 5 were important actors in the international 
tourism industry during the socialist era, have in the transitional economy continued to 
be important actors. As such this provides an answer to questions raised in the 
discussion on regulation theory in Chapter 2 and support for the claims made by 
authors writing about transitional economies that, in the transition from a socialist to a 
capitalist-oriented economy, relations between socio-economic and political actors and 
institutions are being reworked rather than dismantled. Key actors and institutions 
involved in regulating economic activities span both socio-economic systems. As is 
shown in Table 6.1, two of the most powerful tourism actors in the current international 
tourism industry in Hanoi - Hanoitourism and Vinatour - constituted two of the original 
state tour operators set up in the tourism industry in 1963 and 1960 respectively. In 
accounting for the continued prevalence of these institutions, the answer once again lies 
in how political imperatives have informed socio-economic considerations. During the 
socialist era, Hanoitourism and Vinatour served as units under the control of the VTC 
to carry out international tourism which primarily performed a political role through 
fostering relations between Vietnam and socialist countries. In the transitional 
economy, the maintenance of institutions such as Hanoitourism and Vinatour as key 
institutions in the international tourism industry has served political imperatives in 
maintaining the role of the state as the leading institution in the Vietnamese socio- 
economy. 
Examining the mechanics of the VNAT's control over access to international tourism 
trade fairs also provides evidence in addressing two additional themes raised in 
discussions earlier in this thesis: firstly, how local state tour operators have struggled 
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over and competed for access to international tourism trade fairs and, secondly, how 
these struggles have been constituted through cultivating social ties with officials at the 
VNAT. 
First, as claimed in regulation theory and by Smith and Pickles (1998) in the context of 
transitional economies, while tourism institutions from the socialist era continue to play 
key roles in the regulation of international tourism in the transitional economy, their 
respective power and control over nascent processes of international tourism are being 
contested. This has been manifested in attempts by local state tour operators to gain 
preferential access to international tourism trade fairs. With the VNAT inviting only a 
small number of state tour operators to attend each international tourism trade fair, 
competition between local state tour operators for invitations is intense. Local state tour 
operators have attempted to cultivate social ties with officials at the VNAT in order to 
increase their chances of receiving invitations, as the following quotes from two state 
tour operators under the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's Committee illustrate. 
With deregulation in the state tourism sector, all tourism companies such 
as ours have become autonomous units. Therefore, we now have to 
compete with each other in the new environment. One way is by 
attempting to develop good relations with officials at the VNAT so that 
they can assist us by ensuring the smooth administrative running of our 
company in general and by giving us preferential treatment i'is-ä-vis other 
state companies, for example, by being invited regularly as one of a 
handful of state companies to attend international tourism trade fairs 
ahead of other state companies as a way of helping in the promotion of 
our company overseas, meeting and cooperating with tourism companies 
and organisations overseas, thereby stimulating the development of our 
business (Thuy Tien Tourism Company, Hanoi, a state tour operator under 
the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's Committee). 
There is stiff competition between tourism companies wanting to 
be 
selected to attend international tourism trade 
fairs. To gain preferential 
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treatment in being invited to attend tourism trade fairs requires a 
company to have good personal relations with the leaders at the VIVAT. In 
developing such relations, our company has to incur a certain level of 
expense although not significant, in providing officials at the I 4T with 
small gifts including financial gifts, or inviting these officials out for meals 
and drinks, for example. As a result, when the VNAT is planning to attend 
a trade fair, we can be informed about their plans through our 
connections at the VNA T and then prepare an application to attend well in 
advance which will hopefully improve our chances of receiving the 
approval of the VNAT (Song Hong Tourism, Hanoi, a state tour operator 
under the control of the Hanoi Municipal People's Committee). 
The cultivation of social ties by local state tour operators with the VNAT very much 
evokes the umbrella (ö dü) or connections system discussed in Chapter 5 in the context 
of regulatory arrangements between the central and local states in the international 
tourism industry during the socialist era. While in the socialist era, local state tour 
operators cultivated social ties with officials at the VTC as a result of the VTC's 
regulatory control over the allocation of foreign visitors, in the transitional economy 
similar ties are being cultivated as a result of the VNAT's regulatory control over 
access for example to international tourism trade fairs. 
Additionally, the second quote illustrates how social ties are in part being cultivated by 
local state tour operators with officials at the VNAT in order to receive preferential 
access to information regarding plans by the VNAT to attend forthcoming 
international tourism trade fairs. This was a theme I highlighted in Chapter 3, when 
discussing how one of the legacies of the socialist system is the concentration of 
information within the central state. It is therefore interesting to see how in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, with officials at the VNAT controlling access to 
information, officials at local state tour operators are attempting to cultivate social ties 
as a way of obtaining preferential access to information. 
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6.3 PATH DEPENDENCY IN THE VNAT'S REGULATION' OF 
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM SPACE 
So far in this chapter the discussion has focussed on how the practices of the VNAT in 
regulating the building of economic ties and relations between local and foreign 
tourism actors and institutions have been premised on the achievement of political 
imperatives. I now turn to address the theme of path dependency, introduced and 
outlined in chapters 2 and 3 and discussed in the context of Vietnam in Chapter 5.1 
illustrate how the regulatory practices of the VNAT are evolving and being reworked, 
much as described in regulation theory, in a path dependent manner out of. firstly, the 
legacies of historical experiences and secondly, regulatory forms and practices 
evoking former socio-economic systems. 
6.3.1 The Legacies of Historical Experiences 
As I discussed in Chapter 5, antipathy towards the development of ties and activity by 
the central state in Vietnam in the international capitalist economy has been a recurring 
theme throughout the operation of successive socio-economic systems in Vietnamese 
history. However, legacies created out of the experience of colonialism have in the 
transitional economy had a particularly profound effect on the practices of the VNAT in 
regulating international tourism activity with major capitalist economies in Europe and 
North America. This has been evinced in the regulatory practices of the VNAT: firstly, 
in regulating access for Vietnamese tourism businesses in visiting foreign countries as a 
way of promoting their businesses in international markets; and secondly, in regulating 
the activities of foreign tour operators in the Vietnamese tourism market. 
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6.3.1.1 Regulating Access for Vietnamese Tourism Businesses to Foreign Countries 
Following on from the discussion in Section 6.2.2, the three quotes below illustrate how 
the VNAT has exerted significant regulatory control over approving applications from 
tourism businesses - both state and private - to visit foreign countries as a way of 
promoting their businesses in the international market. This is despite the fact that these 
businesses are already officially authorised to carry out such tasks. 
The VNAT operates an extremely restrictive policy with regard to giving 
permission required by tourism businesses to carry out promotion in the 
international market (Thai Binh Hotel, HCMC, a state hotel under the 
control of Saigontourist). 
The VNAT should allow businesses such as our business, with the ability 
to develop international tourism activities themselves, more opportunity to 
approach the international market by giving permission for them to co- 
operate directly and form direct relations with tourism actors overseas, 
instead of always having to ask the VNA Tfor permission to do this... 
... at present, 
before conducting promotional work in the international 
market, businesses have to submit specific details of this work to the 
VNAT. 
... while amendments 
have been made to these restrictive policies, there 
are still a lot of complicated procedures which a business needs to comply 
with in attempting to develop their international tourism activities, for 
example in attempting to send a member of staff overseas to carry out 
promotional work on behalf of his company and liaise, co-operate and 
develop relations directly with tourism actors in the international market 
(Dong Tay Tourism Company, HCMC, a large state ITO under the control 
of Saigontourist). 
We also face a lot of difficulties in trying to develop our activities in the 
international market ... going overseas... making contact with potential 
foreign partners ... and 
forming alliances as a way of developing and 
expanding the tourism industry in Vietnam. Again there are a lot of 
cumbersome procedures and obstacles to overcome to be able to do this. 
For example, we would like to send a member of staff overseas to contact 
and liaise with tour companies overseas but institutions such as the VNA T 
make it difficult for us to do this. They cause problems and waste time for 
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us in completing procedures. This severely limits the ability of the business 
to develop in the international market and consequenthv affects the 
progress of the business' activities as we are not able to compete 
effectively with other large tour operators in HCMC (Tu Hai Tourism 
Company, HCMC, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
The regulatory practices of the VNAT evidenced in the above quotes in part reflect 
issues already discussed in this chapter. Firstly, they reflect the VNAT's objective of 
controlling the building of ties between Vietnamese and foreign tourism businesses and 
providing a handful of local state tour operators preferential access to international 
tourism markets. Secondly, they reflect the arbitrary decision-making powers of 
officials from the VNAT. In addition, they evoke legacies from the experience of 
colonialism which has engendered within the central state in Hanoi suspicion of and 
antipathy towards major capitalist nations. This is reflected in the VNAT's rejection of 
requests from tourism businesses to send staff to "western" tourism markets as a way of 
developing ties with and promoting their businesses in these markets, as illustrated in 
the following quote. This practice has been informed by the legacy of the period after 
the end of the war in 1975 when swathes of the Vietnamese population attempted to 
emigrate to western nations. 
The authorities won 't give us permission to carry out this work in 
developed countries, as they are afraid that the individuals who go, won 't 
come back and will try and earn a living in these rich countries. In recent 
years the VNA T has begun to establish tourism relations in particular with 
other developing countries in South-East and East Asia. However, while 
travelling to these poorer, developing countries has become easier, the 
authorities have still retained tight restrictions on travelling to richer, 
industrialised countries. This severely limits attempts by companies 
although authorised to conduct tourism business overseas i. e. having an 
international tour operator licence, to widen their relations in the 
international market. Generally permission is only given to companies 
when they request and gain approval to join a party of Vietnamese 
tourism businesses going to a tourism trade fair overseas when this park, 
is organised by the VNAT Independent requests made by companies to 
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send employees overseas are, however, generally turned down (Au Lac 
Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
6.3.1.2 The Regulation of Foreign Tour Operators 
While much of the discussion so far in this chapter has focussed on the regulatory 
control of the VNAT in affording access for Vietnamese tourism businesses to the 
international tourism market; the VNAT has also exercised considerable control in 
providing access for foreign tourism businesses to the Vietnamese tourism market. 
Resolution 45 in June 1993 conferred on the VNAT the role as the key institution 
regulating the activities of foreign tour operators in the Vietnamese market in the 
transitional economy through assigning it control over the issuing of licences for 
foreign tour operators to operate in the tourism market in Vietnam. As part of the 
Resolution, the VNAT was charged with "creating favourable conditions for foreign 
tour operators to open representative offices in Vietnam " ("chü döng xäy cat nhä cho 
cäc häng du lich niiöc ngoäi thue de mö vdn phöng dai dien ö Viet Nam") (Tong cuc 
Du lich, 1997: 45). However, in reality, since then the VNAT has demonstrated 
considerable fiat in restricting access for foreign tour operators in the Vietnamese 
market. 
Officially, there are no restrictions on foreign tour operators running joint-venture tour 
operators with Vietnamese parties. However, in 1996, the VNAT decided to protect 
Vietnamese tour operators from competition from foreign tour operators in the 
Vietnamese market by stopping foreign tour operators from organising visas and tours 
in Vietnam, as it was deemed that this was creating excessive and unfair competition 
187 
and reducing prices and profit margins for local tour operators (EIU, Ist quarter 
1997: 26). 
Then, at the end of 1997, the VNAT issued an official letter (cöng vän), stating that it 
had an unofficial policy not to authorise 100% foreign-owned tour operators. At the 
same time, it stated that it would only consider foreign-invested joint-venture tour 
operator projects as pilot projects. It also devised new terms and conditions for setting 
up joint-venture projects between Vietnamese and foreign tour operators licensed to 
bring foreign visitors to Vietnam, which were not considered favourable to foreign 
parties or likely to stimulate much interest among potential foreign tour operators. 
Investment capital in the joint-venture projects was set at a minimum of US$lmillion. 
This was criticised by foreign tour operators as unrealistic and excessive for most 
operators (EIU, 4th quarter 1997: 28; VIR, 20-26 October 1997: 4-5). The shelf life of the 
joint-venture operation was limited to between seven and ten years for a project with 
legal capital of between US$1 M and $1.5 million, and up to 15 years with legal capital 
of between US$1.5M and $2 million, after which time the business was to revert to full 
Vietnamese ownership (EIU, 4th quarter 1997: 28; VIR, 20-26 October 1997: 4-5). 
Consequently, as yet no foreign joint-venture tour operator projects have been licensed 
by the VNAT. 
In the forming of joint-venture partnerships, between Vietnamese and foreign parties, 
the VNAT possesses sole authority for selecting the Vietnamese party with which the 
foreign partner is authorised to co-operate. Evidence of the arbitrary regulatory powers 
of the VNAT and its officials is that while projects with private Vietnamese tour 
operators are not officially excluded under the revised terms of the VNAT's policy, an 
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informant, working in an investment firm, which acts for foreign parties in joint- 
venture negotiations, considered that procedures between a foreign and a private 
Vietnamese tour operator "would be more complicated" (KI1,10.12.99). i. e. 
bureaucratic intervention by the VNAT and its officials would make it highly unlikely 
that applications to form such alliances would be approved. 
Until now, no projects with private Vietnamese tour operators have been licensed. 
Instead, the handful of joint-venture partnerships approved by the VNAT have been 
between foreign tour operators and ITOs primarily under the control of the local state in 
Ho Chi Minh City as well as the VNAT itself. These partnerships are on business co- 
operation contracts, which are less formal and looser arrangements than joint-venture 
agreements (Tap chi Du lich, April 1998: 5; K17,13.10.00). Of the foreign tour 
operators, most are from East and South-East Asia. 12 
Conversely, only one European-invested tour operator business alliance has so far been 
set up in Vietnam. This is Exotissimo, an alliance between the state-owned CESAIS 
(Centre for Economic and Scientific Applications and Investment Services) (Trung tam 
dich vu däu ttr vä (rng dung khoa hoc kinh te) based in Ho Chi Minh City and Mekong 
Investments, a French company (Tap chi Du lich, May 1996: 11). It started operating in 
January 1993, at a time when the regulatory powers of the VNAT and the official 
framework in regulating tourism activity were being drawn up. In the intervening 
12 These include the OSC Travel (SMI Group) Company, which is an alliance between the state-owned 
Vietnam Oil and Gas Services and Tourism Company and the Thai Siam Motor Group International 
Travel Company and the VTB (Vietnam Travel Bureau) Company, which is an alliance between 
Vietnamtourism in HCMC and the Thai Travel Bureau. Both the Vietnamese state companies involved in 
these joint-venture projects are under the control of the VNAT itself. 
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period, no further European-invested tour operator alliances have successfully entered 
the Vietnamese tourism industry (www. exotissimo. com viewed 23.06.03). 
The regulation of foreign tour operators provides further evidence of the control 
possessed by the VNAT over international tourism activity in the transitional economy. 
Once again, it demonstrates the practices of the VNAT in affording a handful of state 
tour operators, under the control of the municipal state as well as the VNAT itself, 
privileged access in forming ties with foreign tour operators. By doing so, the VNAT is 
aiming to ensure that these businesses develop into leading actors in the international 
tourism industry. 
6.3.2 Regulatory Forms and Practices Evoking Former Socio-economic Systems - 
Tourism Promotion 
In promoting Vietnam as an international tourism destination, in this section I 
demonstrate how the practices of the VNAT are evolving and being reworked in a path 
dependent manner out of practices from former socio-economic systems. This has been 
illustrated, firstly, in terms of how the VNAT has organised tourism promotion 
activities and disseminated information regarding these to actors and institutions in the 
tourism industry in Vietnam. Secondly, it has been illustrated in terms of the VNAT's 
lack of experience as an institution operating in the international capitalist economy. 
This has had an adverse effect on the promotion of Vietnam as an international tourism 
destination. 13 
13 Resolution 45 in 1993 conferred the VNAT as the key institution charged with promoting Vietnam as a 
tourism destination in the international tourism economy (TCDL VN, 1997: 45). This was reaffirmed in 
the Tourism Law of 1999 (Anonymous, Vietnam Economic Times, April 2000: 28). 
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6.3.2.1 Dissemination of Tourism Information 
As discussed in Section 5.1.3.1, throughout the monarch and socialist systems, policy- 
making was concentrated at the centre. Information and details regarding orders, plans 
and policies were simply disseminated down to lower levels in the state bureaucracy. In 
the transitional economy, similar practices have continued. This has been evidenced, 
firstly, by the way in which the VNAT designs and disseminates information regarding 
tourism promotion activities to tourism businesses. Secondly, it has been illustrated in 
the way in which the VNAT disseminates information regarding its plans to attend 
tourism promotional events overseas. The quote below - from a manager at an ITO 
under the control of the Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Committee - shows how 
the VNAT draws up tourism promotional activities with little or no co-ordination, 
communication or co-operation with other institutions in the Vietnamese tourism 
industry. It then simply disseminates information regarding these activities down 
primarily to municipal people's committees and a handful of tour operators under the 
control of municipal people's committees, instructing them to prepare for these 
activities. 
The tourism authorities: the VIVAT, the Ho Chi Minh Citly Bureau of 
Tourism and the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee must change the 
way they impose tourism promotional campaigns on tourism businesses 
without due consideration and co-operation with these businesses. We 
have to spend a lot of money participating in these promotional 
programmes, yet because of poor co-ordination the benefits derived for 
companies such as ours from these campaigns are not very great. 
Tourism institutions at central and local levels draw up these promotional 
programmes and instruct leading tourism companies in Ho Chi Minh City 
such as ours to implement the programme. However, tourism institutions 
do not prepare the programmes very thoroughly and do not give the 
companies sufficient time to prepare. Consequently, the companies waste 
a lot of money and the programmes are not very successful. 
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For example, at the beginning of 2001, the VNAT and the Ho Chi Alinh 
City People's Committee implemented a promotional programme. They 
designed a programme introducing tourism in Vietnam and invited 
representatives from around 40 international tour operators in around 13 
countries to come and visit Vietnam. They directly selected a number of 
large tour operators in Ho Chi Minh City such as Saigontourist, Ben 
Thanh Tourist and Hoa Binh Tourism to participate and implement a 
promotional programme for their companies. We had to contribute a lot of 
expenses to this campaign. However, as there was no co-ordination 
between the tourism companies and the state institutions, the achievements 
of the campaign were not very high (Tu Do Tourism Company, HCMC, a 
state tour operator under the control of the HCMC Municipal People's 
Committee). 
Furthermore, the quote above illustrates how traditional practices have continued with 
comprehensive details of the VNAT's tourism promotion plans and invitations to 
tourism promotion activities disseminated down only as far as a handful of tour 
operators under the control of municipal people's committees. Little or no information 
is disseminated by the VNAT down to actors and institutions outside the state, in 
particular private tourism businesses (Le Quang Vu, Vietnam Economic Times, April 
2000: 26; VIR, 11-17 March 2002: 12). This is reflected in comments made by Van 
Anh, a tourism consultant at Red Tours, a private tour operator in Hanoi, when 
referring to the VNAT's plans for tourism promotion in 2002 `promotion and 
marketing is inconsistent. We are part of the industry but we have no idea of the details 
of the campaign " (VIR, 25 February-3 March 2002: 9). 
The above discussion once again illustrates the control possessed by the VNAT in its 
regulation of tourism activity. By providing a handful of tour operators under the 
control of municipal people's committees preferential access to information, the VNAT 
has facilitated the development of these businesses into leading actors in the tourism 
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industry. This has in turn aimed at ensuring that the state remains the most important 
institution in the transitional tourism economy. 
6.3.2.2 Inexperience in Promoting Vietnam as a Tourism Destination in the 
International Capitalist Economy 
One further illustration of how regulatory processes evolve and are reworked in a path 
dependent manner out of past experiences has been evidenced in the VNAT's 
promotion of Vietnam as an international tourism destination. Its comparative 
inexperience in functioning in the international capitalist economy has been manifested 
in international tourism promotion which while evolving as the VNAT gains more 
experience in operating in the international tourism economy, remains largely 
ineffective. This has consequently affected tourism activity in the transitional economy. 
The above point is supported by the following comments of tourism business owners 
and managers in Hanoi and Hue. 
The government and the VNAT have carried out promotion and 
advertising campaigns in a number of countries. However, the overall 
range and effectiveness of these campaigns have been quite limited. This is 
due to the relative inexperience of these institutions; in the concept of 
tourism marketing in particular and marketing in general; in 
understanding how to operate a tourism industry as the tourism market in 
Vietnam is also relatively new; the knowledge and experience of the 
authorities with regard to international co-operation with more than a 
handful of countries is still limited; and their understanding of how the 
international market works is also limited (Nam Ha Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
The authorities are inexperienced in using marketing as a tool of 
international business in general and hence in using marketing as a means 
of promoting Vietnam 's tourism industry in particular. Therefore, at the 
moment the authorities are adopting a cautious approach to international 
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marketing initiatives (Tran Xuan Soan Tourism and Trade Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 14 
The ineffective promotion of the Vietnamese tourism industry by the VN 1T 
and the Hue Bureau of Tourism has limited increases in the number of 
foreign visitors coming to Vietnam and restricted the overall market for 
foreign visitors. Furthermore, poor promotion has also led to the potential 
of tourism in Hue remaining unexploited with low increases in both 
domestic and foreign tourists visiting Hue (Lac Viet Hotel, Hue, a state 
hotel, under the control of the Provincial People's Committee). 
Nevertheless, tourism promotion has evolved throughout the process of transition. The 
first attempt of any significance to promote Vietnam as a tourism destination in the 
international capitalist economy occurred when 1990 was declared `Visit Vietnam 
Year'. At this time, the process of transition in Vietnam was however at only an 
embryonic and relatively fragile stage (Porter, 1993: 190). 
However, 1990 coincided with a resurgence in more conservative views among the 
Party-State and a temporary reversal in the reform process. This arose out of the 
political changes which were accompanying economic transformation in former 
socialist nations in Eastern and Central Europe (Ibid: 192). This alerted the Vietnamese 
Party-State to the danger that integration into the international capitalist economy and 
closer economic co-operation with capitalist nations could engender similar political 
changes in Vietnam and ultimately lead to the unravelling of the Party-State (Ibid: 193). 
Traditional antipathy towards "western" capitalist nations resurfaced as evinced in the 
quote below. 
Attention was diverted to the issue of safeguarding national security. 
Claims were made that imperialist subversives were attempting to 
sabotage the Vietnamese political system and that foreign tourists and 
14 By "the authorities" the respondent is referring to the government and the VNAT. 
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Viet Kieu were being employed by intelligence agencies to undermine the 
government and attempt to instigate a military coup (Mart, 1993: 353). 
Unsurprisingly, in this environment, tourism promotional activities were seriously 
circumscribed and as a consequence the achievements of `Visit Vietnam Year' were 
negligible. 
6.3.2.3 The 2000 Tourism Promotion Campaign: `Vietnam: A Destination for the New 
Millennium' 
Ten years later in 2000, a second international tourism promotional campaign was 
launched with `Vietnam: A Destination for the New Millennium' (Viet Nam: diem den 
cüa thien nien ky möi). While the political context, in which the campaign was 
launched, was benign in comparison with the situation in 1990, the inexperience of the 
VNAT in promoting Vietnam as a tourism destination in the international capitalist 
economy nevertheless remained in evidence. 
Despite being a campaign to attract foreign visitors, promotional activities were mainly 
organised within Vietnam. As a result, knowledge of the campaign outside Vietnam 
remained negligible. This consequently impacted on the effectiveness in promoting 
Vietnam as an international tourism destination and on the expansion of international 
tourism activity (Anonymous, Vietnam Economic Times, April 2000: 28). This is 
reflected in the comments below: firstly, from Denis Colonna, director of Exotissimo 
and, secondly, from Tran Thi Thuy of Handspan, a private tour operator in Hanoi. 
A big irony is the fact that VNAT spends a lot of money on organising 
festivals and erecting banners locally while the real target was attracting 
international visitors. It holds 18 cultural festivals annually but fails to 
promote the country on international TV channels... which is actually part 
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of its action plan. How can foreigners know about these festivals it, lren 
they are not provided any information by Vietnam 's tourism promoters? 
The problem is there are not many promotions abroad to make travellers 
aware of what they can see in Vietnam (VIR, 11-17 March 2002: 12). 
Tourism fairs and exhibitions organised within Vietnam have little impact 
on attracting foreign tourists (VIR, 13-19 March 2000: 4). 
In a survey of business leaders in Vietnam in response to the question: `How would you 
rate the success of the `Vietnam: A Destination for the New Millennium' tourism 
campaign to date? ' only 8% considered the campaign was impressive, compared with 
4% who considered it as poor and 48% as only modest (VIR, 3-9 July 2000: 2). 
Among owners of private tourism businesses, most argued that the promotional 
campaign had at best only had a marginal effect on their businesses. While tourism 
numbers had increased, the majority of owners claimed that the VNAT campaign had 
played little part in this. According to Dang Duc Tri, the manager of Queen Cafe AZ 
Tours, a private tour operator in Hanoi, most of the increase in tourist numbers was 
accounted for by the increase in Chinese tourists, who mainly dealt with state tour 
operators and whose purchasing power was low (VIR, 10-16 July 2000: 3,7) 
Denis Colonna, the director of Exotissimo, agreed with these comments and estimated 
that the campaign had attracted only around 5% of the growth in foreign visitors in 
2000. While agreeing with Dang Duc Tri that the growth in foreign visitors was largely 
due to increases in the number of Chinese visitors, Colonna claimed that the majority of 
these were not however tourists but in fact traders who crossed the northern border 
daily to do business in Vietnam. In his opinion, the increase was further due to a rise in 
the number of Viet Kieu returning to visit Vietnam (VIR, 21-27 May 2001: 20). 
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The opinions expressed above were similarly reflected in comments made by the bulk 
of owners and managers interviewed in both state and private tourism businesses when 
asked to comment on the effectiveness of the 2000 promotional campaign in attracting 
foreign visitors. These comments can be summed up by the quote below from the 
owner of a small, private hotel in Hue: 
The 2000 campaign has had a little effect in making more foreign tourists 
aware about tourism in Vietnam but not as much as hoped for (Vien Dong 
Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
Consequently, the 2000 tourism campaign was largely considered to have been of 
limited immediate effect in promoting Vietnam as a tourism destination in the 
international capitalist economy. Nevertheless, among a significant number of 
respondents, perhaps more important than the actual results achieved from the 
campaign was that it "signified a turning point in the development of the Vietnamese 
tourism industry in the international tourism market" ("bieu hien mot bLröc ngoät trong 
sur phät trien cüa ngänh du lich Viet Nam tren thi tru ng du lich quöc to") (Mai Anh 
Hotel, HCMC, a private hotel). 
To these respondents, `Vietnam: A Destination for the New Millennium' marks the first 
time, the VNAT has been truly committed to organising a campaign promoting 
Vietnam as a tourism destination in the international capitalist economy. As such, the 
campaign provides one further illustration of how regulatory processes are currently 
evolving and being reworked in a path dependent manner out of past experiences in 
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regulating tourism activity. To these respondents, lessons will be drawn from the 2000 
campaign in organising future campaigns and as the VNAT gains experience and 
becomes better acquainted with functioning in the international capitalist economy, it 
will become more effective in promoting Vietnam as a tourism destination in the 
international capitalist economy. This was reflected in comments made by a large 
number of respondents similar to the quote below. 
The 2000 campaign has not made a significant immediate impact. It will 
likely make more of an impact in the coming few years (Huy Hoang Hotel, 
Hue, a state hotel). 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
As identified in other transitional economies in Chapter 3 and in the general 
Vietnamese economy in Chapter 5, this chapter has similarly illustrated how in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, the VNAT has ceded a significant degree of 
regulatory control over tourism activity in local spaces to the local state. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the discussion in this chapter similarly points to the fact that this is being 
done primarily as a way of achieving political imperatives: the maintenance of the state 
as the leading institution in the Vietnamese socio-economy. 
The findings presented in this chapter do however illustrate how with regard to the 
regulation of international tourism, the VNAT has retained considerable regulatory 
power and control, acting as the key conduit regulating access for Vietnamese tourism 
businesses to the international tourism market and for foreign tourism businesses to the 
Vietnamese tourism market. As such, the findings presented in this chapter strongly 
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support the assertion made in regulation theory that the central state remains a key 
conduit through which global economic processes are being mediated and negotiated in 
regulating capitalist economic activities across national spaces. At the same time, they 
also ascribe a much more important regulatory role for the central state in the regulation 
of nascent capitalist economic activities than identified by authors writing about other 
transitional economies. 
However, while within regulation theory there is the assertion that one of the main 
ways in which the central state is able to regulate global economic processes is through 
the enactment of a formal framework of regulatory forms - laws, policies and directives 
to guide such processes throughout national space, the findings in this research suggest 
that only to a small degree does this adequately reflect the full extent of the regulatory 
powers of the central state. 
Instead, the findings presented in this chapter point to the greater significance of the 
discretionary power and control exercised by the VNAT and its officials in regulating 
international tourism activity through their capacity to mediate access for Vietnamese 
tourism businesses to the international tourism market and for foreign tourism 
businesses to the Vietnamese tourism market. This has been evidenced, firstly, in how 
the VNAT has afforded privileged access to international tourism space for a handful of 
local state tour operators primarily under the control of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City Municipal People's Committees. This has facilitated the development of these 
businesses into dominant actors in the international tourism industry in the transitional 
economy. Once again, as highlighted throughout the thesis, the regulatory practices of 
the VNAT have reflected its overriding priority of achieving political imperativ es, 
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ceding economic power over tourism activity to local state tourism institutions as a way 
of maintaining the state as the leading institution in the transitional economy. It has 
secondly been evidenced in the discretionary power exercised by officials at the VNA L 
in their role as regulatory conduits with which Vietnamese tourism businesses have to 
negotiate in order to access international tourism space and in particular in the capacity 
of officials to mediate VNAT directives. 
At the same time, the findings presented in this chapter support another of the key 
analytical concepts identified and discussed throughout this thesis, namely the role of 
path dependency in the regulatory practices of the VNAT. In regulating international 
tourism activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy, the practices of the VNAT are 
evolving and being reworked out of the legacies of in particular, the experience of 
colonialism. This has been manifested in circumspection by the VNAT in regulating 
international tourism activity with major capitalist economies in Europe and North 
America. In addition, the practices of the VNAT also evoke regulatory forms and 
practices from former socio-economic systems together with illustrating the 
comparative inexperience of the VNAT in regulating tourism activity in the 
international capitalist economy. 
This chapter has firmly reinserted the central state back into the regulatory picture as 
the key institution mediating global economic processes into national spaces. 
Nevertheless, as briefly discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in the transitional 
economy, the VNAT has ceded a significant degree of regulatory control over tourism 
activity within local spaces to the local state. Consequently, a question which remains 
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to be addressed is how is tourism activity being regulated within local spaces? This is 
the theme of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LOCAL MODE OF SOCIAL REGULA TION 
The discussion so far in this thesis has established the local state as the pivotal 
institution regulating nascent capitalist economic activities within local spaces in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. At the same time, it has also been demonstrated 
how local state officials have maintained their traditional key role in regulating 
economic activity in local space. In the transitional economy, the control possessed 
by local state officials in regulating capitalist economic activities has been 
consolidated. This has been due to two main reasons. First, control over economic 
activity in local spaces has been formally ceded by the central state down to the local 
state. Second, the reworking by the central state of institutional structures and 
legislative forms to regulate capitalist economic activities affords local state officials 
considerable capacity to interpret and mediate central state directives. 
At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 5, through their control over bureaucratic 
levers, local state officials have retained their historical role as key conduits that 
private actors must negotiate with in order to conduct economic activity in local 
space. Again as was illustrated in Chapter 5, as a way of negotiating the local 
regulatory environment, private economic actors have traditionally cultivated social 
ties with local state officials both by invoking pre-existing ties based on shared 
affiliation but also by creating social ties where no shared affiliation exists. This has 
been perpetuated in the transitional Vietnamese economy by the fact that the vast 
majority of new private businesses have emerged out of social ties between 
entrepreneurs and state officials. 
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In this chapter, based on the findings from interviews conducted with private 
tourism business owners in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, I analyse in detail 
the extent to which the cultivation of social ties has constituted an important 
institutional mechanism in the regulation of private tourism activity in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
The analytical framework utilised for this purpose draws on the themes identified by 
authors writing about guanxi, discussed in Chapter 3, and supported by the 
discussion on social ties in Chapter 5. In particular, I examine the extent to which 
both vertical ties with local state officials and horizontal ties with actors at the 
local and international scales have been cultivated by private tourism business 
owners as a way of facilitating three stages of the business process: 
Firstly, in establishing private tourism businesses 
Vertical Ties: in the approval and navigation of bureaucratic procedures 
Horizontal Ties: in obtaining capital 
Secondly, in the course of running private tourism businesses 
Vertical Ties: in the completion of administrative tasks and in the 
circumvention of official central state regulations 
Thirdly, in developing tourism business 
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Horizontal Ties: with international and local actors 
Vertical Ties: access to information 
At each of these stages, I examine the extent to which ties cultivated by private 
tourism business owners have been constituted through pre-existing ties based on 
shared affiliation thus supporting the notion of social capital, or ties created by 
private tourism business owners where no such shared affiliation exists. 
In addition, having conducted research in the north, the centre and the south of 
Vietnam in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City respectively, throughout this chapter 
I address the issue of diversity in local regulatory processes by identifying the extent 
to which differences in regulatory practices at the three stages of the business 
process were revealed from interviews carried out with private tourism business 
owners in the three locations. In addition, I examine the extent to which social ties 
overseas have facilitated the development of tourism activity for private tourism 
business owners in Ho Chi Minh City vis-ä-vis Hanoi and Hue. This is carried out 
by examining the role that social ties between actors in the Ho Chi Minh City 
economy and the international capitalist economy are playing firstly, in the process 
of establishing a private tourism business through providing capital to enable 
entrepreneurs to set up tourism businesses and, secondly, in developing private 
tourism business through providing foreign customers for private tourism business 
owners. 
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7.1 ESTABLISHING A PRIVATE TOURISM BUSINESS 
7.1.1 Pre-existing Vertical Ties with Local State Officials 
From the responses of private tourism business owners interviewed in all three 
locations, there is strong evidence to support the notion that for private tourism 
business owners, possessing pre-existing ties with local state officials has 
constituted an important regulatory norm facilitating the process of establishing a 
private tourism business. Such a finding was revealed from the responses given by 
private tourism business owners, who after initially being asked to outline the extent 
of their pre-existing ties with local state officials were then asked to assess the 
importance of these ties with the question: 
How important was having relations in the decision 
of the founders to establish the business? 
(Viec cö dzegc cäc möi quan he cßä änh htcöng nhtr the näo täi cäc quyet c inh thänh 
lap doanh nghiep cüa nhüng nglr(ýi sang läp doanh nghiep? ) 
where "cäc möi quan he (relations)" implied pre-existing ties with local state 
officials. 65% of respondents in Hanoi, 60% in Hue and 80% in Ho Chi Minh City 
considered "relations with local state officials" to have been very (rät) important 
(quan trong) and influential (änh huöng) in their decision to establish a private 
tourism business. An additional 25% of respondents in Hanoi, 15% in Hue and 20% 
in Ho Chi Minh City considered relations to have been relatively (tuong döi) 
important and influential. Some of the reasons were revealed from the responses 
given by private tourism business owners in all three locations, and typified in the 
selection of quotes below to the question: 
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In what ways do attitudes among particular institutions and individuals 
vary regarding the amount of support or lack of support in establishing a 
private tourism business such as yours? 
(Nhin Chung, thäi d0 cüa cäc tö chi c vä cä nhän cu the khäc nhau nhut the näo dim 
väo nhieng gi mä ho dä giüp cßä hoäc khöng giüp cßä döi väi viec thänh läp doanh 
nghiep du Lich mang tinh chät tu' nhän Wut doanh nghiep cüa qu' vi? ) 
In theory, according to official regulations, the support given to any 
business of any type should be the same. However, in reality the level 
of support differs markedly depending on the extent ofpre-existing ties 
between the owners of a business with the relevant institutions and 
individuals working in them and the closeness of these ties (Hang Bac 
Tourism Trade and Investment Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). ' 
It depends on the pre-existing ties that the owners of the business have 
with the relevant authorities, for example, with the local office of trade 
when asking for a business licence. 
... 
If an owner of a business has good pre-existing ties with people 
working in relevant offices and institutions in the locality of the 
owner's business, then they will help in the completion of procedures. 
If the owner doesn 't have such good ties then all this work will take 
longer and be more protracted, i. e. difficult (Hoa Ma Tourism and 
Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
In establishing a private tourism business, the support or lack of 
support given to entrepreneurs all depends on pre-existing ties and the 
closeness of ties between the owners of a business and the relevant 
authorities which results in different levels of assistance and in varying 
degrees to which these authorities check or interfere in an owner's 
business, i. e. good ties, less stringent control; not such good ties, 
greater interference by the authorities (... tüy theo cäc moi quan he vä 
micc do quan he cüa chü doanh nghiep vö'i cäc co, quan, to cht c tro' 
giüp mä ho cö sit troy giüp khäc nhau... ) 
For example, if the owner of a business has pre-existing ties with 
officials at the People's Committee, then decisions relating to the 
issuing of licences and the establishment of the business will be 
completed quickly in comparison with the situation where the owner 
doesn 't have such ties (Neu nhu chi DN cö quan he väi can bö trong 
Uy ban nhän din thänh pho thi giäy phep quyet Binh thänh 10p lam rät 
nhanh so väi DN khöng co quan he)(Nam Sao Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
As in previous chapters, throughout this chapter, with tourism 
businesses and owners from which 
quotes and case study material are presented, pseudonyms are used 
in order to protect the anonymity 
of these companies and individuals. 
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With regard to the level of assistance this depends on the pre-existing 
ties that a business owner has with officials from the relevant authoriti, 
institutions (Thai Binh Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, 
a private tour operator). 
It all depends on the extent of pre-existing ties between business 
owners with officials working in relevant state institutions. For 
example, if a business owner has good pre-existing ties with an official 
in the Hue People's Committee then applying for a licence to establish 
the business will be easier in comparison with another business owner 
who does not have any ties in that institution (The Gioi Hotel, Hue, a 
private hotel). 
If an individual has pre-existing ties with officials working in the 
relevant authorities, the establishment process is easy; if an individual 
doesn't have ties, then the authorities will cause some degree of 
difficulty in completing procedures and paperwork, for example, in 
applying for a licence to establish the business or applying for 
certificates such as a Fire and Safety Certificate (Ba Na Hotel, Hue, a 
private hotel). 
The quotes above serve to illustrate how, despite the creation by the central state of a 
formal framework of regulations governing the establishment of private businesses, 
local state officials retain significant capacity to mediate central state regulations and 
exercise arbitrary and discretionary decisions. For entrepreneurs, local state officials 
consequently possess the capacity to facilitate or hinder any stage of the 
establishment process. As a result, for private tourism business owners, possessing 
pre-existing ties with officials working in particular local state institutions involved 
in the approval and establishment of private businesses is considered important. 
Pre-existing ties facilitate the establishment process by providing a greater degree of 
certainty and reliability that all procedures required in the setting up of a business 
can be completed quickly and smoothly. 
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7.1.2 Sites in the Creation of Pre-existing Ties between Private Tourism 
Business Owners and Local State Officials 
From the responses of private tourism business owners, two sites identified in 
chapters 2 and 3 as important in creating social capital had also been important in 
the pre-existing ties cultivated with local state officials. These were university and 
workplace. 
7.1.2.1 University 
In Chapter 3,1 discussed how authors such as David Wank recognise the importance 
of friendships formed at university with, in the transitional economy, entrepreneurs 
cultivating ties with former classmates now working as state officials as a way of 
receiving bureaucratic support in moving into nascent capitalist economic activities. 
As illustrated in the following quotes, this was supported in my own findings. 
We have very good relations with staff at the VNAT, for example, the 
Deputy Head of the VNAT and the Head of the Administration 
Department and also with staff in the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism. These 
connections are former classmates at school, university, from the 
tourism course we studied on, as well as business connections. They 
helped a lot in applying for licences, for building, establishing and 
carrying out business and in applying for licences in connection with 
additional functions related to the hotel business. They also helped in 
introducing guests to the hotel in the initial stages of its operation 
(Thang Nam Hotel, Hanoi, a private hotel). 
We are long-time friends with a number of people working in the 
VNAT and the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism. We met and became friends 
with these people when studying at university. These connections 
helped a lot in speeding up the process and procedures involved in 
setting up the business (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, 
a private tour operator). 
I am friends with a number of staff working in the VNA T and in the 
Hanoi Bureau of Tourism. We met at universitti, and also studied 
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together in the Czech Republic (One of the owners of Nam Sao 
Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
I have a lot of friends who studied with me in Russia who work in the 
Hanoi People's Committee. For example, one of my former university 
classmates in Russia worked in the Organisation Department at the 
Hanoi Municipal People's Committee. He helped in completing all the 
procedures necessary to establish the business (Nam Ha Tourism 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
At the time we set up the hotel, we had relations with a number of 
former university classmates, one the Head of the General Department 
at the Thua Thien Hue People's Committee, and others working in the 
Provincial Police and in the Hue Bureau of Tourism. They helped a lot 
with administrative procedures required to set up the business (Vien 
Dong Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
I had a number of relations with former university classmates and 
relations, who work in the provincial taxation office, the city police 
and in relevant departments in the Provincial People's Committee. 
They helped with regard to completing all procedures and paperwork 
related to establishing the business. They introduced and promoted the 
hotel to their friends and business relations and thus provided the hotel 
with a supply of guests in the initial stages of operation (Bai Duong 
Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
I had a lot of friends and connections working in the tourism industry, 
at the Ho Chi Minh City Bureau of Tourism and at the Ho Chi Minh 
City People's Committee made while at university and while working 
at Sinh Cafe. They helped me a lot in deciding to set up the business 
and in introducing and promoting my business to their relations (Thai 
Binh Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour 
operator). 
In addressing my fifth research question, the quotes above serve to support the 
notion of social capital as an important institutional mechanism in the establishment 
of private tourism businesses. Ties formed with university classmates at the end of 
the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were, ten, fifteen or twenty years later, 
able to provide tourism business owners with support in establishing their 
businesses. 2 
2 Estimated using the mean age of entrepreneurs interviewed of 42,43 and 38 in Hanoi, Hue and 
HCMC respectively 
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7.1.2.2 Workplace and Work Experience 
In Chapter 3,1 discussed how authors such as David Wank have identified how 
entrepreneurs in the transitional Chinese economy have utilised ties with former 
colleagues in state institutions as a way of engaging in nascent capitalist economic 
activities. The findings from my own research support the important role of 
workplace as a site in the creation of social ties by entrepreneurs with local state 
officials. Almost all respondents mentioned how ties formed with state officials in 
previous work had been invoked in facilitating the establishment of their current 
tourism businesses. However, as illustrated in Table 7.1, my findings suggest that 
ties with state officials were created not only from previous work in state 
institutions, but also from previous work in private businesses. This serves to 
introduce one additional site out of which social capital is being created from those 
so far discussed in the literature. This site has emerged from the private businesses 
established in the early stages of the transitional economy in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Currently, `second generation' entrepreneurs, who previously worked in 
these private businesses, are invoking ties with state officials created during this 
time. 
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Table 7.1. Sites of work experience cited by private tourism business owners at 
which ties created with state officials were invoked in facilitating the process of 
establishing the current private tourism business (in percentages) 
Previous work HANOI HUE HCMC 
experience in: 
State 
Tourism businesses or 
institutions 40 62 60 
General businesses or 
institutions 20 0 0 
Private 
Tourism businesses3 10 0 20 
General businesses 30 38 20 
100 100 100 
7.1.2.2.1 Work Experience in State Tourism Institutions 
The highest proportion of respondents: Hanoi (40%), Hue (62%), Ho Chi Minh City 
(60%) cited ties formed with state officials through previous work at state tourism 
institutions as having been cultivated when establishing their private tourism 
businesses. In Hanoi, one respondent had worked for five years in the Hanoi Bureau 
of Tourism. Another respondent had worked as a tour guide for Hanoitourist for two 
years. In Hue, one respondent had worked in the Hue Bureau of Tourism and for 
five years at one of the large state tour operators in Hue. Another respondent had 
worked as an accountant at one of the large state hotels in Hue for four years. A 
3 The low proportion of ties created by private tourism business owners out of work experience in 
private tourism businesses is most likely due to the fact that at the time the majority of private 
tourism business owners established their businesses in the mid-1990s there were few private tourism 
businesses operating. 
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third respondent had gained a considerable amount of experience as the chief 
accountant for the provincial state tour operator. In Ho Chi Minh City, one 
respondent had worked for four years as a tour guide for one of the large state tour 
operators. Another respondent had been a manager in a large state hotel for three 
years. 
While working at state tourism institutions, respondents had formed ties with 
officials working in state tourism institutions with direct control over administrative 
procedures involved in establishing a private tourism business. As is illustrated in 
the following quotes, for respondents, invoking these ties had significantly 
facilitated the establishment process by ensuring that all procedures had been 
completed quickly and smoothly. 
As I had worked for the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism before establishing 
the business, I had good relations with a lot of officials working in 
tourism institutions, for example, at the VNAT with the assistant 
director and also with a number of other officials there. At the Hanoi 
Bureau of Tourism, I knew almost everybody. As a result of these 
connections, I had extremely favourable conditions in which to set up 
my tourism business. My relations in the VNAT and the Hanoi 
Bureau of Tourism helped in applying for and obtaining a licence to 
establish my business. They helped with all the procedures required 
to obtain a licence to set up the business. They ensured that my 
application was dealt with favourably and that the process was quick, 
straight forward and problem free (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and 
Investment Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
... 
I also formed relations with people in the tourism industry, for 
example, with officials in the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism, from the time 
I worked as a tour guide for Hanoitourist. 
... 
These connections helped create good conditions for me when 
completing the procedures involved in establishing the business and 
in getting a licence to register the business (... tao sir thuän lai cho 
viec lam thü tyc giay phep ding ky kinh doanh)(Nam Sao Tourism 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
She obviously has a lot of ven' close relations with officials working 
in the state authority institutions connected with the tourism sector ... 
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... Therefore, there were no 
difficulties at all in setting up the 
business. The help of these state institutions was very effective and 
important. It allowed its to complete all necessary procedures 
quickly... We didn't waste a lot of time, effort or expense. ThCIL was 
no need to resort to shelling out (xi tien ra) extra expenses in order to 
get officials at the relevant authorities on side (Suong Mu Hotel, 
Hue, a private hotel). 
In Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, a significant proportion of respondents - around 2 5°ö 
in Hue and 20% in Ho Chi Minh City - were running businesses while their spouses 
continued to work in local state tourism businesses or institutions. As the quotes 
below illustrate, these arrangements had allowed respondents to "tap into" (khai 
thäc) the ties of their spouses with officials in local state tourism institutions once 
again ensuring that the process of establishing the private tourism business had been 
completed smoothly. As such, this provides an example illustrating the support 
provided by family in enabling entrepreneurs to negotiate the regulatory 
environment and participate in nascent capitalist economic activities. 
In setting up the hotel, I had the support of my husband, who was 
working for the Thua Thien Hue Provincial Tourism Company. 
Through my husband, I had good relations with a number of officials 
working in the Hue Bureau of Tourism. These relations are former 
classmates and colleagues of my husband. These relations facilitated 
the establishment of the business a lot by completing the approval of 
applications for licences quickly and without causing difficulties (The 
Gioi Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
I wanted to set up a hotel for my wife to run and manage. I myself 
have been working at the Hue Tourism Company for eight years and 
continue to work there. Before that I worked in the Hue Bureau of 
Tourism, part of the Thua Thien Hue People's Committee. As a result 
of working at these two institutions, I have formed a lot of relations 
with officials working in local state institutions administering tourism 
businesses, for example, departments within the Provincial People's 
Committee such as the Bureau of Planning and Investment and the 
Bureau of Tourism as well as the provincial taxation department and 
the City Police. All these connections helped with regard to 
completing all procedures and paperwork related to establishing the 
business (Bai Duong Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
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7.1.2.2.2 Negotiating the Unofficial Regulatory Environment in the . -absence of Pre- existing Ties 
The quote above from one of the owners of the Suong Mu Hotel in Hue provides an 
illustration of the difficulties faced by entrepreneurs in negotiating the regulatory 
environment in the absence of "close relations with officials working in the state 
authority institutions connected with the tourism sector". The control possessed by 
local state officials over administrative procedures involved in the process of 
establishing a private tourism business is manifested in these entrepreneurs having to 
"waste a lot of time, effort or expense" and needing "to resort to shelling out extra 
expenses in order to get officials at the relevant authorities on side " ("ditng den bäi 
xi them tien cho quan chic'c trong cäc co, quan phy träch de dzr(yc üng ha') (Suong 
Mu Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). This was reflected in comments made by a small 
number of respondents, who, during the establishment process, had faced difficulties 
not in negotiating the whole process of establishing a private tourism business but at 
particular stages of the process. 
For example, in the case of the Tu Hai Tourism Company, a private tour operator in 
Ho Chi Minh City, illustrated in the quote below, ties formed by one of the owners 
from previous work in a large state tour operator with officials in the Ho Chi Minh 
City tourism industry had been considered as an important factor in the initial 
decision of the owners to establish a tour operator business. Indeed, close ties with 
officials at the Bureau of Tourism in Ho Chi Minh City had enabled the business to 
negotiate official VNAT regulations and obtain an ITOL. However, a lack of ties 
with officials with control over administrative procedures at other stages in the 
establishment process had seriously impeded the smooth completion of these 
procedures. 
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Having worked as a tour guide for the Hoa Binh Tour Company in 
Ho Chi Minh City for four years, I had a lot of friends also working 
in the industry; including at the Bureau of Tourism in Ho Chi Minh 
City, the Hoa Binh Tour Company and Saigontourist. My connections 
at the Bureau of Tourism helped me obtain an international tour 
operator licence, despite the fact that the business was ineligible 
under official regulations. 4 However, as I did not have relations with 
officials working in other authority institutions, I did not receive ant 
particular assistance from officials in these institutions and the 
process of setting up the business took a lot of time and money (Tu 
Hai Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour operator 
with an ITOL). 
Supporting the discussion in chapters 3 and 5 and comments made at the beginning 
of this chapter, the evidence presented here illustrates how despite attempts by the 
central state to streamline the formal regulatory environment, the process of 
establishing a private tourism business continues to be bureaucratic and 
cumbersome. Individual local state officials possess considerable arbitrary and 
discretionary power through their control over particular administrative procedures 
to facilitate or hinder any stage of the establishment process for an entrepreneur. 
This explains why social capital - with the invoking of pre-existing ties with these 
officials - constitutes an important institutional mechanism regulating the 
establishment of private tourism businesses. 
These findings were supported in comments made by one of the owners of the Mai 
Anh Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City: 
As I had good relations with a number of officials working in a 
number of relevant institutions, I mostly encountered no problems at 
all with most procedures completed quickly. There was however one 
problem with a number of officials working in the local department 
4 In this case due to the insufficient turnover of the business. As mentioned in Section 6.2.2.1 in the 
last chapter, officially the VNAT will only issue an ITOL to a business achieving an annual turnover 
of at least VND 1 billion. The turnover for the Tu Hai Tourism Company disclosed to me 
during the 
interview was only VND250 million in 1998 and VND400 million in 2000. 
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responsible for environment and safety. When building of the hotel 
commenced, a number of officials at this department started causing 
a few problems in insisting that pavements and the surrounding area 
near the hotel were kept clean and that building materials did not 
obstruct the pavement. In reality, these officials while threatening to 
fine me for violating regulations were only interested in getting 
kickbacks. Our disagreement was therefore eventually resolved v. 'ith 
these officials receiving sums of cash (Mai Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh 
City, a private hotel). 
7.1.2.2.3 Work Experience in Central State Institutions - Ministries 
In Hanoi, as a result of its status as the political and administrative centre of 
Vietnam, a number of respondents also cited ties formed through previous work at 
ministries as having played an extremely important role in the establishment of their 
tourism businesses. In these cases, respondents had utilised ties formed with 
officials in these ministries rather than with local state officials involved in the 
process of establishing a private tourism business. 
As illustrated in the quotes below, possessing such ties had been pivotal in the 
decisions of respondents to establish their tourism businesses. Ties with ministry 
officials, as well as ensuring the smooth completion of bureaucratic procedures, had 
also enabled respondents to circumvent central state regulations. In the case of the 
Hoang Nu Hotel, it had been able to obtain a licence to operate as a hotel, authorised 
to receive foreign guests, despite not satisfying state regulations effective at the time 
regarding size, standard of accommodation etc. This occurred at a time (the 
beginning of the 1990s) when tourism activity in Vietnam was at only an embryonic 
stage and where central state regulations and attitudes were severely constraining the 
role of private entrepreneurship in the development of a tourism industry. In the case 
of the Danh Du Tourism Company, it had been able to obtain a licence to operate as 
an international tour operator (ITO) despite failing to comply with official state 
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regulations regarding the time it had been in operation. These examples demonstrate 
the important role played by local state officials in the regulation of nascent 
capitalist economic activities. Local state officials retain the capacity to mediate 
central state directives, not only in the completion of bureaucratic procedures, but 
also in the circumvention of directives. Once again, this serves to illustrate why, for 
entrepreneurs, possessing pre-existing ties with these officials is considered so 
important in the establishment process. It allows them to complete bureaucratic 
procedures smoothly, but also to obtain benefits and engage in business activities 
they are not officially authorised to do. 
Through the good relations formed, in particular, with the assistant 
director at the Hoang Hon Company, part of the Ministry of Public 
Security, I was encouraged and given a lot of help in establishing the 
business. 5 
Back in 1992/1993, after I'd thoroughly researched the process of 
setting up a private hotel business, I saw that it was too onerous to 
set up independently. So instead, I decided to set up the business 
under the name of the Hoang Hon Company. My connections there 
were responsible for applying for the licence to establish and operate 
the business. With their help, the process of setting up was completed 
smoothly without any difficulties. The time applying for a licence, 
building and opening the hotel only took 8 months. 
The help of my connections at the Hoang Hon Company was 
invaluable as it enabled me to get a licence to operate as a hotel. 
Without this help, it would have been extremely hard to get a hotel 
licence to serve foreign visitors. Back in 1993 for a small or medium- 
sized private hotel such as mine with only around 20 rooms, it was 
very difficult to get a licence to operate as a hotel as generally small 
scale businesses such as mine could only operate as guest houses for 
domestic customers only. This was due to the strict regulations 
existing at the time of the government and state institutions such as 
the local Police, the local Bureau of Trade, the Fire Prevention 
Department, the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism and local taxation office. 
These institutions demanded that hotels satisfy numerous, strict 
requirements regarding the standard of accommodation, which in 
reality only larger-scale state businesses could satisfy. For example, 
the Bureau of Tourism insisted that in order to serve foreign guests a 
hotel had to have over 20 rooms, otherwise the owner had to set up 
5 The Hoang Hon Company is a pseudonym I have used in order to protect the respondent's 
anonymity 
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as a guest house which couldn 't accept foreign guests. Getting a 
safety licence from the Fire Prevention Department was also very 
difficult as a hotel had to satisfy many requirements. The local police 
also carried out extremely rigorous checks on a hotel 's foreign 
visitors. In addition, a potential owner also had to satisfy financial 
requirements. According to the regulations at the time, an owner had 
to have at least VND50 million in order to set up a hotel business.. As 
a result, in 1993, the main barriers to entry ivere the strict 
regulations of the controlling authorities, which were very effective in 
preventing private businesses from setting up hotel businesses. 
Instead, the regulations forced small and medium-sized hotels to set 
up and operate under the name of a state company. 
Similarly, between the setting up of my hotel business in 1993 until 
1999, my business went under the name of the Hoang Hon Company. 
Then, in 1999, as a result of changes in government policy, 
encouraging small and medium-sized businesses to set tip and 
develop, I changed the status of my hotel to a fully private company 
(Hoang Nu Hotel, Hanoi, a private hotel). 
For 20 years, I had worked within the organisation of a ministry', 
latterly as the manager of a commercial and trading business, part of 
a ministry. 6 As a consequence of having formed good relations with 
leaders at the Ministry during that time, I decided to establish the 
tourism business, as a domestic tour operator principally organising 
the vacation requirements of employees of the Ministry. 
In particular, connections at the Ministry helped in renting me 
business premises at a very reasonable rate. These connections also 
helped in providing me with sources of customers in the initial stages 
after setting up the business. The Ministry also acted as the sponsor 
for the business. This ensured that the Hanoi Municipal People's 
Committee quickly completed all procedures approving the 
application and issuing the licence to establish the business. 
Friends and connections at the Ministry also sponsored the business 
in its application for an international tour operator licence. Despite 
official regulations of the VNAT which stipulate that before being 
eligible to apply for an international tour operator licence, a 
company must have been operating in the tourism field for at least 2 
years, as our company was under the sponsorship of the Ministry, the 
VNAT issued our licence after the company had been in operation for 
only 7 or 8 months (Danh Du Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a 
private tour operator with an ITOL). 
61 have withheld the actual name of the Ministry to maintain the respondent's anonymity. 
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One additional point arising out of the interview conducted with the director of the 
Danh Du Tourism Company reinforces the discussion in Section 7.1.2.2.2 regarding 
both the significant control possessed by a myriad of officials over particular 
administrative procedures and as a result the importance for private tourism business 
owners of possessing pre-existing ties with officials working in those local state 
institutions involved in the process of establishing a private tourism business. 
Similar to the case of the Tu Hai Tourism Company in Ho Chi Minh City, illustrated 
in the previous section, ties formed by the director of the Danh Du Tourism and 
Trade Company with leaders at a ministry out of previous work had facilitated the 
establishment process and in addition had enabled the respondent to mediate official 
VNAT regulations and obtain an ITOL. However, in the absence of pre-existing ties 
directly with officials responsible for completing bureaucratic procedures, the 
respondent had been forced to resort to "shelling out extra expenses in order to get 
officials at the relevant authorities on side" (One of the owners of the Suong Mu 
Hotel in Hue). As illustrated in the quote below, this was accomplished through the 
cultivation of social ties by the respondent with officials, as depicted in Section 3.4.5 
in Chapter 3, by inviting officials out for drinks and meals as well as by offering 
sums of money. 
The main way in which the establishment process in reality differed 
from the one that I had envisaged was that the level of expenses that I 
needed to pay throughout the process to complete procedures and 
when applying for licences to set up the business from the Bureau of 
Planning and Investment at the People's Committee in Hanoi and, in 
particular, when applying for the international tour operator licence 
from the VNAT was much higher then I had anticipated. These 
expenses were to officials at the relevant authorities who helped me, 
for example, expenses incurred in inviting these officials out for 
meals and drinks and some financial gifts (Danh Du Tourism and 
Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
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In the case of the significant expenses incurred by the director of the Danh Du 
Tourism Company in cultivating ties with officials at the VNAT, this suggests that 
the extent of expenses reflected the lack of close ties with officials together with the 
extent of the favour required, i. e. the mediation of official state regulations in 
obtaining a prestigious and invaluable international tour operator licence. This 
mirrors the situation described by David Wank in the context of the transitional 
Chinese economy and discussed in Section 3.4.3 in Chapter 3. 
7.1.2.2.4 Work Experience in Private Businesses 
Table 7.2. Sites of work experience in private businesses cited by private tourism 
business owners at which ties created with state officials were invoked in facilitating 
the process of establishing the current private tourism business (in percentages) 
Previous work HANOI HUE HCMC 
experience in: 
Private 
General Businesses 30 38 20 
As discussed at the beginning of Section 7.1.2.2, previous work in private businesses 
also constituted a site in which a significant proportion of private tourism business 
owners had formed ties with state officials. As the following three quotes from 
interviews conducted in Hanoi and Hue illustrate, in previous work in private 
businesses, respondents had formed ties with those local state officials with control 
over administrative procedures involved in establishing a private business. 
Consequently, after deciding to establish their private tourism businesses, these ties 
were invoked as a way of once again ensuring that the establishment process was 
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completed smoothly and quickly and again as mentioned by the owner of the Cay 
Vang Hotel in Hue as a way of minimising the amount of expense and cumbersome 
bureaucracy faced by respondents in negotiating the establishment process. Once 
again, the importance for private tourism business owners of possessing pre-existing 
ties with those local state officials with control over the process of establishing a 
tourism business was illustrated in the comments made by the owner of the Tran 
Xuan Hotel in Hue that pre-existing ties with officials from the Hue Provincial 
People's Committee, the City Police and the Taxation Department were "quite an 
important factor" in his decision to establish the hotel. 
Through our previous business interests, including running a hotel, 
when we decided to set up the tour company in 1996, we already had 
relations with the authorities responsible for the procedures and 
licences required to set up a private business. These connections 
helped a lot in speeding up the process and procedures involved in 
setting up the business. To carry out all the necessary procedures 
took only one month including: choosing a place to rent, registering 
with the local taxation department, getting a business licence from 
the local office of trade and getting a tour operator licence from the 
Hanoi Bureau of Tourism (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Relations formed with officials at a number of institutions such as the 
Hue Provincial People's Committee, the City Police and the Taxation 
Department, through my previous business and trading activities, 
helped a lot in the establishment process. They completed all 
procedures quickly allowing the hotel to start operating on time. 
Having relations was quite an important factor in my decision to 
establish the business (Tran Xuan Hotel, Hue, a private hotel) 
Through my previous business experience, I had formed a lot of 
relations with individuals working in the Hue People's Committee, 
the provincial economic arbiter (nowadays the Bureau of Planning 
and Investment), the Provincial Police ... 
7 
This help enabled me to open and start running the hotel in a short 
time. In particular, it helped to reduce the time in completing all 
procedures necessary to set up the business ... and also 
helped to 
reduce the expenses, which had to be shelled out by the business to 
the relevant authorities and also reduced the amount of cumbersome 
7 The respondent had previously been engaged in a number of different professions, including 
construction and trading. 
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bureaucracy encountered during the establishment process (Cay 
Vang Hotel, Hue, a private hotel) 
7.1.3 Horizontal Ties 
7.1.3.1 Raising Capital to Establish a Private Tourism Business 
In Section 3.4.4.2 in Chapter 3,1 discussed how within the literature on guanxi, in 
the context of a financial system, dominated by state banks, where lending continues 
to be skewed towards the state rather than the private sector; cultivating horizontal 
ties, constituted through family and friendship ties, has been identified as essential 
for entrepreneurs as a way of raising sufficient capital to establish private 
businesses in the transitional Chinese economy. 
In Section 5.1.3.3.1 in Chapter 5,1 discussed how a similar bias persists in the 
Vietnamese financial system with the consequent difficulties for entrepreneurs in 
obtaining loan capital from the state banking system. However, in addition, 
conversations I had with both informants and private tourism business owners also 
suggested that there was considerable reluctance on the part of entrepreneurs to 
resort to state banks due to the scrutiny this would engender of an entrepreneur's 
finances, accounts, past business dealings and tax history, subjects most 
entrepreneurs preferred to remain private. 
The limited recourse of entrepreneurs to the state banking system in raising capital 
to establish a business was reflected among private tourism business owners 
interviewed in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City with only one respondent, a hotel 
owner in Hue, disclosing that he had borrowed money from a local state bank in 
order to establish the business. This had in large part been due to the fact that the 
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size of the hotel and consequently the amount of investment capital required by the 
respondent was much larger in comparison with other private hotels established not 
only in Hue but in any of the three locations. 
While, as I discuss in the following paragraph, the findings from interviews with 
private tourism business owners did illustrate the importance of family and 
friendship ties for a significant proportion of respondents in raising capital to 
establish private tourism businesses, a slightly higher proportion of respondents (just 
over half of all respondents) in each of the three locations described how they had in 
fact financed their tourism businesses themselves. As illustrated in the following 
quotes, in the majority of cases respondents had accumulated sufficient capital from 
previous businesses to invest in establishing a tourism business. 
I financed the hotel myself. The capital to set up the hotel came from 
money I'd accumulated from previous commercial trading activities: 
trading in electronic equipment and motorbikes and from running a 
restaurant (My Anh Hotel, Hanoi, a private hotel). 
After doing business in a number of different fields, I had 
accumulated a sum of capital. At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
central government started to issue policies encouraging individuals 
with investment capital to enter the tourism field. In particular, in 
Hue, the local authorities had also introduced policies specific to the 
local area encouraging local people to invest and develop hotel 
businesses (Cay Vang Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
Therefore, my findings do not entirely support the assertion made by authors writing 
on the transitional Chinese economy and restated at the beginning of this section that 
cultivating family and friendship ties has been essential for all entrepreneurs as a 
way of raising sufficient capital to establish private businesses. They 
do nevertheless 
point to their significance with just under half of all respondents 
interviewed in 
223 
Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City citing family and friendship ties as having been 
responsible for raising capital to establish their businesses. 
Moreover, as well as being important in raising capital to invest directly into 
establishing businesses, a number of informants and private tourism business owners 
also disclosed how family and friends facilitate the establishment process for 
entrepreneurs by temporarily lending capital. As illustrated in the quote below, this 
allows entrepreneurs to overcome and satisfy official regulatory requirements, 
relating to the financial status of entrepreneurs during the process of applying to 
establish a business. 
When private individuals are applying to set up a new business, they 
have to show proof to the Bureau of Planning and Investment at the 
People's Committee of a sufficient financial standing to establish and 
operate the business, before this institution will issue the business 
licence. In many cases, before applying for the licence from the 
Bureau, individuals will ask their friends and family for short-term 
loans to temporarily accumulate sufficient funds to satisfy the 
requirements of the Bureau of Planning and Investment. After 
gaining the licence or at an agreed time thereafter they will pay back 
these loans (KI 1,18.03.02). 
Consequently, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, cultivating family and 
friendship ties is proving important for private tourism business owners, not only in 
raising capital, but also in negotiating official regulatory obstacles in the process of 
establishing a business. 
7.1.3.1.1 Horizontal Ties between Actors in Ho Chi Minh City and Overseas 
In Section 3.4.4.2 in Chapter 3,1 discussed how authors writing on the transitional 
Chinese economy recognise how horizontal family ties are 
being cultivated by 
entrepreneurs with blood relatives living overseas as a way of obtaining capital 
to 
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establish a business. In Section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5,1 examined how this has similarly 
been borne out in the transitional Vietnamese economy with authors such as Kolko 
(1997) and Templer (1998) identifying how substantial amounts of capital have been 
channelled into the Ho Chi Minh City economy through family networks linking 
ethnic Chinese and Viet Kieu communities overseas and actors in Ho Chi Minh 
City. Furthermore, I discussed how a significant proportion of this capital has been 
channelled to family members in Ho Chi Minh City enabling them to establishing 
private hotel businesses. 
Data obtained from interviews with private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh 
City to a large extent supported the findings of authors such as Kolko and Templer, 
identifying a significant role being played by horizontal family ties between private 
tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City and blood relatives living overseas. 
40% of respondents had obtained capital from family members living overseas 
enabling them to establish tourism businesses. Among respondents, capital had 
however not only been invested in establishing hotels, as identified by Kolko and 
Templer, but an equal proportion of respondents had established tour operator 
businesses. 
As with the two businesses illustrated below, in the majority of cases, the original 
idea of establishing a private tourism business had come from family members 
overseas, who, recognising the future potential of tourism in Vietnam, had offered to 
provide capital to family members in Ho Chi Minh City to establish a business. The 
bulk of family members overseas also recognised the advantages of establishing a 
tourism business through the important role they could potentially play in 
facilitating the development of tourism businesses belonging to blood relatives in 
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Ho Chi Minh City through introducing and promoting the businesses of family 
members in their adopted countries. This is a theme I discuss in more detail in 
Section 7.3.1. 
My older brother, who lives in the USA, suggested opening a hotel. 
He predicted that in the future there would be a lot of favourable 
opportunities to develop a successful hotel as the tourism business 
would develop very well. Therefore, investing in the tourism industry 
would be a secure investment with the potential to yield a high level 
of profitability. He offered to lend me the necessary capital and as a 
result I decided to set up the hotel (Minh Mang Hotel, Ho Chi Minh 
City, a private hotel). 
My older brother in the USA and my older sister in Australia 
encouraged me and lent me money to set up the business (Thai Binh 
Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour 
operator). 
7.2 RUNNING A PRIVATE TOURISM BUSINESS 
7.2.1 The Official Regulatory Environment 
In Section 5.1.3.3.5 in Chapter 5,1 discussed how since the official sanctioning of 
private sector activity in 1988, through a continuous process of enacting and 
amending laws and regulations, the central state has been attempting to create a 
more favourable regulatory environment in running a private business by reducing 
the number of, in particular, local state departments and institutions involved in 
regulating private businesses and by streamlining previously cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures administered by local state officials. Among the bulk of 
private tourism business owners interviewed in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, 
as the quotes below illustrate, in this, the central state has achieved some degree of 
success. 
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The main changes and the general overhaul of the former regulatory, 
system occurred in the early 1990s... The enforcement of regulation's 
on a business such as mine operating since 1995 has been much less 
rigorous than the enforcement which existed under the former 
regulatory system for businesses before 1990. 
... the 
level of enforcement by the controlling state authority 
institutions has changed in recent years in line i, 'ith changes in 
central government policy regarding the management and 
administration by these institutions. The rigorous enforcement by 
state institutions on businesses still restricts their operations but only 
a small number of institutions continue to carry out the enforcement 
of regulations in such a rigorous way. 
... central government policy changes have reduced the difficulties in 
the completion of administrative procedures. These are no longer as 
complicated as before. The changes have created more favourable 
conditions and opportunities for tourism businesses to develop (Ba 
Na Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
The State has had to reform administrative procedures... At the same 
time, it has tried to eliminate previously prevalent extortion, 
meddling and excessive interference by officials working in state 
institutions on individuals and business owners. 
... there 
have also been many changes in the regulatory 
administrative system ... officials working in these state institutions have less opportunity to cause difficulties for a business while 
carrying out their duties (K13,09.07.01). 
Since the business was established, the influence of institutions such 
as the Fire Prevention Department, the Hanoi People's Committee 
and the VNAT with regard to the administrative management of 
tourism businesses has diminished. These institutions no longer cause 
difficulties or waste time in inspecting the activities of the business as 
they did before. The impact of institutions such as the taxation 
department and the police, when registering guests has however 
remained the same (Thang Nam Hotel, Hanoi, a private hotel). 
In recent years, the influence of institutions such as the Fire 
Prevention Department and the administrative management carried 
out by the Hue Tourism Bureau and the Provincial People's 
Committee have diminished. These institutions no longer cause so 
many difficulties when carrying out inspections relating to the 
activities of the business. Nowadays, only the taxation department 
and the police are as influential as before. However, even with these 
institutions, there has been a streamlining and simplification in the 
number of regulatory procedures. Completing and complying with 
these procedures no longer wastes as much time as before (Vien 
Dong Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
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The influence of institutions such as the Fire Prevention Department 
and the Hygiene and Environment Department, which used to exert a lot of force when inspecting businesses has been completell" reduced 
(Suong Mu Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
Until recently, private businesses were treated suspiciously by the 
relevant state institutions, closely monitored and subject to an array 
of cumbersome procedures and constant supervision which wasted a 
significant amount of their time as well as expense. This attitude no 
longer persists and interference by state institutions on the activities 
of private businesses has been reduced (Cay Vang Hotel, Hue, a 
private hotel). 
Amendments and streamlining of administrative policies regarding 
the management of private businesses by state institutions have 
improved the operating environment for private businesses. Private 
businesses are no longer subject to excessive interference and waste 
less time and expenses in dealing with state institutions (Thai Binh 
Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour 
operator). 
The quotes above suggest that, as outlined in regulation theory, through its capacity 
to enact a framework of formal regulatory norms - laws, policies and directives - the 
central state has been able to play a significant role in shaping economic processes 
in the transitional economy and remains an important institution regulating 
economic activity throughout national space. 
7.2.2 The Informal Regulatory Environment 
Nevertheless, despite streamlining in the official regulatory environment, as 
illustrated in the quotes below and as I discuss throughout this section, within local 
spaces, there are still a number of local state institutions where officials retain 
significant control over administrative processes, a private tourism business owner 
needs to negotiate in order to ensure the smooth running of a business. 
Regarding official regulations, these cause no problems in the 
running of the business. Informal requirements however do cause 
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some difficulty, i. e. officials working for particular authority 
institutions, not with the institutions themselves (Hoa Ma Tourism 
and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
The main difficulties are with informal requirements between 
particular state officials and our company, not betit'ee, n two 
institutions (nhiing them map mo, chu yeu do cäc yeu cäu khöng chinh 
thi'rc cüa hai cä nhän väi nhau chap khöng cüa hai to chiec) (Nam Sao 
Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
At the same time, as I discussed in chapters 3 and 5, the introduction of capitalist 
economic processes, the sanctioning of private economic activity and the emergence 
of private economic actors have significantly expanded the economic space over 
which, through their control over bureaucratic levers, the regulatory power of local 
state officials now extends. This has heightened their key role as conduits that 
private economic actors must negotiate in order to participate in nascent capitalist 
economic activities such as tourism. 
Consequently, as reflected in the quote below and in the findings from interviews 
with private tourism business owners in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, 
presented in this section, the cultivation by private tourism business owners of social 
ties with local state officials with control over particular bureaucratic procedures 
constitutes an important regulatory mechanism in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy. The cultivation of social ties enables procedures to be completed quickly 
and smoothly, allowing tourism business owners to concentrate on running their 
businesses. 
In the new economic system, transactions are generally from one 
state institution with the bureaucratic power to an economic unit, a 
business... 
In the new system there is much more leverage for the use of gifts to 
get procedural tasks completed, as these tasks represent the requests 
from a business unit functioning on the basis of profit wanting to 
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complete procedures in the course of running a business for profit 
with a state institution responsible for giving permission to these 
business units (K14,13.09.01). 
My findings from interviews with private tourism business owners in each of the 
three locations suggest that respondents are cultivating social ties with officials from 
particular local state institutions as a way of ensuring the smooth completion of t,, o 
main types of bureaucratic procedure: firstly, bureaucratic procedures regularly 
undertaken by local state officials, in particular in assessing the tax liabilities of a 
business and in registering guests and, secondly, administrative procedures required 
by business owners in order to carry out tourism business, for example, in the 
processing of visa applications by local immigration offices. I will discuss each of 
these aspects in turn. 
7.2.2.1 The Completion of Regular Bureaucratic Procedures 
Contrary to the assertion made in Section 5.1.3.3.6 in Chapter 5, almost all private 
tourism business owners interviewed considered that officials from the local district 
taxation department, in the case of private tour operators and the local district 
taxation department together with the local police, in the case of hotels, continue to 
exert significant control in carrying out administrative procedures. 
8 
The institution which imposes the most rigorous demands is the 
taxation office in assessing the tax bill and the business activitly of my 
business. 
... 
I consider this is probably similar to all tour operators (Tran Xuan 
Soan Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
8 Officially, once a month, officials from the local taxation department 
inspect the accounts and 
business results of the tourism businesses under their control to assess the 
level of business tax the 
tourism business is liable for. With regard to the police, at the end of every day, a 
hotel is required to 
submit the details of all guests staying at the hotel 
for registration purposes. There is overlap between 
these functions as the tax department refers to the register of guests submitted 
by the hotel to the 
police in order to ascertain how many guests 
have stayed at the hotel in the previous month as an 
indication of the revenue earned by the hotel. 
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The impact of institutions such as the taxation department and the 
police in the process of registering guests has remained the same. 
These institutions still rigorously inspect the activities of the hotel. 
However, the administrative procedures involved in this inspection 
work have become less complicated than before (Thang Nam Hotel, 
Hanoi, a private hotel). 
Enforcement by the taxation department and the police is most 
thorough. The taxation office carries out thorough checks monthly 
and every month requires me to send a statement outlining the 
revenue earned at the hotel in the previous month. The local police 
also carry out continual checks regarding the registration of guests. 
At times, they come to the hotel without warning, sometimes in one 
week they'll come three or four times. If there are anl' discrepancies 
then the punishment is severe (Hoang Nu Hotel, Hanoi, a private 
hotel). 
7.2.2.1.1 The Cultivation of Social Ties by Private Tourism Business O'1'ners with 
Local State Officials 
Particular officials from the local taxation office and the police are assigned to 
tourism businesses in carrying out the bureaucratic procedures outlined at the end of 
the previous paragraph. This consequently affords these officials significant 
arbitrary and discretionary powers over the completion of bureaucratic procedures at 
individual tourism businesses and in a similar way to that discussed throughout 
Section 7.1 and in Section 5.2.4 in Chapter 5, considerable capacity to facilitate or 
hinder the completion of bureaucratic procedures. Private tourism business owners 
are therefore once again reliant this time on officials from the local taxation office 
and the police in completing bureaucratic procedures quickly and smoothly, 
allowing owners to concentrate on attracting and serving customers. 
Most private tourism business owners interviewed described a situation where after 
establishing their businesses, in the initial stages of operation, officials from the 
local taxation office and the police visiting these businesses for the first time or the 
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first few times carried out procedures in a way which caused considerable 
inconvenience and disruption for business owners. A number of respondents 
described how officials would attempt to waste as much of their time as possible in 
scrutinising documentation and in making repeated and excessive requests for 
additional paperwork and information. In doing so, for business owners and their 
staff, more and more time was diverted to dealing with the exacting bureaucratic 
demands of officials and less time to actually running the business. 
Addressing the theme of unofficial inspections discussed in Section 5.1.3.3.6 in 
Chapter 5, a number of private hotel owners also talked about how police officers 
had attempted to cause inconvenience and disruption by carrying out frequent, 
surprise inspections on their businesses. One private hotel owner, interviewed in Hol 
An described how in the initial stages of operating the hotel, on a number of 
occasions, the police officers, responsible for collecting details of the guests staying 
at the hotel, arrived at the hotel late in the evening and insisted on visiting all the 
bedrooms in the hotel to verify that the guest figures submitted by the hotel owner 
corresponded with the actual number of guests staying at that time. This was done to 
cause considerable inconvenience and embarrassment both to guests, in their rooms 
at the time of the inspections, and to hotel staff, and ultimately had the potential to 
damage the reputation of the hotel. 9 
Confronted by the arbitrary bureaucratic interference of officials from the local 
taxation office and the police described above, among private tourism business 
owners interviewed, most described as illustrated in the quotes below, how they had 
attempted to resolve difficulties and minimise the interference and disruption caused 
9 The interview was carried out in October 2001 at the Minh Hai (a pseudonym) Hotel in Hol An. 
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by these officials in the running of their businesses by cultivating social ties with 
those officials, responsible for carrying out administering procedures on their 
businesses. 
Officials in the City Police and the taxation department used to cause 
difficulties when carrying out their inspections. However, I have 
solved these problems and every time officials come to mvv hotel, I 
invite them to a meal or give them an envelope containing a little 
money ... 
... with both the Police and the taxation department, the ultimate 
objective is for both sides to benefit and in helping to develop good 
relations between our business with these institutions. In this itvv, 
these institutions no longer cause any difficulties at all (The Gioi 
Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
In cultivating good relations, we only incur a small amount of 
expense entertaining officials belonging to institutions carnuing out 
inspections of our hotel, in order that their inspection work can be 
completed without wasting any time and minimising any 
inconvenience in the running of our business (Thang Nam Hotel, 
Hanoi, a private hotel). 
All difficulties relating to the business can be solved with the right 
incentives to officials - meals, financial gifts for example. These in 
turn help to make relationships with these officials comfortable, 
thereafter causing no further problems in the running of the business 
(Danh Du Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). 
It is important for owners of tourism businesses to have good 
relations with the relevant authority institutions in order for the 
running of a business to be smooth (Au Lac Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
Consequently, the findings from interviews with private tourism business owners in 
Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City once again illustrate the importance, in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, for private tourism business owners of cultivating 
social ties with local state officials as a way of negotiating the unofficial regulatory 
environment, this time in running a private tourism business. However, in contrast to 
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the establishment process, there is little evidence to suggest that social ties have 
been cultivated by private tourism business owners out of pre-existing ties based on 
shared affiliation. Instead, in the absence of shared affiliation, social ties are being 
created by private tourism business owners with local state officials, in a similar way 
to the ties formed by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs with local Vietnamese state 
officials in Ho Chi Minh City after 1954, discussed in section 5.3.3 in chapter 5. 
At the same time, in creating social ties with officials from the local taxation office 
and the police, the social investment strategies described by private tourism business 
owners share many of the characteristics identified within the literature on social 
capital and guanxi, discussed in chapters 2 and 3 and exemplified in the nature, 
stream and mutuality of benefits produced out of ties created by ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs with local Vietnamese state officials in the Ho Chi Minh City 
economy after 1954. 
First, as illustrated in the quote above from the owner of the Hoan Cau Hotel in Hue, 
there is the notion of a regular investment of time and money by private tourism 
business owners, "every time" officials visit. 
Second, the quotes illustrate how ties are cultivated through regular social 
interaction with private tourism business owners offering meals, entertainment 
and envelopes (small sums of money) to local state officials. 
Third, there is the idea that cultivating social ties helps to produce and secure a 
regular stream of material benefits to both parties: for officials, the meals, 
entertainment and financial gifts described above; and for private tourism 
business 
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owners ensuring that all bureaucratic procedures carried out by local state officials 
are completed smoothly without wasting the time of and minimising the difficulties, 
interference or disruption caused to business owners, thus allowing them to focus on 
running their businesses and attracting and serving customers. 
7.2.2.1.2 Circumvention and Non-Compliance with Official Regulations 
As illustrated in the two quotes below, as well as performing an important regulatory 
role in ensuring the smooth completion of bureaucratic procedures, ties cultivated 
with local state officials are, in the transitional Vietnamese economy, also allowing 
private tourism business owners, with the complicity (thong döng) of local state 
officials, to avoid fully complying with, and in a number of cases, to circumvent 
completely official, central state regulations (lach luät). 
The extent of ties between individual tourism business owners and 
state officials from the relevant authority institutions responsible for 
administrative aspects of a business is a determining factor in the 
level of compliance (tuän thü) with official regulations. The closer 
and stronger ties are the more concessions and opportunities there 
are for business owners to circumvent regulatory requirements (Vien 
Dong Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
The level of compliance with central state regulations does not 
depend on how rigorously an institution carries out inspections. It 
depends on the extent of ties between business owners and officials. 
Potentially violations of regulations from any institution no matter 
how rigorously they carry out inspections could result in fines or the 
business licence of a business being revoked. However much these 
matters can be "smoothed over" is the decisive factor in the level of 
compliance by any business (Mai Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a 
private hotel). 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3 in the context of transitional economies 
and demonstrating the continuation of the regulatory practices 
identified historically 
in the Vietnamese socio-economy, discussed in Section 5.3 in Chapter 5; in the 
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transitional Vietnamese economy, despite attempts by the central state to create a 
framework of formal laws and structures to regulate nascent capitalist economic 
activities, this is being contested and mediated by both state and non-state actors in 
local spaces. To these actors, this represents the attempted displacement of more 
culturally and socially-embedded informal structures and practices such as the 
cultivation of social ties and social capital, which have traditionally functioned in 
regulating social, political and economic relations in Vietnam. 
With regard to non-state actors, their mediation of central state regulations was 
evinced in the comments, typified by the quotes below, made by almost all 
respondents - both state tourism business managers as well as private tourism 
business owners themselves - who recognised how private tourism business owners 
poorly comply with official regulations. 
Private businesses generally do not comply well with the regulations, 
especially in under reporting their revenues in order to avoid paying 
the correct amount of tax (Suong Mu Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
... 
Private hotels on the other hand do not comply with regulations 
very strictly. They generally don't adequately report the number of 
guests staying at their hotels in order to conceal the actual revenue 
they earn and hence avoid paying the correct amount of tax (Lac Viet 
Hotel, Hue, a state hotel). 
One important reason cited by a number of respondents as "encouraging" non- 
compliance by private tourism business owners implied in the quote below as well 
as illustrated in the quote above from the director of the Mai Anh Hotel in Ho 
Chi 
Minh City is that with local state officials responsible for monitoring compliance of 
central state regulations by private businesses in local spaces, the 
informal 
regulatory environment in most cases allows for transgressions of central state 
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regulations to be "smoothed over" (Mai Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City) through ties 
cultivated with local state officials by private tourism business owners. 
The treatment of violations of the regulations carried out by the 
relevant state institutions is not as yet venv thorough and does not 
deter or set an example for other businesses to comply with the 
regulations (Thanh Loi Hotel, Hue, a state hotel). 
This once again serves to highlight how with local state officials retaining 
considerable capacity in local spaces to interpret and mediate the official regulations 
and decrees being enacted by the central state, informal structures and practices, 
exemplified by the cultivation of social ties by private tourism business owners with 
local state officials, continue to be privileged over formal structures in the regulation 
of economic processes in local spaces in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
Similarly, with regard to local state officials themselves, the arbitrary and 
discretionary powers they possess in contesting, interpreting and mediating central 
state regulations has been manifested in the transitional economy in the ways they 
have sought to profit through their control over bureaucratic processes in their role 
as regulatory conduits for private tourism business owners in the implementation of 
official state regulations. Once again this illustrates how regulatory practices 
identified historically in the Vietnamese socio-economy and discussed in sections 
5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5 have perpetuated in the regulation of nascent capitalist 
economic processes in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
While, from the responses of private tourism business owners, this is occurring with 
officials from a number of local state institutions, the majority of respondents 
focussed on how officials from the local taxation office 
had exercised their arbitrary 
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and discretionary powers over the completion of taxation procedures as a way that 
both private tourism business owners and taxation officials can benefit by acting in 
complicity to avoid full compliance with official regulations. 
As illustrated in the quote below, an informant, talking about how relations between 
private business owners in general and taxation officials typically unfold, described 
a situation very similar to the one described in the previous section. 
With private businesses, officials from the local tax department will 
initially make as much trouble as possible scrutinising accounts and 
generally wasting a lot of time for the business owner. Eventually, the 
owner and the official from the tax department will come to a 
mutually beneficial arrangement whereby the procedures for paving 
tax can be dealt with quickly and the amount of tax owed by the 
private business in any month can be reduced as long as the official 
from the taxation department gets a little extra remuneration (KI1, 
18.03.02). 
This process was supported in comments made by private tourism business owners, 
as illustrated in the quotes below: 
I did have problems in the past with officials from the taxation 
department in calculating the amount of tax the business was liable 
for. Now both sides have resolved these problems for mutual interest. 
We have managed to have the actual amount of tax the business pays 
reduced and the official has also benefited by pocketing an amount of 
money. Now we have come to this agreement, the procedures in 
calculating the business' tax liabilities are carried out very smoothly 
and amicably (Lan Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private hotel). 
I used to have slight difficulties with officials working in the taxation 
office, with regard to assessing my tax liabilities. We have now 
resolved these problems and reduced my tax bill for the financial 
benefit of both sides. At the same time, it has also fostered a better 
and more comfortable relationship with the completion of tax 
procedures now done speedily with the official coming to my 
premises directll, (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and Investment 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
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Thus, as in Section 7.2.2.1.1, as a way of overcoming the arbitrary bureaucratic 
interference of officials from the local taxation office, for private tourism business 
owners, the cultivation of ties with these officials is an important regulatory 
mechanism ensuring that firstly, bureaucratic procedures can be completed 
smoothly, but in addition, allowing private tourism business owners to transgress 
official state regulations and benefit financially through avoiding fully complying 
with tax regulations. 
At the same time, in the preceding quotes and in the quotes below there is little 
suggestion of a `social' content in the ties cultivated by private business owners with 
taxation officials, as in the ties discussed in Section 7.2.2.1.1. Ties are instead 
principally constituted through financial benefits. However, the ties do share a 
number of the other characteristics identified within the literature on social capital 
and guanxi, discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
With regard to the taxation department and the local police, my 
business and officials from these institutions have come to an 
agreement whereby both sides get financial benefit in return for 
avoiding fully complying with the regulations, i. e. reducing the 
amount of tax the hotel has to pay, through the inaccurate 
registration of guests, i. e. underreporting the number of guests who 
have stayed at the hotel, as a way of underreporting revenue earned 
by the hotel in turn in order to reduce the hotel 's tax liabilities. These 
measures have helped to raise the amount of income retained by the 
hotel's owners (Vien Dong Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
The only issue I face relates to the taxation official with whom I have 
a specific way of dealing... I have suggested a way that they have 
agreed to reduce my tax bill, on the grounds that as my business has 
only recently been formed it hasn 't yet made a profit. As an example, 
say in theory my business has to pay VNDJ, 500,000 in tax a month. 
This is reduced to VND900,000 and I give the tax official 
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VND200,000 (Tran Xuan Soan Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, 
a private tour operator). 
... 
Another instance is say, the official tax bill for our company is 
VND1,000,000 but one of the owners of our company could negotiate 
with the official responsible for our company at the local district 
taxation office to reduce the bill by say VND400,000 and give that 
official VND200,000. Therefore, our company 's tax bill is reduced to 
VND600,000 and we pay only VND800,000 including the payfnent to 
the official (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private 
tour operator). 
First, there is the idea of reciprocity with ties cultivated by private tourism business 
owners with taxation officials securing a regular (monthly) stream of benefits for 
both parties: for a private tourism business owner, the smooth completion of 
taxation procedures and a reduction in the amount of tax paid; and for a taxation 
official, a fee, consisting of a proportion of the tax saved by the tourism owner, 
through acting to transgress official state regulations. 
Second, is the notion that regular interaction between a private tourism business 
owner and a local taxation official, in this case constituted by monthly visits by a 
taxation official to a private tourism business owner's business, helps to regularise 
the behaviour and expectations of both parties. A private tourism business owner 
will be comfortable in the knowledge that taxation procedures will be completed 
quickly and smoothly. As illustrated in the last quote, he will also have an 
expectation regarding the amount of tax he will be able to save. At the same time, a 
taxation official will have a reasonable idea regarding the remuneration he is likely 
to receive. 
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7.2.2.1.2.1 Heightened competition 
According to a number of respondents, one additional factor, which in the 
contemporary era has heightened the importance for private tourism business owners 
of cultivating ties with local taxation officials as a way of reducing the amount of tax 
paid, has resulted from the increasingly competitive nature of the Vietnamese 
tourism industry. 
In the early 1990s, streamlining of the official regulatory environment for private 
businesses, as discussed at the beginning of this section, coincided with significant 
growth in foreign visitor numbers together with optimistic projections regarding 
future growth. This encouraged the establishment of significant numbers of in 
particular, private tourism businesses. However, in the mid-1990s, while the growth 
in the number of tourism businesses continued unabated, the growth in foreign 
visitor numbers slowed down, leading to downward pressures on prices and erosion 
and squeezing of profits to very low levels. Since that time, tourism businesses have 
operated in a difficult and intensely competitive business environment. As illustrated 
in the quote below, this has encouraged private tourism business owners to cultivate 
ties with local taxation officials in order to reduce the amount of tax paid not only in 
order to compete with other tourism businesses, but in a lot of cases simply to 
survive. 
The entry of a lot of new tourism businesses, particular/v private 
businesses has created intense and unhealthy competition (canh 
tranh khoc liet khöng länh manh), which has affected the 
performance of all tourism businesses. As a result of the 
deteriorating business situation, tourism businesses are turning to 
more illicit wa'vs of maintaining their financial situations by 
for 
example colluding with taxation officials and avoiding complying 
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with their legal obligations and responsibilities, in not fully declaring 
their true revenues in order to withhold paying tax (Thien Quang 
Hotel, Hue, a state hotel). 
Once again as discussed throughout this section, non-compliance of official state 
regulations in this way has been facilitated by a regulatory environment in which 
informal structures and practices, such as the cultivation of social ties by private 
tourism business owners with local taxation officials continue, in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy, to mediate more formal structures, such as central state 
regulations, in the regulation of economic processes in local spaces. In addressing 
the third of my research questions, this serves to illustrate one way in which the 
local scale constitutes the key site at which nascent capitalist economic activities are 
being regulated. The impact of competition on the cultivation of ties by private 
tourism business owners is explored further in Section 7.3. 
7.2.2.2 The Completion of Administrative Procedures 
The control retained by officials from a number of local state institutions, including 
departments within the local people's committee, the local bureau of tourism and the 
local immigration office, in completing a range of bureaucratic procedures required 
by private tourism business owners in the course of running their businesses was 
similarly in evidence in the responses given by respondents. As the following two 
quotes illustrate, once again, as a way of negotiating the informal regulatory 
environment, cultivating ties with those officials involved in completing particular 
bureaucratic procedures has constituted an important mechanism for private tourism 
business owners. 
... 
As an example, one of the owners or a member of staff at our 
business cultivates ties with an official at a particular state institution 
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and deals with this official. Thereafter, he only has to give this 
official a small sum of money to resolve quickly any issues arising 
from our work, getting a visa issued quickly, at the office of 
immigration or completing some other procedure quickly, for 
example (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). 
... 
For instance, I have relations with the assistant director of the 
Administration Department at the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism. He 
helps me to complete procedures to organise tours quickly. The onltiv 
uncertainty relates to the scale of the gift - the payment required 
by 
him for helping our business (Nam Sao Tourism Company, Hanoi, a 
private tour operator). 
As with the ties cultivated by private tourism business owners with officials from 
the local taxation office and the police, among the majority of respondents 
interviewed, ties with officials from, for example, the local bureau of tourism and 
the local immigration office, are being created by private tourism business owners 
rather than cultivated out of pre-existing ties based on shared affiliation. As in the 
ties cultivated by private business owners with taxation officials, discussed in 
Section 7.2.2.1.2, in the preceding quotes and in the case study below, there is little 
suggestion of a `social' content. Ties are instead principally constituted through 
financial benefits. Nevertheless, a number of the characteristics identified within the 
social capital and guanxi literature are apparent. 
Firstly, there is the idea that ties are being created and cultivated to produce lasting, 
useful relationships rather than simply to carry out one-off business transactions 
that, secondly, can as a result be invoked in the short and long term to secure a 
regular stream of material benefits to both parties: for private tourism business 
owners, ensuring that all bureaucratic procedures are completed quickly and 
smoothly; and for officials, small sums of money. 
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The following case study was created out of conversations with an informant 
working at a local immigration office in Hanoi. It provides a further illustration of 
the significant arbitrary and discretionary powers possessed by local state officials, 
in this case at the local immigration office in completing bureaucratic procedures, in 
this case in processing applications for visa extensions requested by local tour 
operators. As a result, ties cultivated by private tour operator business owners or 
members of their staff with individual officials at the immigration office constitute 
an important mechanism enabling private tour operator business owners to negotiate 
the informal regulatory environment. Cultivating ties ensures that visa applications 
can be processed quickly and smoothly. 
Figure 7.1. Case Study: Ties created with local state immigration officials 
... with a one month visa extension 
for foreign visitors in Vietnam, the official cost shown 
on the visa stamped on a passport is US$10. A tour operator dealing in visa extensions has 
the discretion to charge foreign customers any amount to complete this service. For 
example, a tour operator may decide to charge a customer say US$18. A member of staff at 
the tour operator will then go to the immigration department. An official at the immigration 
department will agree to process the application on condition that he is paid a level of 
remuneration for completing the task. The level of remuneration is generally determined by 
the extent of the relationship between the official and the member of staff at the tour 
operator, i. e. the closer the relationship, the lower the amount of remuneration sought. 
In the majority of cases, particularly where a tour operator regularly carries out visa 
extensions for foreign customers, ties between a private tour operator and a particular 
official at the local immigration office will most probably have already been created and a 
pre-agreed arrangement or understanding between the official and the tour operator is 
already likely to exist regarding the level of remuneration, say for example, US$2 as well as 
the time required by the official to complete the task (K15,22.09.01). 
244 
The case study above reinforces the notion that ties between private tourism 
businesses and local state officials are being created to produce lasting relationships, 
through which both parties are able to secure a regular stream of material benefits. In 
the case study above, for the private tour operator, as well as ensuring that visa 
applications are completed quickly and smoothly, a profit of US$6 is earned by the 
tour operator on each visa; while an official at the immigration office profits by 
US$2 per visa processed. 
In addition, one further characteristic identified within the literature on social capital 
and guanxi and brought out in the case study above is how regular interaction 
between private tour operators and officials from the immigration office helps to 
regularise the behaviour and expectations of each party. As illustrated in the case 
study above, where ties between a private tour operator and an official at the local 
immigration office are well-established with the tour operator regularly submitting 
applications for visa extensions, the expectations of both parties will have become 
regularised: the private tour operator will be aware of how much time and what level 
of remuneration is required by the official and the official in turn will have a good 
idea of the "fee" he will receive for processing the visa application. 
Conversely, as is implied in the case study, in the absence of ties between private 
tour operators and officials from the local immigration office, through their arbitrary 
and discretionary powers over the process of completing visa applications, officials 
have considerable capacity to hinder the process for private tour operators. First, 
officials retain discretion in how quickly or slowly they complete applications, 
which for tour operators may cause uncertainty and unreliability in the visa services 
they offer to foreign customers. Second, in the absence of ties, for private tour 
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operators, the level of remuneration required by an official from the immigration 
office is likely to be both uncertain and higher than in the case where ties have been 
created, thus reducing the profit earned by a tour operator on its visa services, in 
comparison with a tour operator who has created ties with officials. Once again this 
serves to illustrate the importance for private tourism business owners in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy of cultivating ties with local state officials as a 
way of negotiating the informal regulatory environment in smoothly completing 
bureaucratic processes in the course of running a private tourism business. 
7.3. DEVELOPING TOURISM BUSINESS 
7.3.1 The International Scale 
7.3.1.1 Private Tour Operator and Hotel Owners in Ho Chi Minh City 
In Chapter 3,1 discussed how socio-cultural ties between actors in particular local 
spaces within individual transitional economies and the international capitalist 
economy have been utilised in developing economic activities. As shown in Table 
7.3, private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City have similarly utilised 
their socio-cultural connectedness with actors overseas as a way of facilitating 
access to international tourism markets in generating foreign customers for their 
businesses. 1° All private tour operator owners interviewed mentioned having utilised 
ties with blood relatives overseas and two-thirds mentioned having utilised ties with 
Viet Kieu friends living overseas. Among almost all private tour operator owners, 
possessing social ties with family and friends overseas was considered to have been 
10 I initially analysed private tour operators with an ITOL (ITO) and without an ITOL (TO) 
separately. However, as the findings from both types of business were broadly similar I decided to 
conflate analysis of the data. 
246 
very important in their original decision to establish a tourism business. Among 
private hotel owners interviewed, two-thirds had invoked socio-cultural ties in the 
international scale: one third with blood relatives and one-third with Viet Kieu 
friends. 
Table 7.3. Types of actors with whom private tourism business owners in Ho Chi 
Minh City have cultivated ties as a way of facilitating access to international tourism 
markets in generating foreign customers for their businesses (in percentages) 
ITOs TOs All TOs Hotels 
International Ties 100 100 100 66 
Blood relatives living 
overseas 
100 100 100 33 
Friends (Viet Kieu) 100 50 66 33 
Other International 
Ties 
0 0 0 0 
Indeed, as the following quotes illustrate, reinforcing the point made in Section 
5.4.1.1 in Chapter 5, with the majority of family and friends overseas residing in 
North America, Europe and East Asia, in countries constituting important source 
markets for international tourism in Vietnam, possessing ties with family and friends 
in these markets provided private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City 
with significant opportunities to generate tourism business in these markets. 
... we make use of our personal relations: 
blood relatives and friends 
in France, Canada and Denmark to assist us in developing the 
markets, promoting and introducing our business to customers there. 
... 
We design and send information about our tour programmes to 
our relations overseas to distribute and introduce to a number of 
tourism companies in the cities where they live (Tu Hai Tourism 
Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
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My older brother in the USA and my older sister in Australia help in 
introducing and promoting my business by distributing promotional 
literature, outlining the tour programmes that we offer to relations of 
theirs in the cities where they live (Thai Binh Duong Tourism 
Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour operator). 
In the international market, through having the support of my older 
brother in the USA, I am able to attract business from the US market. 
I co-operate with my brother by sending him promotional literature. 1 
make use of his connections there to develop my tourism business by 
introducing US tourists having an intention to visit Vietnam to come 
and stay at my hotel (Minh Mang Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private 
hotel). 
With regard to the international market, I only operate in this market 
via friends overseas. I have been friends for a long time with a 
number of overseas Vietnamese living and working in Australia, 
South Korea and Japan. They promote and introduce my hotel to 
customers from these countries who have an intention of coming to 
Ho Chi Minh City (Mai Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private 
hotel). 
Nevertheless, despite possessing socio-cultural ties with family and friends in 
important international tourism markets and utilising these ties as a way of 
developing tourism business in these markets, findings from interviews with private 
tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City revealed a number of factors which 
severely constrained their attempts to generate significant volumes of tourism 
business out of these ties and consequently limited the importance of these ties for 
private tourism businesses in Ho Chi Minh City in developing their international 
tourism operations. First, as illustrated in the quotes above, among the vast majority 
of private tourism business owners interviewed in Ho Chi Minh City, family and 
friends overseas were generating tourism business in only an informal way; simply 
promoting tourism in Vietnam and the businesses of their relatives or friends in Ho 
Chi Minh City to friends and connections of theirs in their adopted cities. 
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Second, both the unofficial and official regulatory environments were constraining 
attempts by private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City to carry out 
international tourism business organised from overseas. With regard to the unofficial 
regulatory environment, as discussed in Section 6.2.2.1 in Chapter 6, even among 
private tour operator businesses authorised to carry out international tourism 
business organised from overseas due to having been issued with international tour 
operator licences (ITOLs) by the VNAT, individual officials at the VNAT still 
possess considerable arbitrary and discretionary powers in approving requests made 
by private tour operators to carry out tour business organised from overseas. This 
was illustrated in Section 6.2.2.1, with the case of the Tu Hai Tourism Company, a 
private tour operator in Ho Chi Minh City with an ITOL, which, as illustrated in the 
quote above, had utilised ties with blood relatives and friends in France, Canada and 
Denmark to introduce the company to and co-operate with tour operators in the 
cities in these countries where they live in organising tour business. However, it had 
failed to negotiate the unofficial regulatory environment and having faced 
insurmountable bureaucratic obstacles in attempting to carry out tour business 
organised from overseas had instead been forced to resort to the assistance of a large 
local state tour operator, the Hoa Binh Tourism Company to complete bureaucratic 
procedures in bringing tour groups from overseas into Vietnam. Failure to negotiate 
the unofficial regulatory environment and the significant reduction in profit 
generated from tour business organised from overseas, consequent on 
having to 
utilise the Hoa Binh Tourism Company had as a result severely circumscribed 
the 
pretensions of the Tu Hai Tourism Company in developing 
its international tourism 
business. 
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Similarly, exemplified in the following quote, for the vast majority of private tour 
operator businesses in Ho Chi Minh City without ITOLs and therefore not officially 
authorised to carry out tourism business organised from overseas, the official 
regulatory environment is effective in preventing these businesses from carrying out 
business organised by family and friends overseas themselves. 
My older brother in the USA and my older sister in Australia help in 
introducing and promoting my business ... to relations of theirs in the 
cities where they live. However, we serve most of the foreign 
customers resulting from this once then have arrived in Vietnam and 
come to the office in Ho Chi Minh City. 
... 
The regulations of the VNA T make it difficult for a private 
company such as ours to get an international tour operator licence. 
This reflects the policies of the government and the VNAT in giving 
preference to state tourism businesses and in discriminating against 
private businesses in developing the international tourism market. 
Consequently, it is difficult for us to organise tour business from 
overseas ... 
... we occasionally receive requests to carry out tour business 
organised from overseas by my older brother and sister for 
connections of theirs wanting to come and visit Vietnam or from 
customers who have read the promotional literature of the company, 
outlining the tour programmes that we offer. However, if there is a 
demand from a large tour group overseas to organise a tour before 
the tourists have arrived in Vietnam, we have to go through a tour 
company, authorised to conduct overseas business, i. e. with an ITOL, 
in our case, Ben Thanh Tourist, to be able to conduct this business. 
However, the procedures for doing this are extremely complicated. 
We incur a high level of expense and waste a lot of time in arranging 
this. This makes the cost of the tour much higher than equivalent 
tours offered by companies with ITOLs. Consequently, it becomes 
unprofitable for our business. 
As a result, the business' activities in the international market are 
limited and we do not have any plans to exploit this market in the 
future. 
... this part of the 
business is not ven, significant to the overall 
operations of the company. Instead, our main business activity 
remains the domestic tourism market, serving mainly foreign 
backpacker tourists who have already arrived in Vietnam and come 
to our office to book a tour (Thai Binh Duong Tourism Company, Ho 
Chi Minh City, a private tour operator). 
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7.3.1.1.1 The Importance of Socio-cultural Ties for Private Tourism Business 
Owners in Ho Chi Minh City in Generating International Tourism Business 
As a result of the factors above, while data collected from interviews with private 
tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City revealed relatively wide variations in 
the contribution of family and friends overseas in generating foreign customers for 
respondents' businesses, overall the data suggest that for private tourism business 
owners in Ho Chi Minh City, utilising socio-cultural ties with family and friends 
overseas has made a small but not a significant contribution in developing their 
tourism business activities. In the most significant case, the Tu Hai Tourism 
Company, cited earlier in the section, the owner estimated that approximately 30% 
of the total foreign customers annually received by his business resulted from family 
and friends in Denmark, France and Canada introducing and promoting his business 
to relations of theirs and tourism companies in these markets. Nevertheless, as he 
himself conceded "the majority of foreign customers we serve mainly find our office 
themselves as we are located in the heart of the backpacker area in Ho Clii Minh 
City ". As such, even in this example, socio-cultural ties with family and friends 
overseas are considered as only playing a minor role in developing tourism business 
operations, with instead the bulk of foreign customers originating from within the 
local scale in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Among the majority of private tour operator owners interviewed in Ho Chi Minh 
City, comments made by respondents when asked to assess the contribution of ties 
with family and friends overseas in developing tourism business operations again 
reflected those made by the owner of the Thai Binh Duong Tourism Company, cited 
earlier in this section, who considered that the contribution of his older brother in the 
USA and his older sister in Australia "is not very significant to the overall 
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operations of the company" as these ties were estimated to generate only around 
10% of the total foreign customers annually received by his business. As with the 
owner of the Tu Hai Tourism Company, the owner of the Thai Binh Duong Tourism 
Company considered that "my main business activity remains the domestic tourism 
market, serving mainly foreign backpacker tourists who have already arrived in 
Vietnam and who come to my office to book a tour ". The importance for private 
tourism business owners of cultivating ties in local spaces in developing tourism 
business is the theme of Section 7.3.2. 
Similarly among private hotel owners interviewed in Ho Chi Minh City, again 
despite wide variations in the contribution of family and friends overseas in 
generating foreign customers for individual hotels, overall the impact of these ties 
was not significant with on average, socio-cultural ties estimated to generate only 
8% of the total foreign guests received by these businesses. 
7.3.1.2 Private Tour Operator and Hotel Owners in Hanoi 
As I discussed in Section 5.4 in Chapter 5, in contrast to the socio-cultural and 
historical connectedness of actors in the Ho Chi Minh economy, the degree of 
"insertion" historically of actors in the Hanoi economy with the international 
capitalist economy has been limited. As shown in Table 7.4, in my own study, this 
was reflected with the fact that among private tourism business owners interviewed 
in Hanoi, no (0%) owner mentioned having blood relatives overseas, in comparison 
with all (100%) private tour operator owners interviewed in Ho Chi Minh City, 
while only 28% of private tour operator owners interviewed in Hanoi mentioned 
having utilised ties with Viet Kieu friends living overseas, as a way of developing 
their tourism business operations, in comparison with 67% in Ho Chi Minh City. 
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Similarly, among private hotel owners interviewed in Hanoi, no ties of any form 
were disclosed as existing between respondents and actors overseas compared with 
the one third of hotel owners in Ho Chi Minh City who mentioned having invoked 
ties with blood relatives and the one third who mentioned having invoked ties with 
Viet Kieu friends. 
Table 7.4. Types of actors with whom private tourism business owners in Hanoi 
have cultivated ties as a way of facilitating access to international tourism markets in 
generating foreign customers for their businesses (in percentages) 
Figures for Hanoi (in bold), figures for Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) (in brackets) 
Hanoi (HCMC) ITO TOs All TOs Hotels 
International 100 (100) 67 (100) 86 (100) 0 (66) 
Ties 
Blood relatives 0 (100) 0 (100) 0 (100) 0 (33) 
living overseas 
Friends (Viet 50 (100) 0 (50) 28 (66) 0 (33) 
Kieu) 
Foreign tour operators 25 (0) 0 14 (0) 0 
through relations 
overseas 
Blood relatives 0 (0) 33 (0) 14 (0) 0 
studying overseas 
Friends (Vietnamese) 75 (0) 0 (0) 43 (0) 0 
living temporarily / 
working overseas 
Friends (foreigners) 25 (0) 33 (0) 29 (0) 0 
living overseas 
Relations from 50 (0) 33 (0) 29 (0) 0 
previous business 
interests 
Friends with officials 
in Vietnamese state 0 (0) 33 (0) 14 (0) 0 
institutions with ties 
overseas 
Other International 0 (0) 0 0 0 
Ties 
Nevertheless, in contrast again to private tourism business owners interviewed in Ho 
Chi Minh City, where ties with the international scale were confined to family 
members overseas and Viet Kieu friends, in Hanoi, in the absence of socio-cultural 
ties overseas, as shown in Table 7.4 and illustrated in the following quotes, the 
majority (86%) of private tour operator owners are instead making use of and 
utilising pre-existing ties with a range of actors connected to the international scale 
as a way of developing their tourism business operations and generating foreign 
253 
customers for their businesses. These include Vietnamese friends working overseas, 
foreign friends and relations created out of previous business experience, blood 
relatives and friends studying overseas as well as former classmates now officials in 
Vietnamese state institutions with ties overseas. Again as is reflected in the 
following quotes, these ties have largely been created during the process of 
transition in the Vietnamese economy with the opening and greater integration of the 
Vietnamese economy into the international capitalist economy and the expansion of 
international economic activities affording increased contact between Vietnamese 
and foreign actors, particularly in an economic, political and cultural hub in the 
transitional economy such as Hanoi. 
In reality, we are only able to approach the overseas market and 
attract tourists from a small number of countries where we have 
Vietnamese friends living there. In particular, we co-operate with a 
number of Vietnamese friends who have been living and working in 
Japan and Korea for a number of years. They make tour bookings for 
tourists in those countries who want to visit Vietnam and then our 
company will complete all the procedures necessary for these tourists 
to enter Vietnam (Danh Du Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a 
private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Our foreign customers mainly come from Germany, Switzerland and 
Russia. This is due to having friends and business relations there. We 
produce literature about the tour programmes we run and send it to 
our friends in the above countries. They introduce people to tourism 
in Vietnam and then when these people come to Vietnam, our 
company will serve them. In Germany, we are friends with a Viet 
Kieu; in Switzerland; with a man who is operating a bank in 
Vietnam; and in Russia, from the time we studied and made a lot of 
friends there. 
Since 1998, we've also attracted more customers from Korea, Japan 
and China. This resulted from the increased economic co-operation 
between Asian countries and Vietnam towards the end of the 1990s. 
From about 1997, friends and business relations of ours started 
going to these countries on business. While there, they made business 
relations and when any of these relations expressed an interest in 
visiting Vietnam, our friends and business relations introduced these 
people to our company (Nam Ha Tourism Company, 
Hanoi, a private 
tour operator with an ITOL). 
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Our foreign customers mainly come from France, Australia, Thailand 
and Italy. This is due to the business relations developed by our 
company in these countries from 1992 to 1996 when operating in the 
clothing manufacture and cleaning business. After we started the 
tourism company in 1996 we cultivated these relations with regard to 
our new tourism business (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
A friend of mine studying in Italy contacts tour operators there to 
organise tours for Italian tourists wanting to visit Vietnam. At the 
same time, my sister, who is studying at Newcastle University, 
Australia has helped to organise tour business for students from the 
university to Vietnam (Huu Nghi Travel and Tour Company Ltd, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
As my business doesn 't have an international tour operator licence, I 
knew that the capacity and scale of my international tourism 
activities would be limited. Therefore, the range of ties I have formed 
in order to develop the business' international tourism business 
operations has also been limited. 
... 
Most of my foreign customers come from China, France and 
Australia. 
This is due to having cultivated ties with friends, former school and 
university classmates, working as Heads of department at the 
General Steel Corporation and the Ministry of Trade, in positions 
through which they come into frequent contact with foreign 
counterparts. These large institutions conduct business and co- 
operate a lot overseas, for example in China, France and Australia. 
When their foreign business relations express an intention of visiting 
Vietnam, they introduce and recommend my company, inform me of 
the requirements of their foreign relations and from that I organise a 
suitable tour (Hang Bac Tourism Trade and Investment Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
As a way of creating sources of foreign customers for the business, I 
have only used my connections with the many friends I made in 
countries such as China, Australia and Poland, when in my previous 
work at the Association we went to these countries on business (Tran 
Xuan Soan Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). 11 
In the above quote the exact details of the respondent's previous work is not specified 
in order to 
nrotect the anonymity of the respondent. 
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As reflected in the last two quotes, comments among private tour operators without 
ITOLs interviewed in Hanoi illustrate how the official regulatory environment 
operates in a similar way to that discussed in relation to private tour operator 
businesses without ITOLs in Ho Chi Minh City in Section 7.3.1.1. Consequently, 
this once again limits the effectiveness of pre-existing ties in generating tourism 
business for these businesses. Among private tour operators without ITOLs 
interviewed in Hanoi, in the most significant case, a respondent estimated that 
around 20% of the business' total annual revenue was attributable to these ties. 
However, with regard to private tour operators in Hanoi with international tour 
operator licences, it was significant how, in comparison with private tour operators 
in Ho Chi Minh City, there was a greater incidence of ties cultivated by private ITOs 
in Hanoi as a way of developing their international tourism business operations in 
"neighbouring" regional tourism markets in particular, in generating foreign 
customers and bringing tourists overland from the Chinese tourism market. In 
approaching these markets, comments made by private ITO owners suggested that 
they faced fewer obstacles in negotiating the official regulatory environment in 
obtaining permission to carry out tourism business organised from these markets in 
comparison with those faced by private ITOs in Ho Chi Minh City in attempting to 
carry out tour business organised out of ties with family and friends in "western" 
markets, discussed earlier in Section 7.3.1.1. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, this 
again serves to illustrate the continuing legacy of the state in the transitional 
economy in maintaining a significant degree of regulatory control over the building 
of economic ties between Vietnamese actors and actors in major "western" capitalist 
nations, in this case in affording private tourism businesses in Ho Chi Minh City 
access to "western" tourism markets. 
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As a result, again as discussed earlier in Section 7.3.1.1, for private tourism business 
owners in Ho Chi Minh City, with pre-existing ties utilised in developing their 
tourism business operations confined to family and friends in these "western" 
markets, the regulatory practices of the state create the biggest challenges and 
difficulties for these actors in developing their tourism operations out of ties in the 
international scale. This may in large part explain why private tourism business 
owners in Ho Chi Minh City were unable to any significant extent to capitalise on 
socio-cultural ties with family and friends in "western" markets in developing their 
tourism business activities. 
7.3.1.2.1 The Importance of Pre-existing Ties for Private Tour Operator Businesses 
in Hanoi in Generating International Tourism Business 
The discussion above has gone a long way to explaining how the opportunities 
accruing to private tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City in utilising socio- 
cultural and historical ties with family and friends in the international capitalist 
economy as a way of developing their tourism business operations have largely been 
circumscribed by a regulatory environment, which also continues to be informed by 
historical legacies. As a result, the limited socio-cultural and historical 
connectedness of actors in the Hanoi economy with the international capitalist 
economy has, in the transitional economy, therefore acted less as a constraint on the 
capacity of economic actors in the Hanoi economy to develop internationally- 
oriented capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, as was claimed in Section 
5.4 in Chapter 5. 
Instead, data gathered from interviews suggest that the pre-existing ties utilised by 
private ITO owners in Hanoi with actors connected to the international scale make a 
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significant contribution in generating foreign customers for these businesses and 
have been much more effective than the socio-cultural ties utilised by private 
tourism business owners in Ho Chi Minh City. This is reflected in the following 
quotes, a number of which were included in full in the last section, made by 
respondents at private ITOs in Hanoi when asked firstly where their foreign 
customers came from and then what the main reasons for this were: 
Our foreign customers mainly come from France, the USA, China 
and Thailand. With regard to France and the USA, this is due to the 
close and special relations formed with officials working at the 
Embassies in these countries by a number of our members when 
formerly high-ranking government officials. These Embassy officials 
advertise and market our tour programmes and take bookings from 
customers. In China and Thailand, it is due to having set up offices 
there (Au Lac Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with 
an ITOL). 
From starting the business in 1996 to 1998, customers mainly came 
from China, Japan and Australia. Since 1999, in addition we have 
attracted Korean customers. 
... 
This is chiefly the result of having relations in these countries. We 
ask Vietnamese friends living and working in these countries to 
cooperate in making tour bookings for tourists in those countries who 
want to visit Vietnam ... 
(Danh Du Tourism and Trade Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Our foreign customers mainly come from Germany, Switzerland and 
Russia. This is due to having friends and business relations there. 
... 
They introduce people to tourism in Vietnam... 
Since 1998, we've also attracted more customers from Korea, Japan 
and China. From about 1997, friends and business relations of ours 
started going to these countries on business. While there, they made 
business relations and when any of these relations expressed an 
interest in visiting Vietnam, our friends and business relations 
introduced these people to our company (Nam Ha Tourism 
Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
Our foreign customers mainly come from France, Australia, Thailand 
and Italy. This is due to the business relations developed 
by our 
company in these countries from 1992 to 1996 when operating in the 
clothing manufacture and cleaning business (Hoa Ma Tourism and 
Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
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One additional point which came out of comments made by respondents in Hanoi 
which may also help to explain the greater effectiveness of pre-existing ties utilised 
by private ITO owners in Hanoi with actors connected to the international scale in 
generating international tourism business was that all private ITO owners 
interviewed in Hanoi also possessed pre-existing ties with officials at the VNAT. 
These had been formed at university or through previous work experience. As 
illustrated in the quote below, a number of respondents explicitly acknowledged 
how these ties had facilitated the process of carrying out tour business organised 
from overseas. Therefore, it could also be claimed that private ITO owners in Hanoi 
are benefiting in carrying out tour business organised from overseas, in comparison 
with private ITOs in Ho Chi Minh City, through being situated in the same locality 
as the key regulators of international tourism activity - officials at the VNAT. Due to 
having grown up and lived in Hanoi, private ITO owners in Hanoi have been able to 
build ties and become part of social networks with local economic and political 
actors, including with actors now working as officials at the VNAT. As a result, they 
have been better able to negotiate the unofficial regulatory environment in carrying 
out tour business organised from overseas than private ITOs in Ho Chi Minh City 
such as the Tu Hai Tourism Company, discussed in Section 7.3.1.1. 
We are long-time friends with a number of officials working at the 
VNAT and the Hanoi Bureau of Tourism. We met and became friends 
with these people when studying at university. As a result of having 
good relations, they help us with all paperwork and procedures in 
relation to receiving foreign tourists into Vietnam (Hoa Ma Tourism 
and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator with an ITOL). 
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7.3.1.3 Private Tour Operator and Hotel Owners in Hue 
So far in this section, the discussion has focussed on ties between private tourism 
business owners and the international scale in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. In this 
discussion, references to Hue have been absent. This is for the simple fact that in 
interviews conducted with private tourism business owners in Hue, no ties of any 
form with the international scale were revealed. 
As I discussed in Section 5.4 in Chapter 5, as with Hanoi, the degree of "insertion" 
historically of actors in Hue with the international capitalist economy has been 
limited. However, in contrast to Hanoi, in the transitional economy, the degree of 
"insertion" of the Hue economy has continued to be limited by the comparatively 
slow development of international-oriented activities and by relatively few ties 
created with the international economy. 
7.3.2 The Local Scale 
My findings from interviews in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City demonstrate 
how, for private tourism business owners in all three locations, cultivating horizontal 
ties with actors and institutions within local spaces is proving vital in developing 
tourism business. As discussed in Section 7.2.2.1.2.1, cultivating ties has helped 
private tourism business owners to sustain business operations, compete effectively 
and counteract the intense competition which has pervaded the Vietnamese tourism 
industry since the mid-1990s. However, in contrast to authors writing about other 
transitional economies and discussed in Chapter 3, my findings provide little 
evidence that the cultivation of pre-existing horizontal ties in local spaces is 
playing an important role in this process. Instead, my findings illustrate how as a 
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response to economic and market exigencies, private tourism business owners are 
attempting to create horizontal ties with a range of local actors, with whom no pre- 
existing ties or shared affiliation exist. For private tourism business owners, these 
provide the most effective way by which they are attempting to compete with other 
tourism businesses to attract foreign customers and generate tourism business. 
7.3.2.1 Private Tour Operators 
Among private tour operator owners interviewed, in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh 
City, the key ties created by these businesses, as a way of attracting foreign 
customers, are primarily with hotels. The nature and mechanics of ties created by 
private tour operator owners with hotels is exemplified by the quote below. 
We have formed ties with a small number of private hotels catering to 
backpacker tourists who comprise the majority of our customers. 
... with 
hotels, we draw up tour itineraries and send these to a 
number of hotels on, for example, Häng Tre, Häng Bac and Dinh Liet 
streets in the Old Quarter, popular with backpacker tourists. When 
these hotels get guests who want to go on a tour, they send them to 
our company. In return, we either reduce the price of the tour by say 
5% or give 5% of the price of the tour to the hotels. Conversely, when 
tourists come to our company and make a request to stay in the Old 
Quarter of Hanoi, we introduce them to these hotels. The hotel will 
generally reduce the price of the room 
... 
In both cases, reducing prices acts more as a way to gain a 
competitive advantage in the tourism market and attract customers 
than simply generating additional revenue directly through the 
business introduced (Nam Sao Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private 
tour operator). 
Among private tour operator owners interviewed, as the two quotes below serve to 
illustrate, there is little evidence to suggest of any social content in the process of 
creating ties with hotels. 
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Attempting to form new ties with tourism businesses is usually 
characterised by intense competition with each side Irving to squc'e. -c 
the prices (ep giä) of services offered by the other side. This leads to 
a reduction in profit to negligible levels in the procurement of these 
services... 
The success of ties is mahnly due to offering competitive rates of 
commission (hoa häng) for introducing guests to our 
company... (Nam Ha Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator with an ITOL). 
Negotiation and mild conflict is centred on competing over the price 
of rooms at hotels and in competing over the quality and price of 
tours with tour operators (Hoa Ma Tourism and Trade Company, 
Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
Instead, due to the intense competition within the tourism industries in Hanoi, Hue 
and Ho Chi Minh City, the successful building of ties depends on the satisfaction of 
market and economic criteria with little or no mention among private tour operator 
owners interviewed of the building of social relationships. 
The primacy of purely economic rather than social ties cultivated between private 
tour operators and hotels and regulated according to rates of commission paid in 
introducing foreign customers is further illustrated in the following case study. 
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Figure 7.2. Case Study: Son Ha Tourism Company, Hoi An, a private tour operator 
Son Ha Tourism Company is a private tour operator based in Da Nang. In a similar way to a 
number of other private tour operators operating in major tourism centres in Vietnam, it 
provides a bus service, conveying tourists, predominantly foreign backpacker tourists, 
between Hue, Da Nang and Hol An. In recommending hotels in Hoi An to passengers, it 
receives commission from these hotels of between 10 and 15% of the total revenue earned by the hotel from a tourist, i. e. the price of the room for every night the tourist stays at the hotel. In Hue, it receives a slightly higher rate of commission, averaging around 20', "'o. This 
reflects the more intense level of competition between hotels in Hue as a result of the 
oversupply in hotel accommodation in comparison with Hol An where demand and supply 
are much more balanced, with maybe even a lack of supply. 
Before a tour bus reaches its destination, Hue or Hoi An, staff at the office of Son Ha 
Tourism Company in the locality ring around the hotels there asking about the availability 
of accommodation on that particular day. When the tour bus arrives at its destination, it goes 
to the office and picks up a member of staff, who can direct the bus to particular hotels. The 
bus first goes to the hotel, which has provided the most business for Son Ha Tourism, i. e. 
tour and transport tickets sold to its guests in the preceding month, for example. Due to the 
good volume of business this hotel has generated for Son Ha Tourism, the member of staff 
will recommend the hotel to passengers. At the same time, passengers will also be given an 
estimate regarding the prices of rooms. As Son Ha Tourism deals with high and regular 
volumes of foreign tourists, for hotels, ties with the Company are invaluable. As a result, 
they will attempt to offer competitive room rates in order to attract Son Ha passengers. 
Based on both comments made by the respondent together with my own estimation through 
participant observation carried out on a number of journeys made to and from Hue and Hoi 
An, on average, around 80% of tourists travelling on a Son Ha bus won't have made any 
prior arrangements or decisions regarding where they will stay. Therefore, when the bus 
stops at the first hotel, tourists are invited to look at the rooms and are informed about the 
cost of rooms. On average, around 90% of tourists will choose to stay at the first hotel. Any 
remaining tourists will be taken to a second hotel, i. e. the one which has sold the second 
highest amount of business for the company in the previous month. 
At the same time, hotels in Hue, Da Nang and Hol An also receive commission from Son 
Ha Tourism for business they sell to hotel guests on behalf of the Company. The rate of 
commission varies from around 25% of the cost of a tour or the fare for a journey. In some 
cases, the rate of commission is much higher. For example, at the time of the interview, as 
the Son Ha Tourism Company did not have its own office in Hue, but only shared an office 
with another company, it relied heavily on intermediaries such as hotels, and other tour 
operators in generating business. As a result, these intermediaries were able to exert a lot of 
leverage in obtaining exceedingly high rates of commission. For example, while the ticket 
price on the Son Ha Tourism Company bus from Hue to Hol An was US$3 (VND45,000), 
some intermediaries were able to demand as much as VND25,000 or even VND30,000 of 
this price (K16,3.11.2001). 
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The primacy of economic rather than pre-existing or social ties as the key 
mechanism in the regulation of private tourism business development in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy is further underscored by the following quotes. 
Ties enhance the competitiveness of a business in the tourism market 
as both sides give each other preferential rates on each others 
services. Without ties, a tourism business wouldn 't be competitive in 
the market. This is an extremely important factor in the ever 
increasingly competitive tourism market. Therefore, it can be said 
that ties are essential to the running of a business. Without ties, a 
tourism business wouldn 't be able to guarantee a quality service to 
its customers and wouldn 't be competitive in the market. Thus the 
business would lose customers and ultimately go out of business. 
... 
At the same time, ties reduce the pernicious effects of competition 
between tourism businesses for customers (Hang Bac Tourism Trade 
and Investment Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
Ties help to keep the costs of organising a tour low, enabling the 
business to offer competitive tour prices and to compete effectively 
with other tour companies in the same location (Tu Hai Tourism 
Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private tour operator). 
Ties help in running tours and in being able to offer competitive 
prices to customers in order to compete effectively with other tour 
companies in the same locality in District 1 in Ho Chi Minh City 
(Thai Binh Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private 
tour operator). 
7.3.2.1.2 Vertical Ties Cultivated between Private Tour Operator Owners and 
Officials at State Tour Operators and Institutions 
Findings from interviews with private tour operator owners in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City also revealed a number of ways by which ties between officials at state 
tour operators and institutions and private tour operator owners are also being 
cultivated as a way of generating international tourism business for private tour 
operator owners. However, as with ties created with hotels, in each case, there was 
little or no mention of pre-existing ties having been invoked or of any social content 
inhering in the building of these ties. Instead, relations were solely configured 
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around producing economic benefits for both parties; in the form of fees paid b\ 
private tour operator owners to local state officials enabling the former to carry out 
international tourism business and thus generate additional revenue. 
First, as mentioned in Section 7.3.1, ties are being created with officials at large state 
international tour operators (ITOs) to enable private tour operator owners to carry 
out international tourism business organised from overseas, which, in the case of 
private tour operators without ITOLs, such as the two companies quoted below, they 
are not officially authorised to do. In return for a fee, officials will complete all 
administrative procedures allowing private tour operators to conduct a particular 
programme for a foreign tour group. 
Through ties with officials at Hanoitourist, my business which 
doesn 't have an international tour operator licence, is able to receive 
foreign tourists who have booked a tour from their home countries 
(Tran Xuan Soan Tourism and Trade Company, Hanoi, a private tour 
operator). 
We occasionally co-operate with Ben Thanh Tourist to assist us in 
receiving tour groups our company has arranged from overseas 
(Thai Binh Duong Tourism Company, Ho Chi Minh City, a private 
tour operator). 
Second, as I discussed in Chapter 6, as a result of the regulatory practices of the 
VNAT, a small handful of local state ITOs in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City organise 
and control the bulk of international tourism business in the Vietnamese market 
arranged with tourism actors and institutions overseas. However, according to an 
informant, himself a foreign actor in the Vietnamese tourism industry and, as 
illustrated in the quote below, a number of state ITOs, in reality, advertise and sell 
tour programmes in the international market as their own, but which they themselves 
do not run but instead buy from private tour operators in Vietnam. Consequently, 
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private tour operators have attempted to create ties with those officials at local state 
ITOs responsible for arranging tour programmes for foreign visitors, in order to be 
considered in carrying out this more lucrative business. Once again, there is however 
no evidence suggesting any social content inhering in ties cultivated between 
officials and private tour operator owners with instead relations simply configured 
through fees given to officials by private tour operator owners for allowing them to 
carry out tour programmes for foreign tour groups (K12,30.05.01). 
We have established ties with a number of officials at tour operators, 
including Hanoitourism, aiming to co-operate on tours tit, here these 
companies have licences to conduct overseas tour business. 
Companies such as ours create ties with ITOs in order to get a 
foothold in the more lucrative international market (Nam Sao 
Tourism Company, Hanoi, a private tour operator). 
A third way in many ways similar to the last example by which ties between private 
tour operator owners and officials at state tour operators and institutions are being 
cultivated in response to the regulatory practices of the VNAT is illustrated in the 
following arrangement described to me by an informant in Hanoi. In this case, ties 
with officials at local state tourism businesses and institutions are being cultivated 
by private tour operators as a way of gaining access to information, the preserve of 
particular state tourism institutions, relating to requests from actors and institutions 
overseas to organise tour business in Vietnam for foreign visitors. As such, this 
provides one example illustrating how, with information continuing to be channelled 
and concentrated within the state, the cultivation of ties with state officials can 
facilitate access for non-state actors to information, in the example below as a way 
of enhancing and developing business operations. 
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According to my informant, a standard procedure in foreign tour group business 
relates to how officials, at local state tourism institutions, such as the Hanoi Bureau 
of Tourism, or even at state tour operators, such as Hanoitourism, through which the 
bulk of international tourism business in Hanoi is arranged, deal with requests. 
Officials at these institutions in positions through which they receive and are 
responsible for dealing with requests are able to profit through their privileged 
access to such information by circumventing the official regulatory environment. 
Officials mediate requests away from state tourism businesses and illicitly offer 
private tour operator owners to tender for this tour business. 
In most cases, officials approach and invite private tour operator owners with whom 
ties have already been created in completing such arrangements. However, once 
again, little or no social content inheres in the ties created between officials and 
private tour operator owners. Instead, relations are configured around economic 
benefits produced for both parties with officials receiving a fee from a private tour 
operator owner successfully tendering for the tour business, while private tour 
operator owners are provided with opportunities to generate profit from carrying out 
lucrative international tour business (K13,19.07.01). My informant estimated that 
the approximate financial benefits, accruing to officials and private tour operator 
owners in such arrangements would be as illustrated in the table below. 
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Table 7.5. Revenue accruing to officials and private tour operators owners through 
the mediation of international tourism business 
TOTAL TOUR PRICE: $1000 
Revenue Ex enses Profit 
The State Official: 
offering the tour $100 $0 S100 
business 
The Private Tour 
Operator: $800 $600 $200 
conducting the tour (costs involved in organising 
the tour; accommodation, 
transport etc. ) 
The State ITO: 
completing $100 $0 $100 
administrative 
procedures for the 
private tour operator 
12 
7.3.2.2 Private Hotels 
Similarly, while analysing data obtained from interviews with private hotel owners 
in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City once again illustrates the primacy of horizontal 
ties created with local actors and institutions in developing tourism business, the role 
of pre-existing ties or the cultivation of social ties in this process is largely absent. 
Among all private hotel owners interviewed, in only three interviews: one semi- 
structured interview in Hue and two unstructured interviews in Hoi An did 
respondents mention having invoked pre-existing ties as a way of attracting foreign 
12 After a private tour operator owner has successfully tendered for the international tour business, he 
would then go to an ITO, a tour company with an international tour operator licence, in almost all 
cases a state tour operator, in order to complete all administrative procedures and paperwork involved 
in organising the tour business from overseas. Once again, as illustrated in Table 7.5, a fee would be 
paid to the ITO for doing this. 
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guests. 13 In all three cases, ties had been invoked with fellow private hotel owners: 
in Hue with a private hotel owner in Hoi An and in Hoi An with private hotel 
owners in Hue. Ties in all cases were simply manifested in informal 
recommendations made by hotel owners to guests moving on to Hue or Hol An of 
hotels belonging to friends. In each case, guests were given business cards by private 
hotel owners of their friends' hotels. However, as a way of attracting foreign guests, 
these ties are of negligible effect. When asked to comment on ties with which actors 
and institutions were important in attracting foreign guests, the pre-existing ties 
invoked with private hotel owners did not figure. 
Instead, as the quotes below illustrate, for the majority of private hotel owners, ties 
considered important in attracting foreign guests have been created, firstly as 
discussed in the previous section, with local tour operators and tourism transport 
companies conveying foreign tourists. In addition, ties have also been created with 
taxi, xich 16 and xe öm drivers as well as touts. 14 
My business has formed ties with a number of tourism companies in 
Da Nang, including Da Nang Tourism Company and the Hai Van 
Tourism Company. Ties with these tour operators are responsible for 
bringing around 47% of the total number of guests we serve a year. 
We have also developed ties with a number of xe öm drivers and taxi 
drivers at the airport and the railway station to bring customers to 
our hotel. These are responsible for bringing around 34% of the total 
number of guests we serve a year. 
13 The interview in Hue was conducted with the owner of the Cay Vang Hotel. 
14 A xich lö is a means of transport for conveying passengers similar to a rickshaw, except that the 
vehicle is powered by a bicycle. A xe öm is a form of taxi service using a motorcycle. Om translates 
as holding or embracing to depict the situation where the passenger on a motorcycle holds on to the 
driver for safety. Increases in the number of foreign tourists coming to Vietnam have also spawned 
the emergence of tourist touts. Touts typically wait at airports, train and bus stations or on the street 
and approach foreign tourists, who have just arrived, to recommend hotels. Touts may act on behalf 
of a particular tourism business, a number of tourism businesses with whom the tout has established 
ties or with any tourism business. Touts are integrated into the tourism industry to varying degrees. 
For some touts, this is their main occupation. For others, it constitutes an additional activity to their 
main tourism related occupation, e. g. postcard and souvenir selling. Other touts may simply be 
opportunist members of the general public. 
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Ties have been successful because they guarantee a supply of 
customers for the hotel to be able to develop its business well. Ties 
also help the hotel compete in the hotel market in Hue (Bai Duong 
Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
Our hotel has a reciprocal arrangement with the An Phu Tourist 
Company whereby we sell tickets to our guests for tours and bus trips 
organised by this company and in return the An Phu Tourist 
Company introduces customers travelling to Hue on an An Phu bus 
to our hotel. This provides 18% of total guests to the hotel. 
We have also created an extensive network of local ties with xich lö, 
xe öm and taxi drivers at the bus station and the port, which has 
helped to attract a lot of lone tourists and been responsible for 48% 
of the total guests at the hotel (Tran Xuan Hotel, Hue, a private 
hotel). 
My business only co-operates with a number of tourism companies 
here in Ho Chi Minh City and a number of tourism representative 
offices in the same locality as my business. Ties play an extremely 
important part in the development of the business of the hotel. They 
help to maintain the numbers of customers staying at the hotel and to 
compete effectively with other hotel businesses operating in the local 
area (Lan Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private hotel). 
We have developed ties, in particular, with a number of taxi drivers, 
xe öm drivers and touts as well as a number of other intermediaries 
in district 1, particularly in the local area of Pham Ngü Lao, Büi 
Vien and De Thäm. 15 These ties are very important in providing 
customers. They are responsible for 45% of the total guests we 
receive. 
We have also formed ties with a number of tourism transport 
companies and tour operators with offices in the local area. They 
provide 17% of the total guests we receive. The Saigon Transport 
Tourism Company is also quite important as it is responsible for 15% 
of the total guests we receive (Mai Anh Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a 
private hotel). 
We have formed ties with a number of tour operators and branch 
offices of tour operators in the Pham Ngü Lao area. For example, the 
branch offices of the Da Lat Tourism Company and the Dong Nai 
Tourism Company; the Thanh Nien (Youth) Tourism Company and 
the Saigontourist Transportation and Commercial Company. 
We also co-operate with a number of taxi drivers, working for 
Vietnam Airlines, and a number of motorcycle taxi drivers and xich 
16 drivers generally working in the Pham Ngü Lao area, to introduce 
15 Pham Ngü Lao, Büi Vien and De Thäm are streets in the heart of the backpacker area in Ho Chi 
Minh City. 
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foreign tourists arriving in the area to our hotel. With tour operators, 
we have a reciprocal arrangement that in return for introducing 
guests to our hotel, we introduce guests staving at our hotel to these 
companies to organise tours if any guests have an intention to visit 
other tourism locations in Vietnam 
Ties have been vital for the development of Intiv business. They 
guarantee stability in the numbers of guests staying at m-v hotel. If I 
did not have these ties, I would not be able to receive a stable number 
of guests (Minh Mang Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private hotel). 
However, as the following quotes illustrate, the building of ties between private 
hotel owners and all important intermediaries: local tour operators, tourism transport 
companies, taxi, xich 16 and xe öm drivers and touts is centred on the satisfaction of 
purely economic considerations and agreement between both parties regarding the 
rate of commission paid by a private hotel owner to an intermediary for introducing 
foreign guests to the hotel. 16 By contrast, among private hotel owners interviewed 
there was no mention of any social content in ties created with intermediaries. 
At the beginning of the tourism season, in March or April, we appoint 
a member of staff to go to An Phu Tourism Company and Hai Van 
Tourism Company and negotiate terms, regarding price, settlement 
terms etc. and sign an agreement. We generally reduce room rates by 
between 15 and 17% for these ties. For taxi, xe öm and xich lö 
drivers, we offer commission of between 10 and 15% of the room rate 
the tourist pays (The Gioi Hotel, Hue, a private hotel). 
A member of staff regularly works with local tour operators to 
cultivate relations and co-operation between both sides. For each tie, 
we offer an 18% commission of the room rate (Lan Anh Hotel, Ho 
Chi Minh City, a private hotel). 
7.3.2.2.1 Competition 
Once again, explaining why the invoking of pre-existing ties or the cultivation of 
social ties with intermediaries is playing such a negligible role in the development of 
16 As described in the case study of Son Ha Tourism Company, commission is equivalent to a 
percentage of the total revenue earned by the 
hotel from a guest, introduced by the intermediary. 
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tourism business for a private hotel owner is the fact that as regulatory mechanisms 
they have proved to be of limited utility for private hotel owners. Instead, private 
hotel owners have been forced to consider the building of purely economic ties as a 
way of operating in local tourism markets which, as with private tour operators 
discussed in the previous section, are primarily regulated according to market 
imperatives and increasingly pernicious competitive impulses. As a result, private 
hotel owners are being forced to engage and compete in the creation of ties with a 
range of local actors: local tour operators, tourism transport companies, taxi, xich 16 
and xe öm drivers and touts, with whom no shared affiliation exists, with ties 
cultivated around the satisfaction for both parties of purely economic considerations. 
As the following quotes illustrate, these are nevertheless proving much more 
expedient for private hotel owners in their attempts to compete with other hotels to 
attract foreign guests and generate tourism business in the intensely competitive 
local tourism markets in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City. 
We give greater priority to the network of local taxi, xich lö and xe 
öm drivers here in Hue that we have created ties with, who bring 
guests from the airport, the railway station and the bus station to our 
hotel. 
... 
The biggest constraint faced by our business in attempting to form 
ties with other tourism institutions is the current intense competition 
for guests between hotels in Hue which revolves around the rate of 
commission paid to intermediaries (Cay Vang Hotel, Hue, a private 
hotel). 
Ties with in particular, cyclo, xe öm and taxi drivers contribute a 
major part in the development of the hotel and are necessary to 
maintain the businesses operations of the hotel. As competition in the 
hotel market in Hue is intense, our business has to make every effort 
to form ties and consolidate existing ties in order to compete 
effectively and so as not to be affected by the intense competition 
between hotels in Hue. However, due to the intense competition, it is 
difficult to form new ties as other hotel businesses are also trying to 
maintain, consolidate and expand their ties (Tran Xuan Hotel, Hue, a 
private hotel). 
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The biggest difficulty currently in creating and maintaining ties is in 
looking for ways in which both sides can benefit financially from tie's 
as competition is so intense between hotels. 
... Ties are extremely important and impact directly on the 
performance of the business. The effectiveness of our business 
largely depends on the success of these ties in providing the majority 
of the guests we receive at the hotel (Cuc Mai Hotel, Hue, a private 
hotel). 
At present, there is fierce competition in the locality for foreign 
customers, in terms of prices and the commission paid to third parties 
introducing guests to hotels. In this, private hotels pay a higher rate 
of commission to intermediaries in order to gain more guests and 
they reduce the prices of rooms to very low levels (Lac Viet Hotel, 
Hue, a state hotel). 
In recent years, a lot of hotels and guesthouses have entered the 
tourism sector in the locality leading to intense competition. 
Competition from other hotel businesses for guests has centred 
around offering ever higher rates of commission to intermediaries. 
This has restricted our hotel in attempting to create ties with other 
tourism institutions. As a result, the network of ties created by our 
hotel in the locality is not very extensive (Lan Anh Hotel, Ho Chi 
Minh City, a private hotel). 
The main difficulty faced in creating new and good ties is the current 
intensely competitive tourism market. Nevertheless, if we don 't 
strengthen ties, then the ties will be less effective, we could lose these 
ties and our hotel will be affected by the competition in the tourism 
market and be unable to compete effectively with other hotels. 
... 
Ties have been vital for the development of my business. The 
tourism sector in Ho Chi Minh City is intensely competitive with a lot 
of businesses in the sector. As a result, the competitive impulses are 
extremely strong. If a business wants to survive it has to form ties 
(Minh Mang Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, a private hotel). 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
By carrying out an investigation into the establishment and running of private 
tourism businesses in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, in this chapter I have, 
firstly, aimed to provide a detailed analysis of how the local scale constitutes a key 
site in the regulation of nascent processes of capitalist accumulation in the 
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transitional Vietnamese economy. In addition, I have sought to demonstrate how the 
local state constitutes a key institution in mediating global and national regulatory 
processes of capitalist accumulation in local space. These are themes I identified in 
Chapter 2 as being well-conceptualised but inadequately explored and under- 
researched within the regulation theory research project. One of the conclusions 
reached in this chapter is that while the central state has achieved some degree of 
success in creating a formal framework of rules and laws to regulate private 
economic activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy, local state officials retain 
significant control in implementing and mediating these rules and laws. 
I have, secondly, sought to find answers to the question concerning whether the 
notion of social capital is a useful tool with which to analyse regulatory processes in 
local spaces. This was by way of examining the extent to which, for private tourism 
business owners, the cultivation of social ties has constituted an important 
institutional mechanism regulating private tourism activity in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy. The conclusion reached here is that the notion of social 
capital does provide us with a valid construct with which to analyse the regulation of 
private economic activity. For private tourism business owners, the cultivation of 
ties was playing an important role in the establishment and running of their 
businesses. However, while the function and mechanics of the ties cultivated by 
private tourism business owners did in most cases closely mirror those portrayed in 
the discussion on social capital in chapters 2 and 3, the extent to which ties were 
created out of pre-existing ties, as depicted in the notion of social capital, or were 
indeed genuinely `social' displayed significant variation at different stages of the 
business process. 
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In establishing a private tourism business, possessing pre-existing ties with 
officials working in those local state institutions involved in the approval and 
establishment of private businesses has constituted an important prerequisite in a 
private tourism business owner's decision to establish a business. Through their 
control over administrative procedures, local state officials retain considerable 
arbitrary and discretionary power to facilitate or hinder any stage of the 
establishment process for private tourism business owners. As a result, cultivating 
pre-existing ties with local state officials has provided private tourism business 
owners with a greater degree of certainty and reliability that all procedures required 
in the setting up of their businesses can be completed smoothly. 
In running a private tourism business, social ties are being created by private 
tourism business owners with local state officials rather than cultivated out of pre- 
existing ties. Social ties are, firstly, being created with those officials, assigned to 
individual tourism businesses to carry out administrative procedures, who retain 
significant capacity to facilitate or hinder the completion of these procedures. The 
social investment strategies employed by private tourism business owners in 
creating social ties with local state officials share many of the characteristics 
identified within the literature on social capital and guanxi. Social ties are being 
cultivated through regular social interaction and a regular investment of time and 
money which is helping to produce and secure a regular stream of benefits for both 
parties - for officials: meals, entertainment and financial gifts, and for private 
tourism business owners, ensuring that all administrative procedures are completed 
smoothly. 
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Ties are also being created by private tourism business owners with local state 
officials in order to circumvent central state regulations. While there is little 
suggestion of any `social' content, ties are nevertheless being constituted through 
regular interaction between private tourism business owners and local state officials 
which is helping to regularise the behaviour and expectations of both parties and to 
secure a regular stream of primarily financial benefits for both parties, 
characteristics identified within the literature on social capital and guanxi. 
Similarly, in ties created by private tourism business owners with, for example, local 
immigration officials, again there is little suggestion of a `social' content. Ties are 
nevertheless being cultivated to produce lasting, useful relationships that can be 
invoked in the short and long term to secure a regular stream of material benefits for 
both parties and with regular interaction helping to regularise the behaviour and 
expectations of each party, characteristics again identified within the literature on 
social capital and guanxi. 
As a way of developing tourism business however, for private tourism business 
owners, the invoking of pre-existing ties or the creation and cultivation of social 
ties with state and non-state actors at the local scale have played a negligible role. 
Such ties have proved to be of limited utility for private tourism business owners in 
operating in local tourism markets, which since the mid-1990s have become 
increasingly regulated according to market imperatives and competitive impulses. In 
response, private tourism business owners have instead been required to primarily 
focus on creating purely economic rather than social ties with a range of local 
actors. This has represented the best way by which private tourism business owners 
can develop their business operations and compete with other tourism businesses. 
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The findings presented above were equally in evidence in Hanoi, Hue and Ho Chi 
Minh City. As a consequence, I found that there was a significant degree of 
commonality in the practices of state and non-state actors in these locations in 
regulating private tourism activity and little evidence to suggest that distinct local 
processes of regulation are evolving as postulated in regulation theory. 
Regarding the extent to which socio-cultural ties with the international scale have 
facilitated the development of private tourism businesses in Ho Chi Minh City, my 
findings illustrate that ties with blood relatives overseas have played a significant 
role for private tourism business owners in obtaining capital enabling them to 
establish tourism businesses. However, in utilising these ties to develop international 
tourism business, private tourism business owners have faced considerable obstacles 
in negotiating both the unofficial and the official regulatory environments. Contrary 
to the assertion of Jessop (1999), outlined in Section 2.3.3.2 in Chapter 2, in 
attempting to carry out international tourism business organised out of ties with 
family and friends in "western" markets, private tourism business owners in Ho Chi 
Minh City have found that the VNAT and its officials maintain a significant degree 
of regulatory control over the building of economic ties between Vietnamese actors 
and actors in major "western" capitalist nations. As a result, this has limited the 
extent to which private tourism business owners have been able to capitalise on 
socio-cultural ties with family and friends in "western" markets and consequently 
limited the importance of these ties in developing tourism business. 
The conclusions drawn from this and earlier chapters are now explored in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis has examined the extent to which regulation theory can provide a 
strong theoretical basis for understanding and analysing the development of 
capitalist economic relations and activities in transitional economies. In this 
chapter, in light of the findings from the research, I first re-evaluate the initial 
research ideas, questions and objectives presented in Chapter 1 before moving on to 
discuss how the broader findings from the research have contributed to current 
debates within regulation theory and in the literature on transitional economies. In 
the final part of this chapter, drawing on the main findings from this research, I 
develop an analytical framework to utilise in examining how regulatory processes 
and relations are evolving in regulating capitalist economic activity in transitional 
economies. 
8.1 PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
In Chapter 2, in addressing the first of my research questions, namely: to what extent 
does regulation theory provide a useful conceptual framework with which to 
examine how nascent capitalist economic processes are being regulated in 
transitional economies? I examined the key analytical tools contained within the 
framework of regulation theory. I found that they could serve as a useful foundation 
in building an analytical framework for my research investigation. 
I found how regulation theory builds on the recognition that the national and local 
scales remain key sites in responding to as well as regulating global economic 
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processes, such as tourism, and that the central state and the local state remain key 
conduits for mediating and negotiating these processes. In addition, I identified how 
one important notion in regulation theory is how regulatory processes and socio- 
economic and political relations through which these processes are reworked, are 
shaped and evolve in a path dependent manner out of the residues and legacies of 
former modes of regulation. 
Nevertheless, I also identified a number of gaps in the framework of the regulation 
theory approach. First, there has been inadequate analysis and discussion of the local 
scale as a key site and the role of the local state in the regulation of capitalist 
economic processes. Second, there has been inadequate consideration of the extent 
to which regulatory processes evolve out of political imperatives as well as 
economic priorities and exigencies. Third, within the conceptual framework of 
regulation theory, while there is an implicit consideration of the social struggles, 
contestation and processes of negotiation taking place among social, economic and 
political actors and institutions in defining regulatory practices, regulation theory 
does not provide a conceptual tool with which to allow us to analyse the actual 
processes through which regulatory practices evolve. As a result, I introduced the 
concept of social capital into the theoretical discussion as a potentially useful tool to 
incorporate into the conceptual framework of the regulation theory approach. This 
would allow me to analyse the extent to which social capital between both state and 
non-state actors, at local, national and international scales constitutes an important 
institutional mechanism in regulating economic activity, both historically and 
currently in the transitional Vietnamese economy. 
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In Chapter 3, as a way of addressing the second research question: what evidence is 
there from other transitional economies to support the utilisation of the key 
analytical concepts identified in regulation theory to examine how nascent capitalist 
economic processes are being regulated in transitional economies? I undertook a 
comprehensive review of the literature on transitional economies. I found that there 
was a substantial body of evidence which supported the utilisation of the key 
analytical concepts and tools identified in Chapter 2. 
As in regulation theory, authors writing about transitional economies also recognise 
the role of path dependency in the reconfiguration of relations among socio- 
economic and political actors involved in regulating nascent capitalist economic 
processes in these economies. Authors writing on transitional economies do however 
ascribe an even greater role to the local scale in regulating capitalist economic 
processes than is acknowledged in regulation theory. They claim, firstly, that the 
local scale has emerged as the key scale, secondly, that distinct local regulatory 
processes are evolving, and thirdly that the local state constitutes the key regulatory 
institution, and that local state institutions and officials are pivotal actors in 
regulating nascent capitalist economic processes in these economies. However, in 
discussing how the regulatory control of the central vis-ä-vis the local state over 
nascent capitalist economic activities has evolved in the transitional economy, 
among authors writing on transitional economies, there has still been inadequate 
consideration of the extent to which regulatory control is being negotiated over 
rather than simply ceded by the central state to the local state with regulatory 
processes evolving out of political as well as economic imperatives. 
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Reviewing the literature on transitional economies also provided substantial support 
for utilising the concept of social capital. In particular, analysing the important role 
being played by guanxi in the regulation of private economic activity in the 
transitional Chinese economy with the cultivation of vertical and horizontal ties 
between social, economic and political actors provided a number of useful themes. 
These were incorporated into the analytical framework utilised in carrying out my 
research investigation. 
Chapter 5 initiated analysis, in the context of Vietnam, of the key analytical tools 
identified within regulation theory and discussed in Chapter 2 and informed in the 
context of transitional economies in Chapter 3, in the process addressing the third 
research question: to what extent does the local scale constitute the kelp site at which 
nascent capitalist economic activities are being regulated in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy? The findings presented in this chapter provided strong 
support for the notion of path dependency, with regulatory processes and relations 
between social, economic and political actors having evolved in a path dependent 
manner throughout Vietnamese history as the Vietnamese politico-economy has 
shifted from feudalism to colonialism, socialism and in the current transition to a 
capitalist-oriented economic system. 
The findings also substantiated the discourse on transitional economies with the 
acknowledgement that in the transitional Vietnamese economy, as in other 
transitional economies, the ceding of regulatory control by the central state over 
economic space down to the local state has allowed the local state to emerge as the 
key actor and regulator of nascent capitalist economic activities and the local scale, 
the key site at which such activities are being regulated. 
281 
However, the findings presented in Chapter 5 challenge conventional neo-liberal 
discourse and discourse on transitional economies. I argue, firstly, that the central 
state in Vietnam has historically ceded a significant degree of regulatory control 
over local economic space to the local state. Consequently, processes occurring in 
the transitional economy simply constitute a continuation of traditional regulatory 
processes rather than a reaction to contemporary economic changes in the global 
economy or the process of transition. Secondly, in ceding regulatory control, this has 
once again only to a small extent resulted from prevailing global economic realities, 
but rather reflects the political imperative of the central state to maintain the 
hegemony of the state throughout national space. 
One important manifestation of the path dependent nature of regulatory processes 
and relations identified in Chapter 5 was the key role that has historically been 
played by local state officials in the regulation of economic activity in local spaces. 
As a result, it was found that, as a way of negotiating the local regulatory 
environment, the cultivation of vertical ties with local state officials has traditionally 
constituted an important mechanism regulating economic activity in local spaces 
with ties constituted not only through invoking pre-existing ties based on shared 
affiliation, but in addition through creating ties where no shared affiliation exists. 
One additional finding presented in Chapter 5 was how the significance of the local 
scale as a regulatory site was being heightened in the transitional economy as 
distinct local regulatory processes were evolving in the regulation of internationally- 
oriented capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, in local spaces such as Ho 
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Chi Minh City and Hanoi out of the particular social, cultural and historical legacies 
inhering within these local spaces. 
Chapter 6 analysed the regulatory role of the VNAT - the central state tourism 
institution in the regulation of tourism activity in the transitional Vietnamese 
economy - as a way of addressing the fourth research question: to it'hat extent does 
the central state remain a key institution through which global economic processes 
are being mediated in regulating nascent capitalist economic activities in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy? It was found that the VNAT has ceded a 
significant degree of regulatory control over tourism activity in local spaces to the 
local state. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is being done primarily as a way of 
achieving political imperatives and the maintenance of the state as the leading 
institution in the Vietnamese socio-economy. 
The findings presented in Chapter 6 did however illustrate how with regard to the 
regulation of international tourism activity, the VNAT has retained considerable 
regulatory power and control, acting as the key conduit regulating access for 
Vietnamese tourism businesses to the international tourism market and for foreign 
tourism businesses to the Vietnamese tourism market. As such, these findings 
support the role afforded the central state in regulation theory as a key conduit 
through which global economic processes are being mediated and negotiated in 
regulating capitalist economic activities across national spaces. At the same time, 
they ascribe a much more important regulatory role for the central state in the 
regulation of nascent capitalist economic activities than identified by authors writing 
about other transitional economies. 
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However, the findings presented in Chapter 6 illustrate how only a small degree of 
the regulatory control of the central state over global economic processes is derived 
from its capacity to enact a formal regulatory framework to guide such processes 
throughout national space, as postulated in regulation theory. Instead, the findings 
point to the much greater significance of the informal regulatory practices and 
discretionary power and control exercised by the VNAT and its officials in 
regulating international tourism activity through their capacity to mediate access for 
Vietnamese tourism businesses to the international tourism market and for foreign 
tourism businesses to the Vietnamese tourism market. 
Once again, the regulatory practices of the VNAT have reflected its overriding 
priority of achieving political imperatives. In affording privileged access to 
international tourism markets for a handful of local state tour operators primarily 
under the control of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's 
Committees, the VNAT has aimed to facilitate the development of these businesses 
into dominant actors in the international tourism industry. This has ultimately served 
as a way of preserving the role of the state as the leading institution in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy 
In Chapter 7,1 addressed my final research question: to what extent does the notion 
of social capital constitute an important institutional mechanism regulating private 
capitalist economic activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy? I found that 
for 
private tourism business owners, the cultivation of ties was playing an 
important 
role in the establishment and running of their businesses. 
However, the extent to 
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which ties conformed to the `ideal type' depicted in the notion of social capital, or 
were indeed genuinely `social' varied at different stages of the business process. 
Such regulatory practices were found to be operating in a broadly similar manner in 
each of the three locations at which research was carried out. Consequently, my 
findings served to challenge the notion that in the regulation of private economic 
activity in the transitional Vietnamese economy, distinct local regulatory processes 
are emerging out of the particular social, cultural and historical legacies inhering 
within local spaces. 
Therefore, in response to the principal research aim of this thesis, the findings 
support the notion that, through its recognition of the importance of. firstly, the path 
dependent nature of regulatory processes and, secondly, national and local scales as 
key sites in the regulation of global economic processes, regulation theory can 
provide a strong theoretical basis for understanding and analysing the 
development of capitalist economic relations and activities in transitional 
economies. 
Nevertheless, the findings in this thesis have revealed a number of gaps and 
weaknesses in the regulation theory approach. By addressing such weaknesses, we 
can contribute to debates within the regulation theory research project by offering 
new perspectives on a number of the key concepts contained within regulation 
theory. This will be useful in informing our understanding of how regulatory 
processes are evolving in transitional economies. It can also assist us in moving 
forward debates within regulation theory and in building a more appropriate 
framework for analysing regulatory processes in transitional economies. The 
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weaknesses of the regulation theory approach and the new perspectives that have 
been drawn from the findings of this thesis are discussed in the following section. 
8.2 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
8.2.1 The Central State 
In regulation theory, the regulatory powers of the central state over global economic 
processes are chiefly derived from its capacity to enact a formal framework of 
regulatory forms - laws, policies and directives - to guide such processes throughout 
national space. However, during the analysis in Chapter 6, it became apparent that 
the unofficial practices of the central state were of much greater significance in the 
regulation of international tourism in Vietnam. These were evidenced through the 
way in which the VNAT is regulating access for Vietnamese tourism businesses to 
the international tourism market and for foreign tourism businesses to the 
Vietnamese tourism market. However, consideration of such unofficial practices has 
been overlooked in regulation theory. 
8.2.1.1 The Political Imperatives of the Central State 
As I discussed throughout Chapter 6, the chief explanation for the unofficial 
regulatory practices of the VNAT lay in its objective to achieve political and 
ideological imperatives. By facilitating access to the international tourism market 
for a handful of local state tour operators, by selecting only state tour operators in 
joint-venture partnerships with foreign tour operators and by restricting access to the 
international tourism market for private tourism businesses, the VNAT's primarily 
objective was to maintain the role of the state as the leading 
institution in the 
Vietnamese tourism industry. 
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However, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, regulation theory has up to now been of 
limited utility in considering the role of political and ideological imperatives on 
regulatory processes. This, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, is a serious 
omission. In Vietnam, the political objectives of the state have been an important 
factor determining, firstly, the way in which international tourism has developed in 
the transitional economy and, secondly, the role played by different economic 
actors. Future research invoking regulation theory needs to take much greater 
account of the political objectives of the central state. It needs to address questions 
such as: what are the political objectives of the central state? How do they affect 
different types of actors - state, private, foreign etc.? In what ways and to what 
extent do they impact on the regulation of capitalist economic activity? 
8.2.1.2 Relations between the Central and Local States: The Mode of Societalisation 
By incorporating the political imperatives of the central state into the regulation 
theory framework, I have also in this thesis been able to provide a much more robust 
account of the regulatory capacities of the central state vis-ä-vis the local state. 
Underpinning such regulatory capacities, both historically and in the transitional 
Vietnamese economy, has been the role of the mode of societalisation. 
As I discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the mode of societalisation has remained under- 
utilised within regulation theory and overlooked in the analytical framework of 
authors writing about transitional economies. I would strongly suggest that an 
analysis of regulatory processes in transitional economies is incomplete without 
consideration of the important role played by the mode of societalisation. 
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Throughout the thesis I have provided evidence demonstrating how the regulatory 
capacities of the central state vis-ä-vis the local state have been underpinned by the 
societalisation of central state regulatory practices. As a way of achieving broad 
acceptance throughout national space for its regulatory practices, the central state 
has compromised and ceded a significant degree of regulatory control over 
economic space down to its agent in local space, the local state. Through this, the 
central state has achieved its aim of maintaining the role of the state as the leading 
institution throughout the Vietnamese socio-economy by allowing the local state to 
emerge as the key actor and regulator in local economic space. 
By utilising the mode of societalisation in my analysis, I have also been able to show 
how the ceding of regulatory control over local economic space by the VNAT to the 
local state in the transitional Vietnamese economy has been less due to the demands 
of operating in the international capitalist economy and more a response to a 
national agenda and the political imperatives of the central state. This provides an 
alternative interpretation to that put forward in conventional neo-liberal discourse 
and discourse on transitional economies, which I outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
Utilising the mode of societalisation also helps to explain why contrary to the claims 
of many authors writing on transitional economies, my findings illustrate how in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy, the national scale remains a key site in the 
regulation of global economic processes with the central state continuing to act as a 
key conduit through which global economic processes are being mediated and 
negotiated in national space. As I illustrated in Chapter 6, the central state continues 
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to act as a key regulatory institution through its capacity to mediate capitalist 
economic relations between supra and sub-national actors and institutions. 
8.2.2 The Local Scale - the Local State 
One of the biggest gaps in the regulation theory research project is its lack of 
consideration of the local scale as a site in the regulation of economic activity. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, research invoking regulation theory has largely assumed 
that regulatory processes are formed at the national scale and adopted in local spaces 
in an unproblematic way. However, I have demonstrated throughout this thesis that 
this ignores the considerable capacity of actors and institutions in local spaces to 
mediate national regulatory processes in regulating economic activity. 
In particular, again, while conceptualised within regulation theory, this thesis has 
provided a much more comprehensive account of the role of the local state in 
regulating processes of capitalist accumulation in local space than hitherto discussed 
within much of the regulation theory research project. I have shown how the central 
state in Vietnam has historically afforded the local state considerable capacity to 
mediate national regulatory processes in regulating economic activity in local spaces 
as it has sought to maintain the hegemony of the state throughout the Vietnamese 
socio-economy. For the same reason, as I discussed in Chapter 6, in the transitional 
economy the central state has been providing support for local state tourism 
businesses to enable them to become important actors in the international tourism 
industry. 
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In addition, local state institutions and officials have maintained their traditional role 
as key regulators of local economic activity through their control over bureaucratic 
levers and through their capacity to interpret and implement central state directives. 
As a result, they constitute key actors in the regulation of nascent capitalist 
economic activities in local spaces, in particular, by acting as conduits private 
economic actors must go through in order to participate in nascent capitalist 
economic activities. 
All these points have largely been overlooked in regulation theory research. 
However, the position taken in this thesis is that the role of the local state is pivotal 
and must be taken into account in an investigation into the regulation of capitalist 
economic relations and activities in transitional economies. 
8.2.2.1 Analysing Local Regulatory Processes: the Role of Social Capital 
In Chapter 2,1 discussed how within the conceptual framework of regulation theory 
there is no tool which allows us to analyse regulatory processes in local economic 
spaces. I therefore introduced the notion of social capital as a possible way out of the 
impasse. 
The findings in this thesis and particularly the analysis in Chapter 7 point to the fact 
that the notion of social capital does provide us with a useful tool with which to 
analyse regulatory processes in local spaces. For private tourism business owners in 
Vietnam, the cultivation of ties was playing an important role in the establishment 
and running of their businesses, in particular, ties cultivated with local state officials. 
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Evidence in this thesis therefore provides support for the incorporation of the notion 
of social capital into the conceptual framework of regulation theory. 
However, the analysis, particularly in Chapter 7, demonstrated that the extent to 
which the horizontal and vertical ties cultivated by private tourism business owners 
conformed to the `ideal type' depicted in the social capital literature exhibited 
significant variation at different stages of the business process. As a result, while 
utilising the notion of social capital, we must look beyond this `ideal type' and in 
future research investigate the whole range of ties cultivated by private economic 
actors. These should include vertical ties within local spaces as well as horizontal 
ties in local and extra-local spaces. We also need to examine the function and 
mechanics of these ties in order to ascertain the degree to which they are indeed 
genuinely `social'. 
8.3 CREATING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE 
REGULATION OF CAPITALIST ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 
By their very nature, transitional economies constitute exciting and dynamic objects 
for further study. Following on from the preceding discussion and incorporating the 
key findings from my research, in the final section in this chapter, I would like to put 
forward an analytical framework adapted from the one developed at the end of 
Chapter 3 and employed throughout my analysis of the regulation of tourism in the 
transitional Vietnamese economy. 
As has been identified in this thesis, Figure 8.1 illustrates how global regulatory 
processes are mediated and negotiated and the activities of supra-national economic 
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Figure 8.1. An analytical framework informed by the findings from this thesis to 
examine the regulation of capitalist economic activity in transitional economies 
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actors are regulated in national space by the central state. As is shown in Figure 8.1, 
the ensuing national regulatory processes together with all other regulatory 
processes and relations occurring within national space between social, economic 
and political actors evolve in a path dependent manner out of historical, social, 
cultural, political and economic practices. As is illustrated by the arrows pointing 
out from as well as within national space, path dependency not only influences 
regulatory processes and relations within national space but also between national 
and international spaces. 
Within national space, one of the key regulatory processes identified in this thesis 
has been the societalisation of central state regulatory practices. The importance of 
the mode of societalisation as a conceptual tool in analysing regulatory processes in 
transitional economies is illustrated in Figure 8.1 by its position at the centre of 
`National Space'. In future research on transitional economies, much greater 
attention needs to be directed to how the attainment of political imperatives 
constitutes an important factor impacting on the reconfiguration of regulatory 
processes and relations in regulating capitalist economic activity in transitional 
economies. 
Local spaces of regulation are depicted in Figure 8.1 with the key role afforded the 
local state in mediating national regulatory processes. Within the local state, local 
state institutions are afforded pivotal roles through their position as important actors 
in and regulators of local economic activity. Local state officials are similarly 
afforded key roles in the framework through their capacity to 
interpret and 
implement central state directives in regulating economic activity in local spaces. 
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Figure 8.1 depicts how the local regulatory processes of local state institutions and 
officials influence the business operations of private economic actors. Also shown, 
are the ties cultivated by private economic actors in establishing and running their 
businesses: vertical ties with local state officials as well as horizontal ties in local 
and extra-local spaces. 
I believe that this analytical framework, developed throughout the theoretical and 
analytical journey I have undertaken, is robust enough to be utilised as a basis in 
future research for examining the regulation of capitalist economic activity in 
transitional economies. 
8.3.1 Implications of the Research for the Future Development of Economic 
Activity in Vietnam 
As revealed in this thesis, the political imperatives of the central state lie at the heart 
to understanding how regulatory processes have evolved in the Vietnamese 
economy. The `transformation' and restructuring of economic relations which 
occurred in the mid-1980s came out of an economic crisis, which threatened to 
undermine the legitimacy of the central state. The radical reform measures 
subsequently adopted, including the sanctioning of private economic activity, 
primarily aimed to stem this loss of legitimacy through improving the economic 
situation. 
Since then capitalist economic activities, such as tourism, have developed in the 
context where three key institutional practices, which have traditionally regulated 
economic activity in Vietnam remain. First, the central state is the primary 
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institution responsible for creating a formal framework of laws, policies and 
directives for regulating capitalist economic activity in national space. Second, the 
central state however continues to afford local state institutions and officials 
significant capacity to mediate, interpret and implement its rules and directives in 
regulating local economic space. Third, as a result, economic actors such as private 
tourism business owners are reliant on the `support' of local state officials in order 
to negotiate local regulatory processes in carrying out economic activity. In 
attempting to gain this support, economic actors are cultivating `social' ties with 
local state officials. 
I firmly believe that these three institutional practices will continue to define 
regulatory processes in Vietnam in the foreseeable future. As a result, future 
research must consider these three institutional practices as a starting point in any 
investigation into the development of capitalist economic relations and activities in 
the Vietnamese economy. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE INTER VIEW SCHED ULE (WITH A TRANSLA TION IN ENGLISH) 
297 
TU ' NFIAN 
BAN CAU HÖI PHU 
298 
PRIVATE BUSINESSES 
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
299 
1) TEN CÜA DOANH NGHIEP: 
2) HOAT DO NG TO Thüng Nam 
3) HINH THÜC S6 HÜU: 
Chi dänh däu väo 10: 
Doanh nghiep nhä nuö'c 
Doanh nghiep tu nhän do nguöi Viet Nam quän 1y 100% 
Cling ty c6 phan 
Lien doanh 
100% v6n nuörc ngoäi 
Cäc hinh thüc khäc: De nghi n6i rö 
l) CHÜ SO 111W DOANH NGHIEP 
TT Ho vä ten Tu6i Chüc vu trong % c6 phän Que quän Hien Co cu TM Then 
doanh nghiep trong trü tai day gian sinh gian 
doanh khöng song tai tham 
nghiep (Cö/Khöng) noo cu gia 
trü hien kinh 
nay duoc doan 
bao lau h du 
(näm) Lich 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 
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1) NAME OF BUSINESS: 
2) OPERATING FROM: mm yr 
3) OWNERSHIP 
Please tick one only 
100% state owned 
100% privately owned by Vietnamese nationals 
Equitised company 
Joint-venture 
100% foreign owned 
Other: please specify; 
4) OWNERS 
Full Age Function in Equity Place of Currently Years Years 
name of business share in the origin residing in the living in involved in 
owners business same location current this tourism 
as the business location business 
(Y/N) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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5) VON 
a) Von cüa doanh nghiep Dvt: tiieu döng hoäc (USD) 
Nam däu tien hoäc 1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
6) HOAT DO NG CÜA DOANH NGHIEP 
A) HOAT DO NG CHINH: 
Chi dänh däu väo 16 thich hop: 
1. Ch6 i cho du khäch nOi dia 
2. Ch6 6 cho du khäch nuö'c ngoäi 
3. Dieu hänh du khäch nöi dia i Viet Nam 
4. Dieu hänh du khäch nubc ngoäi ä Viet Nam (d6i v6i cäc tour väo Viet Nam) 
5. Dieu hänh khäch du lich Viet Nam ra nuäc ngoäi (d6i v6ri cäc tour ra nuärc ngoäi) 
6. V4n chuyen du khäch nOi dia trong dia phän Viet Nam 
7. Van chuyen du khäch nuäc ngoäi trong dia phän Viet Nam 
8. Cäc dich vu khäc: De nghi nöi r6 
B) TAT CA CAC HOAT DO NG KHAC CO THAM GIA: 
Dänh däu väo ö phü hop 
1. Ch6 & cho du khäch ndi dia 
2. Ch6 6 cho du khäch nuärc ngoäi 
3. Dieu hänh du khäch ndi dia & Viet Nam 
4. Di6u hänh du khäch nu6c ngoäi d Vitt Nam (döi vöi cäc tour väo Viet Nam) 
5. Di6u hänh khäch du lich Viet Nam ra mr6c ngoäi (d6i vöi cäc tour ra nüäoc ngoäi) 
6. Vän chuyen du khäch nOi dia trong dia phan Viet Nam 
7. Van chuy6n du khäch my 6c ngoäi trong dia phän Viet Nam 
8. Cic dich vu khäc: De nghi nöi r6 
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5) FINANCING 
a) Capital in the business VND million or USD 
Year I or 1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 - --- -- 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
6) ACTIVITIES OF THE BUSINESS 
A) MAIN ACTIVITY: 
Please tick one only 
1. Accommodation for domestic tourists 
2. Accommodation for foreign tourists 
3. Tour operator for Vietnamese tourists in Viet Nam 
4. Tour operator for foreign tourists in Viet Nam (inbound tours) 
5. Tour operator for Vietnamese tourists travelling overseas (outbound tours) 
6. Tourism transportation for Vietnamese tourists in Viet Nam 
7. Tourism transportation for foreign tourists in Viet Nam 
8. Other tourism services: please specify 
B) ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN: 
Tick any which apply 
1. Accommodation for domestic tourists 
2. Accommodation for foreign tourists 
3. Tour operator for Vietnamese tourists in Viet Nam 
4. Tour operator for foreign tourists in Viet Nam ( inbound tours) 
5. Tour operator for Vietnamese tourists travelling overseas (outbound) 
6. Tourism transportation for Vietnamese tourists in Viet Nam 
7. Tourism transportation for foreign tourists in Viet Nam 
8. Other tourism services: please specify 
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7) KET QUA HOAT DÖNG KINH DOANH 
Xin hay dien day dü mau bieu duhi day: 
Bvt: trieu d6ng (LSD) 
NAM Nam dau 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
HOAT DONG tien hoäc 
1992 
TONG THU NHÄP 
TONG LQl NHUÄN 
TONG THU NHAP TÜ 
KINH DOANH PHONG 
Khäch trong nubc 
Khäch nuhc ngoäi: 
Trong dö 
Tour tron göi 
Khäch du lich 
väng lai (le) 
1_ 
_1 
DIEU HANH DU LICH 
Khäch du lich nOi dia 
a) & Vi@t Nam 
b) ra nuOOc ngoäi 
(cäc tour ra nu Oc ngoäi) 
Khäch du lich nu6c 
ngoäi 
6 Viet Nam 
(cäc tour trong nuärc) 
Trong dö; 
Tour tron göi 
Khäch du lich F 
väng lai(16) 
L 
VÄN CHUYEN KHACH DU LICH 
Khäch du lieh trong 
mr6c 
Khäch du lieh ntr6c 
ngoäi 
Trong dö; 
Tour tron göi 
Khäch du lieh 
v5ng lai (1e) 
Cac dich vu du lieh 
khac: Xin nöi rö 
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7) BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 
Please complete the following table: 
GROSS REVENUE VND MILLION or USD 
Year 1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
or 1992 
GROSS REVENUE 
GROSS PROFIT 
GROSS REVENUE FROM: 
ACCOMMODATION 
Domestic tourists 
Foreign tourists: 
Of which 
Package tour 
Independent traveller 
TOUR OPERATOR 
Domestic tourists 
a)in Viet Nam 
b)travelling overseas 
outbound tours) 
Foreign tourists 
In Viet Nam 
(inbound tours) 
Of which; 
Package tour 
Independent traveller 
TOURISM TRANSPORTATION 
Domestic tourists 
Foreign tourists 
Of which; 
Package tour 
Independent traveler 
OTHER TOURISM 
SERVICES: 
please specify 
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8) DU KHÄCH 
Xin vui long dien bang duÖi day 
NAM 
HOAT DÖNG 
Tong s6 lugng 
khäch nugc ngoäi 
Nhimg quöc tich 
chinh cüa khäch 
Töng s6 Iugng cua 
nhüng quoc tich näy 
Näm däu tien 
hoäc nam 1992 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 - 
1999 
2000 
9) GIAY PHEP LIU HÄNH QUÖC TE 
Doanh nghiep cüa qui vi co giäy phep 1 hänh qu6c to khöng. 
Co 
Kheng 
Tai sao c6 tai sao kh6ng? 
10) LIEN KET VA MANG LUOI KINH DOANH 
Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä cö gäng thü vä/ hoäc thänh 14 möi lien ket väi bgt cü t6 chiic du lich khäc nhäm phät trien viec kinh 
doanh du lich cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
Chi dänh däu väo 1 ö: 
C6 
Kh6ng 
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8) VISITORS 
Please complete the following table 
YEAR Total number of foreign 
customers 
Main nationalities of foreign 
customers 
Total number of 
customers of each 
nationality 
Year 1 or 1992 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
9) INTERNATIONAL TOUR OPERATOR LICENCE 
Does your business have an international tour operator licence? 
Yes 
No 
Why/Why not? 
10) BUSINESS ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS 
Has your business attempted to and/or formed alliances with any other tourism organisations in order to develop your 
international tourism business? Please tick one. 
Yes 
No 
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Ti1NHÄN 
BAN CÄU HÖI CHINH 
308 
PRIVATE 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
309 
THÄNH LAP DOANH NGHIEP DU LICH 
1) Xin vui long mö tä hoän cänh vä böi cänh trubc khi thänh 14p doanh nghiep du lich? 
Bao gom: 
0 Ngttöi khäi . vvöhng thänh 
lap doanh nghiep du lieh ctia quy ngäi (träch nhiem) 
0 Tai sao ngr. Iäi dö lai yuyet dinh thänh lüp doanh nghiep du lieh (dOng co') 
" Kinh nghic%m ruia nguäi äy trong lTnh ruic" du lieh (kinh nghiem) 
" Kie , thiic re' cöng %, iec trio 2c (My rria nguö'i dö nhu the näo 
" Tong sö ngudi tham gial Ho cö con tham gia khöng? Ho !ä ai' 
CAC MÖI QUAN HE 
1) Chü doanh nghiep cö m6i quan he cä nhän vä nghe nghiep chuyen mön nhii the näo väi cäc cä nhän vä t6 chüc khäc 
trong ngänh cling nghiep du lich? 
2) Cön cö nhlrig m6i quan he näo khäc dä tao dieu kien thuän loi cho 
viec thhnh lap doanh nghi@p? 
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ESTABLISHING A TOURISM BUSINESS 
1) Describe the circumstances and background before setting up the tourism business? Include: 
who had the original idea of establishing a tourism business (responsible) 
" why did he/she/they decide to establish a tourism business (motivation) 
" what previous experience did he/she/they have in the tourism field (experience) 
what was his/her/their previous work background 
" who else was involved/ are they still involved? 
CONNECTIONS 
1) What personal and professional connections did the owners have with individuals and institutions in the tourism industry? 
2) What other connections helped facilitate the establishment of the business? 
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Nhimg m6i quan he nay da giüp gi cho hoat döng ban däu cüa doanh nghiep? 
3) Viec cö dugc cäc m6i quan he dä änh huöng nhu the näo täi cäc quyet dinh thänh 15p doanh nghiep cüa nhimg nguäri sang 
1äp doanh nghiep? 
Rdt nhieu tudng doi nhieu it khong co gi 
4) Ly do näo lä 1y do chinh dd thänh lap doanh nghiep du lich cüa quy vi tai dia ban nay? (co nghia !ä dia diem kink doanh 
ciia doanh nghiep quy vi) 
5) Truöc khi doanh nghiep dugc thänh lap, quy vi biet gi ve cäc thü tuc vä the the cö lien quan den viec thänh lap doanh 
nghiep du lich nhu m8 hinh doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? De nghi cho biet mot so chi tiet 
6) Quy vi dä du kien truck quy trinh thänh lap doanh nghiep nhu the näo? 
Xin neu mot rili chi tief 
Vi du: khöng phia tap, phüc tap, luöng truäc duac nhitng khö khan 
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0 How did these connections help in starting the tourism business? 
3) How important was having connections in influencing the decision of the founders to establish the business'? 
very murk quite a lot not very much not at all 
4) What were the main reasons for establishing the tourism business specifically in this location in Ha Noi? 
5) Before the business was established, what did you know about the procedures and institutions involved in setting up a 
tourism business? Some detail not one-word answers 
6) How did you perceive the establishment process? Some detail not one-word answers i. e. straight forward, complicated; 
anticipate particular problems etc. 
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QUY TRINH THÄNH LAP DOANH NGHIEP 
1) Phäc hoa cäc giai doan lien quan den viec thänh lap doanh nghiep du lich theo trinh tu th ii gian. (cäc thü tu(- lien quan den 
rig%c thänh lap doanh nghiep) Bao göm: The'che cö lien quan, thong, chi tief ri a timg giai doan, phani vi i-ä lý do klzöng 
phil hap/ mcru thuän, cä(- i'ci'n de nay duce gidi quyet nhu the näo, vi du: thda hiep, nhv&ig hö ... 
Vrn ca quan _ 
Muc dich chung: 
Thäi gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tief 
Ngäy/Thäng/Näm 
Vöi co quan Ngäy/Thäng/Näm 
Muc dich chung: 
'11 ri gian cua giai doan nay: 
Chi ti& 
Väi co' quan Ngäy%Thäng/Näm 
Muc dich chung: 
Then gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tiet 
Vrn co quan Ngäy/ThänglNäm 
Muc dich chung: 
Thöi gian cüa giai doan nay: - 
Chi ti6t 
Vöi ccr quan Ngäy%Thäng/Näm 
Muc dich chung: 
Thai gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi ti@t 
314 
PROCESS OF SETTING UP THE BUSINESS 
1) Outline the stages involved in establishing the tourism business in time order. Include: the institutions involved, date, details of 
each stage; areas and reasons for disagreement, how these were resolved i. e. through compromise, concessions etc. 
With 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
With 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: - 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: , 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
With 
General purpose: ,. 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
Date(mm/yr) 
Date(mm/yr) 
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Väi co quan 
Muc dich chung: 
Thäi gian cüa giai down nay: 
Chi tiet 
V6i ca quan 
Muc dich chung: 
Thäri gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tiet 
Ngäy/Thäng/Näm 
NgäyrMAng/Näm 
Vöi co quan 
Muc dich chung: 
Thö'i gian cüa giai down nay: 
Chi tiet 
Väri co quas 
Muc dich chung: 
Thäi gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tief 
Väi co quan 
Muc dich chung: 
Thöii gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tief 
Vöi co quan 
Muc dich chung: 
Thin gian cüa giai doan nay: 
Chi tief 
NgäylThäng/Näm 
Ngäy/Thäng/Näm 
Ngäy/Thäng/Nämm 
Ngäy/Ihäng/Narn 
316 
With 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
With 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
With 
General purpose: 
Length of this stage: 
Details: 
Date(mm/yr) 
Date(mm/yr) 
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VE DOANH NGHIEP CÜA QUA' VI 
1) Cäc co quan vä cä nhän näo dä tao dieu kiiln thuän 1oi cho viec thänh lap doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
" Cäch thirc mä cic co quan hoäc cä nhan dä giüp dd? 
" Str giüp dä cüa cäc co quan hoäc cä nhän cö hieu qua nhu the näo? 
2) Cäc cc quan vä cäc nhän näo dä can tr& ve vies thänh lap doanh nghiep cüa qu9 vi? 
" Cäch tht'rc mä cäc co quan hoäc cä nhdn da can trän doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
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ABOUT YOUR BUSINESS 
1) Which institutions or individuals facilitated the establishment of your business? 
" in what ways did these institutions or individuals help? 
" how effective was the help of these institutions or individuals? 
2) Which institutions or individuals hindered the establishment of your business? 
" in what ways did these institutions or individuals hinder your 
business? 
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" Str cän trä thänh lap doanh nghicp cüa quy vi tü cäc to chüc vä cä nhAn cö änh huäng/ täc döng nhu the näo? 
VE DOANH NGHIEP NOI CHUNG 
1) Nhin chung, thai dö cüa cäc to chüc vä ca nhän cu the khäc nhau nhu the' näo dua väo nhüng gl mä ho dä tro giüp/ giüp da 
hoäc khöng giüp dö d6i v ci viec thänh lap doanh nghiep du lich mang tinh chat tu nhän, nhä nu6c, lien doanh nhu doanh 
nghiep cüa quy vi? 
0 Xin neu cäc vi du: 
" Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi nguyen nhän cüa viec nay lä gi? 
2) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi, viec thänh lap mot doanh nghiep du lich mang tinh chät tu nhän d dia phuang cüa quy vi lä d@ hay 
khö? De nhu the näo? Khö nhu the näo? 
3) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi viec cäc loci hinh doanh nghiep khäc thänh 14p mot doanh nghiep du lich 6 dia phuomg cüa quy 
vi c6 d@ dang hon hay kh6 khan hon? Nhu the näo? 
0 Nguy@n nhän cüa viec nay lä gi? 
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how effective were these institutions or individuals in hindering the setting up your business? 
ABOUT BUSINESSES IN GENERAL 
1) Overall, in what ways do attitudes among particular institutions and individuals vary regarding the amount of support or 
lack of support in establishing a private tourism business such as yours? Please give examples. 
" in your opinion, what are the reasons for this? 
2) In your opinion, how easy or difficult is it to establish a private tourism business in your locality? 
3) In your opinion, in what ways is it easier or more difficult for other business types e. g. state, joint-venture businesses to 
enter the tourism sector in your 
locality? 
what are the reasons for this? 
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4) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä nhän t6 chü yeu de to dieu kir n cho doanh nghiep cüa quy vi tham gia väo ngänh kinh 
doanh nay? 
Häy chü y den möi truö'ng kinh doanh tai dia phuang - thöng thoäng/ khep kin; 
dnh hiding tit ben ngoäi dia phuo'ng: trung uong, quöc to döi vöi dia phuong cling nhu nhän tö ddc thü cüa dia 
phuong 
Luu y lä bdn thän thi truäng - vi du: dung hic rung rcii cüa du [ich tai dia phuong - cö the chiu träch nhiem chü yeu 
döi vöi viec tao dieu kien tham gia..., chü khöng phdi möi truö'ng dieu le/ thuän loi. 
5) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä nhän t6 chinh cho phep cdc cling ty khäc ct dia phuorng cüa quy vi tham gia väo 
ngänh kinh doanh nay? 
6) Cäi gi lä nguyen nhän chinh can trä chü the tham gia väo ngänh kinh doanh nay tai dia phuang cüa quy vi? 
vi du: nli nig räo (an chinh döi vöi vies gia nhäp/ tham gia 
7) Cäc cling ty hien nay c6 tao dieu kien hay can trot cäc cling ty möi tham gia kh6ng? Nhu the näo? (ye v6n de coin trd truck khi 
Cty mäi thänh läp) 
Viec can trä cüa cäc cling ty hien nay c6 änh huöng nhu the näo d6i vol viec tham gia väo ngänh nay cüa cäc cling ty 
mrn? 
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4) What were the main factors which enabled your firm to enter the sector'? 
i) consider the business environment in the locality - open/closed; 
ii) influences from outside the locality: central, international on the locality as well as locally specific factors 
iii) bear in mind that the market itself - i. e. the wider dynamics of tourism in the locality - may be principally 
responsible for ease of entry, etc, not just the regulatory/facilitatory environment. 
5) In your opinion, what are the main factors which allow other firms in your locality to enter the sector? 
i) consider the business environment in the locality - open/closed; 
ii) influences from outside the locality: central, international on the locality as well as locally specific factors 
iii) bear in mind that the market itself - i. e. the wider dynamics of tourism in the locality - may be principally 
responsible for ease of entry, etc, not just the regulatory/facilitatory environment. 
6) What are the main reasons preventing any actor from entering the sector in your locality? i. e. the main barriers to entry 
7) In what ways do existing firms in the sector facilitate or hinder the entry of new firms into the sector? 
" how effective are existing firms in preventing the entry of new firms 
into the sector? 
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cäi gi 1ä nhän t6 chinh quyet dinh viec nht"rng cöng ty dö c6 thänh cöng trong viec can trä, ngän chän cäc cöng t' 
mäi tham gia väo ngänh kinh doanh nay? 
Lim y den tinh hinh canh tranh tai dia phuangi trong nuäc 
8) Nhüng cäch thüc chü yeu näo mä theo dö quä trinh thänh lap doanh nghiep trong thuc to lai khäc voi nhüng gi mä quy vi 
da du tinh truOc khi qua trinh nay bat däu? 
Nhüng viec gi dä _k(, 
iy ra khong nhat quy vi dii tinh? 
9) Thuc to dien ra trong qua trinh thänh lap doanh nghiep cö läm thay doi nhüng ky vong cüa quy vi, lien quan den hieu suit 
kinh doanh cüa doanh nghiep trong tuorng lai so vrn nhüng du tinh tr iüc khi qua trinh thänh lap bat däu? 
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what are the major factors determining whether these firms are successful in preventing new firms entering into the 
sector'? Consider the local competitive situation 
8) What were the main ways in which the establishment process in reality differed from the one that you envisaged before 
starting the establishment process? What things happened that you did not expect? 
9) How has the experience of establishing the business changed your expectations with regard to the future performance of 
the business compared to your expectations before starting the establishment process? 
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DIEU HÄNH QUÄN LY DOANH NGHIEP 
TRACH NHIEM HÄNG NGÄY CÜA DOANH NGHIEP 
MOI TRUONG DIEU TIET 
NHLJNG CO QUAN TRO GIÜP - döi väi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi: 
1) Nhvng t6 chüc chinh thüc, khöng chinh thüc vä ck cä nhän näo trq giüp, tao dieu kien dieu hänh vä xäy dung, phät men 
doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
0 Neu vi du trq giüp chi d6i väi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi thöi 
Ten tö chilc/ Tragiüp Ly do tragiüp 
Cä nhän 
" Neu vi du viec tra giüp d6i vol cäc doanh nghiep khäc nöi chung 
Vi du: döi röi td cd cäc doanh nghiep, « ii doanh nghiep kink doanh du iich, hoäc tdt cd c äi doanh nghiep tu nhdn du 
lieh 
Ten tö chüc/ 
cä nhän 
Tra giüp nhüng doanh 
nghiep ndo 
Tragiüp Ly do tragiüp 
2) NhIn chung, su trq giüp cüa cäc t6 chüc vä cä nhän cö täm quan trong nhu the näo döi v6i viec dieu hänh vä phät trien 
doanh nghiep cüa qüy vi? 
quarr trong Tung döi quan bong Khöng quan trong l6ni Khöng quarr trgng gi cä 
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RUNNING THE BUSINESS 
DAY TO DAY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESS 
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
FACILITATORS - for your business 
I) Which formal and informal institutions and individuals support and facilitate in the running and development of the 
business? 
0 Give examples of the support to your business only 
Name of institution/ support given reason for support 
Individual 
" give examples where support is / was given more generally? e. g. to all husinesses, all tourism businesses or all other 
private tourism businesses 
Institution/ Support to which Support given Reason for 
Individual businesses support 
2) How important overall has the support of institutions and individuals generally been in the running and development of 
your business? 
Very important Quite important Not nerv important Not important at all 
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3) Str trq giüp cüa nhüng tö chüc cu the cö täm quan trong vä müc do cu the nhu the näo trong vier die -u hänh vä phät trien 
doanh nghiep 
Ten tö chic / cä nhdn Rät quan 
trong 
Twang 
döi quan 
trong 
Khöng 
quan 
tong 
! dm 
Khöng 
quan 
trong gi 
cd 
Täc dung döi vöi doanh nghiep 
4) Su tray giüp nay phän änh thäi dö cüa cäc tö chüc vä cä nhän cu the mang tinh truyen th6ng hien nay nhu th6 näo 
i. ö' dia phuong cua quy vi 
ii. tü trung gong trn cäc doanh nghiep tu nhän nhu doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
Vi du: uu tien doanh nghiep nhä nu6c, thänh kien v(i su sä hitu tu nhän/ doanh nghiep tu nhän/ ban chat tu ban chü nghia 
cüa du lieh. Thai dö the hien trong `Qua trinh thänh 1ap doanh nghiep' - Cau hbi 4 `Ve cic doanh nghiep nöi chung' 
" Theo quan didm cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä co sä cüa thäi do nay/ thäi dö nay bat nguön tü dau? 
Vi du: cäc nhän t6 vän hoä, -vd 
höi, trong nuäc/ dia phuang 
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3) How important and in what concrete ways has the support of particular institutions and individuals been in the running and 
development of the business? 
Institution/ 
Individual 
Very Quite Not 
very 
Not at 
all 
Effect on the business 
4) How does this support reflect traditional or current attitudes by particular institutions and individuals 
i) in the locality and 
ii) at the centre to private businesses such as your business? 
e. g. preference of state sector, prejudice of entrepreneurship/ private enterprise/capitalist nature of tourism. Attitudes 
expressed in 'Process of setting up the business'- Q4 'About businesses in general' 
" in your opinion, what is the background to this attitude/ where is this attitude rooted? i. e. cultural, social, local 
factors 
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5) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi su trq giüp mä doanh nghiep cüa quy vi cö duarc so väi su trq giüp nay d6i vöi: 
i) nhüng doanh nghiep tit nhdn khäc 
ii) cäc loci hinh doanh nghiep kinh doanh du lich khäc lä nhu the 
näo 
Vi clu: it l nhieu horn so vbi loci to cln<r näo; tro gii p ti! tö chi c ndo 
" Theo quas di@m cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä nguyen nhän chinh d6i v6i cäc müc d6 trg giüp khäc nhau nay? 
6) Tuong lai nhüng khöi xuäng näo tir cäc to chüc vä cä nhän cu the näo cö the giüp ich cho viec phät trien cäc doanh 
nghiep du lich tir nhän? 
" Tai sao nhüng bien phäp nay chua duac chäp nhän? 
NHÜNG CO QUAN DI EU CHINH- döi vöi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi 
1) Nhvng t6 chCrc vä cäc cä nhän chinh thüc hoäc kh6ng chinh th(rc kiem the cling viec dieu hänh, quän 1y vä phät tri6n cüa 
doanh nghiep? 
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0 Neu vi du kiem the chi d6i vii doanh nghiep cüa quy vi thOi 
5) In your opinion, how does the support given to your business compare with the support given to other private tourism 
businesses and b) other types of tourism business? (less / more than which kind of institutions; support from which 
institutions to) 
" in your opinion, what are the main reasons for different levels of support? 
6) What initiatives from particular institutions and individuals could further stimulate the development of prirate tourism 
businesses? 
0 why have these measures not been adopted yet? 
REGULATORS 
1) Which formal and informal institutions and individuals constrain the running and development of the business? 
Give examples of constraints on your business only 
Name of institution/ Constraints imposed Reason for constraint 
Individual 
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Quy vi cö cäm nhän gi ve nhýrng kiem the nay? 
N@u vi du mä viec kiem the thuärng dien ra d6i vöi cäc doanh nghiep du lich khäc 
Vi du: döi vöi ttit cd cäc doanh nghiep, tdt cd cäc doanh nghiep kink doanh du lieh hoäc tcit ri ccir doanh nghiep du lieh 
tu nhän 
Ten to; chüc/ cä nhän Kiem the ddi vöi doanh 
nghiep näo 
Kiem chi Ly do 
2) Anh huteng cüa nhimg kiem the nay d6i väi viec dieu hänh quän 1y vä phät trien doanh nghiep är m(rc do nhu the näo? 
Dang ke' Twing döi it Khong 
3) Nhüng kiem the cüa cäc tö chüc vä cä nhän cu the cö täm quan trong nhu the näo (c(ing nhu theo cäch thüc cu the näo) 
dfii v6i viec dieu hänh quän ly vä phät trien doanh nghiep? 
Ten tö chüc/ cd nhän Rät quan 
trong 
Twang 
döi quan 
trong 
Khöng 
quan 
trong 
lam 
Khöng 
quan 
trong gi 
cd 
Anh hitöng döi vol doanh nghiep 
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what do you feel about these constraints? 
give examples where constraints have been imposed more generally e. g. on all businesses, all tourism businesses or all 
other private tourism businesses 
Institution/ Constraints imposed on Constraints imposed Reason for 
Individual which businesses constraint 
2) How significantly have these constraints affected the running and development of the business? 
Very much Quite a lot Not very much Not at all 
3) How important and in what concrete ways have the constraints imposed by particular institutions and individuals been in 
the running and development of the business? 
Institution/ 
Individual 
Very Quite Not very Not at all Effect on the business 
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4) Vi@c nay ducts phän änh thäi dö truy@n thong hien nay cüa cäc to chdc vä cä nhan cu the nhu the näo 
i) tai dia phuong cüa quy vi 
ii) tit trung uung täri cäc doanh nghiep du lich tu nhän nhu doanh nghiep cüa quy vi 
Vi du: nhuscfphän hiet döixü rat hoäc uu ticýn cho roc loci hinh doanh nghiep Cu the 
" Theo quan diem cüa quy vi, cäi gi lä co säg cho thäi do nay bät nguön tü däu? 
Vi du: nhän tö vän hoä, -k- 
i höi, d'ia phu'ang 
5) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi nhirng kiem the mä doanh nghiep cüa quy vi co ducYC so vöi nhirng kiem the d6i väi 
i) nhüng doanh nghiep ti(nhän khäc 
ii) cäc loci hinh doanh nghiep kinh doanh du lich khäc lä nhu the näo 
Vi du: it / nhieu ho'n so vö'i loaf to r/ii näo; nhimg kiem c he'tü to rhiir näo 
" Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä nguyen nhan chinh döi vöi cäc müc dö nhüng kiem the khäc nhau nay? 
6) Quan diem cüa quy vi nhu the näo ve möi truämg dieu tief t6ng the ä khia canh änh huärng cüa nö döi vvi möi tnrüng phät 
trien doanh nghiýp kinh doanh du lich? De nghi neu vi du chüng minh quan diem nay 
7) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi thi nhüng khia canh näo mä co quan ä cap trung uong vä cäp dia phuong 
kiem the su phät 
trien cäc doanh nghiep du lich tunhän cänn ducc hüy bä? 
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4) How does this reflect/correspond with traditional or current attitudes by particular institutions and individuals i) in the 
locality and ii) at the centre to private businesses such as your business? i. e. in the discrimination and/or preference 
given to certain business types 
" in your opinion, what is the background to this attitude/ where is this attitude rooted? i. e. cultural, social, local 
factors 
5) In your opinion, how do the constraints imposed on your business compare with the constraints imposed on other private 
tourism businesses and b) other types of tourism business? (less/more than which kind of institutions; constraints 
imposed by which institutions on) 
" in your opinion, what are the main reasons for different levels of constraints? 
6) What is your opinion of the overall regulatory environment in terms of its effect on the tourism business development 
environment? Please give examples to support this opinion: 
7) In your opinion, which aspects of national and local institutional activity which constrain the development of private 
tourism businesses should be lifted? 
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8) Tai sao nhimg bien phäp nay chua dugc thirc hien? 
TUAN THÜ 
1) Chinh säch cua cäc tö chiic chü quän döi väi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi cö ph(rc tap, gay khö khan de doanh nghiep cüa 
quy vi khö tuän thü khOng? Tai sao? 
2) B6 may host dOng cüa cäc t6 cht c chü quän cö gay khö khan dd cho doanh nghiep cüa quy vi hoat dOng khöng? Tai sao? 
Nghia lä: cä nhdn trong hö may däy Co (vi du tham nhiüng, höi lö V. 1'. ) 
Vi du: map mä - cö the' lien quan den sir tdng Binh; hock cö the' lien quan den vier doanh nghiep khöng hieu dircre mau (10t 
c ua quy tic - gidi thich khöng rö rüng - dien gidi theo ccic cäch khcir nhau rria cäc quan chüc hoäc quy tic u/u äp dpt ma 
khöng tham khdo y kielr hoäc khöng cö huöng dän thi hänh cu the'? 
" Co nhýrng diem näo map mäß trong cäc yeu cäu chinh thdc/ phäp 1y hoäc khöng chinh thüc? 
D@ nghi neu vi du nhüng diem map mä vä väi nhüng tö chäc vä cä nhän näo? 
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8) Why are these measures still in place? 
COMPLIANCE 
1) How difficult is it to comply with your responsibilities and duties to all institutions and individuals? 
2) Do the relevant authorities cause any difficulties in the running of your business? 
" are the main points of confusion with formal/legal or informal requirements? 
Please give examples of the main points of confusion and with which institutions and individuals 
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" Doanh nghiep cüa qu9 vi da nö hic nhu the näo de lam rö nhüng khia cash map mäß lien quan den träch nhiem cüa 
doanh nghiep cüa qu9 vi d6i v6i cäc t6 chdc vä cäc nhän? 
3) Quy vi dä cfi ging giäm t6i thieu änh huärng nhüng yeu cäu tieu cuc toi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi nhu the näo vä trong 
truömg help näo? 
CO 
" tai sao quy vi da c6 gang lam viec nay? 
" quy vi dä thänh cling nhu the näo trong viec giäm t6i thieu cäc änh huämg nay vä tai sao quy vi lai thänh cling? 
" quy vi dä thänh cling hay kh6ng tai sao? 
Vi du: räi gi Id ly do chinh dixäe Binh thänh cöng hay thät bai trong riee gidm toi thieu nhüng dnh huöng nüv? 
KHÖNG 
" tai sao quy vi dä kh6ng co gang lam viýc nay? 
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" how does your business attempt to clarify confusing aspects relating to the business' responsibilities to institutions 
and individuals? 
3) How and in what situations have you tried to minimise the effect of and/or avoid/circumvent requirements which 
negatively affected your business? 
YES 
" why has your business attempted to do this? e. g. financially or administratively too burdensome to take them 
seriously; wilful non-compliance, corruption, mistrust, loopholes, connections etc 
" how successful have you been in minimising these effects? 
" why have you been successful or not? what have been the main reasons determining success or lack of success in 
minimising these effects? loopholes, connections; social constraints which underpin compliance - reputation, trust, 
sanction, gossip etc 
NO 
why has your business not attempted to do this? risks, lack of knowledge of loopholes, lack of connections etc 
social constraints which underpin compliance - reputation, trust, sanction, gossip etc 
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4) Theo quan didm cüa quy vi thi täc d¢ng cüa viec tuän thü khäc nhau nhu the näo giita cäc doanh nghiep du lich nnncän 
khäc so vci cäc loci hinh doanh nghiep du lich khäc ö dia phuo-ng cüa quy vi? 
thi du: «ü( doanh nghiep du lieh lien doanh, nhä nuäc 
" Theo quan di@m cüa quy vi thi cäi gi lä nguyen nhän chinh d6i vö'i cäc müc de tuän thü khäc nhau giýra cäc Ioai 
hinh doanh nghiep du lich khäc ä dia phuong cüa quy vi? 
5) Nhin Chung, vicc tuän thü träch nhiem cüa doanh nghiep cua quy vi co änh huöng gi döi väi cling täc di6u hänh, quin 1 
vä phät trien doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
Rät dang ke' tucing doi dang ke' khöng dang ke'län, khöng dl ng ke'gi cd 
De nghi neu vi du nhüng hinh thüc cu the trong dö viec tuän thü träch nhiem cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi d6i väi 
cäc t6 chüc vä cä nhän änh hung den cling täc dieu hänh, quän ly vä phät trien doanh nghiep ciia quy vi? 
Ten to; chüc/ cä nhän Träch nhiem Anh hming Tam quern trong 
Rä"t - titang döi - 
khöng quan trong 
lam - khöng quan 
trong gi ra 
6) Viec cäc t6 chüc vä cä nhän döi höi doanh nghiep phäi thuc thi träch nhiem vä nghia vu nhäm phuc vu muc 
dich gi? 
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4) In your opinion, how do the affects of compliance vary among other private tourism businesses vis-a-vis other tourism 
business types in your locality? e. g state, joint-venture tourism businesses etc. 
" in your opinion, what are the main reasons for different levels of compliance among different tourism business 
types? e. g aspects relating to wilful non-compliance, corruption, mistrust, loopholes, connections. social 
attitudes/constraints which underpin compliance - reputation, trust, sanction, gossip etc 
5) Overall, how significantly does compliance with the business' responsibilities to particular institutions and individuals 
affect the running and development of your business? 
very nm rh quite a lot not very much not at all 
" Please give examples of the concrete ways in which compliance with the business' responsibilities to institutions 
and individuals affect the running and development of your business? 
Institution/ Responsibility Effect Importance 
individual (very much, quite a lot, 
not very much, not at 
all) 
6) What purposes do the imposition of duties and responsibilities on the business by outside institutions and individuals 
serve? 
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0 Quy vi nghi gi ve viec nay? 
7) Cäc to chüc vä cä nhän cu the dä tien hänh vä thüc ep nghi@m ngät nhu thT näo dd thi hänh nhimg y@u cäu cüa ho d6i vöi 
doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
" fie nghi cho vi du viýc thi hänh lä chat the vä khOng chat the 
" To chic, ca nhän näo thuc hien chat the nhät vä tö chic, cä nhän näo that hien khong chat the nhät? 
" theo quan diem cüa quy vi, tai sao cäc mtIc dö thi hänh lai khäc nhau? Vi du: nhýtng nhän t6 änh huvng den tinh 
hieu quä, tuän thü, hoäc trän tränh dieu le, quy tac 
" Cäch tht'rc mä cäc mtic d6 thi hänh lai khäc nhau änh huämg müc dö tuän thü cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
0 theo quan diem cüa quy vi. 
i) viec thi hänh hop 1y vä 
ii) viec thi hänh khong hop ly 
cö tic dOng tich cuc hoäc Lieu cuc nhu the näo täi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi nöi rieng vä cäc doanh nghiep 
du 
lich nöi chung tai dia phuong cüa quy vi? 
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what do you think about this? 
7) How rigorously do particular institutions and individuals carry out and enforce the requirements they impose on your 
business? 
" give examples where enforcement is thorough and where it is not. 
" which institutions and individuals are most and least thorough? 
" in your opinion, why does the level of enforcement vary? i. e. the factors which influence effectiveness, compliance or 
avoidance of regulations. 
" in what ways does this affect the level of compliance by your business? 
in your opinion, how does a) good enforcement and b) bad enforcement positively or negatively serve your business 
in 
particular and tourism businesses in general in the locality? 
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THAY DOI DIEU CHiNH 
Tit khi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi thänh 14p d@n nay, nhimg su thay doi näo trong m6i truäng dieu ti6t dä 
i) cö täc dung tot, tao di6u kien vä 
ii) kim ham su dieu hänh quän 1y vä phät trien doanh nghiep? 
" nhüng su thay doi nay cö tic dang nhu nhau d6i vöi cäc doanh nghiep du lich khäc khOng? 
" nhýrng su thay d6i nay dä cö nhung änh huöng khäc nhau nhu the näo toi 
i) cäc doanh nghiep du lich tun{ßän vä 
ii) cäc loai hinh doanh nghiep du lich khäc 
" co sä näo d nhüng sir thay d6i nay dur c dha ra? 
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CHANGES IN REGULATION 
1) Since your business was established what changes in the regulatory environment have a) most facilitated and b) most 
constrained the running and development of your business? 
" have these changes equally affected other tourism businesses? 
" how have the changes impacted in different ways on 
a) other private tourism businesses and 
b) other tourism business types in the tourism sector? 
0 on what grounds have the changes been introduced? 
. 
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" nhvng ski thay döi nay nh5m muc dich gi? 
" ai cö Rn! huäng 10 tü nhüng sv thay döi nay 
0 quy vi cö cäm nhän gi tü nhüng sir thay d6i nay? 
" theo quan diem cüa quy vi, nhtrng su thay d6i näo lä cän thiet vä nhümg su thay d6i näo lä kh6ng can thizt? 
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9 what purposes do the changes serve? 
0 who benefits from the changes? 
" what do you feel about the changes? 
" in your opinion, which changes have been necessary and which have not? 
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NHÜNG THAY DOI ÄNH HUfONG MANG TINH TO CHLUC TRONG MÖI TRUONG DIEU TIET 
]) Ke tü khi doanh nghi4p cüa quy vi duac thänh lap din giä änh huöng cüa cäc t6 chüc vä cä nhän cu the 8 cap dia phuomg, 
trung acing vä quöc to änh huäng toi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä thay döi nhu the näo? 
De nghi neu vi du: 
" cäi gi lä nhän to chinh dfii v6 i änh hirong giäm di hoäc tang len tü cäc tö chüc vä cä nhän khäc nhau? 
2) Theo cäch näo mä viec nay dä thay döi tien trinh vä vai trö cüa quan hý giao dich, dam phän vä ra quyet dinh giirra doanh 
nghiep cüa quy vi vbi chic t6 chüc vä cä nhän cu the trong qua trinh hoat deng cüa doanh nghiep? 
Vi du: nghia !ä giämi Läng pham vi! cäc to chüc thöng qua quyet 
dinh kinh doanh näo dtlac dua ra; 
täng! gidm quyen hic ccia c ar to chic vä cä nhän J cäp dia 
phuong digiao dich true tiep; 
tang cuöngl läni suy yeit c cic tö chclc ä cäp trnng tang r. i . 
0 vä änh hubng den su phät trien doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
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CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
1) Since your business was established, how has the influence of particular institutions and individuals at local, central and 
international scales affecting your business changed? Please give examples. 
" what have been the main factors responsible for the increased or decreased influence of different institutions and 
individuals? 
2) In what ways has this changed the processes and roles of dealing, negotiating and decision-making between your 
business and particular institutions and individuals in the course of business operations? e. g. reduced/increased the 
stages/ institutions through which business decisions are made, increasedldecreased the power of local institutions and 
individuals to deal directly, reinforcedlweakened regionallcentral institutions et(. 
" and consequently affected the development of your business? 
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3) a) Nhitng su thay doi mang tinh t6 cht"tc nay cö änh huärng nhu nhau d6i väi cäc doanh nghiep du lich khäc? 
b) Nhüng su thay d6i nay cö tdc dOng theo nhieu cdch khäc nhau d6i vöi cäc doanh nghiep khäc trong linh vtrc 
du lich nhu the näo? 
4) Nhin chung, nhüng su thay d6i änh huämg mang tinh t6 chüc dä änh hing the näo den su phät trien cüa cäc doanh 
nghiep du lich ö' dia phuong cüa quy vi? 
Vi du: su phän quyen trong nie ra quyet Binh trong ngänh do lieh dä den den thänh tuu to lö'n hon ciia vie( phät trim 
cöng häng hay tap trung ii ich väo ngttäi dän ve kinh tc chinh tri xj höi d cäc dia phuang nhu the näo? 
5) Theo y kien cüa quy vi, viec phät trien cüa ngänh cöng nghiep du lich d dia phtrumg cüa quy vi dä phän änh, hien than vä 
dap img quyen lqi vä änh huärng cäc t6 chüc dia phuong, trung uong vä qu6c to vä cäc cä nhän tham gia väo ngänh cong 
nghiep nay a mt"tc do nhir the näo vä bang cäch näo? 
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3) a) Have these changes in institutional influence equally affected other tourism businesses? 
b) How have the changes impacted in different ways on other business types in the tourism sector? 
4) Overall, in your opinion how have changes in institutional influence affected the development of tourism businesses in 
your locality? e. g. has decentralisation of tourism decision-making led to greater achievement of equitable development 
or greater of concentration of benefits in hands of ec/pol elites in localities? 
5) In your opinion, how much and in what ways does the development of the tourism industry in your locality reflect, 
represent and respond to the interests and influence of local, central and international institutions and individuals 
participating in the industry? 
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ÄNH HUONG CÜA CAC DOANH NGHIEP DO NUÖC NGOÄI QL, ýN L\' 
1) Viec tham gia cüa cäc doanh nghiep kinh doanh du lich do nguöi nuäc ngoäi quän 1y tai dia phuong cua quy vi cö änh 
huäng nhu the näo d6i vci doanh nghiýp cüa quy vi nöi rieng? 
vä cäc doanh nghiep du lich khäc nöi chung? 
Bao göm: 
a) dem lai y te(äng mai trong viec dien hänh doanh nghiep 
b) dem lai sit thay döi trong quarr niem rü cäch hieie ve marketing 
(-) canh tranh - thu hat c (ii nguon khäch häng möi hope cnnh tranh de'giý! khäc-h hien cö 
d) gidi quv/t vdi rci( to c huc 
e) riýr tiep can thi trctöng du lieh qu(- to 
f) trien vong quoc to 
g) thu nhäp Chung, lai nhuän, luang kliddc h häng tang ... 
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INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN-OWNED INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSES 
l) How has the entry of foreign-owned tourism businesses into your locality affected your business in particular? 
" And tourism businesses in general? 
Include: 
a) bringing new ideas in operating businesses 
h) producing changes in your business' perception of marketing 
r) competition - attracting new sources of customers or competing for- the existing customer base 
d) dealing with institutions 
e) a( ( ess to markets 
f) international outlook etc. 
g) overall income, profitability, client growth etc 
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LIEN KET VÄ MANG LUCOI KINH DOANH 
1) Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä c6 gang thü vä/ hoäc thänh lap möi lien ket vöi bät cü t6 chüc du lich khäc de phät tridn vice 
kinh doanh du lieh cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
CO xem trang 30 
KHONG xem trang 34 
354 
BUSINESS ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS 
1) Has your business attempted to and/or formed alliances with any other tourism organisations in order to develop your 
tourism business'? 
Yes go to page 30 
No go to page 34 
355 
cö 
1) Phäc hoa bat cd möi li@n k6t näo dä c6 co gang thd, thänh cling hay kh6ng: böi cänh - ai tiep cän ai, qua trinh thänh lap 
vä dam phän trong linh vuc nay vä 1y do cüa su bät dung/ xung dOt, nhCrng van d6 nay du"- giäi quyet nhu the näo hoäc 
kh6ng dugc giäi quyet 
Nghia lä: su thod hiep, nhuong ho, hao göm sit tham gia c uia cäc tö chit(-khäc; vdi loci hinh doanh nghiep/ tö rhrn näo, 
dia phän c"ria döi tfc kinh doanh / tö (In? ( ... 
" trong nhüng truöng harp nhimg nö hic thiet lap lien ket kinh doanh kh6ng di den ket qua nhu mong dpi, cal gi lä 1y 
do chinh? 
" trong nhCrng truöng hop nhCmg n6 hic thiet lap lien ket kinh doanh thänh cling, cal gi 
lä ban chat cüa m6i quan he 
nay; cäc dieu khoän chinh, lai ich cho cä hai phia v. v.. 
356 
YES 
l) Outline any links which have been attempted, successfully or not: the background- who approached «ho, the establishment 
and negotiation process, areas and reasons for disagreement, how these were resolved or not i. e. compromise, concessions etc ; 
including the involvement of other institutions; with what type of business/institution, the location of the business/institution 
partner etc. 
" in cases where attempts to form alliances were unsuccessful, what were the main reasons for this'? 
" in cases where attempts to form alliances have been successful, what is the nature of the relationship; main terms, 
benefits to both sides etc. 
357 
CHIEN LUOC LIEN KET KINH DOANH CÜA DOANH NGHIEP CÜA QUY VI 
1) Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi da thin thiet 1äp lien ket kinh doanh vöi: 
0 cäc loai hinh kinh doanh cu the? 
Vi du: 
" clutr näng kinh doanh nhu nhau, vi du: khäch san rdi khäch san 
" hoat döng kinh doanh (bü trü, hö sung) vi du khäch san vöi lc? hänh du uni 
" vöi con tö chile du lieh nliä niföc , tunhän, 
lien doanh, (ti( to chüc du lieh quöc to 
" vöi cäc" tJiInin du lieh näm trong hoäc ngoäi dia phuong rnüu guy vi 
" ädia phän cu the' ... 
hoäc 
0 väi bat cü doanh nghiep du lich näo 
" Ly do cüa viec nay lä gi? 
2) Nhümg tröh ngai näo mä doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä/ dang phäi d6i mat khi thü lien ket kinh doanh vc i cäc t6 chüc du Lich 
khäc lä gi? 
Vi du: mang tinh tö chüc, lien he, kien that-, thong tin, mang luöi, canh tranh r. i' .. 
358 
YOUR BUSINESS' ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
Has your busir 
" 
e. g. 
less attempted to form alliances with: 
particular types of businesses 
same business function e. g. hotel with hotel 
complementary business function e. g. hotel with tour operator; 
with state, private- [V businesses, international tourism organisation. N 
in or outside the locality 
in particular locations etc; 
or 
" with any tourism businesses 
" What are the reasons for this? 
2) What constraints has/does your business face(d) in attempting links with other tourism organisations? e. g. institutional, 
contacts, knowledge, information, networks, competition etc 
359 
3) Cäc loci hinh doanh nghiep vä/hoäc dia diem cä trong nuäc cä qu6c to cu the näo mä viec dö di dang/ khö khan hon 
trong viec xäy dang vä phät trien lift ket kink doanh? 
Tai sao lai nhu väy? 
4) Chien luoc cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi d6i vöi loai hinh doanh nghiep nay dä tiep can su thay d6i kd tü khi thänh lap 
doanh nghiep nhu the näo? 
" Sao dieu dö 1ai thay d6i? 
Vi du: hoän cdnh, döng ca, khci ndng, ca höi 
Loai hinh to chüc näo mä quy vi dä vä dang a) bö nhieu cöng süc hon, b) bö it cöng sic hon khi tiep cän 
Sao lai nhu väy? 
360 
3) Which particular types of business or locations has it been easier/more difficult to develop alliances with? 
Why is that? 
4) How has your business' strategy regarding the type of business approached changed since establishing the business? 
" Why has it changed? e. g. circumstances, motivations, abilities, opportunities 
" Which types of organisation have you made; a) more effort and b) less effort at approaching? 
" Why is that? 
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" Trong nhiing näm gän day, quy vi c6 b6 nhieu cöng svc dd thi6t lap quan he vöi cäc doanh nghiep vä tö chüc qudc 
t6 vä toän cAu hon truäc day? 
" Tai sao / Tai sao kh6ng? 
5) Möi lien ket kinh doanh cö täm quan trong nhu the näo d6i väi ket qua kinh doanh nöi chung cüa doanh nghiep cüa qu9 
vi? 
rdt quan trong twang döi quan trgng Khöng quan trong lam khöng quan trong gi (a 
6) Phäc hoa täm quan trong cüa möi lien ket kinh doanh cu the d6i v6i ket qua kinh doanh nöi chung cüa doanh nghiýp cüa 
qu9 vi 
Doi täc lien ket Rät quan 
trong 
Tuong d6i 
quan 
trong 
Khöng 
quan 
trong ldm 
Khong 
quan 
trong gi 
cd 
dnh huöng döi vol doanh nghiep cüa 
quy vi: 
vi du: latang khäch häng Läng, doanh 
thu, ldi nhupn v. v... 
7) Nhin chung, tai sao cäc möi lidn ket nay Iai thänh cling hay kh6ng thänh cling trong su phät tri@n 
doanh nghiep cüa quy 
vi? 
... Vi du: dung ltildng canh trank qua 
1677 
362 
" In recent years, have you made more effort at establishing links with international and global businesses and 
institutions than before? 
0 Why/ why not? 
5) How important are business alliances in the overall performance of your business? 
very much quite a lot not very much not at all 
6) Outline the importance of particular alliances in the overall performance of your business 
Alliance 
Partner 
Very Quite Not very Not at 
all 
Effect on your business 
e. g. in terms of client growth, 
turnover, profitability etc. 
7) Overall, why have they been successful or not successful in the development of your business? e. g. competitive 
impulses 
too strong 
363 
KHONG 
1) Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi cö quan tam den thiet lap quan he lam än vci cäc doanh nghiep, ai chüc du Lich nhäm phät men 
kinh doanh du lich cüa doanh nghiep cüa quy vi? 
Co Khöng 
Tai sao doanh nghiep cüa quy vi Tai sao khong? 
chua thi't lap quan he lam an väi 
cäc doanh nghiep, t6 chüc du lich? 
364 
NO 
Has your business considered forming alliances with other tourism organizations in order to develop your tourism 
business? 
Yes No 
Why hasn't your business Why not? 
formed any alliances with 
other tourism organisations yet? 
365 
KHÄCH DU LICH 
1) Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi don khäch tü nhvng nuäc däc thü? 
Co Khöng 
0 Khäch du lich töi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi tit nhüng nuäc näo? 
0 Ly do chinh cüa viec nay 1ä g'i 
2) Tür khi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi thänh lap den gib, da cö su thay d6i dang ke ve qu6c tich cüa khäch du lich chua? 
Co 
Nhieu ham : 
it hon: 
Khöng 
3) Bang cäch näo doanh nghiep cüa quy vi phäi chiu träch nhiem ve nhüng thay d6i nay? Vi du: sting kien ue: marketing, 
lien kei kinh doanh, quan he r. v. 
4) Bang each näo mä cäc t6 chvc vä cä nhän khäc phäi chin träch nhi@m ve nhvng thay dfii näy? Bao göm: cd rcic hie n phrip 
khuyen khich v e) han chi, vi do nhcu tao dien kien cup visa, c ac c"hien dich gndng c"äo tai dia phcrongl c6p quöc" gia ii.. 
366 
VISITORS 
(Q], 2,4 - REFER TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE TABLE RE FOREIGN CUSTOMERS) 
1) Does your business receive foreign customers from particular countries? 
YES 
NO 
" Which countries do your foreign customers come from? 
" What are the main reasons for this? 
2) Since your business was established have there been any significant changes in the nationality of your customers? 
YES 
More: 
Less: 
3) In what ways has your business been responsible for these changes? e. g. through marketing, business links, contacts etc. 
4) In what ways have other institutions and individuals been responsible for these changes? Include both measures to 
promote and restrict e. g. easing of visa restrictions, locallnational promotion campaigns etc. 
NO 
367 
QUÄNG CÄO DU LICH QUÖC TE 
CAP TRUNG UONG 
1) Theo quan diem cüa quy vi, vi-c xüc tien quäng cäo ve Vitt nam lä möt diem den cüa du lich qu6c to trong thai gian vüa 
qua cö hieu quä nhtr the näo trong viec thu hüt khäch du lich ntröc ngoäi väo Viet nam? 
Tai sao/ Tai sao khOng hieu quä? 
vä Viet nam näm 2000: chien dich quäng cäo Viet nam - didm den cüa thien ni@n ky möi 
" Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä cö änh hung nhu the näo b&i chien dich nay? 
2) Theo y kien cüa quy vi, phäi tien hänh nhtr the näo de viec quäng cäo ve Viet nam cö the hüu hieu ham? 
" tai sao dieu nay vän chua duoc tien hänh? 
" nhüng the the vä host dßng gi dä änh huäng tieu cuc den hinh änh ve Viet nam nhu Iä m6t diem den cüa khich du 
lich nu is ngoäi? 
368 
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM PROMOTION 
NATIONAL 
1) In your opinion, how effective is the overall promotion of Vietnam as an international tourism destination in attracting 
foreign visitors? 
Please give reasons for your answer 
" and the'Viet Nam 2000: Destination for the new millennium' promotion campaign 
" how has your business been affected by the campaign? 
2) In your opinion, how can Viet Nam be promoted more effectively? 
" why hasn't this been done yet? 
" which institutions and what activities have adversely affected the image of Viet 
Nam as a destination for foreign 
visitors? 
369 
DIA PHUONG 
1) Dia phttomg ciia quy vi dä duac ai, vä quäng cäo nhu the näo nhtr mot diem den cho khäch du lich quöc tz? 
chuong trinh quäng cäo nay dä änh huöng nhu the näo töi doanh nghiep cüa quy vi cling nhu hoat dOng kinh doanh 
du lich tai dia phuong cüa quy vi? 
" tai sao thänh cling hoäc kh6ng thänh cling vä c6 täc dung hay kh6ng c6 täc dung tai sao? 
2) Theo y kien cüa quy vi, phäi lam nhu the näo de dia phuang cüa quy vi duoc quäng cäo c6 hieu qua hen? 
" tai sao dieu nay vän chua duac thuc hien? 
" nhfrng th@ the vä host d6ng gi dä änh hung tidu cuc den hinh änh ve dia phuang cüa quy vi nhu lä mot diem den 
cüa khäch du lieh nuäc ngoäi? 
370 
LOCAL 
1) How and by who is your locality promoted as a destination for international tourism? 
how has this promotion affected your business and tourism activity in your locality? 
" why successful or not? 
2) In your opinion, how can your locality be promoted more effectively? 
" why hasn't this been done before? 
" which institutions and what activities have adversely affected the image of your locality as a destination for foreign 
visitors? 
371 
BAN THAN DOANH NGHIEP 
1) Doanh nghiep cüa quy vi dä tiep can thi trutäng vä quäng cäo cäc dich vu cüa minh nham thu hüt khäch du Lich quöc to 
nhu thee näo? 
- da hay chira 
" Ong täc marketing mä doanh nghiep quy vi tien hänh dä thänh cling i mt c d6 näo de phdt trien doanh nghiep cüa 
minh? 
" hay neu vi du nhirng truämg hap näo cling täc marketing quy vi tien hänh lai c6 hieu qua vä thänh cling, truöng hap 
näo cling täc marketing quy vi tien hänh 1ai kh6ng c6 hieu qua vä kh6ng thänh cling 
Bao gdm: cäch thüc, nguyen nhdn va hieu qud cu the 
372 
OWN BUSINESS 
1) How does your business market and advertise its services to attract foreign visitors? 
how successful has marketing by your business been in developing your business? 
" give examples where marketing was successful and where it was not include how, why, the concrete effects 
373 
APPENDIX 2 
PROFILE OF TOURISM BUSINESSES 
374 
HANOI 
Name ' Type ITOL Ownership Established Gross 
Revenue 2 
Le Loi Tourism Tour N State 1967 2Bn 
Company Operator 
Mai An Tourism Tour Y State 1961 18.8Bn 
Company Operator 
Nuoc Ta Tourism Tour Y State 1992 12.5Bn 
Company Operator 
Song Hong Tour Y State 1963 49Bn 
Tourism Operator 
Thanh Truong Tour N State 1994 1.4Bn 
Tourism Company Operator 
Thuy Tien Tour Y State 1990 7.5Bn 
Tourism and Operator 
Trade Company 
Viet Huong Tour Y State 1960 26Bn 
Tourism Operator 
Yen Sang Tourism Tour Y State 1992 8.6Bn 
Company Operator 
Au Lac Tourism Tour Y Private 1992 2Bn 
Company Operator 
Danh Du Tourism Tour Y Private 1996 900m 
and Trade Operator 
Company 
Hang Bac 
Tourism Trade Tour N Private 1996 750m 
and Investment Operator 
Company 
Hoa Ma Tourism Tour Y Private 1996 650m 
and Trade Operator 
Company 
He Thong Tour N Private 1998 400m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Huu Nghi Travel Tour N Private 2001 200m 
and Tour Operator 
Company Ltd 
Nam Ha Tourism Tour Y Private 1989 950m 
Company Operator 
Nam Sao Tourism Tour N Private 1992 800m 
Company Operator 
1 Pseudonyms are used in order to protect the anonymity of the 
businesses. 
2 For the year 2000 in Vietnamese Dong 
375 
Planet Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1995 750m 
Thanh Ha 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1998 550m 
Tran Xuan Soan 
Tourism and 
Trade Company 
Tour 
Operator N 
Private 1998 600m 
Van Mieu 
Tourism, trade and 
investment 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1996 700m 
Yen Sao Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1999 300m 
Bac Viet Hotel Hotel - State 1992 6.8Bn 
Hien Dai Hotel Hotel - State 1990 12.3Bn 
Hoang Tu 
Tourism and Hotel 
Company 
Hotel - State 1975 11 Bn 
Huy Dinh Hotel Hotel - State 1995 5.6Bn 
Le Duan Hotel Hotel - State 1980 17.5Bn 
My Thuyet Hotel Hotel - State 1992 4.5Bn 
Thien Quang 
Hotel Tourism 
Company 
Hotel - State 1961 29Bn 
Crown Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 1.4Bn 
Dong Khanh 
Hotel 
Hotel - Private 1998 750m 
Hai An Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 450m 
Hoang Nu Hotel Hotel - Private 1993 200m 
Minh Khue Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 400m 
My Anh Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 200m 
Quan Minh Hotel Hotel - Private 1998 600m 
Thang Nam Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 
13.5Bn 
Tien Thong Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 950m 
Xuong Bai Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 1.2Bn 
Indochine Hotel Hotel - Foreign- 
invested 
joint-venture 
1993 61 Bn 
Thuy Van Hotel Hotel - Foreign- 
invested 
joint-venture 
1997 27Bn 
376 
HUE 
Name Type ITOL Ownership Established Gross 
Revenue 
Bac Ma Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1994 1.8Bn 
Bong Sen Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
Y State 1975 27.7Bn 
Vang Trang 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1994 600m 
Perfume River 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1995 800m 
Suong Mu 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1996 350m 
Thanh Xien 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1997 550m 
Trung Uong 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1995 2.2Bn 
Vu Truong 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N State 1975 1.3Bn 
Anh Dong 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1998 150m 
Hong Ngoc 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1999 200m 
My Linh Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1995 300m 
Thanh Xuan 
Tourism Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 2000 250m 
Tu Chang Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1998 400m 
A Dong Tourism 
Company 
Hotel - State 1993 36Bn 
Hong Ngoc Hotel Hotel - State 1980 2.9Bn 
Huy Hoang Hotel Hotel - State 1994 2.8Bn 
Lac Viet Hotel Hotel - State 1998 20Bn 
Ngoc Ha Hotel Hotel - State 1972 4Bn 
Thanh Loi Hotel Hotel - State 1990 2Bn 
Thien Quang 
Hotel 
Hotel - State 1996 1.4Bn 
Tu Duc Hotel, Hue Hotel - State 1980 3.4Bn 
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Ba Na Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 160m 1 
Bai Duong Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 470m 
Cay Vang Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 275m 
Cuc Mai Hotel Hotel - Private 1990 3.4Bn 
Dong Xuan Hotel Hotel - Private 1998 300m 
Suong Mu Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 410m 
The Gioi Hotel Hotel - Private 1993 430m 
Tran Xuan Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 2.2Bn 
Truong Quanh 
Hotel 
Hotel - Private 1998 350m 
Vien Dong Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 380m 
HOI AN 
Name Type ITOL Ownership Established Gross 
Revenue 
Son Ha Tourism Tour N Private 1995 350m 
Company Operator 
Minh Hai Hotel Hotel - Private 1997 550m 
378 
HO CHI MINH CITY 
Name Type ITOL Ownership Established Gross 
Revenue 
Dong Tay Tourism Tour Y State 1994 42Bii 
Company Operator 
Nam Thanh Tour Y State 1992 4.5Bn 
Tourism Company Operator 
Quoc Te Tourism Tour Y State 1993 19Bn 
Company Operator 
Song Que Tourism Tour Y State 1984 25Bn 
Company Operator 
Thang Cong Tour Y State 1992 7.8Bn 
Tourism Company Operator 
Tien Thanh Tour Y State 1993 2.4Bn 
Tourism Company Operator 
Tu Do Tourism Tour Y State 1989 27Bn 
Company Operator 
Viet Hanh Tour N State 1990 1.8Bn 
Tourism Company Operator 
Bac Nam Travel 
and Tourism Tour N Private 1994 400m 
Company Operator 
De Tham Tourism Tour N Private 1995 550m 
Company Operator 
Dong Nam Tour N Private 1996 650m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Green Dragon Tour N Private 1997 450m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Hai Huong Tour N Private 1993 320m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Hong Huong Tour N Private 1994 540m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Lan Khanh Tour N Private 1998 380m 
Tourism Company Operator 
Long Duc Travel 
and Tourism Tour N Private 1996 840m 
Company Operator 
Mekong Tourism Tour N Private 1992 350m 
Company Operator 
Nam Ha Tourism Tour N Private 1997 400m 
Company Operator 
Thai Binh Duong 
Tourism Company Tour N Private 1994 530m 
Operator 
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Tran Viet Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
N Private 1998 760m 
Tu Hai Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
Y Private 1996 450m 
Van Anh Tourism 
Company 
Tour 
Operator 
Y Private 1996 250m 
Minh Anh Hotel Hotel - State 1992 14.7Bn 
Nguyen Hue Hotel Hotel - State 1994 18.6Bn 
Pan-Asia Hotel Hotel - State 1997 7.7Bn 
Thai Binh Hotel Hotel - State 1994 16.2Bn 
Thang Long Hotel Hotel - State 1989 35Bn 
Thanh Tuu Hotel Hotel - State 1994 8.5Bn 
Thien Thai Hotel Hotel - State 1995 13.8Bn 
Victory Hotel Hotel - State 1992 24.8Bn 
Chi Ha Guest 
House 
Hotel - Private 1995 450m 
Guest House 245 Hotel - Private 1992 1.3Bn 
Lan Anh Hotel Hotel - Private 1994 920m 
Mai Anh Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 870m 
Minh Mang Hotel Hotel - Private 1993 1.89Bn 
Nang Linh Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 2.2Bn 
Phan Anh Hotel Hotel - Private 1998 800m 
Quang Truong 
Hotel 
Hotel - Private 1994 3.1 Bn 
Sung Hung Hotel Hotel - Private 1998 500m 
Tan Thinh Hotel Hotel - Private 1992 1.6Bn 
Thai Quan Hotel Hotel - Private 1993 1.9Bn 
Thanh Yen Hotel Hotel - Private 1995 3.4Bn 
Tom Yung Hotel Hotel - Private 1996 750m 
Truong Vang 
Hotel 
Hotel - Private 1994 4.4Bn 
380 
APPENDIX 3 
PART OF A MA TRIX USED TO ANALYSE DA TA COLLECTED 
FROM INTERVIEWS 
381 
Name Thang Hoa Ma Danh Au Lac Me Kong Nam My Hoang Nu Nam Ha 
Nam 96 Du 12/92 1990 Sao Anh 93 89 
12/95 6/96 7/94 
92 
Loc HN HN HN HN HN HN HN IIN HN 
Type H TO TO TO H TO H H TO 
Form E E P P P p p p p 
Est 12/95 96 6/96 12/92 1990 1992 7/94 93 1/89 
Main 2 4 3 4 XXX 4 2 1 4 
Activ. 
ITOL Y Y Y Y XXX N N N Y (1998) 
Owners 5 3 7 13 1 2 1 1 2 
Origin I-IN 2HN I SG Ninh HN Ha Tay HN Hai I-IN 2HN 
Binh Hung 1 Hai 
Duong 
Age est. XXX 47 47 +50 45 32 48 34 43 
bus 
Years in all All 25 All 9 All 43 All All 
FIN when 
est. bus 
Age 0 0 22 0 36 0 5 0 0 
came HN 
Years All 2 all 30 All 20 All 50 All 2 all, 
inHN 1-11 
Age at XXX 52,5256 52 Old 56 41 55 42 HN55, 
Inter- 38 
view HD54 
Educ Grad Grad Bus. ? ? XXX Grad N Grad 
Econ. ad/ bus. Econ 
Man. / 
hotel man. 
Tour Y Y N N XXX Y N N Y 
Ex p. 5yrs 2yrs 2yrs 
Bus. Y Y Y N XXX Y Y Y 
Exp. 
Other War vets/ XXX 
Min/ 
Govt 
Cons Y Y Y Y XXX Y Y Y Y 
VNAT Y Y Y Y XXX Y N N Y 
B of Y Y Y Y XXX Y N Y Y 
Tour 
PC Y N N Y XXX Y N N Y 
B of Con M of B of P&I XXX M of M of Pub 
Other Pub For Aff Sec 
State Sec 
B of P 
&I 
Other XXX Other N N 
TBus 
Why Sch Univ Bus Min/ XXX Univ Part of Univ 
Univ Bus. Govt/ TBus MPS Co. Thus 
Bus. 
Con Q V V Q XXX V NVM Q Q 
- Imp? 
Cap 1999 1992 1996 1992 1999 1992 1994 1993 1993 
33BN 400M200 1.25B 407M 3.2513N l00M 257M 500M 600M 
0 2000 1996 1999 2000 2001 
4BN 4.35B 707M 220M IBN 1.5BN 
382 
APPENDIX 4 
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE VIETNAM TOURISM REVIE fl ' 
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1 Vietnamese, director of a legal investment and consultancy firm, Hanoi 
2 European, tourism adviser, Hanoi 
3 Vietnamese, Head of the Tourism Department at a state tourism 
company, Hanoi 
4 Vietnamese, entrepreneur, Hanoi 
5 Vietnamese, official at the immigration office, Hanoi 
6 Vietnamese, tour guide and employee at a private tour operator in Da 
Nang 
7 Vietnamese, university lecturer, Hanoi 
8 Vietnamese, owner of a private tour operator business, Hanoi 
9 European, adviser, UNDP, Hanoi 
10 Vietnamese, owner of a private hotel, Hanoi 
11 Vietnamese, employee at a state tourism company, Hanoi 
12 Vietnamese, employee at a state tourism company, Ho Chi Minh City 
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